[Docs] [txt|pdf|xml|html] [Tracker] [Email] [Diff1] [Diff2] [Nits]

Versions: 00 01 02 03

Internet Engineering Task Force                              A. Johnston
Internet-Draft                                                     Avaya
Intended status: Informational                                 J. Uberti
Expires: August 8, 2014                                           Google
                                                               J. Yoakum
                                                                K. Singh
                                                                   Avaya
                                                        February 4, 2014


               An Origin Attribute for the STUN Protocol
                   draft-johnston-tram-stun-origin-01

Abstract

   STUN, or Session Traversal Utilities for NAT, is a protocol used to
   assist other protocols traverse Network Address Translators or NATs.
   STUN, and STUN extensions such as TURN, or Traversal Using Relays
   around NAT, and ICE, Interactive Communications Establishment, have
   been around for many years but with WebRTC, Web Real-Time
   Communications, STUN and related extensions are about to see major
   deployments and implementation due to these protocols being
   implemented in browsers.  This specification defines an ORIGIN
   attribute for STUN that can be used in similar ways to the HTTP
   header field of the same name.  WebRTC browsers utilizing STUN and
   TURN would include this attribute which would provide servers with
   additional information about the STUN and TURN requests they receive.
   This specification defines the usage of the STUN ORIGIN attribute for
   web and SIP contexts.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on August 8, 2014.

Copyright Notice



Johnston, et al.         Expires August 8, 2014                 [Page 1]


Internet-Draft                 STUN Origin                 February 2014


   Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.


Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
     1.1.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
   2.  STUN ORIGIN attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
     2.1.  STUN Usage  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
     2.2.  TURN Usage  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
     2.3.  ICE Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
   3.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
   4.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
   5.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

























Johnston, et al.         Expires August 8, 2014                 [Page 2]


Internet-Draft                 STUN Origin                 February 2014


1.  Introduction

   STUN, or Session Traversal Utilities for NAT, is a protocol used to
   assist other protocols traverse Network Address Translators or NATs.
   TURN, or Traversal Using Relays around NAT [RFC5766], is a STUN
   extension [RFC5389] that allows endpoints to acquire a relayed
   address for media flows.  It is most commonly used in conjunction
   with ICE, Interactive Connectivity Establishment [RFC5245], which is
   used to establish peer-to-peer flows between endpoints through NATs
   and firewalls.

   STUN defines three authentication modes, depending on the STUN usage.
   For STUN binding requests sent between peers, such as for ICE
   connectivity checks, a short term authentication method is
   recommended.  Each peer contributes random strings which are
   exchanged over signaling and used to authenticate the connectivity
   checks.  For TURN, a usage of STUN used to acquire and refresh relay
   addresses, a long term authentication method is recommended.  This
   authentication is similar to SIP Digest [RFC3261], which involves an
   authentication challenge for each request.  A server, upon receipt of
   a TURN request, generates an authentication challenge that includes a
   realm and nonce.  The client resends the TURN request supplying a
   user name and password based on the realm indicated by the server.
   For a STUN binding request sent to a STUN server, no authentication
   is recommended, as generating the response is less work for a server
   than the server utilizing the short term or long term authentication
   approach.

   WebRTC, Web Real-Time Communications, adds peer-to-peer real-time,
   interactive voice and video media capabilities and data channels to
   browsers [I-D.ietf-rtcweb-overview] without a plugin or download, and
   allows web developers to access this functionality using JavaScript
   API calls [WebRTC-API].  WebRTC includes STUN, TURN, and ICE client
   functionality built into browsers.  For a session established between
   two browsers, if either browser is behind a NAT, a STUN server is
   necessary.  Public STUN servers are currently available and a web
   application can suggest a particular STUN server be used.  In other
   cases, a TURN server is needed to establish a peer connection.  In
   this case, TURN credentials need to be available to the browser for
   the long term authentication approach.  A TURN server for WebRTC
   might serve a number of different domains and realms.

   From the perspective of the web application provider, providing
   service for a number of different domains and realms, it is useful to
   know something about the source of the STUN request when processing
   the request.  For a web application provider STUN or TURN server, the
   server will have no idea which web pages or sites are sending binding
   requests to the service.  In conventional applications, the SOFTWARE



Johnston, et al.         Expires August 8, 2014                 [Page 3]


Internet-Draft                 STUN Origin                 February 2014


   attribute would provide some identifying information to the service,
   but that no longer works when the browser is the application.  For a
   web application provider TURN server, the TURN server does not know
   which realm to include in an authentication challenge.

   In the web world, HTTP requests have the concept of origin.  The
   origin of a web page, as defined in [RFC6454], is defined by the
   URI's scheme, host or IP address, and port portions.  The HTTP Origin
   header field inserted by the web browser carries this information and
   is useful information for servers that receive HTTP requests
   generated via JavaScript.  For example, Cross Origin Resource
   Sharing, CORS, allows an HTTP server to serve HTTP requests from
   multiple origins.

   This specification proposes extending the origin concept to STUN
   requests.  STUN requests generated by a web browser would include the
   origin of the HTTP page that is initiating the Peer Connection.
   Using this extra information, a STUN server could use the origin to
   determine which STUN binding requests to respond to, reducing the
   load on a STUN server.  Using this information, a TURN server could
   use the origin to determine which realm to include in the
   authentication challenge.  A TURN server can also use the origin
   information for logging and analytics, and also as additional
   information after authentication for providing service.

   An important use case that the STUN Origin helps solve is the
   operation of a multi-tenanted TURN server (i.e. a TURN server that
   serves multiple, perhaps tens of thousands of different domains).
   The problem associated with this use case is described in Section 4.5
   of [I-D.reddy-behave-turn-auth].  While it is possible for a TURN
   server to use the same authentication credentials across many
   domains, a more likely (and more manageable) scenario is to have
   separate credentials for each domain, and hence a different realm for
   each domain.  To implement this, a TURN server needs to know which
   realm to include in authentication challenge to TURN clients.  One
   way to do this would be to create a unique TURN URL for each realm.
   This would require either a separate IP address or port for each
   realm, and this unique URL would need to be correctly provisioned by
   each domain (i.e. included in JavaScript, which then could not be
   copied between domains).  Clearly, this doesn't scale for hundreds or
   thousands of domains.  Origin information solves this problem since
   TURN requests will contain the domain in the Origin attribute.  The
   TURN server just needs to be configured with a mapping between a
   domain (conveyed in the Origin) and the realm string (to be used in
   the authentication challenge).  Thus, a single TURN URL could be used
   across all domains, and the resulting JavaScript code would be
   portable.  There is no need for thousands of IP addresses or ports to
   be allocated and managed.



Johnston, et al.         Expires August 8, 2014                 [Page 4]


Internet-Draft                 STUN Origin                 February 2014


   It has been suggested that this origin insight is not needed if the
   server_name TLS extension in [RFC6066] is supported.  This extension
   allows a TLS client to provide to the TLS server the name of the
   server they are contacting.  In this case, the STUN or TURN client
   using TLS transport would provide the domain from the TURN server URL
   during the TLS client hello, allowing the TURN server to respond with
   the appropriate server certificate.  For the TURN server domain to be
   used by the TURN server to choose the appropriate realm, this would
   require a unique TURN URL to be provisioned per realm.  This is not
   scalable for supporting thousands of realms.  Also, this URL would
   need to be provisioned in the JavaScript, making the resulting code
   non-portable.  Finally, [RFC6066] provides no help for UDP or TCP
   transport, which are the most commonly used transports today for STUN
   and TURN.

   Another approach that could be pursued is for the client to be
   explicitly provisioned with a realm value, to which its username and
   password are scoped.  When using the long-term authentication method
   to authenticate to a TURN server, the client would include this REALM
   value in the initial, unauthorized requests, allowing the TURN server
   to know which REALM to use in its authorization challenge.  This
   approach avoids many of the issues with the RFC 6066 approach, but it
   still requires the realm value to be explicitly provisioned in
   Javascript.  In addition, it does not work in unauthenticated usages,
   i.e.  STUN binding requests sent to a STUN server.

   Note that the origin information is most useful as a hint in initial
   STUN and TURN requests as received by a server.  However, origin
   information still has value for logging and other purposes throughout
   the session even after authentication.

   The following sections of this document define the STUN ORIGIN
   attribute and define its usage.

1.1.  Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].


2.  STUN ORIGIN attribute

   This specification defines how to apply the web origin concept and
   syntax of [RFC6454] to the STUN protocol.

   This specification defines a new Attribute to the STUN protocol
   [RFC5389].  The attribute is called ORIGIN and uses the syntax



Johnston, et al.         Expires August 8, 2014                 [Page 5]


Internet-Draft                 STUN Origin                 February 2014


   defined in Section 15 of [RFC5389].  A STUN Attribute type is a hex
   number in the range 0x0000 - 0xFFFF.  The ORIGIN attribute value is
   0x802F, chosen in the comprehension optional range.

   Editor's Note: At the appropriate time, the authors will work with
   the chairs of TRAM to follow RFC 4020 procedures to ensure that no
   attribute collisions occur while running code is being developed and
   tested.

   For a web browser (HTTP User Agent), the contents of the ORIGIN
   attribute is the unicode-serialization of an origin defined in
   Section 6.1 of [RFC6454].  The origin value included is the same as
   the Origin header field for an HTTP request generated from the web
   page that is creating the Peer Connection.  It does not include any
   string terminating (\x00) character in the serialization.

   For a SIP User Agent [RFC3261] using STUN and TURN, the ORIGIN
   attribute is set to be the URI of the registrar server used by the
   User Agent (i.e. the Request-URI of a REGISTER method).

   Other contexts can define a usage of the ORIGIN attribute to use an
   appropriate URI or URL.

2.1.  STUN Usage

   For STUN requests sent without authentication to a STUN server (i.e.
   STUN binding requests sent to a STUN server), the STUN client SHOULD
   include the ORIGIN attribute.  A STUN server can derive additional
   information for logging and analytics about the request through the
   ORIGIN attribute, such as the source of the request.  For example, an
   enterprise STUN server might only reply to STUN binding requests from
   certain domains.

2.2.  TURN Usage

   For STUN requests sent using the long-term authentication method,
   such as TURN [RFC5766] allocate requests, the STUN client SHOULD
   include the ORIGIN attribute.  A TURN server can use the ORIGIN
   attribute to determine which REALM to include in the authentication
   challenge.  A TURN server can also use the ORIGIN attribute after
   authentication to provide appropriate service.

2.3.  ICE Usage

   For STUN requests sent using the short-term authentication method,
   such as ICE connectivity checks [RFC5245], the use of the ORIGIN
   attribute is NOT RECOMMENDED.  No valid use cases for the ORIGIN
   attribute have been identified to date.



Johnston, et al.         Expires August 8, 2014                 [Page 6]


Internet-Draft                 STUN Origin                 February 2014


3.  IANA Considerations

   This specification, if approved, adds a new value to the IANA "STUN
   Attributes Registry" created by [RFC5389].  The ORIGIN attribute
   value is 0x802F.


4.  Security Considerations

   The security considerations of [RFC6454] apply to this extension.
   Servers using the information present in the STUN ORIGIN attribute
   need to realize that this attribute could be set arbitrarily by a
   non-browser client or modified by an intermediary.  The method
   proposed in this document is not meant to replace existing STUN
   authentication mechanisms but to provide additional information to
   the server for logging and analytics and how to handle the request
   after authentication.

   Just as browsers do not allow a web application to set the Origin
   header field via JavaScript, browsers should not allow a web
   application through JavaScript to set the STUN ORIGIN attribute.

   If the STUN MESSAGE-INTEGRITY attribute is present, the contents of
   the ORIGIN attribute are integrity protected.  The strength of this
   protection is a function of the secret used to generate the MESSAGE-
   INTEGRITY value.

   The STUN ORIGIN attribute does have privacy implications.  The
   recipient of the STUN request learns the web origin of the user.  In
   addition, an on-path attacker could determine this information by
   inspecting STUN messages between the STUN client and STUN server,
   depending on the transport used.  This information is often available
   in other messages sent by the browser, such as DNS or HTTP requests.
   However, in cases where secure DNS and secure HTTP is used, including
   the ORIGIN attribute over an unencrypted transport could leak this
   information.  STUN has a defined TLS transport; however, TLS
   transport is generally unsuitable for the real-time media flows that
   follow STUN requests and must use the same transport.  A DTLS
   transport for STUN would provide a very good privacy solution to this
   problem.  In cases where privacy is paramount, the ORIGIN attribute
   SHOULD NOT be included or only included if DTLS or TLS transport is
   used.


5.  Normative References

   [I-D.ietf-rtcweb-overview]
              Alvestrand, H., "Overview: Real Time Protocols for Brower-



Johnston, et al.         Expires August 8, 2014                 [Page 7]


Internet-Draft                 STUN Origin                 February 2014


              based Applications", draft-ietf-rtcweb-overview-08 (work
              in progress), September 2013.

   [I-D.reddy-behave-turn-auth]
              Reddy, T., R, R., Perumal, M., and A. Yegin, "Problems
              with STUN Authentication for TURN",
              draft-reddy-behave-turn-auth-04 (work in progress),
              September 2013.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC3261]  Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston,
              A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E.
              Schooler, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261,
              June 2002.

   [RFC5245]  Rosenberg, J., "Interactive Connectivity Establishment
              (ICE): A Protocol for Network Address Translator (NAT)
              Traversal for Offer/Answer Protocols", RFC 5245,
              April 2010.

   [RFC5389]  Rosenberg, J., Mahy, R., Matthews, P., and D. Wing,
              "Session Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN)", RFC 5389,
              October 2008.

   [RFC5766]  Mahy, R., Matthews, P., and J. Rosenberg, "Traversal Using
              Relays around NAT (TURN): Relay Extensions to Session
              Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN)", RFC 5766, April 2010.

   [RFC6066]  Eastlake, D., "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extensions:
              Extension Definitions", RFC 6066, January 2011.

   [RFC6454]  Barth, A., "The Web Origin Concept", RFC 6454,
              December 2011.

   [WebRTC-API]
              Bergkvist, A., Burnett, D., Jennings, C., and A.
              Narayanan, "WebRTC 1.0: Real-time Communication Between
              Browsers", W3C Working Draft http://www.w3.org/TR/webrtc/,
              2013, <http://www.w3.org/TR/2013/WD-webrtc-20130910/>.










Johnston, et al.         Expires August 8, 2014                 [Page 8]


Internet-Draft                 STUN Origin                 February 2014


Authors' Addresses

   Alan Johnston
   Avaya
   St. Louis, MO
   USA

   Phone:
   Email: alan.b.johnston@gmail.com


   Justin Uberti
   Google
   Kirkland, WA
   USA

   Phone:
   Email: justin@uberti.name


   John Yoakum
   Avaya
   Cary, NC
   USA

   Phone:
   Email: yoakum@avaya.com


   Kundan Singh
   Avaya
   San Francisco, CA
   USA

   Phone:
   Email: kundan10@gmail.com















Johnston, et al.         Expires August 8, 2014                 [Page 9]


Html markup produced by rfcmarkup 1.129d, available from https://tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcmarkup/