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Versions: 00

httpbis                                                    J. Brzozowski
Internet-Draft                                             Comcast Cable
Intended status: Best Current Practice                        K. Beevers
Expires: November 23, 2018                                           NS1
                                                             J. Cariello
                                                                  Google
                                                               J. Colton
                                                             Squarespace
                                                                L. Jacob
                                                               Bloomberg
                                                                J. Leddy
                                                           Comcast Cable
                                                                J. Shaul
                                                                  Akamai
                                                            L. Steinberg
                                                            CTM Insights
                                                            May 22, 2018


                            Trusted Traffic
                 draft-jjmb-httpbis-trusted-traffic-00

Abstract

   Current methods for managing traffic through content inspection tend
   to process all sessions similarly.  Internet traffic examples like
   DDoS mitigation require all data to pass through one of a limited
   number of scrubbing centers, which create both natural choke points
   and the potential for widespread collateral damage should a center
   become overloaded.  Similar issues exist with email SPAM and malware
   filtering, traffic shaping, etc.  We propose a method to utilize
   existing HTTP and HTTPS protocols that enables destinations to
   temporarily confer trust on sources, and for trusted traffic to be
   routed and processed differently from untrusted traffic.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any




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   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on November 23, 2018.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Approach  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  HTTP and HTTPS  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     4.1.  Trust Tokens as Cookies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.2.  Assertion Tokens  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     4.3.  Assertion Token use within a Browser  . . . . . . . . . .   8
     4.4.  Validator Function  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     4.5.  Implementation Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   5.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   6.  Internationalization Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   8.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   9.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     9.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     9.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10

1.  Introduction

   In the wake of several high profile DDoS attacks, the authors
   convened a series of meetings to investigate alternatives to routing
   all traffic through centralized "scrubbing centers".  It was believed
   that the widespread use of consumer appliances was creating a rapidly
   expanding edge that is increasingly being compromised.  As the edge
   could potentially grow faster than centralized services could



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   increase capacity, we envisioned a structural issue in which
   mitigation services could become overwhelmed.  The impact would be
   magnified through collateral damage, affecting all users of the
   mitigation service vs just those being attacked.  We began looking
   for ways to allow certain traffic, once trusted by a destination, to
   bypass scrubbing centers when headed to that destination.  Only
   traffic from a source untrusted by the destination required
   additional scrutiny.  This would both reduce load on the scrubbing
   centers and allow trusted traffic to flow unimpeded even if a
   scrubbing center was overwhelmed.

   As we investigated solutions, it became apparent that the underlying
   issue was more generalized than we originally understood.  What was
   lacking was a pairwise trust model that could affect how traffic is
   treated.  This would permit destinations to designate that they trust
   a source, and the network edge would apply different treatment
   (service transformations) when and only when a source communicates
   with a destination that trusts it.  Example applications of this
   approach include an express lane that lets trusted traffic bypass
   DDoS scrubbing centers, the ability to apply deep malware scanning or
   pfishing filtering to untrusted email senders or content providers,
   and traffic shaping like rate limits for untrusted DNS queries.
   Distributing the validation of trusted traffic to a network edge
   creates resiliency by eliminating the use of centralized aggregation
   points, which become targets, for trusted traffic.

   A version of this approach was explored for non-HTTP/S traffic. in
   it, IPv6 Segment Routing Headers were used to transmit Trust and
   Assertion Tokens, as well as to direct messages containing Assertion
   Tokens through an edge Validator.  Implementation and testing of this
   approach was deferred to focus on the HTTP/S use case.

   Also discussed was that this mechanism is consistent with a delegated
   or federated trust model.  Destinations that lack the ability to
   directly determine whether a source should be trusted can leverage
   the trust determined by 3rd parties.  This is accomplished by having
   the 3rd party, once trust is established, reference or load an image
   belonging to the destination's domain.  The destination can then, if
   properly referred by the 3rd party, set a Trust Token cookie for the
   destination's domain.

   Several key principles were established to guide our efforts:

   1.  Trust is pairwise between a destination and a source

   2.  A destination decides to trust to a source based solely on its
       own decision making process




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   3.  Trust is temporal

   4.  Untrusted traffic flows unimpeded

   5.  No new protocols would be defined

   6.  We would leverage a distributed set of services to validate that
       traffic is trusted in order to provide resiliency and scale

   7.  Validation of trust would be stateless, with no decryption keys
       or tables

2.  Assumptions

   The motivation for this work falls into the following categories:

   o  DNSSEC signed zones

   o  DNS references (where applicable) for use to bootstrap control
      protocol (see below)

   o  Secure transport for beaconing or control protocol (QUIC, HTTPS,
      etc.)

   o  Control Protocol Definition (this document)

3.  Approach

   Our concept of a distributed processing layer at the edge was further
   influenced by feedback from the service provider participants.  Based
   on their input, we decided to separate the implementation of a
   processing layer from the network itself, thereby avoiding potential
   conflicts with things like Net Neutrality principles.  Service
   providers could comfortably route to or via destinations requested by
   a client, without the network layer making value decisions around
   message treatment

   The approach selected borrowed heavily from the concept of web
   cookies.  In essence, a layer 3 cookie became a Trust Token ("TT")
   that was offered by a destination to a source.  Each destination is
   free to define its own mechanism for deciding whom to trust and for
   how long, as over-trusting (or under) only affects that destination.
   The use of a token allowed us to work with devices behind a Network
   Address Translator ("NAT"), which was an important consideration for
   consumer households that had a mix of potentially trusted devices
   (e.g. a computer) and untrusted devices (e.g. a webcam).





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   Trust Tokens contain several fields: the public name or IP address of
   the destination issuing it, the public name or IP address of a
   Validator Service ("Validator"), the public IP address of the device
   being trusted, an expiration time beyond which the token is not
   valid, and a cryptographic signature to guard against fraudulently
   generated or manipulated tokens.  A protocol to issue and refresh
   expiring trust tokens is proposed in this document.  Note that fields
   which are readily available are not required to be duplicated in the
   TT.

   Traffic from a source that has been trusted by a destination has to
   assert that it is currently trusted, and route its traffic through a
   nearby Validator.  The assertion is accomplished by inserting an
   Assertion Token ("AT"), a subset of the full TT containing the
   expiration time and the cryptographic signature.  The validator
   service is then responsible for inspecting the AT and testing the
   cryptographic signature against a combination of the destination IP
   address, the public IP address of the source, and the expiration
   time.  If successful, and the expiration time has not yet been
   reached, the message is forwarded.  If not, the message is discarded.

   A successfully validated message SHOULD be forwarded directly to the
   destination through the use of a tunnel such as a GRE [RFC2784]
   between the Validator and destination.  The Validator would see the
   destination as the next hop and route appropriately.  The Validator
   MAY learn routes through the tunnel but MUST NOT announce those
   routes to ensure that only traffic specifically sent to the Validator
   is tested.

   It is expected that the service provided by Validators is
   computationally much more efficient than the service transformation
   being applied to untrusted traffic (e.g.  DDoS mitigation).  This
   efficiency allows Validators to be widely distributed at the edge of
   a large network.  All Validators MAY be assigned a common Anycast
   address [RFC1546] to simplify the effort of generating TTs, and to
   assist in creating resiliency should one or more Validators become
   unavailable.  Alternatively, the server issuing TTs can check the
   health of each validator to which it has an active GRE, and use a
   formula such as geolocating the client's IP to determine the nearest
   healthy Validator.  As Validators become unavailable, the traffic
   will naturally migrate away as new TTs are issued and existing ones
   are refreshed.

4.  HTTP and HTTPS

   HTTP and especially HTTPS created some practical implementation
   issues.  The first was that the browser environment doesn't generally
   have access to set socket options for an HTTP GET or POST outside of



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   web sockets.  Implementing this solution would require modifying the
   browser source code.  The use of a cookie construct helped as we were
   able to leverage browser cookies to hold the TT.  A browser plugin
   detects a message to a destination for which there is a matching,
   unexpired cookie and rewrites the hostname or SNI field to prepend
   the AT.  A wildcard version of the destination address with any
   prepend MUST resolve to the Validator's IP address.  The Validator
   acts as a transparent proxy, stripping the prepended data before
   forwarding the message.

4.1.  Trust Tokens as Cookies

   In the case of HTTP/HTTPS, the TT described above is sent by the
   destination server to a trusted client as a web cookie [RFC6265] with
   the following fields:

   Set-Cookie: type= TrustAssertionToken; Version= 1; ProxyValidator=
   [proxy.example.com]; Domain= [example.com];
   ClientSource=[clientIpAddr]; Max-Age= [ttl]; ExpireTime=
   [timeoutAbsolute]; Signature= [signedHash]

   The value of ttl is set by the server to indicate when the trust
   relationship will end if not renewed.  The value timeoutAbsolute
   SHOULD be current time in seconds since epoch plus ttl plus a server
   defined grace period in case the cookie expires while in transmission
   or processing.  Note that the timeoutAbsolute value is presented back
   to the server to determine if a renewal is warranted.  The value of
   signedHash is generated at the destination server by:

   1.  appending the numeric timeoutAbsolute value to the end of the
       clientIpAddr value

   2.  creating a signature using a private key with the EdDSA algorithm
       and Ed25519 per [RFC8032].

   3.  converting the signature to an ascii string

   4.  applying a base64 hash algorithm to reduce the signature to 63
       bytes of ascii

   In the web implementation, this is accomplished through the following
   example:

   const crypto = require('crypto');

   const ed25519 = require('ed25519');

   class SignatureService extends CommonService {



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   generateSignature(timeoutAbsolute, clientIpAddress) {

   const seed =crypto.randomBytes(32);

   const pair = ed25519.MakeKeypair(seed);

   const message = clientIpAddress + timeoutAbsolute;

   const signature = ed25519.Sign(new Buffer(message, 'utf8'),
   pair.privateKey);

   return crypto.createHash('sha256').update(signature.toString('ascii')
   ).digest('base64');

   }

   }

   The signedHash value MUST be encoded to be compatible with the
   restrictions of the Hostname [RFC1123].  As the ED25519 signed
   message is `base64` encoded.  The character set potentially produced
   is [A-Za-z0-9+/]

   Since Hostnames are case insensitive and the characters `+` and `/`
   are not valid, each capital letter MUST BE prepended with a `-` and
   transformed to lower case; each `+` MUST BE transformed to `--` and
   each `/` MUST BE transformed into `_`

   Valid Hostnames MUST be broken into 63 byte fields, separated by `.`
   characters.  Furthermore, Hostname's starting with `-` or hostnames
   with `-` before and after `.` are considered invalid.  A prefix `a`
   and a suffix `a` MUST be added to the encoded signature, and if a 63
   byte hostname field has a `-` that follows a `.` the `.` is pulled to
   the left and is set between the first pair of small characters.

   e.g. for hostname "asfdsdfasdf--asd-.s"

   the '.' would be pulled to the left to in between s and d, so
   asfdsdfasdf--asd-.s becomes asfdsdfasdf--as.d-s

4.2.  Assertion Tokens

   Assertion Tokens are a subset of the full browser cookie.  The use of
   HTTPS results in cookies that are encrypted during transmission,
   which hides them from a stateless Validator.  Instead, an Assertion
   Token MUST contain the clientIpAddr as an ascii representation of the
   hex values , followed by a ".", followed by the ascii representation




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   of the value in timeoutAbsolute, followed by a ".", followed by the
   signedHash value.

   For clarity, clientIpAddr MAY NOT be a dotted decimal string and
   timeoutAbsolute MUST be the number of seconds since epoch, in GMT,
   after which the trust relationship will expire, with the digits
   expressed as an ASCII string plus a grace period.

4.3.  Assertion Token use within a Browser

   Within the browser environment, the a participating client MUST run
   code that prepends the AT, followed by a ".", to the ProxyValidator
   value and places this in the hostname or SNI field.  Note that the
   ProxyValidator value is a superset of the Domain.  This rewrite will
   send the session via the transparent proxy server at the
   ProxyValidator address.

4.4.  Validator Function

   When an HTTP/HTTPS session is initiated to the Validator, it strips
   the prepended AT and proxy from the hostname/SNI.  It then MUST use a
   public key, which MAY be locally stored, associated with the
   remaining hostname value to decrypt and test the validity of the
   signedHash.  Should no local key exist, or the hash validation fail,
   the message MUST be dropped.  The Validator MUST test the
   timeoutAbsolute against the current time, and MUST drop the message
   should the current time exceed the value specified in the AT.

   The validator MAY further check that the tcp connection has a source
   IP address that matches the clientIPAddress and drop the message
   should the test fail.  The validator MAY choose to ignore this test
   to accommodate longer lived TTs where the public IP address might
   change (e.g. multiple public interfaces or dual IP stack clients),

4.5.  Implementation Considerations

   The role of the Validator is to both check that browser sessions are
   unexpired and legitimate, and to act as a transparent proxy server.
   If all tests are successful at the Validator, messages are forwarded
   to the destination server as specified in the hostname/SNI field
   without the prepended AT or proxy values.

   For performance reasons, the Validator MAY choose to cache signedHash
   values once they have been tested, until the expiration of the ATs.

   Each participating destination SHOULD have a GRE tunnel to each
   validator, and SHOULD announce routes to the Destination Server via
   that tunnel.  The Validator MUST NOT announce these learned routes



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   When the Validator decides to forward sessions to the destination,
   the closest next hop from a routing perspective is the GRE,
   essentially bypassing any traffic filtering and transformations that
   untrusted traffic is routed through include diagram

   Timeout values are in both the cookie and the AT, as the timeout
   needs to be visible to both the destination server and the Validator
   .  The destination server MAY use the timeoutAbsolute to refresh the
   TT as it nears expiration

5.  IANA Considerations

   No IANA considerations are defined at this time.

6.  Internationalization Considerations

   No IANA considerations are defined at this time.

7.  Security Considerations

   No Additional Security Considerations are made in this document.

8.  Acknowledgements

   The authors would like to thank the following, in alphabetical order,
   for their contributions:

   John Curtis of Curtis Digital and Thomas M Jacob of Comcast
   contributed to a POC implementation and testing of this system.
   Their efforts and design feedback are greatly appreciated.

9.  References

9.1.  Normative References

   [RFC1123]  Braden, R., Ed., "Requirements for Internet Hosts -
              Application and Support", STD 3, RFC 1123,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC1123, October 1989,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1123>.

   [RFC1546]  Partridge, C., Mendez, T., and W. Milliken, "Host
              Anycasting Service", RFC 1546, DOI 10.17487/RFC1546,
              November 1993, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1546>.

   [RFC2784]  Farinacci, D., Li, T., Hanks, S., Meyer, D., and P.
              Traina, "Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE)", RFC 2784,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2784, March 2000,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2784>.



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   [RFC3315]  Droms, R., Ed., Bound, J., Volz, B., Lemon, T., Perkins,
              C., and M. Carney, "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol
              for IPv6 (DHCPv6)", RFC 3315, DOI 10.17487/RFC3315, July
              2003, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3315>.

   [RFC3514]  Bellovin, S., "The Security Flag in the IPv4 Header",
              RFC 3514, DOI 10.17487/RFC3514, April 2003,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3514>.

   [RFC4032]  Camarillo, G. and P. Kyzivat, "Update to the Session
              Initiation Protocol (SIP) Preconditions Framework",
              RFC 4032, DOI 10.17487/RFC4032, March 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4032>.

   [RFC4302]  Kent, S., "IP Authentication Header", RFC 4302,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4302, December 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4302>.

   [RFC6265]  Barth, A., "HTTP State Management Mechanism", RFC 6265,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6265, April 2011,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6265>.

   [RFC8032]  Josefsson, S. and I. Liusvaara, "Edwards-Curve Digital
              Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)", RFC 8032,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8032, January 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8032>.

9.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.ietf-v6ops-v4v6tran-framework]
              Carpenter, B., Jiang, S., and V. Kuarsingh, "Framework for
              IP Version Transition Scenarios", draft-ietf-v6ops-
              v4v6tran-framework-02 (work in progress), July 2011.

   [RFC6343]  Carpenter, B., "Advisory Guidelines for 6to4 Deployment",
              RFC 6343, DOI 10.17487/RFC6343, August 2011,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6343>.

Authors' Addresses

   John Jason Brzozowski
   Comcast Cable
   1701 John F. Kennedy Blvd.
   Philadelphia, PA
   USA

   Email: john_brzozowski@cable.comcast.com




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   Kris Beevers
   NS1
   40 Exchange Place, Suite 410
   New York, NY
   USA

   Email: kbeevers@ns1.com


   James Cariello
   Google
   111 8th Ave
   New York, NY
   USA


   John Colton
   Squarespace
   8 Clarkson St
   New York, NY
   USA


   Lutz Jacob
   Bloomberg
   731 Lexington Avenue
   New York, NY
   USA

   Email: ljacob@bloomberg.net


   John Leddy
   Comcast Cable
   1701 John F. Kennedy Blvd.
   Philadelphia, PA
   USA

   Email: john_leddy@cable.comcast.com


   Josh Shaul
   Akamai
   150 Broadway
   Cambridge, MA
   USA

   Email: jshaul@akamai.com



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   Lou Steinberg
   CTM Insights
   1988 Beekman Ct
   Yorktown Heights, NY
   USA

   Email: lou@ctminsights.com












































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