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Versions: 00 01 02 03 04 draft-ietf-jose-json-web-signature

Network Working Group                                           M. Jones
Internet-Draft                                                 Microsoft
Intended status: Standards Track                              D. Balfanz
Expires: October 31, 2011                                         Google
                                                              J. Bradley
                                                             independent
                                                               Y. Goland
                                                               Microsoft
                                                               J. Panzer
                                                                  Google
                                                             N. Sakimura
                                               Nomura Research Institute
                                                               P. Tarjan
                                                                Facebook
                                                          April 29, 2011


                        JSON Web Signature (JWS)
                   draft-jones-json-web-signature-02

Abstract

   JSON Web Signature (JWS) is a means of representing signed content
   using JSON data structures.  Related encryption capabilities are
   described in the separate JSON Web Encryption (JWE) specification.

Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on October 31, 2011.



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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.





































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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   2.  Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   3.  JSON Web Signature (JWS) Overview  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     3.1.  Example JWS  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   4.  JWS Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     4.1.  Reserved Header Parameter Names  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     4.2.  Public Header Parameter Names  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     4.3.  Private Header Parameter Names . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   5.  Rules for Creating and Validating a JWS  . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   6.  Base64url encoding as used by JWSs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
   7.  Signing JWSs with Cryptographic Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . 11
     7.1.  Creating a JWS with HMAC SHA-256, HMAC SHA-384, or
           HMAC SHA-512 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
     7.2.  Creating a JWS with RSA SHA-256, RSA SHA-384, or RSA
           SHA-512  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
     7.3.  Creating a JWS with ECDSA P-256 SHA-256, ECDSA P-384
           SHA-384, or ECDSA P-521 SHA-512  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
     7.4.  Additional Algorithms  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
   8.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
   9.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
     9.1.  Unicode Comparison Security Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
   10. Open Issues and Things To Be Done (TBD)  . . . . . . . . . . . 17
   11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
     11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
     11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
   Appendix A.  JWS Examples  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
     A.1.  JWS using HMAC SHA-256 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
       A.1.1.  Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
       A.1.2.  Decoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
       A.1.3.  Validating . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
     A.2.  JWS using RSA SHA-256  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
       A.2.1.  Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
       A.2.2.  Decoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
       A.2.3.  Validating . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
     A.3.  JWS using ECDSA P-256 SHA-256  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
       A.3.1.  Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
       A.3.2.  Decoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
       A.3.3.  Validating . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
   Appendix B.  Algorithm Identifier Cross-Reference  . . . . . . . . 29
   Appendix C.  Notes on implementing base64url encoding without
                padding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
   Appendix D.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
   Appendix E.  Document History  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33





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1.  Introduction

   JSON Web Signature (JWS) is a compact signature format intended for
   space constrained environments such as HTTP Authorization headers and
   URI query parameters.  It represents signed content using JSON
   [RFC4627] data structures.  The JWS signature mechanisms are
   independent of the type of content being signed, allowing arbitrary
   content to be signed.  A related encryption capability is described
   in a separate JSON Web Encryption (JWE) [JWE] specification.


2.  Terminology

   JSON Web Signature (JWS)  A data structure cryptographically securing
      a JWS Header Input and a JWS Payload Input with a JWS Crypto
      Output.

   JWS Header Input  A string containing a base64url encoded JSON object
      that describes the cryptographic operations applied to the JWS
      Header Input and the JWS Payload Input.

   JWS Payload Input  A string containing base64url encoded content.

   JWS Crypto Output  A string containing base64url encoded
      cryptographic material that secures the contents of the JWS Header
      Input and the JWS Payload Input.

   Decoded JWS Header Input  JWS Header Input that has been base64url
      decoded back into a JSON object.

   Decoded JWS Payload Input  JWS Payload Input that has been base64url
      decoded.

   Decoded JWS Crypto Output  JWS Crypto Output that has been base64url
      decoded back into cryptographic material.

   JWS Signing Input  The concatenation of the JWS Header Input, a
      period ('.') character, and the JWS Payload Input.

   Header Parameter Names  The names of the members within the JSON
      object represented in a JWS Header Input.

   Header Parameter Values  The values of the members within the JSON
      object represented in a JWS Header Input.







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   Digital Signature  For the purposes of this specification, we use
      this term to encompass both Hash-based Message Authentication
      Codes (HMACs), which can provide authenticity but not non-
      repudiation, and digital signatures using public key algorithms,
      which can provide both.  Readers should be aware of this
      distinction, despite the decision to use a single term for both
      concepts to improve readability of the specification.

   Base64url Encoding  For the purposes of this specification, this term
      always refers to the he URL- and filename-safe Base64 encoding
      described in RFC 4648 [RFC4648], Section 5, with the '=' padding
      characters omitted, as permitted by Section 3.2.


3.  JSON Web Signature (JWS) Overview

   JWSs represent content that is base64url encoded and digitally
   signed, and optionally encrypted, using JSON data structures.  A
   portion of the base64url encoded content that is signed is the JWS
   Payload Input.  An accompanying base64url encoded JSON object - the
   JWS Header Input - describes the signature method used.

   The member names within the Decoded JWS Header Input are referred to
   as Header Parameter Names.  These names MUST be unique.  The
   corresponding values are referred to as Header Parameter Values.

   JWSs contain a signature that ensures the integrity of the contents
   of the JWS Header Input and the JWS Payload Input.  This signature
   value is the JWS Crypto Output.  The JSON Header object MUST contain
   an "alg" parameter, the value of which is a string that unambiguously
   identifies the algorithm used to sign the JWS Header Input and the
   JWS Payload Input to produce the JWS Crypto Output.

3.1.  Example JWS

   The following example JSON header object declares that the encoded
   object is a JSON Web Token (JWT) [JWT] and the JWS Header Input and
   the JWS Payload Input are signed using the HMAC SHA-256 algorithm:
   {"typ":"JWT",
    "alg":"HS256"}

   Base64url encoding the UTF-8 representation of the JSON header object
   yields this JWS Header Input value:
   eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLA0KICJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9

   The following is an example of a JSON object that can be encoded to
   produce a JWS Payload Input.  (Note that the payload can be any
   base64url encoded content, and need not be a base64url encoded JSON



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   object.)
   {"iss":"joe",
    "exp":1300819380,
    "http://example.com/is_root":true}

   Base64url encoding the UTF-8 representation of the JSON object yields
   the following JWS Payload Input.
eyJpc3MiOiJqb2UiLA0KICJleHAiOjEzMDA4MTkzODAsDQogImh0dHA6Ly9leGFtcGxlLmNvbS9pc19yb290Ijp0cnVlfQ

   Signing the UTF-8 representation of the JWS Signing Input (the
   concatenation of the JWS Header Input, a period ('.') character, and
   the JWS Payload Input) with the HMAC SHA-256 algorithm and base64url
   encoding the result, as per Section 7.1, yields this JWS Crypto
   Output value:
   dBjftJeZ4CVP-mB92K27uhbUJU1p1r_wW1gFWFOEjXk

   This computation is illustrated in more detail in Appendix A.1.


4.  JWS Header

   The members of the JSON object represented by the Decoded JWS Header
   Input describe the signature applied to the JWS Header Input and the
   JWS Payload Input and optionally additional properties of the JWS.
   Implementations MUST understand the entire contents of the header;
   otherwise, the JWS MUST be rejected for processing.

4.1.  Reserved Header Parameter Names

   The following header parameter names are reserved.  All the names are
   short because a core goal of JWSs is for the representations to be
   compact.



















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   +-----------+--------+--------------+-------------------------------+
   | Header    | JSON   | Header       | Header Parameter Semantics    |
   | Parameter | Value  | Parameter    |                               |
   | Name      | Type   | Syntax       |                               |
   +-----------+--------+--------------+-------------------------------+
   | alg       | string | StringAndURI | The "alg" (algorithm) header  |
   |           |        |              | parameter identifies the      |
   |           |        |              | cryptographic algorithm used  |
   |           |        |              | to secure the JWS.  A list of |
   |           |        |              | reserved alg values is in     |
   |           |        |              | Table 3.  The processing of   |
   |           |        |              | the "alg" (algorithm) header  |
   |           |        |              | parameter, if present,        |
   |           |        |              | requires that the value of    |
   |           |        |              | the "alg" header parameter    |
   |           |        |              | MUST be one that is both      |
   |           |        |              | supported and for which there |
   |           |        |              | exists a key for use with     |
   |           |        |              | that algorithm associated     |
   |           |        |              | with the signer of the        |
   |           |        |              | content.  The "alg" parameter |
   |           |        |              | value is case sensitive.      |
   |           |        |              | This header parameter is      |
   |           |        |              | REQUIRED.                     |
   | typ       | string | String       | The "typ" (type) header       |
   |           |        |              | parameter is used to declare  |
   |           |        |              | the type of the signed        |
   |           |        |              | content.  The "typ" value is  |
   |           |        |              | case sensitive.  This header  |
   |           |        |              | parameter is OPTIONAL.        |
   | jku       | string | URL          | The "jku" (JSON Key URL)      |
   |           |        |              | header parameter is a URL     |
   |           |        |              | that points to JSON-encoded   |
   |           |        |              | public keys that can be used  |
   |           |        |              | to validate the signature.    |
   |           |        |              | The keys MUST be encoded as   |
   |           |        |              | per the JSON Web Key (JWK)    |
   |           |        |              | [JWK] specification.  This    |
   |           |        |              | header parameter is OPTIONAL. |












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   | kid       | string | String       | The "kid" (key ID) header     |
   |           |        |              | parameter is a hint           |
   |           |        |              | indicating which specific key |
   |           |        |              | owned by the signer should be |
   |           |        |              | used to validate the          |
   |           |        |              | signature.  This allows       |
   |           |        |              | signers to explicitly signal  |
   |           |        |              | a change of key to            |
   |           |        |              | recipients.  Omitting this    |
   |           |        |              | parameter is equivalent to    |
   |           |        |              | setting it to an empty        |
   |           |        |              | string.  The interpretation   |
   |           |        |              | of the contents of the "kid"  |
   |           |        |              | parameter is unspecified.     |
   |           |        |              | This header parameter is      |
   |           |        |              | OPTIONAL.                     |
   | x5u       | string | URL          | The "x5u" (X.509 URL) header  |
   |           |        |              | parameter is a URL utilizing  |
   |           |        |              | TLS RFC 5785 [RFC5785] that   |
   |           |        |              | points to an X.509 public key |
   |           |        |              | certificate or certificate    |
   |           |        |              | chain that can be used to     |
   |           |        |              | validate the signature.  This |
   |           |        |              | certificate or certificate    |
   |           |        |              | chain MUST use the PEM        |
   |           |        |              | encoding RFC 1421 [RFC1421]   |
   |           |        |              | and MUST conform to RFC 5280  |
   |           |        |              | [RFC5280].  This header       |
   |           |        |              | parameter is OPTIONAL.        |
   | x5t       | string | String       | The "x5t" (x.509 certificate  |
   |           |        |              | thumbprint) header parameter  |
   |           |        |              | provides a base64url encoded  |
   |           |        |              | SHA-1 thumbprint (a.k.a.      |
   |           |        |              | digest) of the DER encoding   |
   |           |        |              | of an X.509 certificate that  |
   |           |        |              | can be used to match the      |
   |           |        |              | certificate.  This header     |
   |           |        |              | parameter is OPTIONAL.        |
   +-----------+--------+--------------+-------------------------------+

              Table 1: Reserved Header Parameter Definitions

   Additional reserved header parameter names MAY be defined via the
   IANA JSON Web Signature Header Parameters registry, as per Section 8.
   The syntax values used above are defined as follows:






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   +--------------+----------------------------------------------------+
   | Syntax Name  | Syntax Definition                                  |
   +--------------+----------------------------------------------------+
   | IntDate      | The number of seconds from 1970-01-01T0:0:0Z as    |
   |              | measured in UTC until the desired date/time.  See  |
   |              | RFC 3339 [RFC3339] for details regarding           |
   |              | date/times in general and UTC in particular.       |
   | String       | Any string value MAY be used.                      |
   | StringAndURI | Any string value MAY be used but a value           |
   |              | containing a ":" character MUST be a URI as        |
   |              | defined in RFC 3986 [RFC3986].                     |
   | URL          | A URL as defined in RFC 1738 [RFC1738].            |
   +--------------+----------------------------------------------------+

               Table 2: Header Parameter Syntax Definitions

4.2.  Public Header Parameter Names

   Additional header parameter names can be defined by those using JWSs.
   However, in order to prevent collisions, any new header parameter
   name or algorithm value SHOULD either be defined in the IANA JSON Web
   Signature Header Parameters registry or be defined as a URI that
   contains a collision resistant namespace.  In each case, the definer
   of the name or value MUST take reasonable precautions to make sure
   they are in control of the part of the namespace they use to define
   the header parameter name.

   New header parameters should be introduced sparingly, as they can
   result in non-interoperable JWSs.

4.3.  Private Header Parameter Names

   A producer and consumer of a JWS may agree to any header parameter
   name that is not a Reserved Name Section 4.1 or a Public Name
   Section 4.2.  Unlike Public Names, these private names are subject to
   collision and should be used with caution.

   New header parameters should be introduced sparingly, as they can
   result in non-interoperable JWSs.


5.  Rules for Creating and Validating a JWS

   To create a JWS, one MUST follow these steps:

   1.  Create the payload content to be encoded as the Decoded JWS
       Payload Input.




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   2.  Base64url encode the Decoded JWS Payload Input.  This encoding
       becomes the JWS Payload Input.

   3.  Create a JSON object containing a set of desired header
       parameters.  Note that white space is explicitly allowed in the
       representation and no canonicalization is performed before
       encoding.

   4.  Translate this JSON object's Unicode code points into UTF-8, as
       defined in RFC 3629 [RFC3629].

   5.  Base64url encode the UTF-8 representation of this JSON object as
       defined in this specification (without padding).  This encoding
       becomes the JWS Header Input.

   6.  Compute the JWS Crypto Output in the manner defined for the
       particular algorithm being used.  The JWS Signing Input is always
       the concatenation of the JWS Header Input, a period ('.')
       character, and the JWS Payload Input.  The "alg" header parameter
       MUST be present in the JSON Header Input, with the algorithm
       value accurately representing the algorithm used to construct the
       JWS Crypto Input.

   When validating a JWS, the following steps MUST be taken.  If any of
   the listed steps fails, then the signed content MUST be rejected.

   1.  The JWS Payload Input MUST be successfully base64url decoded
       following the restriction given in this specification that no
       padding characters have been used.

   2.  The JWS Header Input MUST be successfully base64url decoded
       following the restriction given in this specification that no
       padding characters have been used.

   3.  The Decoded JWS Header Input MUST be completely valid JSON syntax
       conforming to RFC 4627 [RFC4627].

   4.  The JWS Crypto Output MUST be successfully base64url decoded
       following the restriction given in this specification that no
       padding characters have been used.

   5.  The JWS Header Input MUST be validated to only include parameters
       and values whose syntax and semantics are both understood and
       supported.

   6.  The JWS Crypto Output MUST be successfully validated against the
       JWS Header Input and JWS Payload Input in the manner defined for
       the algorithm being used, which MUST be accurately represented by



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       the value of the "alg" header parameter, which MUST be present.

   Processing a JWS inevitably requires comparing known strings to
   values in the header.  For example, in checking what the algorithm
   is, the Unicode string encoding "alg" will be checked against the
   member names in the Decoded JWS Header Input to see if there is a
   matching header parameter name.  A similar process occurs when
   determining if the value of the "alg" header parameter represents a
   supported algorithm.  Comparing Unicode strings, however, has
   significant security implications, as per Section 9.

   Comparisons between JSON strings and other Unicode strings MUST be
   performed as specified below:

   1.  Remove any JSON applied escaping to produce an array of Unicode
       code points.

   2.  Unicode Normalization [USA15] MUST NOT be applied at any point to
       either the JSON string or to the string it is to be compared
       against.

   3.  Comparisons between the two strings MUST be performed as a
       Unicode code point to code point equality comparison.


6.  Base64url encoding as used by JWSs

   JWSs make use of the base64url encoding as defined in RFC 4648
   [RFC4648].  As allowed by Section 3.2 of the RFC, this specification
   mandates that base64url encoding when used with JWSs MUST NOT use
   padding.  The reason for this restriction is that the padding
   character ('=') is not URL safe.

   For notes on implementing base64url encoding without padding, see
   Appendix C.


7.  Signing JWSs with Cryptographic Algorithms

   JWSs use specific cryptographic algorithms to sign the contents of
   the JWS Header Input and the JWS Payload Input.  The use of the
   following algorithms for producing JWSs is defined in this section.
   The table below is the list of "alg" header parameter values reserved
   by this specification, each of which is explained in more detail in
   the following sections:






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   +--------------------+----------------------------------------------+
   | Alg Parameter      | Algorithm                                    |
   | Value              |                                              |
   +--------------------+----------------------------------------------+
   | HS256              | HMAC using SHA-256 hash algorithm            |
   | HS384              | HMAC using SHA-384 hash algorithm            |
   | HS512              | HMAC using SHA-512 hash algorithm            |
   | RS256              | RSA using SHA-256 hash algorithm             |
   | RS384              | RSA using SHA-384 hash algorithm             |
   | RS512              | RSA using SHA-512 hash algorithm             |
   | ES256              | ECDSA using P-256 curve and SHA-256 hash     |
   |                    | algorithm                                    |
   | ES384              | ECDSA using P-384 curve and SHA-384 hash     |
   |                    | algorithm                                    |
   | ES512              | ECDSA using P-521 curve and SHA-512 hash     |
   |                    | algorithm                                    |
   +--------------------+----------------------------------------------+

           Table 3: JSON Web Signature Reserved Algorithm Values

   See Appendix B for a table cross-referencing the "alg" values used in
   this specification with the equivalent identifiers used by other
   standards and software packages.

   Of these algorithms, only HMAC SHA-256 MUST be implemented by
   conforming implementations.  It is RECOMMENDED that implementations
   also support the RSA SHA-256 and ECDSA P-256 SHA-256 algorithms.
   Support for other algorithms is OPTIONAL.

   The signed content for a JWS is the same for all algorithms: the
   concatenation of the JWS Header Input, a period ('.') character, and
   the JWS Payload Input.  This character sequence is referred to as the
   JWS Signing Input.  Note that if the JWS represents a JWT, this
   corresponds to the portion of the JWT representation preceding the
   second period character.  The UTF-8 representation of the JWS Signing
   Input is passed to the respective signing algorithms.

7.1.  Creating a JWS with HMAC SHA-256, HMAC SHA-384, or HMAC SHA-512

   Hash based Message Authentication Codes (HMACs) enable one to use a
   secret plus a cryptographic hash function to generate a Message
   Authentication Code (MAC).  This can be used to demonstrate that the
   MAC matches the hashed content, in this case the JWS Signing Input,
   which therefore demonstrates that whoever generated the MAC was in
   possession of the secret.  The means of exchanging the shared key is
   outside the scope of this specification.

   The algorithm for implementing and validating HMACs is provided in



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   RFC 2104 [RFC2104].  This section defines the use of the HMAC SHA-
   256, HMAC SHA-384, and HMAC SHA-512 cryptographic hash functions as
   defined in FIPS 180-3 [FIPS.180-3].  The reserved "alg" header
   parameter values "HS256", "HS384", and "HS512" are used in the JWS
   Header Input to indicate that the JWS Crypto Output contains a
   base64url encoded HMAC value using the respective hash function.

   The HMAC SHA-256 MAC is generated as follows:

   1.  Apply the HMAC SHA-256 algorithm to the UTF-8 representation of
       the JWS Signing Input using the shared key to produce an HMAC.

   2.  Base64url encode the HMAC, as defined in this specification.

   The output is the JWS Crypto Output for that JWS.

   The HMAC SHA-256 MAC for a JWS is validated as follows:

   1.  Apply the HMAC SHA-256 algorithm to the UTF-8 representation of
       the JWS Signing Input of the JWS using the shared key.

   2.  Base64url encode the previously generated HMAC, as defined in
       this specification.

   3.  If the JWS Crypto Output and the previously calculated value
       exactly match, then one has confirmation that the key was used to
       generate the HMAC on the JWS and that the contents of the JWS
       have not be tampered with.

   4.  If the validation fails, the signed content MUST be rejected.

   Signing with the HMAC SHA-384 and HMAC SHA-512 algorithms is
   performed identically to the procedure for HMAC SHA-256 - just with
   correspondingly longer key and result values.

7.2.  Creating a JWS with RSA SHA-256, RSA SHA-384, or RSA SHA-512

   This section defines the use of the RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 signature
   algorithm as defined in RFC 3447 [RFC3447], Section 8.2 (commonly
   known as PKCS#1), using SHA-256, SHA-384, or SHA-512 as the hash
   function.  The RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 algorithm is described in FIPS 186-3
   [FIPS.186-3], Section 5.5, and the SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512
   cryptographic hash functions are defined in FIPS 180-3 [FIPS.180-3].
   The reserved "alg" header parameter values "RS256", "RS384", and
   "RS512" are used in the JWS Header Input to indicate that the JWS
   Crypto Output contains a base64url encoded RSA signature using the
   respective hash function.




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   The public keys employed may be retrieved using Header Parameter
   methods described in Section 4.1 or may be distributed using methods
   that are outside the scope of this specification.

   A 2048-bit or longer key length MUST be used with this algorithm.

   The RSA SHA-256 signature is generated as follows:

   1.  Generate a digital signature of the UTF-8 representation of the
       JWS Signing Input using RSASSA-PKCS1-V1_5-SIGN and the SHA-256
       hash function with the desired private key.  The output will be a
       byte array.

   2.  Base64url encode the byte array, as defined in this
       specification.

   The output is the JWS Crypto Output for that JWS.

   The RSA SHA-256 signature for a JWS is validated as follows:

   1.  Take the JWS Crypto Output and base64url decode it into a byte
       array.  If decoding fails, the signed content MUST be rejected.

   2.  Submit the UTF-8 representation of the JWS Signing Input and the
       public key corresponding to the private key used by the signer to
       the RSASSA-PKCS1-V1_5-VERIFY algorithm using SHA-256 as the hash
       function.

   3.  If the validation fails, the signed content MUST be rejected.

   Signing with the RSA SHA-384 and RSA SHA-512 algorithms is performed
   identically to the procedure for RSA SHA-256 - just with
   correspondingly longer key and result values.

7.3.  Creating a JWS with ECDSA P-256 SHA-256, ECDSA P-384 SHA-384, or
      ECDSA P-521 SHA-512

   The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) is defined by
   FIPS 186-3 [FIPS.186-3].  ECDSA provides for the use of Elliptic
   Curve cryptography, which is able to provide equivalent security to
   RSA cryptography but using shorter key lengths and with greater
   processing speed.  This means that ECDSA signatures will be
   substantially smaller in terms of length than equivalently strong RSA
   Digital Signatures.

   This specification defines the use of ECDSA with the P-256 curve and
   the SHA-256 cryptographic hash function, ECDSA with the P-384 curve
   and the SHA-384 hash function, and ECDSA with the P-521 curve and the



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   SHA-512 hash function.  The P-256, P-384, and P-521 curves are also
   defined in FIPS 186-3.  The reserved "alg" header parameter values
   "ES256", "ES384", and "ES512" are used in the JWS Header Input to
   indicate that the JWS Crypto Output contains a based64url encoded
   ECDSA P-256 SHA-256, ECDSA P-384 SHA-384, or ECDSA P-521 SHA-512
   signature, respectively.

   The public keys employed may be retrieved using Header Parameter
   methods described in Section 4.1 or may be distributed using methods
   that are outside the scope of this specification.

   A JWS is signed with an ECDSA P-256 SHA-256 signature as follows:

   1.  Generate a digital signature of the UTF-8 representation of the
       JWS Signing Input using ECDSA P-256 SHA-256 with the desired
       private key.  The output will be the EC point (R, S), where R and
       S are unsigned integers.

   2.  Turn R and S into byte arrays in big endian order.  Each array
       will be 32 bytes long.

   3.  Concatenate the two byte arrays in the order R and then S.

   4.  Base64url encode the 64 byte array, as defined in this
       specification.

   The output is the JWS Crypto Output for the JWS.

   The ECDSA P-256 SHA-256 signature for a JWS is validated as follows:

   1.  Take the JWS Crypto Output and base64url decode it into a byte
       array.  If decoding fails, the signed content MUST be rejected.

   2.  The output of the base64url decoding MUST be a 64 byte array.

   3.  Split the 64 byte array into two 32 byte arrays.  The first array
       will be R and the second S. Remember that the byte arrays are in
       big endian byte order; please check the ECDSA validator in use to
       see what byte order it requires.

   4.  Submit the UTF-8 representation of the JWS Signing Input, R, S
       and the public key (x, y) to the ECDSA P-256 SHA-256 validator.

   5.  If the validation fails, the signed content MUST be rejected.

   The ECDSA validator will then determine if the digital signature is
   valid, given the inputs.  Note that ECDSA digital signature contains
   a value referred to as K, which is a random number generated for each



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   digital signature instance.  This means that two ECDSA digital
   signatures using exactly the same input parameters will output
   different signatures because their K values will be different.  The
   consequence of this is that one must validate an ECDSA signature by
   submitting the previously specified inputs to an ECDSA validator.

   Signing with the ECDSA P-384 SHA-384 and ECDSA P-521 SHA-512
   algorithms is performed identically to the procedure for ECDSA P-256
   SHA-256 - just with correspondingly longer key and result values.

7.4.  Additional Algorithms

   Additional algorithms MAY be used to protect JWSs with corresponding
   "alg" header parameter values being defined to refer to them.  New
   "alg" header parameter values SHOULD either be defined in the IANA
   JSON Web Signature Algorithms registry or be a URI that contains a
   collision resistant namespace.  In particular, the use of algorithm
   identifiers defined in XML DSIG [RFC3275] and related specifications
   is permitted.


8.  IANA Considerations

   This specification calls for:

   o  A new IANA registry entitled "JSON Web Signature Header
      Parameters" for reserved header parameter names is defined in
      Section 4.1.  Inclusion in the registry is RFC Required in the RFC
      5226 [RFC5226] sense for reserved JWS header parameter names that
      are intended to be interoperable between implementations.  The
      registry will just record the reserved header parameter name and a
      pointer to the RFC that defines it.  This specification defines
      inclusion of the header parameter names defined in Table 1.

   o  A new IANA registry entitled "JSON Web Signature Algorithms" for
      reserved values used with the "alg" header parameter values is
      defined in Section 7.4.  Inclusion in the registry is RFC Required
      in the RFC 5226 [RFC5226] sense.  The registry will just record
      the "alg" value and a pointer to the RFC that defines it.  This
      specification defines inclusion of the algorithm values defined in
      Table 3.


9.  Security Considerations

   TBD: Lots of work to do here.  We need to remember to look into any
   issues relating to security and JSON parsing.  One wonders just how
   secure most JSON parsing libraries are.  Were they ever hardened for



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   security scenarios?  If not, what kind of holes does that open up?
   Also, we need to walk through the JSON standard and see what kind of
   issues we have especially around comparison of names.  For instance,
   comparisons of header parameter names and other parameters must occur
   after they are unescaped.  Need to also put in text about: Importance
   of keeping secrets secret.  Rotating keys.  Strengths and weaknesses
   of the different algorithms.

   TBD: Need to put in text about why strict JSON validation is
   necessary.  Basically, that if malformed JSON is received then the
   intent of the sender is impossible to reliably discern.

   TBD: Write security considerations about the implications of using a
   SHA-1 hash (for compatibility reasons) for the "x5t" (x.509
   certificate thumbprint).

9.1.  Unicode Comparison Security Issues

   Header parameter names in JWSs are Unicode strings.  For security
   reasons, the representations of these names must be compared verbatim
   after performing any escape processing (as per RFC 4627 [RFC4627],
   Section 2.5).

   This means, for instance, that these JSON strings must compare as
   being equal ("sig", "\u0073ig"), whereas these must all compare as
   being not equal to the first set or to each other ("SIG", "Sig",
   "si\u0047").

   JSON strings MAY contain characters outside the Unicode Basic
   Multilingual Plane.  For instance, the G clef character (U+1D11E) may
   be represented in a JSON string as "\uD834\uDD1E".  Ideally, JWS
   implementations SHOULD ensure that characters outside the Basic
   Multilingual Plane are preserved and compared correctly;
   alternatively, if this is not possible due to these characters
   exercising limitations present in the underlying JSON implementation,
   then input containing them MUST be rejected.


10.  Open Issues and Things To Be Done (TBD)

   The following items remain to be done in this draft (and related
   drafts):

   o  Consider whether there is a better term than "Digital Signature"
      for the concept that includes both HMACs and digital signatures
      using public keys.





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   o  Consider whether we really want to allow private header parameter
      names that are not registered with IANA and are not in collision-
      resistant namespaces.  Eventually this could result in interop
      nightmares where you need to have different code to talk to
      different endpoints that "knows" about each endpoint's private
      parameters.

   o  Clarify the optional ability to provide type information in the
      JWS header.  Specifically, clarify the intended use of the "typ"
      Header Parameter, whether it conveys syntax or semantics, and
      indeed, whether this is the right approach.  Also clarify the
      relationship between these type values and MIME [RFC2045] types.

   o  Clarify the semantics of the "kid" (key ID) header parameter.
      Open issues include: What happens if a "kid" header is received
      with an unrecognized value?  Is that an error?  Should it be
      treated as if it's empty?  What happens if the header has a
      recognized value but the value doesn't match the key associated
      with that value, but it does match another key that is associated
      with the issuer?  Is that an error?

   o  Consider whether a key type parameter should also be introduced.

   o  Since RFC 3447 Section 8 explicitly calls for people NOT to adopt
      RSASSA-PKCS1 for new applications and instead requests that people
      transition to RSASSA-PSS, we probably need some Security
      Considerations text explaining why RSASSA-PKCS1 is being used
      (it's what's commonly implemented) and what the potential
      consequences are.

   o  Add Security Considerations text on timing attacks.

   o  Finish the Security Considerations section.

   o  Sort out what to do with the IANA registries if this is first
      standardized as an OpenID specification.

   o  Finish the companion encryption specification, per the agreements
      documented at http://self-issued.info/?p=378.


11.  References

11.1.  Normative References

   [FIPS.180-3]
              National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Secure
              Hash Standard (SHS)", FIPS PUB 180-3, October 2008.



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   [FIPS.186-3]
              National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Digital
              Signature Standard (DSS)", FIPS PUB 186-3, June 2009.

   [JWK]      Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", April 2011.

   [JWT]      Jones, M., Balfanz, D., Bradley, J., Goland, Y., Panzer,
              J., Sakimura, N., and P. Tarjan, "JSON Web Token (JWT)",
              March 2011.

   [RFC1421]  Linn, J., "Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic
              Mail: Part I: Message Encryption and Authentication
              Procedures", RFC 1421, February 1993.

   [RFC1738]  Berners-Lee, T., Masinter, L., and M. McCahill, "Uniform
              Resource Locators (URL)", RFC 1738, December 1994.

   [RFC2045]  Freed, N. and N. Borenstein, "Multipurpose Internet Mail
              Extensions (MIME) Part One: Format of Internet Message
              Bodies", RFC 2045, November 1996.

   [RFC2104]  Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
              Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
              February 1997.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC3339]  Klyne, G., Ed. and C. Newman, "Date and Time on the
              Internet: Timestamps", RFC 3339, July 2002.

   [RFC3447]  Jonsson, J. and B. Kaliski, "Public-Key Cryptography
              Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications
              Version 2.1", RFC 3447, February 2003.

   [RFC3629]  Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO
              10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, November 2003.

   [RFC3986]  Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
              Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
              RFC 3986, January 2005.

   [RFC4627]  Crockford, D., "The application/json Media Type for
              JavaScript Object Notation (JSON)", RFC 4627, July 2006.

   [RFC4648]  Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
              Encodings", RFC 4648, October 2006.




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   [RFC5226]  Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
              IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226,
              May 2008.

   [RFC5280]  Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
              Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
              (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.

   [RFC5785]  Nottingham, M. and E. Hammer-Lahav, "Defining Well-Known
              Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs)", RFC 5785,
              April 2010.

   [USA15]    Davis, M., Whistler, K., and M. Duerst, "Unicode
              Normalization Forms", Unicode Standard Annex 15, 09 2009.

11.2.  Informative References

   [CanvasApp]
              Facebook, "Canvas Applications", 2010.

   [JCA]      Oracle, "Java Cryptography Architecture", 2011.

   [JSS]      Bradley, J. and N. Sakimura (editor), "JSON Simple Sign",
              September 2010.

   [JWE]      Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
              Encryption (JWE)", March 2011.

   [MagicSignatures]
              Panzer (editor), J., Laurie, B., and D. Balfanz, "Magic
              Signatures", August 2010.

   [RFC3275]  Eastlake, D., Reagle, J., and D. Solo, "(Extensible Markup
              Language) XML-Signature Syntax and Processing", RFC 3275,
              March 2002.


Appendix A.  JWS Examples

   This section provides several examples of JWSs.  While these examples
   all represent JSON Web Tokens (JWTs) [JWT], the payload can be any
   base64url encoded content.

A.1.  JWS using HMAC SHA-256






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A.1.1.  Encoding

   The following example JSON header object declares that the data
   structure is a JSON Web Token (JWT) [JWT] and the JWS Signing Input
   is signed using the HMAC SHA-256 algorithm.  Note that white space is
   explicitly allowed in Decoded JWS Header Input strings and no
   canonicalization is performed before encoding.
   {"typ":"JWT",
    "alg":"HS256"}

   The following byte array contains the UTF-8 characters for the
   Decoded JWS Header Input:

   [123, 34, 116, 121, 112, 34, 58, 34, 74, 87, 84, 34, 44, 13, 10, 32,
   34, 97, 108, 103, 34, 58, 34, 72, 83, 50, 53, 54, 34, 125]

   Base64url encoding this UTF-8 representation yields this JWS Header
   Input value:
   eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLA0KICJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9

   The Decoded JWS Payload Input used in this example follows.  (Note
   that the payload can be any base64url encoded content, and need not
   be a base64url encoded JSON object.)
   {"iss":"joe",
    "exp":1300819380,
    "http://example.com/is_root":true}

   The following byte array contains the UTF-8 characters for the
   Decoded JWS Payload Input:

   [123, 34, 105, 115, 115, 34, 58, 34, 106, 111, 101, 34, 44, 13, 10,
   32, 34, 101, 120, 112, 34, 58, 49, 51, 48, 48, 56, 49, 57, 51, 56,
   48, 44, 13, 10, 32, 34, 104, 116, 116, 112, 58, 47, 47, 101, 120, 97,
   109, 112, 108, 101, 46, 99, 111, 109, 47, 105, 115, 95, 114, 111,
   111, 116, 34, 58, 116, 114, 117, 101, 125]

   Base64url encoding the above yields the JWS Payload Input value:
eyJpc3MiOiJqb2UiLA0KICJleHAiOjEzMDA4MTkzODAsDQogImh0dHA6Ly9leGFtcGxlLmNvbS9pc19yb290Ijp0cnVlfQ

   Concatenating the JWS Header Input, a period character, and the JWS
   Payload Input yields this JWS Signing Input value (with line breaks
   for display purposes only):
eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLA0KICJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9
.
eyJpc3MiOiJqb2UiLA0KICJleHAiOjEzMDA4MTkzODAsDQogImh0dHA6Ly9leGFtcGxlLmNvbS9pc19yb290Ijp0cnVlfQ

   The UTF-8 representation of the JWS Signing Input is the following
   byte array:



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   [101, 121, 74, 48, 101, 88, 65, 105, 79, 105, 74, 75, 86, 49, 81,
   105, 76, 65, 48, 75, 73, 67, 74, 104, 98, 71, 99, 105, 79, 105, 74,
   73, 85, 122, 73, 49, 78, 105, 74, 57, 46, 101, 121, 74, 112, 99, 51,
   77, 105, 79, 105, 74, 113, 98, 50, 85, 105, 76, 65, 48, 75, 73, 67,
   74, 108, 101, 72, 65, 105, 79, 106, 69, 122, 77, 68, 65, 52, 77, 84,
   107, 122, 79, 68, 65, 115, 68, 81, 111, 103, 73, 109, 104, 48, 100,
   72, 65, 54, 76, 121, 57, 108, 101, 71, 70, 116, 99, 71, 120, 108, 76,
   109, 78, 118, 98, 83, 57, 112, 99, 49, 57, 121, 98, 50, 57, 48, 73,
   106, 112, 48, 99, 110, 86, 108, 102, 81]

   HMACs are generated using keys.  This example uses the key
   represented by the following byte array:

   [3, 35, 53, 75, 43, 15, 165, 188, 131, 126, 6, 101, 119, 123, 166,
   143, 90, 179, 40, 230, 240, 84, 201, 40, 169, 15, 132, 178, 210, 80,
   46, 191, 211, 251, 90, 146, 210, 6, 71, 239, 150, 138, 180, 195, 119,
   98, 61, 34, 61, 46, 33, 114, 5, 46, 79, 8, 192, 205, 154, 245, 103,
   208, 128, 163]

   Running the HMAC SHA-256 algorithm on the UTF-8 representation of the
   JWS Signing Input with this key yields the following byte array:

   [116, 24, 223, 180, 151, 153, 224, 37, 79, 250, 96, 125, 216, 173,
   187, 186, 22, 212, 37, 77, 105, 214, 191, 240, 91, 88, 5, 88, 83,
   132, 141, 121]

   Base64url encoding the above HMAC output yields the JWS Crypto Output
   value:
   dBjftJeZ4CVP-mB92K27uhbUJU1p1r_wW1gFWFOEjXk

A.1.2.  Decoding

   Decoding the JWS first requires removing the base64url encoding from
   the JWS Header Input, the JWS Payload Input, and the JWS Crypto
   Output.  We base64url decode the inputs per Section 6 and turn them
   into the corresponding byte arrays.  We translate the header input
   byte array containing UTF-8 encoded characters into the Decoded JWS
   Header Input string.

A.1.3.  Validating

   Next we validate the decoded results.  Since the "alg" parameter in
   the header is "HS256", we validate the HMAC SHA-256 signature
   contained in the JWS Crypto Output.  If any of the validation steps
   fail, the signed content MUST be rejected.

   First, we validate that the decoded JWS Header Input string is legal
   JSON.



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   To validate the signature, we repeat the previous process of using
   the correct key and the UTF-8 representation of the JWS Signing Input
   as input to a SHA-256 HMAC function and then taking the output and
   determining if it matches the Decoded JWS Crypto Output.  If it
   matches exactly, the signature has been validated.

A.2.  JWS using RSA SHA-256

A.2.1.  Encoding

   The Decoded JWS Header Input in this example is different from the
   previous example in two ways: First, because a different algorithm is
   being used, the "alg" value is different.  Second, for illustration
   purposes only, the optional "typ" parameter is not used.  (This
   difference is not related to the signature algorithm employed.)  The
   Decoded JWS Header Input used is:
   {"alg":"RS256"}

   The following byte array contains the UTF-8 characters for the
   Decoded JWS Header Input:

   [123, 34, 97, 108, 103, 34, 58, 34, 82, 83, 50, 53, 54, 34, 125]

   Base64url encoding this UTF-8 representation yields this JWS Header
   Input value:
   eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9

   The Decoded JWS Payload Input used in this example, which follows, is
   the same as in the previous example.  Since the JWS Payload Input
   will therefore be the same, its computation is not repeated here.
   {"iss":"joe",
    "exp":1300819380,
    "http://example.com/is_root":true}

   Concatenating the JWS Header Input, a period character, and the JWS
   Payload Input yields this JWS Signing Input value (with line breaks
   for display purposes only):
eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9
.
eyJpc3MiOiJqb2UiLA0KICJleHAiOjEzMDA4MTkzODAsDQogImh0dHA6Ly9leGFtcGxlLmNvbS9pc19yb290Ijp0cnVlfQ

   The UTF-8 representation of the JWS Signing Input is the following
   byte array:

   [101, 121, 74, 104, 98, 71, 99, 105, 79, 105, 74, 83, 85, 122, 73,
   49, 78, 105, 74, 57, 46, 101, 121, 74, 112, 99, 51, 77, 105, 79, 105,
   74, 113, 98, 50, 85, 105, 76, 65, 48, 75, 73, 67, 74, 108, 101, 72,
   65, 105, 79, 106, 69, 122, 77, 68, 65, 52, 77, 84, 107, 122, 79, 68,



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   65, 115, 68, 81, 111, 103, 73, 109, 104, 48, 100, 72, 65, 54, 76,
   121, 57, 108, 101, 71, 70, 116, 99, 71, 120, 108, 76, 109, 78, 118,
   98, 83, 57, 112, 99, 49, 57, 121, 98, 50, 57, 48, 73, 106, 112, 48,
   99, 110, 86, 108, 102, 81]

   The RSA key consists of a public part (n, e), and a private exponent
   d.  The values of the RSA key used in this example, presented as the
   byte arrays representing big endian integers are:

   +-----------+-------------------------------------------------------+
   | Parameter | Value                                                 |
   | Name      |                                                       |
   +-----------+-------------------------------------------------------+
   | n         | [161, 248, 22, 10, 226, 227, 201, 180, 101, 206, 141, |
   |           | 45, 101, 98, 99, 54, 43, 146, 125, 190, 41, 225, 240, |
   |           | 36, 119, 252, 22, 37, 204, 144, 161, 54, 227, 139,    |
   |           | 217, 52, 151, 197, 182, 234, 99, 221, 119, 17, 230,   |
   |           | 124, 116, 41, 249, 86, 176, 251, 138, 143, 8, 154,    |
   |           | 220, 75, 105, 137, 60, 193, 51, 63, 83, 237, 208, 25, |
   |           | 184, 119, 132, 37, 47, 236, 145, 79, 228, 133, 119,   |
   |           | 105, 89, 75, 234, 66, 128, 211, 44, 15, 85, 191, 98,  |
   |           | 148, 79, 19, 3, 150, 188, 110, 155, 223, 110, 189,    |
   |           | 210, 189, 163, 103, 142, 236, 160, 198, 104, 247, 1,  |
   |           | 179, 141, 191, 251, 56, 200, 52, 44, 226, 254, 109,   |
   |           | 39, 250, 222, 74, 90, 72, 116, 151, 157, 212, 185,    |
   |           | 207, 154, 222, 196, 199, 91, 5, 133, 44, 44, 15, 94,  |
   |           | 248, 165, 193, 117, 3, 146, 249, 68, 232, 237, 100,   |
   |           | 193, 16, 198, 182, 71, 96, 154, 164, 120, 58, 235,    |
   |           | 156, 108, 154, 215, 85, 49, 48, 80, 99, 139, 131,     |
   |           | 102, 92, 111, 111, 122, 130, 163, 150, 112, 42, 31,   |
   |           | 100, 27, 130, 211, 235, 242, 57, 34, 25, 73, 31, 182, |
   |           | 134, 135, 44, 87, 22, 245, 10, 248, 53, 141, 154,     |
   |           | 139, 157, 23, 195, 64, 114, 143, 127, 135, 216, 154,  |
   |           | 24, 216, 252, 171, 103, 173, 132, 89, 12, 46, 207,    |
   |           | 117, 147, 57, 54, 60, 7, 3, 77, 111, 96, 111, 158,    |
   |           | 33, 224, 84, 86, 202, 229, 233, 161]                  |
   | e         | [1, 0, 1]                                             |














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   | d         | [18, 174, 113, 164, 105, 205, 10, 43, 195, 126, 82,   |
   |           | 108, 69, 0, 87, 31, 29, 97, 117, 29, 100, 233, 73,    |
   |           | 112, 123, 98, 89, 15, 157, 11, 165, 124, 150, 60, 64, |
   |           | 30, 63, 207, 47, 44, 211, 189, 236, 136, 229, 3, 191, |
   |           | 198, 67, 155, 11, 40, 200, 47, 125, 55, 151, 103, 31, |
   |           | 82, 19, 238, 216, 193, 90, 37, 216, 213, 206, 160, 2, |
   |           | 94, 227, 171, 46, 139, 127, 121, 33, 111, 198, 59,    |
   |           | 234, 86, 39, 83, 180, 6, 68, 198, 161, 81, 39, 217,   |
   |           | 178, 149, 69, 64, 160, 187, 225, 163, 5, 86, 152, 45, |
   |           | 78, 159, 222, 95, 100, 37, 241, 77, 75, 113, 52, 65,  |
   |           | 181, 93, 199, 59, 155, 74, 237, 204, 146, 172, 227,   |
   |           | 146, 126, 55, 245, 125, 12, 253, 94, 117, 129, 250,   |
   |           | 81, 44, 143, 73, 97, 169, 235, 11, 128, 248, 168, 7,  |
   |           | 70, 114, 138, 85, 255, 70, 71, 31, 52, 37, 6, 59,     |
   |           | 157, 83, 100, 47, 94, 222, 30, 132, 214, 19, 8, 26,   |
   |           | 250, 92, 34, 208, 81, 40, 91, 214, 59, 148, 59, 86,   |
   |           | 93, 137, 138, 5, 104, 84, 19, 229, 60, 60, 108, 101,  |
   |           | 37, 255, 31, 227, 78, 61, 220, 112, 240, 213, 100,    |
   |           | 80, 253, 164, 139, 161, 46, 16, 78, 157, 235, 159,    |
   |           | 184, 24, 129, 225, 196, 189, 242, 93, 146, 71, 244,   |
   |           | 80, 200, 101, 146, 121, 104, 231, 115, 52, 244, 65,   |
   |           | 79, 117, 167, 80, 225, 57, 84, 110, 58, 138, 115,     |
   |           | 157]                                                  |
   +-----------+-------------------------------------------------------+

   The RSA private key (n, d) is then passed to the RSA signing
   function, which also takes the hash type, SHA-256, and the UTF-8
   representation of the JWS Signing Input as inputs.  The result of the
   signature is a byte array S, which represents a big endian integer.
   In this example, S is:





















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   +--------+----------------------------------------------------------+
   | Result | Value                                                    |
   | Name   |                                                          |
   +--------+----------------------------------------------------------+
   | S      | [112, 46, 33, 137, 67, 232, 143, 209, 30, 181, 216, 45,  |
   |        | 191, 120, 69, 243, 65, 6, 174, 27, 129, 255, 247, 115,   |
   |        | 17, 22, 173, 209, 113, 125, 131, 101, 109, 66, 10, 253,  |
   |        | 60, 150, 238, 221, 115, 162, 102, 62, 81, 102, 104, 123, |
   |        | 0, 11, 135, 34, 110, 1, 135, 237, 16, 115, 249, 69, 229, |
   |        | 130, 173, 252, 239, 22, 216, 90, 121, 142, 232, 198,     |
   |        | 109, 219, 61, 184, 151, 91, 23, 208, 148, 2, 190, 237,   |
   |        | 213, 217, 217, 112, 7, 16, 141, 178, 129, 96, 213, 248,  |
   |        | 4, 12, 167, 68, 87, 98, 184, 31, 190, 127, 249, 217, 46, |
   |        | 10, 231, 111, 36, 242, 91, 51, 187, 230, 244, 74, 230,   |
   |        | 30, 177, 4, 10, 203, 32, 4, 77, 62, 249, 18, 142, 212,   |
   |        | 1, 48, 121, 91, 212, 189, 59, 65, 238, 202, 208, 102,    |
   |        | 171, 101, 25, 129, 253, 228, 141, 247, 127, 55, 45, 195, |
   |        | 139, 159, 175, 221, 59, 239, 177, 139, 93, 163, 204, 60, |
   |        | 46, 176, 47, 158, 58, 65, 214, 18, 202, 173, 21, 145,    |
   |        | 18, 115, 160, 95, 35, 185, 232, 56, 250, 175, 132, 157,  |
   |        | 105, 132, 41, 239, 90, 30, 136, 121, 130, 54, 195, 212,  |
   |        | 14, 96, 69, 34, 165, 68, 200, 242, 122, 122, 45, 184, 6, |
   |        | 99, 209, 108, 247, 202, 234, 86, 222, 64, 92, 178, 33,   |
   |        | 90, 69, 178, 194, 85, 102, 181, 90, 193, 167, 72, 160,   |
   |        | 112, 223, 200, 163, 42, 70, 149, 67, 208, 25, 238, 251,  |
   |        | 71]                                                      |
   +--------+----------------------------------------------------------+

   Base64url encoding the signature produces this value for the JWS
   Crypto Output:
cC4hiUPoj9Eetdgtv3hF80EGrhuB__dzERat0XF9g2VtQgr9PJbu3XOiZj5RZmh7AAuHIm4Bh-0Qc_lF5YKt_O8W2Fp5jujGbds9uJdbF9CUAr7t1dnZcAcQjbKBYNX4BAynRFdiuB--f_nZLgrnbyTyWzO75vRK5h6xBArLIARNPvkSjtQBMHlb1L07Qe7K0GarZRmB_eSN9383LcOLn6_dO--xi12jzDwusC-eOkHWEsqtFZESc6BfI7noOPqvhJ1phCnvWh6IeYI2w9QOYEUipUTI8np6LbgGY9Fs98rqVt5AXLIhWkWywlVmtVrBp0igcN_IoypGlUPQGe77Rw

A.2.2.  Decoding

   Decoding the JWS from this example requires processing the JWS Header
   Input and JWS Payload Input exactly as done in the first example.

A.2.3.  Validating

   Since the "alg" parameter in the header is "RS256", we validate the
   RSA SHA-256 signature contained in the JWS Crypto Output.  If any of
   the validation steps fail, the signed content MUST be rejected.

   First, we validate that the decoded JWS Header Input string is legal
   JSON.

   Validating the JWS Crypto Output is a little different from the
   previous example.  First, we base64url decode the JWS Crypto Output



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   to produce a signature S to check.  We then pass (n, e), S and the
   UTF-8 representation of the JWS Signing Input to an RSA signature
   verifier that has been configured to use the SHA-256 hash function.

A.3.  JWS using ECDSA P-256 SHA-256

A.3.1.  Encoding

   The Decoded JWS Header Input for this example differs from the
   previous example because a different algorithm is being used.  The
   Decoded JWS Header Input used is:
   {"alg":"ES256"}

   The following byte array contains the UTF-8 characters for the
   Decoded JWS Header Input:

   [123, 34, 97, 108, 103, 34, 58, 34, 69, 83, 50, 53, 54, 34, 125]

   Base64url encoding this UTF-8 representation yields this JWS Header
   Input value:
   eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiJ9

   The Decoded JWS Payload Input used in this example, which follows, is
   the same as in the previous examples.  Since the JWS Payload Input
   will therefore be the same, its computation is not repeated here.
   {"iss":"joe",
    "exp":1300819380,
    "http://example.com/is_root":true}

   Concatenating the JWS Header Input, a period character, and the JWS
   Payload Input yields this JWS Signing Input value (with line breaks
   for display purposes only):
eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiJ9
.
eyJpc3MiOiJqb2UiLA0KICJleHAiOjEzMDA4MTkzODAsDQogImh0dHA6Ly9leGFtcGxlLmNvbS9pc19yb290Ijp0cnVlfQ

   The UTF-8 representation of the JWS Signing Input is the following
   byte array:

   [101, 121, 74, 104, 98, 71, 99, 105, 79, 105, 74, 70, 85, 122, 73,
   49, 78, 105, 74, 57, 46, 101, 121, 74, 112, 99, 51, 77, 105, 79, 105,
   74, 113, 98, 50, 85, 105, 76, 65, 48, 75, 73, 67, 74, 108, 101, 72,
   65, 105, 79, 106, 69, 122, 77, 68, 65, 52, 77, 84, 107, 122, 79, 68,
   65, 115, 68, 81, 111, 103, 73, 109, 104, 48, 100, 72, 65, 54, 76,
   121, 57, 108, 101, 71, 70, 116, 99, 71, 120, 108, 76, 109, 78, 118,
   98, 83, 57, 112, 99, 49, 57, 121, 98, 50, 57, 48, 73, 106, 112, 48,
   99, 110, 86, 108, 102, 81]




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   The ECDSA key consists of a public part, the EC point (x, y), and a
   private part d.  The values of the ECDSA key used in this example,
   presented as the byte arrays representing big endian integers are:

   +-----------+-------------------------------------------------------+
   | Parameter | Value                                                 |
   | Name      |                                                       |
   +-----------+-------------------------------------------------------+
   | x         | [127, 205, 206, 39, 112, 246, 196, 93, 65, 131, 203,  |
   |           | 238, 111, 219, 75, 123, 88, 7, 51, 53, 123, 233, 239, |
   |           | 19, 186, 207, 110, 60, 123, 209, 84, 69]              |
   | y         | [199, 241, 68, 205, 27, 189, 155, 126, 135, 44, 223,  |
   |           | 237, 185, 238, 185, 244, 179, 105, 93, 110, 169, 11,  |
   |           | 36, 173, 138, 70, 35, 40, 133, 136, 229, 173]         |
   | d         | [142, 155, 16, 158, 113, 144, 152, 191, 152, 4, 135,  |
   |           | 223, 31, 93, 119, 233, 203, 41, 96, 110, 190, 210,    |
   |           | 38, 59, 95, 87, 194, 19, 223, 132, 244, 178]          |
   +-----------+-------------------------------------------------------+

   The ECDSA private part d is then passed to an ECDSA signing function,
   which also takes the curve type, P-256, the hash type, SHA-256, and
   the UTF-8 representation of the JWS Signing Input as inputs.  The
   result of the signature is the EC point (R, S), where R and S are
   unsigned integers.  In this example, the R and S values, given as
   byte arrays representing big endian integers are:

   +--------+----------------------------------------------------------+
   | Result | Value                                                    |
   | Name   |                                                          |
   +--------+----------------------------------------------------------+
   | R      | [14, 209, 33, 83, 121, 99, 108, 72, 60, 47, 127, 21, 88, |
   |        | 7, 212, 2, 163, 178, 40, 3, 58, 249, 124, 126, 23, 129,  |
   |        | 154, 195, 22, 158, 166, 101]                             |
   | S      | [197, 10, 7, 211, 140, 60, 112, 229, 216, 241, 45, 175,  |
   |        | 8, 74, 84, 128, 166, 101, 144, 197, 242, 147, 80, 154,   |
   |        | 143, 63, 127, 138, 131, 163, 84, 213]                    |
   +--------+----------------------------------------------------------+

   Concatenating the S array to the end of the R array and base64url
   encoding the result produces this value for the JWS Crypto Output:
DtEhU3ljbEg8L38VWAfUAqOyKAM6-Xx-F4GawxaepmXFCgfTjDxw5djxLa8ISlSApmWQxfKTUJqPP3-Kg6NU1Q

A.3.2.  Decoding

   Decoding the JWS from this example requires processing the JWS Header
   Input and JWS Payload Input exactly as done in the first example.





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A.3.3.  Validating

   Since the "alg" parameter in the header is "ES256", we validate the
   ECDSA P-256 SHA-256 signature contained in the JWS Crypto Output.  If
   any of the validation steps fail, the signed content MUST be
   rejected.

   First, we validate that the decoded JWS Header Input string is legal
   JSON.

   Validating the JWS Crypto Output is a little different from the first
   example.  First, we base64url decode the JWS Crypto Output as in the
   previous examples but we then need to split the 64 member byte array
   that must result into two 32 byte arrays, the first R and the second
   S. We then pass (x, y), (R, S) and the UTF-8 representation of the
   JWS Signing Input to an ECDSA signature verifier that has been
   configured to use the P-256 curve with the SHA-256 hash function.

   As explained in Section 7.3, the use of the k value in ECDSA means
   that we cannot validate the correctness of the signature in the same
   way we validated the correctness of the HMAC.  Instead,
   implementations MUST use an ECDSA validator to validate the
   signature.


Appendix B.  Algorithm Identifier Cross-Reference

   This appendix contains a table cross-referencing the "alg" values
   used in this specification with the equivalent identifiers used by
   other standards and software packages.  See XML DSIG [RFC3275] and
   Java Cryptography Architecture [JCA] for more information about the
   names defined by those documents.

   +-------+-----+----------------------------+----------+-------------+
   | Algor | JWS | XML DSIG                   | JCA      | OID         |
   | ithm  |     |                            |          |             |
   +-------+-----+----------------------------+----------+-------------+
   | HMAC  | HS2 | http://www.w3.org/2001/04/ | HmacSHA2 | 1.2.840.113 |
   | using | 56  | xmldsig-more#hmac-sha256   | 56       | 549.2.9     |
   | SHA-2 |     |                            |          |             |
   | 56    |     |                            |          |             |
   |  hash |     |                            |          |             |
   |  algo |     |                            |          |             |
   | rithm |     |                            |          |             |







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   | HMAC  | HS3 | http://www.w3.org/2001/04/ | HmacSHA3 | 1.2.840.113 |
   | using | 84  | xmldsig-more#hmac-sha384   | 84       | 549.2.10    |
   | SHA-3 |     |                            |          |             |
   | 84    |     |                            |          |             |
   |  hash |     |                            |          |             |
   |  algo |     |                            |          |             |
   | rithm |     |                            |          |             |
   | HMAC  | HS5 | http://www.w3.org/2001/04/ | HmacSHA5 | 1.2.840.113 |
   | using | 12  | xmldsig-more#hmac-sha512   | 12       | 549.2.11    |
   | SHA-5 |     |                            |          |             |
   | 12    |     |                            |          |             |
   |  hash |     |                            |          |             |
   |  algo |     |                            |          |             |
   | rithm |     |                            |          |             |
   | RSA   | RS2 | http://www.w3.org/2001/04/ | SHA256wi | 1.2.840.113 |
   | using | 56  | xmldsig-more#rsa-sha256    | thRSA    | 549.1.1.11  |
   | SHA-2 |     |                            |          |             |
   | 56    |     |                            |          |             |
   |  hash |     |                            |          |             |
   |  algo |     |                            |          |             |
   | rithm |     |                            |          |             |
   | RSA   | RS3 | http://www.w3.org/2001/04/ | SHA384wi | 1.2.840.113 |
   | using | 84  | xmldsig-more#rsa-sha384    | thRSA    | 549.1.1.12  |
   | SHA-3 |     |                            |          |             |
   | 84    |     |                            |          |             |
   |  hash |     |                            |          |             |
   |  algo |     |                            |          |             |
   | rithm |     |                            |          |             |
   | RSA   | RS5 | http://www.w3.org/2001/04/ | SHA512wi | 1.2.840.113 |
   | using | 12  | xmldsig-more#rsa-sha512    | thRSA    | 549.1.1.13  |
   | SHA-5 |     |                            |          |             |
   | 12    |     |                            |          |             |
   |  hash |     |                            |          |             |
   |  algo |     |                            |          |             |
   | rithm |     |                            |          |             |
   | ECDSA | ES2 | http://www.w3.org/2001/04/ | SHA256wi | 1.2.840.100 |
   | using | 56  | xmldsig-more#ecdsa-sha256  | thECDSA  | 45.3.1.7    |
   | P-256 |     |                            |          |             |
   | curve |     |                            |          |             |
   | and   |     |                            |          |             |
   | SHA-2 |     |                            |          |             |
   | 56    |     |                            |          |             |
   |  hash |     |                            |          |             |
   |  algo |     |                            |          |             |
   | rithm |     |                            |          |             |






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   | ECDSA | ES3 | http://www.w3.org/2001/04/ | SHA384wi | 1.3.132.0.3 |
   | using | 84  | xmldsig-more#ecdsa-sha384  | thECDSA  | 4           |
   | P-384 |     |                            |          |             |
   | curve |     |                            |          |             |
   | and   |     |                            |          |             |
   | SHA-3 |     |                            |          |             |
   | 84    |     |                            |          |             |
   |  hash |     |                            |          |             |
   |  algo |     |                            |          |             |
   | rithm |     |                            |          |             |
   | ECDSA | ES5 | http://www.w3.org/2001/04/ | SHA512wi | 1.3.132.0.3 |
   | using | 12  | xmldsig-more#ecdsa-sha512  | thECDSA  | 5           |
   | P-521 |     |                            |          |             |
   | curve |     |                            |          |             |
   | and   |     |                            |          |             |
   | SHA-5 |     |                            |          |             |
   | 12    |     |                            |          |             |
   |  hash |     |                            |          |             |
   |  algo |     |                            |          |             |
   | rithm |     |                            |          |             |
   +-------+-----+----------------------------+----------+-------------+

               Table 4: Algorithm Identifier Cross-Reference


Appendix C.  Notes on implementing base64url encoding without padding

   This appendix describes how to implement base64url encoding and
   decoding functions without padding based upon standard base64
   encoding and decoding functions that do use padding.

   To be concrete, example C# code implementing these functions is shown
   below.  Similar code could be used in other languages.


















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   static string base64urlencode(byte [] arg)
   {
     string s = Convert.ToBase64String(arg); // Standard base64 encoder
     s = s.Split('=')[0]; // Remove any trailing '='s
     s = s.Replace('+', '-'); // 62nd char of encoding
     s = s.Replace('/', '_'); // 63rd char of encoding
     return s;
   }

   static byte [] base64urldecode(string arg)
   {
     string s = arg;
     s = s.Replace('-', '+'); // 62nd char of encoding
     s = s.Replace('_', '/'); // 63rd char of encoding
     switch (s.Length % 4) // Pad with trailing '='s
     {
       case 0: break; // No pad chars in this case
       case 2: s += "=="; break; // Two pad chars
       case 3: s += "="; break; // One pad char
       default: throw new System.Exception(
         "Illegal base64url string!");
     }
     return Convert.FromBase64String(s); // Standard base64 decoder
   }

   As per the example code above, the number of '=' padding characters
   that needs to be added to the end of a base64url encoded string
   without padding to turn it into one with padding is a deterministic
   function of the length of the encoded string.  Specifically, if the
   length mod 4 is 0, no padding is added; if the length mod 4 is 2, two
   '=' padding characters are added; if the length mod 4 is 3, one '='
   padding character is added; if the length mod 4 is 1, the input is
   malformed.

   An example correspondence between unencoded and encoded values
   follows.  The byte sequence below encodes into the string below,
   which when decoded, reproduces the byte sequence.
   3 236 255 224 193
   A-z_4ME


Appendix D.  Acknowledgements

   Solutions for signing JSON content were previously explored by Magic
   Signatures [MagicSignatures], JSON Simple Sign [JSS], and Canvas
   Applications [CanvasApp], all of which influenced this draft.





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Appendix E.  Document History

   -02

   o  Reference the JSON Web Key (JWK) specification from the "jku"
      header parameter.

   -01

   o  Changed RSA SHA-256 from MUST be supported to RECOMMENDED that it
      be supported.  Rationale: Several people have objected to the
      requirement for implementing RSA SHA-256, some because they will
      only be using HMACs and symmetric keys, and others because they
      only want to use ECDSA when using asymmetric keys, either for
      security or key length reasons, or both.

   o  Clarified that "x5u" is an HTTPS URL referencing a PEM-encoded
      certificate or certificate chain.

   o  Clarified that the "alg" parameter value is case sensitive.

   o  Changed "x5t" (x.509 certificate thumbprint) to use a SHA-1 hash,
      rather than a SHA-256 hash, for compatibility reasons.

   -00

   o  Created first signature draft using content split from
      draft-jones-json-web-token-01.  This split introduced no semantic
      changes.


Authors' Addresses

   Michael B. Jones
   Microsoft

   Email: mbj@microsoft.com
   URI:   http://self-issued.info/


   Dirk Balfanz
   Google

   Email: balfanz@google.com







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   John Bradley
   independent

   Email: ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com


   Yaron Y. Goland
   Microsoft

   Email: yarong@microsoft.com


   John Panzer
   Google

   Email: jpanzer@google.com


   Nat Sakimura
   Nomura Research Institute

   Email: n-sakimura@nri.co.jp


   Paul Tarjan
   Facebook

   Email: pt@fb.com























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