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Versions: 00 01

Network Working Group                                           J. Jeong
Internet-Draft                                                   S. Hyun
Intended status: Informational                   Sungkyunkwan University
Expires: January 18, 2018                                         T. Ahn
                                                           Korea Telecom
                                                                S. Hares
                                                                  Huawei
                                                                D. Lopez
                                                          Telefonica I+D
                                                           July 17, 2017


 Applicability of Interfaces to Network Security Functions to Networked
                           Security Services
                   draft-jeong-i2nsf-applicability-01

Abstract

   This document describes the applicability of Interface to Network
   Security Functions (I2NSF) to networked security services in Network
   Functions Virtualization (NFV) environments, such as firewall, deep
   packet inspection, and attack mitigation.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups.  Note that
   other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
   Drafts.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.

   The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.

   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 18, 2018.

Copyright Notice




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   Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
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   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  Requirements Language  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   3.  Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   4.  I2NSF Framework  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   5.  Use Cases  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     5.1.  Firewall: Centralized Firewall System  . . . . . . . . . .  6
     5.2.  Deep Packet Inspection: Centralized VoIP/VoLTE
           Security System  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     5.3.  Attack Mitigation: Centralized DDoS-attack Mitigation
           System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   6.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
   7.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
   8.  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     8.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     8.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
   Appendix A.  Changes from draft-jeong-i2nsf-applicability-00 . . . 13




















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1.  Introduction

   Interface to Network Security Functions (I2NSF) proposes a standard
   framework and standard interfaces for networked security services in
   Network Functions Virtualization (NFV) environments.  The I2NSF
   enables multiple security-vendor products to be used cost-effectively
   in the NFV environment by utilizing the capabilties of such products
   and the virtualization of security functions in the NFV platform.

   This document describes the applicability of I2NSF to networked
   security services with use cases, such as firewall, Deep Packet
   Inspection (DPI), and Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack
   mitigation.

2.  Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

3.  Terminology

   This document uses the terminology described in [RFC7149],
   [ITU-T.Y.3300], [ONF-OpenFlow], [ONF-SDN-Architecture],
   [ITU-T.X.1252], [ITU-T.X.800], [i2nsf-framework],
   [consumer-facing-inf-im], [consumer-facing-inf-dm],
   [i2nsf-nsf-cap-im], [nsf-facing-inf-dm], [registration-inf-im],
   [registration-inf-dm], and [nsf-triggered-steering].  In addition,
   the following terms are defined below:

   o  Software-Defined Networking: A set of techniques that enables to
      directly program, orchestrate, control, and manage network
      resources, which facilitates the design, delivery and operation of
      network services in a dynamic and scalable manner [ITU-T.Y.3300].

   o  Firewall: A firewall that is a device or service at the junction
      of two network segments that inspects every packet that attempts
      to cross the boundary.  It also rejects any packet that does not
      satisfy certain criteria for disallowed port numbers or IP
      addresses.

   o  Centralized Firewall System: A centralized firewall that can
      establish and distribute access control policy rules into network
      resources for efficient firewall management.  These rules can be
      managed dynamically by a centralized server for firewall.  SDN can
      work as a network-based firewall system through a standard
      interface between an SDN switch and a firewall function as a
      vitual network function (VNF).



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   o  Centralized VoIP/VoLTE Security System: A centralized security
      system that handles the security issues related to VoIP and VoLTE
      services.  SDN can work as a network-based security system through
      a standard interface between an SDN switch and a VoIP/VoLTE
      security function as a VNF.

   o  Centralized DDoS-attack Mitigation System: A centralized mitigator
      that can establish and distribute access control policy rules into
      network resources for efficient DDoS-attack mitigation.  These
      rules can be managed dynamically by a centralized server for DDoS-
      attack mitigation.  SDN can work as a network-based mitigation
      system through a standard interface between an SDN switch and a
      DDoS-attack mitigation function as a VNF.

4.  I2NSF Framework

   This section describes an extended I2NSF framework with SDN for I2NSF
   applicability and use cases, such as firewall system, deep packet
   inspection system, and DDoS-attack mitigation system.

   Figure 1 shows an I2NSF framework with SDN networks to support
   networked security services [i2nsf-framework].  As shown in Figure 1,
   I2NSF User can use security services by delivering their high-level
   security policies to Security Controller via Consumer-Facing
   Interface [consumer-facing-inf-im][consumer-facing-inf-dm].

   Security Controller can translate the high-level security policies
   (received from I2NSF User via Consumer-Facing Interface) into low-
   level security policies for the corresponding NSFs.  These low-level
   security policies are sent to NSFs via NSF-Facing Interface
   [i2nsf-nsf-cap-im][nsf-facing-inf-dm].

   Security Controller asks NSFs to perform low-level security services
   via NSF-Facing Interface.  The NSFs run as Virtual Network Functions
   (VNFs) on top of virtual machines through Network Functions
   Virtualization (NFV) [ETSI-NFV].  Security Controller also asks
   Switch Controller to perform their required security services on
   switches under the supervision of Switch Controller (i.e., SDN
   Controller).  In addition, Security Controller uses Registration
   Interface [registration-inf-im][registration-inf-dm] to communicate
   with Developer's Management Aystem for registering (or deregistering)
   the developer's NSFs into (or from) the NFV system using the I2NSF
   framework.

   Consumer-Facing Interface between I2NSF User and Security Controller
   can be implemented by RESTCONF [RFC8040], which is a protocol based
   on HTTP for configuring data defined in YANG [RFC6020], using the
   datastore concepts defined in Network Configuration Protocol



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   (NETCONF) [RFC6241].  YANG data models can describe high-level
   security services for the sake of I2NSF User.  A data model in
   [consumer-facing-inf-dm] can be used for the I2NSF Consumer-Facing
   Interface.

      +------------+
      | I2NSF User |
      +------------+
             ^
             | Consumer-Facing Interface
             v
   +-------------------+     Registration     +-----------------------+
   |Security Controller|<-------------------->|Developer's Mgnt System|
   +-------------------+       Interface      +-----------------------+
      ^     ^
      |     | NSF-Facing Interface
      |     v
      | +----------------+ +---------------+   +-----------------------+
      | |      NSF-1     |-|     NSF-2     |...|         NSF-n         |
      | |   (Firewall)   | |     (DPI)     |   |(DDoS-Attack Mitigator)|
      | +----------------+ +---------------+   +-----------------------+
      |
      | NSF-Facing Interface
      v                                              SDN Network
  +-------------------------------------------------------------------+
  |  +-----------------+                                              |
  |  |Switch Controller|                                              |
  |  +-----------------+                                              |
  |           ^                                                       |
  |           | SDN Southbound Interface                              |
  |           v                                                       |
  |      +--------+ +--------+      +--------+                        |
  |      |Switch 1|-|Switch 2|......|Switch m|                        |
  |      +--------+ +--------+      +--------+                        |
  +-------------------------------------------------------------------+

              Figure 1: An I2NSF Framework with SDN Networks

   NSF-Facing Interface between Security Controller and NSFs can be
   implemented by NETCONF [RFC6241] for configuring data defined in YANG
   [RFC6020].  YANG data models can describe low-level security services
   for the sake of NSFs.  A data model in [nsf-facing-inf-dm] can be
   used for the I2NSF NSF-Facing Interface.

   Registration Interface between Security Controller and Developer's
   Management System can be implemented by RESTCONF [RFC8040] for
   configuring data defined in YANG [RFC6020].  YANG data models can
   describe the NSF capabilities of networked security services.  A data



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   model in [registration-inf-dm] can be used for the I2NSF Registration
   Interface.

   Also, the I2NSF framework can enforce mutliple chained NSFs for the
   low-level security policies with a service function chaining (SFC)
   for the I2NSF architecture in [nsf-triggered-steering].

5.  Use Cases

   This section introduces three use cases for cloud-based security
   services: (i) firewall system, (ii) deep packet inspection system,
   and (iii) attack mitigation system.

5.1.  Firewall: Centralized Firewall System

   For the centralized firewall system, a centralized network firewall
   can manage each network resource and firewall rules can be managed
   flexibly by a centralized server for firewall (called Firewall).  The
   centralized network firewall controls each switch for the network
   resource management and the firewall rules can be added or deleted
   dynamically.

   The procedure of firewall operations in the centralized firewall
   system is as follows:

   1.  Switch forwards an unknown flow's packet to Switch Controller.

   2.  Switch Controller forwards the unknown flow's packet to an
       appropriate security service application, such as Firewall.

   3.  Firewall analyzes the headers and contents of the packet.

   4.  If Firewall regards the packet as a malware's packet with a
       suspicious pattern, it reports the malware's packet to Switch
       Controller.

   5.  Switch Controller installs new rules (e.g., drop packets with the
       suspicious pattern) into switches.

   6.  The malware's packets are dropped by switches.

   For the above centralized firewall system, the existing SDN protocols
   can be used through standard interfaces between the firewall
   application and switches [RFC7149][ITU-T.Y.3300][ONF-OpenFlow]
   [ONF-SDN-Architecture].

   Legacy firewalls have some challenges such as the expensive cost,
   performance, management of access control, establishment of policy,



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   and packet-based access mechanism.  The proposed framework can
   resolve the challenges through the above centralized firewall system
   based on SDN as follows:

   o  Cost: The cost of adding firewalls to network resources such as
      routers, gateways, and switches is substantial due to the reason
      that we need to add firewall on each network resource.  To solve
      this, each network resource can be managed centrally such that a
      single firewall is manipulated by a centralized server.

   o  Performance: The performance of firewalls is often slower than the
      link speed of network interfaces.  Every network resource for
      firewall needs to check firewall rules according to network
      conditions.  Firewalls can be adaptively deployed among network
      switches, depending on network conditions in the framework.

   o  The management of access control: Since there may be hundreds of
      network resources in an administered network, the dynamic
      management of access control for security services like firewall
      is a challenge.  In the framework, firewall rules can be
      dynamically added for new malware.

   o  The establishment of policy: Policy should be established for each
      network resource.  However, it is difficult to describe what flows
      are permitted or denied for firewall within a specific
      organization network under management.  Thus, a centralized view
      is helpful to determine security policies for such a network.

   o  Packet-based access mechanism: Packet-based access mechanism is
      not enough for firewall in practice since the basic unit of access
      control is usually users or applications.  Therefore, application
      level rules can be defined and added to the firewall system
      through the centralized server.

5.2.  Deep Packet Inspection: Centralized VoIP/VoLTE Security System

   For the centralized VoIP/VoLTE security system, a centralized VoIP/
   VoLTE security system can monitor each VoIP/VoLTE flow and manage
   VoIP/VoLTE security rules controlled by a centralized server for
   VoIP/VoLTE security service (called VoIP IPS).  The VoIP/VoLTE
   security system controls each switch for the VoIP/VoLTE call flow
   management by manipulating the rules that can be added, deleted or
   modified dynamically.

   The procedure of VoIP/VoLTE security operations in the centralized
   VoIP/VoLTE security system is as follows:





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   1.  A switch forwards an unknown call flow's signal packet (e.g., SIP
       packet) to Switch Controller.  Also, if the packet belongs to a
       matched flow's packet related to SIP (called matched SIP packet),
       Switch forwards the packet to Switch Controller so that the
       packet can be checked by an NSF for VoIP (i.e., VoIP IPS) via
       Switch Controller, which monitors the behavior of its SIP call.

   2.  Switch Controller forwards the unknown flow's packet or the
       matched SIP packet to an appropriate security service function,
       such as VoIP IPS.

   3.  VoIP IPS analyzes the headers and contents of the signal packet,
       such as IP address, calling number, and session description
       [RFC4566].

   4.  If VoIP IPS regards the packet as a spoofed packet by hackers or
       a scanning packet searching for VoIP/VoLTE devices, it requests
       the Switch Controller to block that packet and the subsequent
       packets that have the same call-id.

   5.  Switch Controller installs new rules (e.g., drop packets) into
       switches.

   6.  The illegal packets are dropped by switches.

   For the above centralized VoIP/VoLTE security system, the existing
   SDN protocols can be used through standard interfaces between the
   VoIP IPS application and switches [RFC7149][ITU-T.Y.3300]
   [ONF-OpenFlow][ONF-SDN-Architecture].

   Legacy hardware based VoIP IPSes have some challenges, such as
   provisioning time, the granularity of security, expensive cost, and
   the establishment of policy.  The proposed framework can resolve the
   challenges through the above centralized VoIP/VoLTE security system
   based on SDN as follows:

   o  Provisioning: The provisioning time of setting up a legacy VoIP
      IPS to network is substantial because it takes from some hours to
      some days.  By managing the network resources centrally, VoIP IPS
      can provide more agility in provisioning both virtual and physical
      network resources from a central location.

   o  The granularity of security: The security rules of a legacy VoIP
      IPS are compounded considering the granularity of security.  The
      proposed framework can provide more granular security by
      centralizing security control into a switch controller.  The VoIP
      IPS can effectively manage security rules throughout the network.




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   o  Cost: The cost of adding VoIP IPS to network resources, such as
      routers, gateways, and switches is substantial due to the reason
      that we need to add VoIP IPS on each network resource.  To solve
      this, each network resource can be managed centrally such that a
      single VoIP IPS is manipulated by a centralized server.

   o  The establishment of policy: Policy should be established for each
      network resource.  However, it is difficult to describe what flows
      are permitted or denied for VoIP IPS within a specific
      organization network under management.  Thus, a centralized view
      is helpful to determine security policies for such a network.

5.3.  Attack Mitigation: Centralized DDoS-attack Mitigation System

   For the centralized DDoS-attack mitigation system, a centralized
   DDoS-attack mitigation can manage each network resource and
   manipulate rules to each switch through a centralized server for
   DDoS-attack mitigation (called DDoS-attack Mitigator).  The
   centralized DDoS-attack mitigation system defends servers against
   DDoS attacks outside private network, that is, from public network.

   Servers are categorized into stateless servers (e.g., DNS servers)
   and stateful servers (e.g., web servers).  For DDoS-attack
   mitigation, traffic flows in switches are dynamically configured by
   traffic flow forwarding path management according to the category of
   servers [AVANT-GUARD].  Such a managenent should consider the load
   balance among the switches for the defense against DDoS attacks.

   The procedure of DDoS-attack mitigation operations in the centralized
   DDoS-attack mitigation system is as follows:

   1.  Switch periodically reports an inter-arrival pattern of a flow's
       packets to Switch Controller.

   2.  Switch Controller forwards the flow's inter-arrival pattern to an
       appropriate security service application, such as DDoS-attack
       Mitigator.

   3.  DDoS-attack Mitigator analyzes the reported pattern for the flow.

   4.  If DDoS-attack Mitigator regards the pattern as a DDoS attack, it
       computes a packet dropping probability corresponding to
       suspiciousness level and reports this DDoS-attack flow to Switch
       Controller.

   5.  Switch Controller installs new rules into switches (e.g., forward
       packets with the suspicious inter-arrival pattern with a dropping
       probability).



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   6.  The suspicious flow's packets are randomly dropped by switches
       with the dropping probability.

   For the above centralized DDoS-attack mitigation system, the existing
   SDN protocols can be used through standard interfaces between the
   DDoS-attack mitigator application and switches [RFC7149]
   [ITU-T.Y.3300][ONF-OpenFlow][ONF-SDN-Architecture].

   The centralized DDoS-attack mitigation system has challenges similar
   to the centralized firewall system.  The proposed framework can
   resolve the challenges through the above centralized DDoS-attack
   mitigation system based on SDN as follows:

   o  Cost: The cost of adding DDoS-attack mitigators to network
      resources such as routers, gateways, and switches is substantial
      due to the reason that we need to add DDoS-attack mitigator on
      each network resource.  To solve this, each network resource can
      be managed centrally such that a single DDoS-attack mitigator is
      manipulated by a centralized server.

   o  Performance: The performance of DDoS-attack mitigators is often
      slower than the link speed of network interfaces.  The checking of
      DDoS attacks may reduce the performance of the network interfaces.
      DDoS-attack mitigators can be adaptively deployed among network
      switches, depending on network conditions in the framework.

   o  The management of network resources: Since there may be hundreds
      of network resources in an administered network, the dynamic
      management of network resources for performance (e.g., load
      balancing) is a challenge for DDoS-attack mitigation.  In the
      framework, as dynamic network resource management, traffic flow
      forwarding path management can handle the load balancing of
      network switches [AVANT-GUARD].  With this management, the current
      and near-future workload can be spread among the network switches
      for DDoS-attack mitigation.  In addition, DDoS-attack mitigation
      rules can be dynamically added for new DDoS attacks.

   o  The establishment of policy: Policy should be established for each
      network resource.  However, it is difficult to describe what flows
      are permitted or denied for new DDoS-attacks (e.g., DNS reflection
      attack) within a specific organization network under management.
      Thus, a centralized view is helpful to determine security policies
      for such a network.

   So far this document has described the procedure and impact of the
   three use cases for networked security services using the I2NSF
   framework with SDN networks.  To support these use cases in the
   proposed data-driven security service framework, YANG data models



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   described in [consumer-facing-inf-dm], [nsf-facing-inf-dm], and
   [registration-inf-dm] can be used as Consumer-Facing Interface, NSF-
   Facing Interface, and Registration Interface, respectively, along
   with RESTCONF [RFC8040] and NETCONF [RFC6241].

6.  Security Considerations

   The I2NSF framework with SDN networks in this document is derived
   from the I2NSF framework [i2nsf-framework], so the security
   considerations of the I2NSF framework should be included in this
   document.  Therefore, proper secure communication channels should be
   used the delivery of control or management messages among the
   components in the proposed framework.

   This document shares all the security issues of SDN that are
   specified in the "Security Considerations" section of [ITU-T.Y.3300].

7.  Acknowledgements

   This work was supported by Institute for Information & communications
   Technology Promotion (IITP) grant funded by the Korea government
   (MSIP) (No.R-20160222-002755, Cloud based Security Intelligence
   Technology Development for the Customized Security Service
   Provisioning).

   This document has greatly benefited from inputs by Hyoungshick Kim,
   Jung-Soo Park, Se-Hui Lee, Jinyong Kim, Daeyoung Hyun, and Dongjin
   Hong.

8.  References

8.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]                 Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to
                             Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14,
                             RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [i2nsf-framework]         Lopez, D., Lopez, E., Dunbar, L.,
                             Strassner, J., and R. Kumar, "Framework for
                             Interface to Network Security Functions",
                             draft-ietf-i2nsf-framework-05 (work in
                             progress), May 2017.

   [RFC6020]                 Bjorklund, M., "YANG - A Data Modeling
                             Language for the Network Configuration
                             Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6020,
                             October 2010.




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   [RFC6241]                 Enns, R., Bjorklund, M., Schoenwaelder, J.,
                             and A. Bierman, "Network Configuration
                             Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6241, June 2011.

   [RFC8040]                 Bierman, A., Bjorklund, M., and K. Watsen,
                             "RESTCONF Protocol", RFC 8040,
                             January 2017.

8.2.  Informative References

   [consumer-facing-inf-im]  Kumar, R., Lohiya, A., Qi, D., Bitar, N.,
                             Palislamovic, S., and L. Xia, "Information
                             model for Client-Facing Interface to
                             Security Controller", draft-kumar-i2nsf-
                             client-facing-interface-im-02 (work in
                             progress), April 2017.

   [consumer-facing-inf-dm]  Jeong, J., Kim, E., Ahn, T., Kumar, R., and
                             S. Hares, "I2NSF Consumer-Facing Interface
                             YANG Data Model", draft-jeong-i2nsf-
                             consumer-facing-interface-dm-02 (work in
                             progress), July 2017.

   [i2nsf-nsf-cap-im]        Xia, L., Strassner, J., Basile, C., and D.
                             Lopez, "Information Model of NSFs
                             Capabilities",
                             draft-xibassnez-i2nsf-capability-01 (work
                             in progress), March 2017.

   [nsf-facing-inf-dm]       Kim, J., Jeong, J., Park, J., Hares, S.,
                             and L. Xia, "I2NSF Network Security
                             Functions-Facing Interface YANG Data
                             Model", draft-kim-i2nsf-nsf-facing-
                             interface-data-model-02 , July 2017.

   [registration-inf-im]     Hyun, S., Jeong, J., Woo, S., Yeo, Y., and
                             J. Park, "I2NSF Registration Interface
                             Information Model", draft-hyun-i2nsf-
                             registration-interface-im-02 (work in
                             progress), July 2017.

   [registration-inf-dm]     Hyun, S., Jeong, J., Yeo, Y., Woo, S., and
                             J. Park, "I2NSF Registration Interface YANG
                             Data Model",
                             draft-hyun-i2nsf-registration-dm-01 (work
                             in progress), July 2017.

   [nsf-triggered-steering]  Hyun, S., Jeong, J., Park, J., and S.



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                             Hares, "NSF-triggered Traffic Steering
                             Framework",
                             draft-hyun-i2nsf-nsf-triggered-steering-03
                             (work in progress), July 2017.

   [RFC7149]                 Boucadair, M. and C. Jacquenet, "Software-
                             Defined Networking: A Perspective from
                             within a Service Provider Environment",
                             RFC 7149, March 2014.

   [ITU-T.Y.3300]            Recommendation ITU-T Y.3300, "Framework of
                             Software-Defined Networking", June 2014.

   [ONF-OpenFlow]            ONF, "OpenFlow Switch Specification
                             (Version 1.4.0)", October 2013.

   [ONF-SDN-Architecture]    ONF, "SDN Architecture", June 2014.

   [ITU-T.X.1252]            Recommendation ITU-T X.1252, "Baseline
                             Identity Management Terms and Definitions",
                             April 2010.

   [ITU-T.X.800]             Recommendation ITU-T X.800, "Security
                             Architecture for Open Systems
                             Interconnection for  CCITT Applications",
                             March 1991.

   [AVANT-GUARD]             Shin, S., Yegneswaran, V., Porras, P., and
                             G. Gu, "AVANT-GUARD: Scalable and Vigilant
                             Switch Flow Management in Software-Defined
                             Networks", ACM CCS, November 2013.

   [ETSI-NFV]                ETSI GS NFV 002 V1.1.1, "Network Functions
                             Virtualisation (NFV); Architectural
                             Framework", October 2013.

   [RFC4566]                 Handley, M., Jacobson, V., and C. Perkins,
                             "SDP: Session Description Protocol",
                             RFC 4566, July 2006.

Appendix A.  Changes from draft-jeong-i2nsf-applicability-00

   The following changes have been made from
   draft-jeong-i2nsf-applicability-00:

   o  Figure 1 is modified such that Security Controller and Switch
      Controller are directly connected with each other via NSF-Facing
      Interface for the security policy configuration.



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Authors' Addresses

   Jaehoon Paul Jeong
   Department of Software
   Sungkyunkwan University
   2066 Seobu-Ro, Jangan-Gu
   Suwon, Gyeonggi-Do  16419
   Republic of Korea

   Phone: +82 31 299 4957
   Fax:   +82 31 290 7996
   EMail: pauljeong@skku.edu
   URI:   http://iotlab.skku.edu/people-jaehoon-jeong.php


   Sangwon Hyun
   Department of Software
   Sungkyunkwan University
   2066 Seobu-Ro, Jangan-Gu
   Suwon, Gyeonggi-Do  16419
   Republic of Korea

   Phone: +82 31 290 7222
   Fax:   +82 31 299 6673
   EMail: swhyun77@skku.edu
   URI:   http://imtl.skku.ac.kr/


   Tae-Jin Ahn
   Korea Telecom
   70 Yuseong-Ro, Yuseong-Gu
   Daejeon  305-811
   Republic of Korea

   Phone: +82 42 870 8409
   EMail: taejin.ahn@kt.com


   Susan Hares
   Huawei
   7453 Hickory Hill
   Saline, MI  48176
   USA

   Phone: +1-734-604-0332
   EMail: shares@ndzh.com





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   Diego R. Lopez
   Telefonica I+D
   Jose Manuel Lara, 9
   Seville,   41013
   Spain

   Phone: +34 682 051 091
   EMail: diego.r.lopez@telefonica.com











































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