[Docs] [txt|pdf|xml] [Tracker] [Email] [Diff1] [Diff2] [Nits]

Versions: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11

Network Working Group                                           J. Abley
Internet-Draft                                                 Dyn, Inc.
Intended status: Informational                               J. Schlyter
Expires: October 09, 2015                                          Kirei
                                                               G. Bailey
                                                               Microsoft
                                                          April 07, 2015


           DNSSEC Trust Anchor Publication for the Root Zone
                  draft-jabley-dnssec-trust-anchor-11

Abstract

   The root zone of the Domain Name System (DNS) has been
   cryptographically signed using DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC).

   In order to obtain secure answers from the root zone of the DNS using
   DNSSEC, a client must configure a suitable trust anchor.  This
   document describes how such trust anchors are published.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on October 09, 2015.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect



Abley, et al.           Expires October 09, 2015                [Page 1]


Internet-Draft     Root Zone Trust Anchor Publication         April 2015


   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Root Zone Trust Anchor Publication  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.1.  XML . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.2.  Certificate Signing Request (PKCS#10) . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Root Zone Trust Anchor Retrieval  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.1.  HTTP  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.2.  HTTP Over TLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.3.  Signature Verification  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   4.  Implementation Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.1.  HTTP Over TLS Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.2.  XML Validation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.3.  Trust Anchor Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   5.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   7.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   8.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     8.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     8.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   Appendix A.  Trust Anchor Publication Document Schema . . . . . .  10
   Appendix B.  Example Signed Trust Anchor Set  . . . . . . . . . .  11
   Appendix C.  ASN.1 Module for DNS Resource Record . . . . . . . .  12
   Appendix D.  Historical Note  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   Appendix E.  About this Document  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     E.1.  Discussion  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     E.2.  Document History  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
       E.2.1.  draft-jabley-dnssec-trust-anchor-00 . . . . . . . . .  13
       E.2.2.  draft-jabley-dnssec-trust-anchor-01 . . . . . . . . .  13
       E.2.3.  draft-jabley-dnssec-trust-anchor-02 . . . . . . . . .  14
       E.2.4.  draft-jabley-dnssec-trust-anchor-04 . . . . . . . . .  14
       E.2.5.  draft-jabley-dnssec-trust-anchor-05 . . . . . . . . .  14
       E.2.6.  draft-jabley-dnssec-trust-anchor-06 . . . . . . . . .  14
       E.2.7.  draft-jabley-dnssec-trust-anchor-07 . . . . . . . . .  14
       E.2.8.  draft-jabley-dnssec-trust-anchor-10 . . . . . . . . .  14
       E.2.9.  draft-jabley-dnssec-trust-anchor-11 . . . . . . . . .  14
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14









Abley, et al.           Expires October 09, 2015                [Page 2]


Internet-Draft     Root Zone Trust Anchor Publication         April 2015


1.  Introduction

   The Domain Name System (DNS) is described in [RFC1034] and [RFC1035].
   Security extensions to the DNS (DNSSEC) are described in [RFC4033],
   [RFC4034], [RFC4035], [RFC4509], [RFC5155] and [RFC5702].

   A discussion of operational practices relating to DNSSEC can be found
   in [RFC6781].

   In the DNSSEC protocol, resource record sets (RRSets) are signed
   cryptographically.  This means that a response to a query contains
   signatures that allow the integrity and authenticity of the RRSet to
   be verified.  Signatures are validated by following a chain of
   signatures to a key called a "trust anchor".  The reason for trusting
   such a key is outside the DNSSEC protocol, but having one or more
   trust anchors is required for the DNSSEC protocol to work.

   The publication of trust anchors for the root zone of the DNS is an
   IANA function performed by ICANN.  A detailed description of
   corresponding key management practices can be found in [DPS], which
   can be retrieved from the IANA Repository [IANA-DNSSEC-INFO].

   This document describes the distribution of the DNSSEC trust anchors
   from IANA.  This document is concerned only with the distribution of
   trust anchors for the root zone, although the data formats and the
   publication and retrieval methods described here can be adapted for
   other uses.

   The protocol described in this document is not a substitute for the
   automated DNSSEC trust anchor update protocol described in [RFC5011].
   That protocol allows for secure in-band succession of trust anchors
   when trust has already been established.  The protocol described in
   this document allows a trust anchor to initially be established out-
   of-band, possibly relying on trusted out-of-band authorities.  Thus,
   this document and [RFC5011] are complimentary protocols.

2.  Root Zone Trust Anchor Publication

   Trust anchors for the root zone are published in two formats, each of
   which is described in this document:

   o  as the hashes of the corresponding DNSKEY records, consistent with
      the defined presentation format of Delegation Signer (DS) resource
      records [RFC4034], contained within an XML document, as described
      in Section 2.1, and

   o  as Certificate Signing Requests (CSRs) in PKCS#10 format [RFC2986]
      for further processing by other entities such as Certification



Abley, et al.           Expires October 09, 2015                [Page 3]


Internet-Draft     Root Zone Trust Anchor Publication         April 2015


      Authorities and validation of proof of possession of the
      corresponding private keys, as described in Section 2.2.

2.1.  XML

   Trust anchors are published in an XML document whose schema is
   described in Appendix A. The document contains a complete set of
   trust anchors for the root zone, including anchors suitable for
   immediate use and also historical data.  Each trust anchor optionally
   includes one or more Certificate elements, with Uniform Resource
   Locators (URLs) for retrieving corresponding X.509 certificates.

   Examples of trust anchors packaged and signed for publication can be
   found in Appendix B.

2.2.  Certificate Signing Request (PKCS#10)

   To facilitate signing the trust anchor by a public key
   infrastructure, trust anchors are also published as Certificate
   Signing Requests (CSRs) in PKCS#10 format [RFC2986].

   Each CSR will have a Subject with following attributes:

   O: the string "ICANN".

   OU:  the string "IANA".

   CN:  the string "Root Zone KSK" followed by the time and date of key
      generation in the format specified in [RFC3339], e.g. "Root Zone
      KSK 2010-06-16T21:19:24+00:00".

   resourceRecord:  the hash of the public key consistent with the
      presentation format of the Delegation Signer (DS) [RFC4034]
      resource record (see Appendix C for attribute definition).

3.  Root Zone Trust Anchor Retrieval

3.1.  HTTP

   Trust anchors are available for retrieval using HTTP [RFC2616].

   The URL for retrieving the CSR is <http://data.iana.org/root-anchors/
   key-label.csr>, with "key-label" replaced by the key label of the
   corresponding KSK.

   The URL for retrieving a signed X.509 certificate is <http://
   data.iana.org/root-anchors/key-label.crt>, with "key-label" again
   replaced as described above.



Abley, et al.           Expires October 09, 2015                [Page 4]


Internet-Draft     Root Zone Trust Anchor Publication         April 2015


   The URL for retrieving the complete trust anchor set is available
   from [TA-HTTP-XML].

   The URL for a detached S/MIME [RFC5751] signature for the current
   trust anchor set, in XML format, is available from [TA-HTTP-SMIME].

   The URL for a detached OpenPGP [RFC4880] signature for the current
   trust anchor set, in XML format, is available from [TA-HTTP-PGP].

3.2.  HTTP Over TLS

   Trust anchors are available for retrieval using HTTP over TLS
   [RFC2818].

   The URLs specified in Section 3.1 are also available using HTTPS.
   That is:

   The URL for retrieving the CSR is <https://data.iana.org/root-anchors
   /key-label.csr>, with "key-label" replaced by the key label of the
   corresponding KSK.

   The URL for retrieving a signed X.509 certificate is <https://
   data.iana.org/root-anchors/key-label.crt>, with "key-label" again
   replaced as described above.

   The URL for retrieving the complete trust anchor set available from
   [TA-HTTPS-XML].

   The URL for a detached S/MIME [RFC5751] signature for the current
   trust anchor set is available from [TA-HTTPS-SMIME].

   The URL for a detached OpenPGP [RFC4880] signature for the current
   trust anchor set is available from [TA-HTTPS-PGP].

   TLS sessions are authenticated with certificates presented from the
   server.  No client certificate verification is performed.  The
   certificate presented by the server is chosen such that it can be
   trusted using an X.509 trust anchor that is believed to be well-
   known, e.g. one that corresponds to a WebTrust-accredited Certificate
   Authority.  Other TLS authentication mechanisms may be considered in
   the future.

3.3.  Signature Verification

   The OpenPGP [RFC4880] keys used to sign trust anchor documents carry
   signatures from personal keys of staff who are able to personally
   attest to their validity.  Those staff members will continue to make
   their personal keys freely available for examination by third



Abley, et al.           Expires October 09, 2015                [Page 5]


Internet-Draft     Root Zone Trust Anchor Publication         April 2015


   parties, e.g. by way of PGP key parties at operator and IETF
   meetings.  In this fashion a diverse set of paths through the PGP web
   of trust will be maintained to the trust anchor PGP keys.

   An OpenPGP keyring containing public keys pertinent to signature
   verification is published at [ICANN-PGP].  The public keys on that
   keyring will also be distributed widely, e.g. to public PGP key
   servers.

   Certificates used to create S/MIME [RFC5751] signatures for the
   current trust anchor set, in XML format, are signed by a Certificate
   Authority (CA) administered by ICANN as the IANA functions operator
   and also optionally by well-known (e.g.  WebTrust-certified) CAs to
   facilitate signature validation with widely-available X.509 trust
   anchors.

4.  Implementation Considerations

   Note: This non-normative section gives suggestions for implementing
   root zone trust anchor retrieval.

   Root trust anchor retrieval by the HTTP or HTTP over TLS transports
   has several implementation considerations to ensure robustness,
   usability and secure operation.

4.1.  HTTP Over TLS Transport

   The HTTP over TLS transport [RFC2818] is suggested instead of using
   the unencrypted HTTP transport [RFC2616] for implementations that use
   the XML-format root trust anchors, since the latter transport does
   not provide authentication.  It is not suggested that implementations
   restrict certification path validation of the HTTP over TLS transport
   session to the current or historical certificate authorities used by
   the root trust anchor server, since doing so would reduce robustness
   of the implementation.  It is suggested that the implementation
   configure the HTTP over TLS transport library to: validate the
   certification path against certificate revocation lists [RFC5280],
   and/or with the online certificate status protocol [RFC6960]; and
   reject self-signed certificates and certification paths that do not
   terminate in a trusted certificate authority.

   Implementations can allow configuration of the URL used to retrieve
   the root trust anchor resources, but it is suggested that the default
   configuration use the URLs specified in Section 3.2.

4.2.  XML Validation





Abley, et al.           Expires October 09, 2015                [Page 6]


Internet-Draft     Root Zone Trust Anchor Publication         April 2015


   Implementations may perform strict validation of the retrieved XML
   document against the XML schema; however, such an implementation
   would not be robust against future changes in the XML schema.  It is
   suggested that the implementation perform "loose" validation, where
   unknown attributes and elements are ignored.  This suggestion allows
   for future additions to the XML schema without affecting existing
   implementations.

4.3.  Trust Anchor Validation

   The implementation can ignore trust anchors for which the Algorithm
   or DigestType elements refer to an unknown, or unsupported algorithm.
   Additionally, trust anchors for which the Algorithm or DigestType
   elements refer to a deprecated algorithm can be ignored, provided
   that this suggestion does not cause all trust anchors to be ignored.
   Further, note that these suggestions may not apply where an
   implementation shares trust anchors between many DNS validating
   resolvers, since the set of supported algorithms may vary between
   resolvers, and could possibly be disjoint.

   The implementation can also ignore a trust anchor when the validUntil
   time, if present, is in the past.  If the implementation also
   supports automated updates of trust anchors [RFC5011], it can ignore
   trust anchors where the current time subtracted from the validFrom
   time, if present, is greater than the add-hold down time [RFC5011]
   for the trust point.

   The implementation can reject any trust anchor for a trust point
   other than the root zone.

5.  IANA Considerations

   Key Signing Key (KSK) management for the root zone is an IANA
   function.  This document describes an initial set of publication
   mechanisms for trust anchors related to that management.  In the
   future, additional publication schemes may also be made available, in
   which case they will be described in a new document that updates this
   one.

   Existing mechanisms will not be deprecated without very strong
   technical justification.

   This document serves as the reference for id-mod-dns-resource-record,
   value 70, in the SMI Security for PKIX Module Identifier registry.

6.  Security Considerations





Abley, et al.           Expires October 09, 2015                [Page 7]


Internet-Draft     Root Zone Trust Anchor Publication         April 2015


   This document describes how DNSSEC trust anchors for the root zone of
   the DNS are published.  It is to be expected that many DNSSEC clients
   will only configure IANA-issued trust anchors to perform validation,
   and that the trust anchors they use will be those of the root zone.
   As a consequence, reliable publication of trust anchors is important.

   This document aims to specify carefully the means by which such trust
   anchors are published, as an aid to the formats and retrieval methods
   described here being integrated usefully into user environments.

7.  Acknowledgements

   Many pioneers paved the way for the deployment of DNSSEC in the root
   zone of the DNS, and the authors hereby acknowledge their substantial
   collective contribution.

   This document incorporates suggestions made by Paul Hoffman and
   Alfred Hoenes, whose contributions are appreciated.

8.  References

8.1.  Normative References

   [RFC1034]  Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities",
              STD 13, RFC 1034, November 1987.

   [RFC1035]  Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
              specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, November 1987.

   [RFC2616]  Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H.,
              Masinter, L., Leach, P., and T. Berners-Lee, "Hypertext
              Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1", RFC 2616, June 1999.

   [RFC2818]  Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818, May 2000.

   [RFC2986]  Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #10: Certification
              Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7", RFC 2986,
              November 2000.

   [RFC3339]  Klyne, G., Ed. and C. Newman, "Date and Time on the
              Internet: Timestamps", RFC 3339, July 2002.

   [RFC4033]  Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
              Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements", RFC
              4033, March 2005.






Abley, et al.           Expires October 09, 2015                [Page 8]


Internet-Draft     Root Zone Trust Anchor Publication         April 2015


   [RFC4034]  Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
              Rose, "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions",
              RFC 4034, March 2005.

   [RFC4035]  Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
              Rose, "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security
              Extensions", RFC 4035, March 2005.

   [RFC4509]  Hardaker, W., "Use of SHA-256 in DNSSEC Delegation Signer
              (DS) Resource Records (RRs)", RFC 4509, May 2006.

   [RFC4880]  Callas, J., Donnerhacke, L., Finney, H., Shaw, D., and R.
              Thayer, "OpenPGP Message Format", RFC 4880, November 2007.

   [RFC5011]  StJohns, M., "Automated Updates of DNS Security (DNSSEC)
              Trust Anchors", STD 74, RFC 5011, September 2007.

   [RFC5155]  Laurie, B., Sisson, G., Arends, R., and D. Blacka, "DNS
              Security (DNSSEC) Hashed Authenticated Denial of
              Existence", RFC 5155, March 2008.

   [RFC5280]  Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
              Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
              (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.

   [RFC5702]  Jansen, J., "Use of SHA-2 Algorithms with RSA in DNSKEY
              and RRSIG Resource Records for DNSSEC", RFC 5702, October
              2009.

   [RFC5751]  Ramsdell, B. and S. Turner, "Secure/Multipurpose Internet
              Mail Extensions (S/MIME) Version 3.2 Message
              Specification", RFC 5751, January 2010.

   [RFC6781]  Kolkman, O., Mekking, W., and R. Gieben, "DNSSEC
              Operational Practices, Version 2", RFC 6781, December
              2012.

   [RFC6960]  Santesson, S., Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A.,
              Galperin, S., and C. Adams, "X.509 Internet Public Key
              Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP",
              RFC 6960, June 2013.









Abley, et al.           Expires October 09, 2015                [Page 9]


Internet-Draft     Root Zone Trust Anchor Publication         April 2015


8.2.  Informative References

   [DPS]      Ljunggren, F., Okubo, T., Lamb, R., and J. Schlyter,
              "DNSSEC Practice Statement for the Root Zone KSK
              Operator", May 2010.

   [IANA-DNSSEC-INFO]
              , "IANA DNSSEC Information", , <https://www.iana.org/
              dnssec/>.

   [ICANN-PGP]
              , "ICANN PGP Keys", ,
              <http://data.iana.org/root-anchors/icann.pgp>.

   [TA-HTTP-PGP]
              , "Root DNSSEC Trust Anchors (OpenPGP)", ,
              <http://data.iana.org/root-anchors/root-anchors.asc>.

   [TA-HTTP-SMIME]
              , "Root DNSSEC Trust Anchors (S/MIME)", ,
              <http://data.iana.org/root-anchors/root-anchors.p7s>.

   [TA-HTTP-XML]
              , "Root DNSSEC Trust Anchors (XML)", ,
              <http://data.iana.org/root-anchors/root-anchors.xml>.

   [TA-HTTPS-PGP]
              , "Root DNSSEC Trust Anchors (OpenPGP)", , <https://
              data.iana.org/root-anchors/root-anchors.asc>.

   [TA-HTTPS-SMIME]
              , "Root DNSSEC Trust Anchors (S/MIME)", , <https://
              data.iana.org/root-anchors/root-anchors.p7s>.

   [TA-HTTPS-XML]
              , "Root DNSSEC Trust Anchors (XML)", , <https://
              data.iana.org/root-anchors/root-anchors.xml>.

   [root-anchors]
              , "DNSSEC Trust Anchors", , <https://data.iana.org/root-
              anchors/root-anchors.xml>.

Appendix A.  Trust Anchor Publication Document Schema

   A Relax NG Compact Schema for the documents used to publish trust
   anchors can be found in Figure 1.





Abley, et al.           Expires October 09, 2015               [Page 10]


Internet-Draft     Root Zone Trust Anchor Publication         April 2015


   datatypes xsd = "http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-datatypes"

   start = element TrustAnchor {
       attribute id { xsd:string },
       attribute source { xsd:string },
       element Zone { xsd:string },

       keydigest+
   }

   keydigest = element KeyDigest {
       attribute id { xsd:string },
       attribute validFrom { xsd:dateTime },
       attribute validUntil { xsd:dateTime }?,

       element KeyTag {
               xsd:nonNegativeInteger { maxInclusive = "65535" } },
       element Algorithm {
               xsd:nonNegativeInteger { maxInclusive = "255" } },
       element DigestType {
               xsd:nonNegativeInteger { maxInclusive = "255" } },
       element Digest { xsd:hexBinary },

       element Certificate {
               attribute source { xsd:string },
               empty
       }+
   }


                                 Figure 1

Appendix B.  Example Signed Trust Anchor Set

   Figure 2 describes two trust anchors for the root zone such as might
   be retrieved from [root-anchors].


   <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>

   <TrustAnchor
       id="AD42165F-B099-4778-8F42-D34A1D41FD93"
       source="http://data.iana.org/root-anchors/root-anchors.xml">

       <Zone>.</Zone>

       <KeyDigest id="42"
                  validFrom="2010-07-01T00:00:00-00:00"



Abley, et al.           Expires October 09, 2015               [Page 11]


Internet-Draft     Root Zone Trust Anchor Publication         April 2015


                  validUntil="2010-08-01T00:00:00-00:00">
           <KeyTag>34291</KeyTag>
           <Algorithm>5</Algorithm>
           <DigestType>1</DigestType>
           <Digest>c8cb3d7fe518835490af8029c23efbce6b6ef3e2</Digest>
       </KeyDigest>

       <KeyDigest id="53"
                  validFrom="2010-08-01T00:00:00-00:00">
           <KeyTag>12345</KeyTag>
           <Algorithm>5</Algorithm>
           <DigestType>1</DigestType>
           <Digest>a3cf809dbdbc835716ba22bdc370d2efa50f21c7</Digest>
           <Certificate
             source="http://data.iana.org/root-anchors/Kexample1.crt"/>
           <Certificate
             source="http://data.iana.org/root-anchors/Kexample2.crt"/>
       </KeyDigest>

   </TrustAnchor>


                                 Figure 2

Appendix C.  ASN.1 Module for DNS Resource Record


   ResourceRecord
     { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
       mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-dns-resource-record(70) }

   DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=

   BEGIN

   -- EXPORTS ALL --

   IMPORTS

   caseIgnoreMatch FROM SelectedAttributeTypes
       { joint-iso-itu-t ds(5) module(1) selectedAttributeTypes(5) 4 }

   ;

   iana OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3)
       dod(6) internet(1) private(4) enterprise(1) 1000 }

   iana-dns OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iana 53 }



Abley, et al.           Expires October 09, 2015               [Page 12]


Internet-Draft     Root Zone Trust Anchor Publication         April 2015


   resourceRecord ATTRIBUTE ::= {
       WITH SYNTAX IA5String
       EQUALITY MATCHING RULE caseIgnoreIA5Match
       ID iana-dns
   }

   END



Appendix D.  Historical Note

   The first KSK for use in the root zone of the DNS was generated at a
   key ceremony at an ICANN Key Management Facility (KMF) in Culpeper,
   Virginia, USA on 2010-06-16.  This key entered production during a
   second key ceremony held at an ICANN KMF in El Segundo, California,
   USA on 2010-07-12.  The resulting trust anchor was first published on
   2010-07-15.

Appendix E.  About this Document

   [RFC Editor: please remove this section, including all subsections,
   prior to publication.]

E.1.  Discussion

   This document is not the product of any IETF working group.  However,
   communities interested in similar technical work can be found at the
   IETF in the DNSOP and DNSEXT working groups.

   The team responsible for deployment of DNSSEC in the root zone can be
   reached at rootsign@icann.org.

   The authors also welcome feedback sent to them directly.

E.2.  Document History

E.2.1.  draft-jabley-dnssec-trust-anchor-00

   This document is based on earlier documentation used within and
   published by the team responsible for DNSSEC deployment in the root
   zone.  This is the first revision circulated with the intention of
   publication in the RFC series.

E.2.2.  draft-jabley-dnssec-trust-anchor-01

   Incorporated initial community suggestions.  Editorial improvements.
   Allocate OID and clean up syntax of ASN.1 module.



Abley, et al.           Expires October 09, 2015               [Page 13]


Internet-Draft     Root Zone Trust Anchor Publication         April 2015


E.2.3.  draft-jabley-dnssec-trust-anchor-02

   Draft expired.

E.2.4.  draft-jabley-dnssec-trust-anchor-04

   Added the optional <Certificate> element to the XML schema to provide
   a mechanism for locating external X.509 certificates relating to a
   particular key.

E.2.5.  draft-jabley-dnssec-trust-anchor-05

   Update author address.

E.2.6.  draft-jabley-dnssec-trust-anchor-06

   Update references.

E.2.7.  draft-jabley-dnssec-trust-anchor-07

   Minor changes based on review by Paul Hoffman.

E.2.8.  draft-jabley-dnssec-trust-anchor-10

   Incorporate additional suggestions by Paul Hoffman.  Add
   consideration for OCSP to Implementation Considerations.

E.2.9.  draft-jabley-dnssec-trust-anchor-11

   Draft expired.

Authors' Addresses

   Joe Abley
   Dyn, Inc.
   470 Moore Street
   London, ON  N6C 2C2
   Canada

   Phone: +1 519 670 9327
   Email: jabley@dyn.com


   Jakob Schlyter
   Kirei AB

   Email: jakob@kirei.se




Abley, et al.           Expires October 09, 2015               [Page 14]


Internet-Draft     Root Zone Trust Anchor Publication         April 2015


   Guillaume Bailey
   Microsoft Corporation
   One Microsoft Way
   Redmond, WA  98052
   US

   Phone: +1 425 538 6153 x86153
   Email: gubailey@microsoft.com











































Abley, et al.           Expires October 09, 2015               [Page 15]


Html markup produced by rfcmarkup 1.112, available from https://tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcmarkup/