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Versions: 00 01

JOSE Working Group                                              M. Jones
Internet-Draft                                                 Microsoft
Intended status: Standards Track                           March 3, 2015
Expires: September 4, 2015


                 Key Managed JSON Web Signature (KMJWS)
           draft-jones-jose-key-managed-json-web-signature-00

Abstract

   Key Managed JSON Web Signature (KMJWS) represents content that is
   integrity protected with a Message Authentication Code (MAC) in which
   key management is employed for the MAC key.  This representation
   reuses key management functionality already present in the JSON Web
   Encryption (JWE) specification and MAC functionality already present
   in the JSON Web Signature (JWS) specification.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
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   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 4, 2015.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
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   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as



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   described in the Simplified BSD License.


Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     1.1.  Notational Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   3.  Example KMJWS  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   4.  KMJWS Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   5.  Header Parameters  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
   6.  Serializations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     6.1.  JWS Compact Serialization  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     6.2.  JWS JSON Serialization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
       6.2.1.  General KMJWS JSON Serialization Syntax  . . . . . . .  7
       6.2.2.  Flattened KMJWS JSON Serialization Syntax  . . . . . .  8
   7.  Distinguishing between KMJWS, JWS, and JWE Objects . . . . . .  9
   8.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     8.1.  JWS and JWE Header Parameter Registration  . . . . . . . .  9
       8.1.1.  Registry Contents  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   9.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
   Appendix A.  Example KMJWS using RSAES OAEP and HMAC SHA-256 . . . 11
     A.1.  JOSE Header  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     A.2.  Payload  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     A.3.  JWS Signing Input  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
     A.4.  Integrity Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
     A.5.  Key Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
     A.6.  Complete Representation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
   Appendix B.  Document History  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
   Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15


















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1.  Introduction

   Key Managed JSON Web Signature (KMJWS) represents content that is
   integrity protected with a Message Authentication Code (MAC) in which
   key management is employed for the MAC key.  This representation
   reuses key management functionality already present in the JSON Web
   Encryption (JWE) [JWE] specification and MAC functionality already
   present in the JSON Web Signature (JWS) [JWS] specification.

   A KMJWS is neither a JWS nor a JWE, but incorporates elements of
   both.  Specifically, the Key Management algorithms registered in the
   JSON Web Signature and Encryption Algorithms Registry
   [IANA.JOSE.Algs] are used to provide MAC keys in the same way that
   they are used to provide content encryption keys in JSON Web
   Encryption (JWE) [JWE].  Likewise, the MAC algorithms registered in
   this registry are used to integrity protect the JWS Payload and JWS
   Protected Header in the same way that they are used to integrity
   protect the JWS Payload and JWS Protected Header in JSON Web
   Signature (JWS) [JWS].

1.1.  Notational Conventions

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in Key
   words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels [RFC2119].

   UTF8(STRING) denotes the octets of the UTF-8 [RFC3629] representation
   of STRING, where STRING is a sequence of zero or more Unicode
   [UNICODE] characters.

   ASCII(STRING) denotes the octets of the ASCII [RFC20] representation
   of STRING, where STRING is a sequence of zero or more ASCII
   characters.

   The concatenation of two values A and B is denoted as A || B.


2.  Terminology

   This specification uses the same terminology as the JSON Web
   Signature (JWS) [JWS], JSON Web Encryption (JWE) [JWE], and JSON Web
   Algorithms (JWA) [JWA] specifications.

   These terms are defined by this specification:






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   Key Managed JSON Web Signature (KMJWS)
      A data structure employing key management representing a MACed
      message.

   MAC Key
      A symmetric key for the MAC algorithm used to integrity protect
      the JWS Payload and the JWS Protected Header.

   KMJWS Encrypted Key
      Encrypted MAC Key. Note that for some algorithms, the KMJWS
      Encrypted Key value is specified as being the empty octet
      sequence.


3.  Example KMJWS

   This section provides an example of a KMJWS.  Its computation is
   described in more detail in Appendix A, including specifying the key
   values used.

   The following example JWS Protected Header declares that:

   o  The MAC Key is encrypted using the RSAES OAEP [RFC3447] algorithm
      to produce the KMJWS Encrypted Key.

   o  The JWS Protected Header and the JWS Payload are integrity
      protected using the HMAC SHA-256 [RFC2104, SHS] algorithm.


     {"alg":"RSA-OAEP","mac":"HS256"}

   Encoding this JWS Protected Header as BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected
   Header)) gives this value:

     eyJhbGciOiJSU0EtT0FFUCIsIm1hYyI6IkhTMjU2In0

   The payload in this example is the ASCII representation of the text
   "What I have written, I have written."  The value BASE64URL(JWS
   Payload) is:

     V2hhdCBJIGhhdmUgd3JpdHRlbiwgSSBoYXZlIHdyaXR0ZW4u

   Computing the HMAC of the JWS Signing Input ASCII(BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS
   Protected Header)) || '.' || BASE64URL(JWS Payload)) with the HMAC
   SHA-256 algorithm using the MAC Key specified in Appendix A.4 and
   base64url encoding the result yields this BASE64URL(JWS Signature)
   value:




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     NjTOnXAAXtr7dA6RSxYkZcD6F-n5BOrLHRTxiTLptKM

   The MAC Key is encrypted using the RSAES OAEP algorithm and the RSA
   key specified in Appendix A.5.  The resulting BASE64URL(KMJWS
   Encrypted Key) value (with line breaks for display purposes only) is:

     OKOawDo13gRp2ojaHV7LFpZcgV7T6DVZKTyKOMTYUmKoTCVJRgckCL9kiMT03JGe
     ipsEdY3mx_etLbbWSrFr05kLzcSr4qKAq7YN7e9jwQRb23nfa6c9d-StnImGyFDb
     Sv04uVuxIp5Zms1gNxKKK2Da14B8S4rzVRltdYwam_lDp5XnZAYpQdb76FdIKLaV
     mqgfwX7XWRxv2322i-vDxRfqNzo_tETKzpVLzfiwQyeyPGLBIO56YJ7eObdv0je8
     1860ppamavo35UgoRdbYaBcoh9QcfylQr66oc6vFWXRcZ_ZT2LawVCWTIy3brGPi
     6UklfCpIMfIjf7iGdXKHzg

   Concatenating these values in the order
   Header.Payload.Signature.Encrypted_Key with period ('.') characters
   between the parts yields this complete KMJWS representation using the
   KMJWS Compact Serialization (with line breaks for display purposes
   only):

     eyJhbGciOiJSU0EtT0FFUCIsIm1hYyI6IkhTMjU2In0
     .
     V2hhdCBJIGhhdmUgd3JpdHRlbiwgSSBoYXZlIHdyaXR0ZW4u
     .
     NjTOnXAAXtr7dA6RSxYkZcD6F-n5BOrLHRTxiTLptKM
     .
     OKOawDo13gRp2ojaHV7LFpZcgV7T6DVZKTyKOMTYUmKoTCVJRgckCL9kiMT03JGe
     ipsEdY3mx_etLbbWSrFr05kLzcSr4qKAq7YN7e9jwQRb23nfa6c9d-StnImGyFDb
     Sv04uVuxIp5Zms1gNxKKK2Da14B8S4rzVRltdYwam_lDp5XnZAYpQdb76FdIKLaV
     mqgfwX7XWRxv2322i-vDxRfqNzo_tETKzpVLzfiwQyeyPGLBIO56YJ7eObdv0je8
     1860ppamavo35UgoRdbYaBcoh9QcfylQr66oc6vFWXRcZ_ZT2LawVCWTIy3brGPi
     6UklfCpIMfIjf7iGdXKHzg


4.  KMJWS Contents

   A Key Managed JSON Web Signature (KMJWS) represents these logical
   values:

   o  JOSE Header
   o  JWS Payload
   o  JWS Signature
   o  KMJWS Encrypted Key

   For a KMJWS, just as it is for a JWS, the JOSE Header members are the
   union of the members of these values:






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   o  JWS Protected Header
   o  JWS Unprotected Header

   The JWS Payload and JWS Signature are likewise the same for a KMJWS
   are they are for a JWS.

   The KMJWS Encrypted Key is the one value present in a KMJWS that is
   not present in a JWS.  It enables key management for the MAC Key.


5.  Header Parameters

   A KMJWS uses these Header Parameter fields to convey the key
   management and MAC algorithms used:

   alg
      The key management algorithm employed.  This parameter has the
      same meaning, syntax, and processing rules as the "alg" Header
      Parameter defined in Section 4.1.1 of [JWE], except that the key
      being encrypted or determined is the MAC key, rather than the
      Content Encryption Key.

   mac
      This parameter has the same meaning, syntax, and processing rules
      as the "alg" Header Parameter defined in Section 4.1.1 of [JWS],
      except that the algorithm MUST be a MAC algorithm and the MAC key
      is determined by the key management procedure employed.

   The "jku", "jwk", "kid", "x5u", "x5c", "x5t", "x5t#S256", "typ", and
   "crit" Header Parameters defined in Section 4.1 of [JWE] are used
   identically, except that the key being encrypted or determined is the
   MAC key, rather than the Content Encryption Key. The "cty" Header
   Parameter defined in Section 4.1.10 of [JWS] is used identically,
   except that the JWS Payload is that of a KMJWS, rather than a JWS.
   The "enc" and "zip" Header Parameters defined in Section 4.1 of [JWE]
   MUST NOT be used.


6.  Serializations

   Like JWSs, KMJWSs can utilize one of two different serializations:
   the KMJWS Compact Serialization or the KMJWS JSON Serialization.

6.1.  JWS Compact Serialization

   Like the JWS Compact Serialization, the KMJWS Compact Serialization
   represents MACed content as a compact, URL-safe string.  This string
   is:



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      BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected Header)) || '.' ||
      BASE64URL(JWS Payload) || '.' ||
      BASE64URL(JWS Signature) || '.' ||
      BASE64URL(KMJWS Encrypted Key)

   Only one MAC is supported by the KMJWS Compact Serialization and it
   provides no syntax to represent a JWS Unprotected Header value.

6.2.  JWS JSON Serialization

   Like the JWS JSON Serialization, the KMJWS JSON Serialization
   represents MACed content as a JSON object RFC 7159 [RFC7159].  This
   representation is neither optimized for compactness nor URL-safe.

   Also like the JWS JSON Serialization, two closely related syntaxes
   are defined for the KMJWS JSON Serialization: a fully general syntax,
   with which content can be secured with more than one MAC operation,
   and a flattened syntax, which is optimized for the single MAC case.

6.2.1.  General KMJWS JSON Serialization Syntax

   The following members are defined for use in top-level JSON objects
   used for the fully general KMJWS JSON Serialization syntax:

   payload
      This is the same as the JWS "payload" member.

   signatures
      This is the same as the JWS "signatures" member.

   The following members are defined for use in the JSON objects that
   are elements of the "signatures" array:

   protected
      This is the same as the JWS the "protected" member.

   header
      This is the same as the JWS "header" member.

   signature
      This is the same as the JWS "signature" member.

   encrypted_key
      The "encrypted_key" member MUST be present and contain the value
      BASE64URL(KMJWS Encrypted Key).

   At least one of the "protected" and "header" members MUST be present
   for each MAC computation so that "alg" and "mac" Header Parameter



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   values are conveyed.

   Additional members can be present in both the JSON objects defined
   above; if not understood by implementations encountering them, they
   MUST be ignored.

   The Header Parameter values used when creating or validating
   individual MAC values are the union of the two sets of Header
   Parameter values that may be present: (1) the JWS Protected Header
   represented in the "protected" member of the MAC's array element, and
   (2) the JWS Unprotected Header in the "header" member of the MAC's
   array element.  The union of these sets of Header Parameters
   comprises the JOSE Header.  The Header Parameter names in the two
   locations MUST be disjoint.

   Each JWS Signature value is computed using the parameters of the
   corresponding JOSE Header value in the same manner as for the JWS
   Compact Serialization.  This has the desirable property that each JWS
   Signature value represented in the "signatures" array is identical to
   the value that would have been computed for the same parameter in the
   KMJWS Compact Serialization, provided that the JWS Protected Header
   value for that MAC computation (which represents the integrity
   protected Header Parameter values) matches that used in the KMJWS
   Compact Serialization.

   In summary, the syntax of a KMJWS using the general KMJWS JSON
   Serialization is as follows:

     {
      "payload":"<payload contents>",
      "signatures":[
       {"protected":"<integrity-protected header 1 contents>",
        "header":<non-integrity-protected header 1 contents>,
        "signature":"<signature 1 contents>",
        "encrypted_key":"<encrypted key 1 contents>"},
       ...
       {"protected":"<integrity-protected header N contents>",
        "header":<non-integrity-protected header N contents>,
        "signature":"<signature N contents>",
        "encrypted_key":"<encrypted key N contents>"}]
     }

6.2.2.  Flattened KMJWS JSON Serialization Syntax

   The flattened KMJWS JSON Serialization syntax is based upon the
   general syntax, but flattens it in the same way that the flattened
   JWS JSON Serialization syntax flattens its general syntax.




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   In summary, the syntax of a KMJWS using the flattened KMJWS JSON
   Serialization is as follows:

     {
      "payload":"<payload contents>",
      "protected":"<integrity-protected header contents>",
      "header":<non-integrity-protected header contents>,
      "signature":"<signature contents>",
      "encrypted_key":"<encrypted key contents>"
     }


7.  Distinguishing between KMJWS, JWS, and JWE Objects

   While KMJWSs have characteristics of both JWSs and JWEs, these
   methods can be used to distinguish KMJWSs from either of them.  This
   section augments the information in Section 9 of [JWE].

   o  If the object is using a compact serialization, the number of
      base64url encoded segments separated by period ('.') characters
      will differ.  KMJWSs have four segments separated by three period
      ('.') characters and the others do not.

   o  If the object is using a JSON serialization, the members used will
      be different.  KMJWSs have both a "payload" and an "encrypted_key"
      member and the others do not.

   o  The JOSE Header for a KMJWS can also be distinguished from the
      JOSE Header for a JWS or JWE by determining whether a "mac" (MAC
      Algorithm) member exists.  If the "mac" member exists, it is a
      KMJWS; otherwise, it is not.


8.  IANA Considerations

8.1.  JWS and JWE Header Parameter Registration

   This specification registers the "mac" (MAC Algorithm) Header
   Parameter defined in Section 5 in the IANA JSON Web Signature and
   Encryption Header Parameters registry defined in [JWS].

8.1.1.  Registry Contents

   o  Header Parameter Name: "mac"
   o  Header Parameter Description: MAC Algorithm
   o  Header Parameter Usage Location(s): KMJWS





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   o  Change Controller: IETF
   o  Specification Document(s): Section 5 of [[ this document ]]


9.  Security Considerations

   The key management security considerations from [JWE] apply.  The
   integrity protection security considerations from [JWS] apply.  The
   algorithm security considerations from [JWA] apply.


10.  References

10.1.  Normative References

   [IANA.JOSE.Algs]
              Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA), "JSON Web
              Signature and Encryption Algorithms Registry", 2015, <http
              ://www.iana.org/assignments/jose/
              jose.xhtml#web-signature-encryption-algorithms-types>.

   [JWA]      Jones, M., "JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)",
              draft-ietf-jose-json-web-algorithms (work in progress),
              January 2015.

   [JWE]      Jones, M. and J. Hildebrand, "JSON Web Encryption (JWE)",
              draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption (work in progress),
              January 2015.

   [JWS]      Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
              Signature (JWS)", draft-ietf-jose-json-web-signature (work
              in progress), January 2015.

   [RFC20]    Cerf, V., "ASCII format for Network Interchange", RFC 20,
              October 1969.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC3629]  Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO
              10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, November 2003.

   [RFC7159]  Bray, T., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
              Interchange Format", RFC 7159, March 2014.

   [UNICODE]  The Unicode Consortium, "The Unicode Standard", 1991-,
              <http://www.unicode.org/versions/latest/>.




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10.2.  Informative References

   [JWK]      Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)",
              draft-ietf-jose-json-web-key (work in progress),
              January 2015.

   [RFC2104]  Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
              Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
              February 1997.

   [RFC3447]  Jonsson, J. and B. Kaliski, "Public-Key Cryptography
              Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications
              Version 2.1", RFC 3447, February 2003.

   [SHS]      National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Secure
              Hash Standard (SHS)", FIPS PUB 180-4, March 2012.


Appendix A.  Example KMJWS using RSAES OAEP and HMAC SHA-256

   This example secures the payload using RSAES OAEP for key encryption
   and HMAC SHA-256 for integrity protection.

A.1.  JOSE Header

   The following example JWS Protected Header declares that:

   o  The MAC Key is encrypted using the RSAES OAEP [RFC3447] algorithm
      to produce the KMJWS Encrypted Key.

   o  The JWS Protected Header and the JWS Payload are integrity
      protected using the HMAC SHA-256 [RFC2104, SHS] algorithm.


     {"alg":"RSA-OAEP","mac":"HS256"}

   Encoding this JWS Protected Header as BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected
   Header)) gives this value:

     eyJhbGciOiJSU0EtT0FFUCIsIm1hYyI6IkhTMjU2In0

A.2.  Payload

   The payload in this example is the ASCII representation of the text
   "What I have written, I have written."  The representation of this
   payload (using JSON array notation) is:

   [87, 104, 97, 116, 32, 73, 32, 104, 97, 118, 101, 32, 119, 114, 105,



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   116, 116, 101, 110, 44, 32, 73, 32, 104, 97, 118, 101, 32, 119, 114,
   105, 116, 116, 101, 110, 46]

   The value BASE64URL(JWS Payload) is:

     V2hhdCBJIGhhdmUgd3JpdHRlbiwgSSBoYXZlIHdyaXR0ZW4u

A.3.  JWS Signing Input

   Combining these as BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected Header)) || '.' ||
   BASE64URL(JWS Payload) gives this string (with line breaks for
   display purposes only):

     eyJhbGciOiJSU0EtT0FFUCIsIm1hYyI6IkhTMjU2In0
     .
     V2hhdCBJIGhhdmUgd3JpdHRlbiwgSSBoYXZlIHdyaXR0ZW4u

   The resulting JWS Signing Input value, which is the ASCII
   representation of above string, is the following octet sequence
   (using JSON array notation):

   [101, 121, 74, 104, 98, 71, 99, 105, 79, 105, 74, 83, 85, 48, 69,
   116, 84, 48, 70, 70, 85, 67, 73, 115, 73, 109, 49, 104, 89, 121, 73,
   54, 73, 107, 104, 84, 77, 106, 85, 50, 73, 110, 48, 46, 86, 50, 104,
   104, 100, 67, 66, 74, 73, 71, 104, 104, 100, 109, 85, 103, 100, 51,
   74, 112, 100, 72, 82, 108, 98, 105, 119, 103, 83, 83, 66, 111, 89,
   88, 90, 108, 73, 72, 100, 121, 97, 88, 82, 48, 90, 87, 52, 117]

A.4.  Integrity Protection

   Compute the HMAC of the JWS Signing Input with the HMAC SHA-256
   algorithm.  This example uses the MAC Key below:

   [177, 161, 244, 128, 84, 143, 225, 115, 63, 180, 3, 255, 107, 154,
   212, 246, 138, 7, 110, 91, 112, 46, 34, 105, 47, 130, 203, 46, 122,
   234, 64, 252]

   The resulting JWS Signature value is:

   [54, 52, 206, 157, 112, 0, 94, 218, 251, 116, 14, 145, 75, 22, 36,
   101, 192, 250, 23, 233, 249, 4, 234, 203, 29, 20, 241, 137, 50, 233,
   180, 163]

   Base64url encoding the result yields this BASE64URL(JWS Signature)
   value:

     NjTOnXAAXtr7dA6RSxYkZcD6F-n5BOrLHRTxiTLptKM




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A.5.  Key Encryption

   Encrypt the MAC Key with the recipient's public key using the RSAES
   OAEP algorithm to produce the KMJWS Encrypted Key. This example uses
   the RSA key represented in JSON Web Key [JWK] format below (with line
   breaks within values for display purposes only):

     {"kty":"RSA",
      "n":"oahUIoWw0K0usKNuOR6H4wkf4oBUXHTxRvgb48E-BVvxkeDNjbC4he8rUW
           cJoZmds2h7M70imEVhRU5djINXtqllXI4DFqcI1DgjT9LewND8MW2Krf3S
           psk_ZkoFnilakGygTwpZ3uesH-PFABNIUYpOiN15dsQRkgr0vEhxN92i2a
           sbOenSZeyaxziK72UwxrrKoExv6kc5twXTq4h-QChLOln0_mtUZwfsRaMS
           tPs6mS6XrgxnxbWhojf663tuEQueGC-FCMfra36C9knDFGzKsNa7LZK2dj
           YgyD3JR_MB_4NUJW_TqOQtwHYbxevoJArm-L5StowjzGy-_bq6Gw",
      "e":"AQAB",
      "d":"kLdtIj6GbDks_ApCSTYQtelcNttlKiOyPzMrXHeI-yk1F7-kpDxY4-WY5N
           WV5KntaEeXS1j82E375xxhWMHXyvjYecPT9fpwR_M9gV8n9Hrh2anTpTD9
           3Dt62ypW3yDsJzBnTnrYu1iwWRgBKrEYY46qAZIrA2xAwnm2X7uGR1hghk
           qDp0Vqj3kbSCz1XyfCs6_LehBwtxHIyh8Ripy40p24moOAbgxVw3rxT_vl
           t3UVe4WO3JkJOzlpUf-KTVI2Ptgm-dARxTEtE-id-4OJr0h-K-VFs3VSnd
           VTIznSxfyrj8ILL6MG_Uv8YAu7VILSB3lOW085-4qE3DzgrTjgyQ",
      "p":"1r52Xk46c-LsfB5P442p7atdPUrxQSy4mti_tZI3Mgf2EuFVbUoDBvaRQ-
           SWxkbkmoEzL7JXroSBjSrK3YIQgYdMgyAEPTPjXv_hI2_1eTSPVZfzL0lf
           fNn03IXqWF5MDFuoUYE0hzb2vhrlN_rKrbfDIwUbTrjjgieRbwC6Cl0",
      "q":"wLb35x7hmQWZsWJmB_vle87ihgZ19S8lBEROLIsZG4ayZVe9Hi9gDVCOBm
           UDdaDYVTSNx_8Fyw1YYa9XGrGnDew00J28cRUoeBB_jKI1oma0Orv1T9aX
           IWxKwd4gvxFImOWr3QRL9KEBRzk2RatUBnmDZJTIAfwTs0g68UZHvtc",
      "dp":"ZK-YwE7diUh0qR1tR7w8WHtolDx3MZ_OTowiFvgfeQ3SiresXjm9gZ5KL
           hMXvo-uz-KUJWDxS5pFQ_M0evdo1dKiRTjVw_x4NyqyXPM5nULPkcpU827
           rnpZzAJKpdhWAgqrXGKAECQH0Xt4taznjnd_zVpAmZZq60WPMBMfKcuE",
      "dq":"Dq0gfgJ1DdFGXiLvQEZnuKEN0UUmsJBxkjydc3j4ZYdBiMRAy86x0vHCj
           ywcMlYYg4yoC4YZa9hNVcsjqA3FeiL19rk8g6Qn29Tt0cj8qqyFpz9vNDB
           UfCAiJVeESOjJDZPYHdHY8v1b-o-Z2X5tvLx-TCekf7oxyeKDUqKWjis",
      "qi":"VIMpMYbPf47dT1w_zDUXfPimsSegnMOA1zTaX7aGk_8urY6R8-ZW1FxU7
           AlWAyLWybqq6t16VFd7hQd0y6flUK4SlOydB61gwanOsXGOAOv82cHq0E3
           eL4HrtZkUuKvnPrMnsUUFlfUdybVzxyjz9JF_XyaY14ardLSjf4L_FNY"
     }

   The resulting KMJWS Encrypted Key value is:

   [56, 163, 154, 192, 58, 53, 222, 4, 105, 218, 136, 218, 29, 94, 203,
   22, 150, 92, 129, 94, 211, 232, 53, 89, 41, 60, 138, 56, 196, 216,
   82, 98, 168, 76, 37, 73, 70, 7, 36, 8, 191, 100, 136, 196, 244, 220,
   145, 158, 138, 155, 4, 117, 141, 230, 199, 247, 173, 45, 182, 214,
   74, 177, 107, 211, 153, 11, 205, 196, 171, 226, 162, 128, 171, 182,
   13, 237, 239, 99, 193, 4, 91, 219, 121, 223, 107, 167, 61, 119, 228,
   173, 156, 137, 134, 200, 80, 219, 74, 253, 56, 185, 91, 177, 34, 158,
   89, 154, 205, 96, 55, 18, 138, 43, 96, 218, 215, 128, 124, 75, 138,



Jones                   Expires September 4, 2015              [Page 13]


Internet-Draft   Key Managed JSON Web Signature (KMJWS)       March 2015


   243, 85, 25, 109, 117, 140, 26, 155, 249, 67, 167, 149, 231, 100, 6,
   41, 65, 214, 251, 232, 87, 72, 40, 182, 149, 154, 168, 31, 193, 126,
   215, 89, 28, 111, 219, 125, 182, 139, 235, 195, 197, 23, 234, 55, 58,
   63, 180, 68, 202, 206, 149, 75, 205, 248, 176, 67, 39, 178, 60, 98,
   193, 32, 238, 122, 96, 158, 222, 57, 183, 111, 210, 55, 188, 215,
   206, 180, 166, 150, 166, 106, 250, 55, 229, 72, 40, 69, 214, 216,
   104, 23, 40, 135, 212, 28, 127, 41, 80, 175, 174, 168, 115, 171, 197,
   89, 116, 92, 103, 246, 83, 216, 182, 176, 84, 37, 147, 35, 45, 219,
   172, 99, 226, 233, 73, 37, 124, 42, 72, 49, 242, 35, 127, 184, 134,
   117, 114, 135, 206]

   Encoding this KMJWS Encrypted Key as BASE64URL(KMJWS Encrypted Key)
   gives this value (with line breaks for display purposes only):

     OKOawDo13gRp2ojaHV7LFpZcgV7T6DVZKTyKOMTYUmKoTCVJRgckCL9kiMT03JGe
     ipsEdY3mx_etLbbWSrFr05kLzcSr4qKAq7YN7e9jwQRb23nfa6c9d-StnImGyFDb
     Sv04uVuxIp5Zms1gNxKKK2Da14B8S4rzVRltdYwam_lDp5XnZAYpQdb76FdIKLaV
     mqgfwX7XWRxv2322i-vDxRfqNzo_tETKzpVLzfiwQyeyPGLBIO56YJ7eObdv0je8
     1860ppamavo35UgoRdbYaBcoh9QcfylQr66oc6vFWXRcZ_ZT2LawVCWTIy3brGPi
     6UklfCpIMfIjf7iGdXKHzg

A.6.  Complete Representation

   Assemble the final representation: The Compact Serialization of this
   result is the string BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected Header)) || '.' ||
   BASE64URL(JWS Payload) || '.' || BASE64URL(JWS Signature) || '.' ||
   BASE64URL(KMJWS Encrypted Key).

   The final result in this example (with line breaks for display
   purposes only) is:

     eyJhbGciOiJSU0EtT0FFUCIsIm1hYyI6IkhTMjU2In0
     .
     V2hhdCBJIGhhdmUgd3JpdHRlbiwgSSBoYXZlIHdyaXR0ZW4u
     .
     NjTOnXAAXtr7dA6RSxYkZcD6F-n5BOrLHRTxiTLptKM
     .
     OKOawDo13gRp2ojaHV7LFpZcgV7T6DVZKTyKOMTYUmKoTCVJRgckCL9kiMT03JGe
     ipsEdY3mx_etLbbWSrFr05kLzcSr4qKAq7YN7e9jwQRb23nfa6c9d-StnImGyFDb
     Sv04uVuxIp5Zms1gNxKKK2Da14B8S4rzVRltdYwam_lDp5XnZAYpQdb76FdIKLaV
     mqgfwX7XWRxv2322i-vDxRfqNzo_tETKzpVLzfiwQyeyPGLBIO56YJ7eObdv0je8
     1860ppamavo35UgoRdbYaBcoh9QcfylQr66oc6vFWXRcZ_ZT2LawVCWTIy3brGPi
     6UklfCpIMfIjf7iGdXKHzg








Jones                   Expires September 4, 2015              [Page 14]


Internet-Draft   Key Managed JSON Web Signature (KMJWS)       March 2015


Appendix B.  Document History

   [[ to be removed by the RFC editor before publication as an RFC ]]

   -00

   o  Created draft-jones-jose-key-managed-json-web-signature.


Author's Address

   Michael B. Jones
   Microsoft

   Email: mbj@microsoft.com
   URI:   http://self-issued.info/



































Jones                   Expires September 4, 2015              [Page 15]


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