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IETF                                                           B. Jordan
Internet-Draft                                      Symantec Corporation
Intended status: Informational                                A. Thomson
Expires: July 22, 2019                                LookingGlass Cyber
                                                        January 18, 2019


 Collaborative Automated Course of Action Operations (CACAO) for Cyber
                                Security
                     draft-jordan-cacao-charter-01

Abstract

   This is the charter for the Working Group: Collaborative Automated
   Course of Action Operations (CACAO) for Cyber Security

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on July 22, 2019.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

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   described in the Simplified BSD License.




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Table of Contents

   1.  Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Working Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   3.  Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  Deliverables  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4

1.  Problem

   Threat Actors and Intrusion Sets are advancing at an increasing rate
   relative to an organization's ability to defend against and respond
   to cyber attacks.  In addition, it is common that defenders need to
   manually identify and process prevention, mitigation, and remediation
   steps in order to protect their systems, networks, data, and users.
   There is also currently no standard means to easily and dynamically
   share proposed prevention, mitigation, or remediation steps and the
   operational experience gained from these attacks or their associated
   successful responses among a trusted set of organizations.

   Due to the increasing sophistication and amplitude of cyber attacks
   the need for a secure collaborative set of systems providing
   coordinated detection and response across hosts, networks, and
   security infrastructure has raised significantly.  This solution is
   necessary to effectively respond to threats in machine relevant time.
   While some attacks may be well known to certain security experts and
   researchers they are often not documented in a way that would enable
   automated prevention, mitigation, or remediation.

   Key to this coordinated cyber attack response is a coordinated threat
   response including a standard information model; a set of functional
   capabilities, associated interfaces, and protocols.  These key
   requirements would be defined in each of the system components across
   host; network and security infrastructure to ensure that each system
   can work together in a coordinated manner.

2.  Working Group

   To enable efficient collaboration and facilitate the rapid sharing of
   preventative, mitigative, and remediative actions this working group
   will focus on defining the set of technologies (protocols,
   interfaces, functional capabilities, and information model) required
   to detect, prevent, mitigate, and remediate threats.  This solution
   will also define the machine-readable actions to enable an action-
   oriented defensive system.  This effort will focus on providing the
   functionality requirements for each system that would participate in
   a coordinated threat response; the interfaces they should support
   including the transport mechanism used and finally the information



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   model across those systems to enable the coordinated actions in a
   structured secure manner.

   Each collaborative course of action will consist of a sequence of
   cyber defense actions that can be executed by the various systems
   that those actions target.  Further, these COAs can be coordinated
   and deployed across heterogeneous cyber security systems such that
   both the actions requested and the resultant outcomes may be
   monitored and verified.  These actions will be referenceable in a
   connected data structure that provides support for connected data
   object and efficient operational use of those data objects such as
   Threat Actors, Campaigns, Intrusion Sets, Malware, Attack Patterns,
   and other adversarial techniques, tactics, and procedures (TTPs).

   Where possible the working group will leverage existing efforts that
   _may_ define the atomic actions to be included in a process or
   sequence.  The working group will not consider how shared actions are
   used/enforced, except where a response is expected for such a
   received shared action by a receiving party.  It will also focus on
   the requirements for the correct construction and correct
   distribution of the structured actions and their corresponding
   interfaces and protocols.

3.  Goals

   This working group has the following major goals: * Document the use
   cases and requirements * Identify and document the system functions
   and roles that must exist with associated protocols for a coordinated
   threat response system to operate effectively * Identify and document
   the configuration for a series of protocols that can be used to
   distribute courses of action in both direct delivery and publish-
   subscribe methods * Identify and document the mechanism(s) required
   to monitor, report and alert on effective distribution of CACAO
   actions and the potential threat response to those actions * Create
   an information and data model that can capture and enable
   collaborative courses of action (sometimes called playbooks) that
   will be used in the coordinated threat response systems * Define and
   create a series of tests and documents to assist with
   interoperability of the various systems involved in the coordinated
   threat response system.

4.  Deliverables

   The working group plans to create informational and standards track
   documents, some of which may be published through the IETF RFC
   stream.  * CACAO Use Cases and Requirements * CACAO Functional
   Architecture: Roles and Interfaces * CACAO Interface Specification *




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   CACAO JSON Data Model * CACAO Distribution and Response Application
   Layer Protocol

   The working group may decide to not publish the use cases and
   requirements as RFCs.  That decision will be made during the lifetime
   of the working group.

Authors' Addresses

   Bret Jordan
   Symantec Corporation
   350 Ellis Street
   Mountain View  CA 94043
   USA

   Email: bret_jordan@symantec.com


   Allan Thomson
   LookingGlass Cyber
   10740 Parkridge Blvd, Suite 200
   Reston  VA 20191
   USA

   Email: athomson@lookingglasscyber.com


























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