[Docs] [txt|pdf|xml] [Tracker] [Email] [Diff1] [Diff2] [Nits]
Versions: 00 01 02
Network Working Group C. Percival
Internet-Draft Tarsnap
Intended status: Informational S. Josefsson
Expires: March 28, 2013 SJD AB
September 24, 2012
The scrypt Password-Based Key Derivation Function
draft-josefsson-scrypt-kdf-01
Abstract
This document specifies the password-based key derivation function
scrypt. The function derives one or more secret keys from a secret
string. It is based on memory-hard functions which offer added
protection against attacks using custom hardware. The document also
provides an ASN.1 schema.
Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on March 28, 2013.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
Percival & Josefsson Expires March 28, 2013 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft scrypt September 2012
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. The Salsa20/8 Core Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. The scryptBlockMix Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. The scryptROMix Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. The scrypt Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6. ASN.1 Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6.1. ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7. Test Vectors for Salsa20/8 Core . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
8. Test Vectors for scryptBlockMix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
9. Test Vectors for scryptROMix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
10. Test Vectors for PBKDF2 with HMAC-SHA-256 . . . . . . . . . . 13
11. Test Vectors for scrypt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
12. Copying Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
13. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
14. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
15. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
16. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
16.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
16.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Percival & Josefsson Expires March 28, 2013 [Page 2]
Internet-Draft scrypt September 2012
1. Introduction
Password-based key derivation functions are used in cryptography for
deriving one or more secret keys from a secret value. Over the
years, several password-based key derivation functions have been
used, including the original DES-based UNIX Crypt-function, FreeBSD
MD5 crypt, PKCS#5 PBKDF2 [RFC2898] (typically used with SHA-1), GNU
SHA-256/512 crypt, Windows NT LAN Manager (NTLM) hash, and the
Blowfish-based bcrypt. These algorithms are based on similar
techniques that employ a cryptographic primitive, salting and/or
iteration. The iteration count is used to slow down the computation.
Providing that the number of iterations used is increased as computer
systems get faster, this allows legitimate users to spend a constant
amount of time on key derivation without losing ground to an
attackers' ever-increasing computing power - as long as attackers are
limited to the same software implementations as legitimate users.
However, as Bernstein pointed out in the context of integer
factorization, while parallelized hardware implementations may not
change the number of operations performed compared to software
implementations, this does not prevent them from dramatically
changing the asymptotic cost, since in many contexts - including the
embarrassingly parallel task of performing a brute-force search for a
passphrase - dollar-seconds are the most appropriate units for
measuring the cost of a computation. As semiconductor technology
develops, circuits do not merely become faster; they also become
smaller, allowing for a larger amount of parallelism at the same
cost. Consequently, existing key derivation algorithms, even when
the iteration count is increased so that the time taken to verify a
password remains constant, the cost of finding a password by using a
brute force attack implemented in hardware drops each year.
The scrypt function aims to reduce the advantage which attackers can
gain by using custom-designed parallel circuits for breaking
password-based key derivation functions.
For further background, see the original scrypt paper [SCRYPT].
The rest of this document is divided into sections that each describe
algorithms needed for the final "scrypt" algorithm.
Percival & Josefsson Expires March 28, 2013 [Page 3]
Internet-Draft scrypt September 2012
2. The Salsa20/8 Core Function
Salsa20/8 Core is a round-reduced variant of the Salsa20 Core. It is
a hash function from 64-octet strings to 64-octet strings. Note that
Salsa20/8 Core is not a cryptographic hash function since it is not
collision-resistant. See [SALSA20CORE] for the specification.
Percival & Josefsson Expires March 28, 2013 [Page 4]
Internet-Draft scrypt September 2012
3. The scryptBlockMix Algorithm
The scryptBlockMix algorithm is the same as the BlockMix algorithm
described in [SCRYPT] but with Salsa20/8 Core used as the hash
function H. Below, Salsa(T) corresponds to the Salsa20/8 Core
function applied to the octet vector T.
Algorithm scryptBlockMix
Parameters:
r Block size parameter.
Input:
B[0], ..., B[2 * r - 1]
Input vector of 2 * r 64-octet blocks.
Output:
B'[0], ..., B'[2 * r - 1]
Output vector of 2 * r 64-octet blocks.
Steps:
1. X = B[2 * r - 1]
2. for i = 0 to 2 * r - 1 do
T = X xor B[i]
X = Salsa (T)
Y[i] = X
end for
3. B' = (Y[0], Y[2], ..., Y[2 * r - 2],
Y[1], Y[3], ..., Y[2 * r - 1])
Percival & Josefsson Expires March 28, 2013 [Page 5]
Internet-Draft scrypt September 2012
4. The scryptROMix Algorithm
The scryptROMix algorithm is the same as the ROMix algorithm
described in [SCRYPT] but with scryptBlockMix used as the hash
function H and the Integerify function explained inline.
Algorithm scryptROMix
Input:
r Block size parameter.
B Input octet vector of length 128 * r octets.
N CPU/Memory cost parameter, must be larger than 1,
a power of 2 and less than 2^(128 * r / 8).
Output:
B' Output octet vector of length 128 * r octets.
Steps:
1. X = B
2. for i = 0 to N - 1 do
V[i] = X
X = scryptBlockMix (X)
end for
3. for i = 0 to N - 1 do
j = Integerify (X) mod N
where Integerify (B[0] ... B[2 * r - 1]) is defined
as the result of interpreting B[2 * r - 1] as a
little-endian integer.
T = X xor V[j]
X = scryptBlockMix (T)
end for
4. B' = X
Percival & Josefsson Expires March 28, 2013 [Page 6]
Internet-Draft scrypt September 2012
5. The scrypt Algorithm
The PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA-256 function used below denote the PBKDF2
algorithm [RFC2898] used with HMAC-SHA-256 [RFC6234] as the PRF. The
HMAC-SHA-256 function generates 32 octet outputs.
Algorithm scrypt
Input:
P Passphrase, an octet string.
S Salt, an octet string.
N CPU/Memory cost parameter, must be larger than 1,
a power of 2 and less than 2^(128 * r / 8).
r Block size parameter.
p Parallelization parameter, a positive integer
less than or equal to ((2^32-1) * hLen) / MFLen
where hLen is 32 and MFlen is 128 * r.
dkLen Intended output length in octets of the derived
key; a positive integer less than or equal to
(2^32 - 1) * hLen where hLen is 32.
Output:
DK Derived key, of length dkLen octets.
Steps:
1. B[0] || B[1] || ... || B[p - 1] =
PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 (P, S, 1, p * 128 * r)
2. for i = 0 to p - 1 do
B[i] = scryptROMix (r, B[i], N)
end for
3. DK = PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 (P, B[0] || B[1] || ... || B[p - 1],
1, dkLen)
Percival & Josefsson Expires March 28, 2013 [Page 7]
Internet-Draft scrypt September 2012
6. ASN.1 Syntax
This section defines ASN.1 syntax for the scrypt key derivation
function. The intended application of these definitions includes
PKCS #8 and other syntax for key management. (Various aspects of
ASN.1 are specified in several ISO/IEC standards.)
The object identifier id-scrypt identifies the scrypt key derivation
function.
id-scrypt OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {1 3 6 1 4 1 11591 4 11}
The parameters field associated with this OID in an
AlgorithmIdentifier shall have type scrypt-params:
scrypt-params ::= SEQUENCE {
salt OCTET STRING,
costParameter INTEGER (1..MAX),
blockSize INTEGER (1..MAX),
parallelizationParameter INTEGER (1..MAX),
keyLength INTEGER (1..MAX) OPTIONAL }
The fields of type scrypt-params have the following meanings:
- salt specifies the salt value. It shall be an octet string.
- costParameter specifies the CPU/Memory cost parameter N.
- blockSize specifies the block size parameter r.
- parallelizationParameter specifies the parallelization parameter.
- keyLength, an optional field, is the length in octets of the
derived key. The maximum key length allowed depends on the
implementation; it is expected that implementation profiles may
further constrain the bounds. This field only provides convenience;
the key length is not cryptographically protected.
6.1. ASN.1 Module
For reference purposes, the ASN.1 syntax is presented as an ASN.1
module here.
Percival & Josefsson Expires March 28, 2013 [Page 8]
Internet-Draft scrypt September 2012
-- scrypt ASN.1 Module
scrypt-0 {1 3 6 1 4 1 11591 4 10}
DEFINITIONS ::= BEGIN
id-scrypt OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {1 3 6 1 4 1 11591 4 11}
scrypt-params ::= SEQUENCE {
salt OCTET STRING,
costParameter INTEGER (1..MAX),
blockSize INTEGER (1..MAX),
parallelizationParameter INTEGER (1..MAX),
keyLength INTEGER (1..MAX) OPTIONAL
}
END
Percival & Josefsson Expires March 28, 2013 [Page 9]
Internet-Draft scrypt September 2012
7. Test Vectors for Salsa20/8 Core
Below is a sequence of octets to illustrate input and output values
for the Salsa20/8 Core. The octets are hex encoded and whitespace is
inserted for readability. The value corresponds to the first input
and output pair generated by the first scrypt test vector below.
INPUT:
7e 87 9a 21 4f 3e c9 86 7c a9 40 e6 41 71 8f 26
ba ee 55 5b 8c 61 c1 b5 0d f8 46 11 6d cd 3b 1d
ee 24 f3 19 df 9b 3d 85 14 12 1e 4b 5a c5 aa 32
76 02 1d 29 09 c7 48 29 ed eb c6 8d b8 b8 c2 5e
OUTPUT:
a4 1f 85 9c 66 08 cc 99 3b 81 ca cb 02 0c ef 05
04 4b 21 81 a2 fd 33 7d fd 7b 1c 63 96 68 2f 29
b4 39 31 68 e3 c9 e6 bc fe 6b c5 b7 a0 6d 96 ba
e4 24 cc 10 2c 91 74 5c 24 ad 67 3d c7 61 8f 81
Percival & Josefsson Expires March 28, 2013 [Page 10]
Internet-Draft scrypt September 2012
8. Test Vectors for scryptBlockMix
Below is a sequence of octets to illustrate input and output values
for scryptBlockMix. The test vector uses an r value of 1. The
octets are hex encoded and whitespace is inserted for readability.
The value corresponds to the first input and output pair generated by
the first scrypt test vector below.
INPUT
B[0] = f7 ce 0b 65 3d 2d 72 a4 10 8c f5 ab e9 12 ff dd
77 76 16 db bb 27 a7 0e 82 04 f3 ae 2d 0f 6f ad
89 f6 8f 48 11 d1 e8 7b cc 3b d7 40 0a 9f fd 29
09 4f 01 84 63 95 74 f3 9a e5 a1 31 52 17 bc d7
B[1] = 89 49 91 44 72 13 bb 22 6c 25 b5 4d a8 63 70 fb
cd 98 43 80 37 46 66 bb 8f fc b5 bf 40 c2 54 b0
67 d2 7c 51 ce 4a d5 fe d8 29 c9 0b 50 5a 57 1b
7f 4d 1c ad 6a 52 3c da 77 0e 67 bc ea af 7e 89
OUTPUT
B'[0] = a4 1f 85 9c 66 08 cc 99 3b 81 ca cb 02 0c ef 05
04 4b 21 81 a2 fd 33 7d fd 7b 1c 63 96 68 2f 29
b4 39 31 68 e3 c9 e6 bc fe 6b c5 b7 a0 6d 96 ba
e4 24 cc 10 2c 91 74 5c 24 ad 67 3d c7 61 8f 81
B'[1] = 20 ed c9 75 32 38 81 a8 05 40 f6 4c 16 2d cd 3c
21 07 7c fe 5f 8d 5f e2 b1 a4 16 8f 95 36 78 b7
7d 3b 3d 80 3b 60 e4 ab 92 09 96 e5 9b 4d 53 b6
5d 2a 22 58 77 d5 ed f5 84 2c b9 f1 4e ef e4 25
Percival & Josefsson Expires March 28, 2013 [Page 11]
Internet-Draft scrypt September 2012
9. Test Vectors for scryptROMix
Below is a sequence of octets to illustrate input and output values
for scryptROMix. The test vector uses an r value of 1 and an N value
of 16. The octets are hex encoded and whitespace is inserted for
readability. The value corresponds to the first input and output
pair generated by the first scrypt test vector below.
INPUT:
B = f7 ce 0b 65 3d 2d 72 a4 10 8c f5 ab e9 12 ff dd
77 76 16 db bb 27 a7 0e 82 04 f3 ae 2d 0f 6f ad
89 f6 8f 48 11 d1 e8 7b cc 3b d7 40 0a 9f fd 29
09 4f 01 84 63 95 74 f3 9a e5 a1 31 52 17 bc d7
89 49 91 44 72 13 bb 22 6c 25 b5 4d a8 63 70 fb
cd 98 43 80 37 46 66 bb 8f fc b5 bf 40 c2 54 b0
67 d2 7c 51 ce 4a d5 fe d8 29 c9 0b 50 5a 57 1b
7f 4d 1c ad 6a 52 3c da 77 0e 67 bc ea af 7e 89
OUTPUT:
B = 79 cc c1 93 62 9d eb ca 04 7f 0b 70 60 4b f6 b6
2c e3 dd 4a 96 26 e3 55 fa fc 61 98 e6 ea 2b 46
d5 84 13 67 3b 99 b0 29 d6 65 c3 57 60 1f b4 26
a0 b2 f4 bb a2 00 ee 9f 0a 43 d1 9b 57 1a 9c 71
ef 11 42 e6 5d 5a 26 6f dd ca 83 2c e5 9f aa 7c
ac 0b 9c f1 be 2b ff ca 30 0d 01 ee 38 76 19 c4
ae 12 fd 44 38 f2 03 a0 e4 e1 c4 7e c3 14 86 1f
4e 90 87 cb 33 39 6a 68 73 e8 f9 d2 53 9a 4b 8e
Percival & Josefsson Expires March 28, 2013 [Page 12]
Internet-Draft scrypt September 2012
10. Test Vectors for PBKDF2 with HMAC-SHA-256
Below is a sequence of octets illustring input and output values for
PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA-256. The octets are hex encoded and whitespace is
inserted for readability. The test vectors below can be used to
verify the PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA-256 [RFC2898] function. The password and
salt strings are passed as sequences of ASCII [ANSI.X3-4.1986]
octets.
PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA-256 (P="passwd", S="salt",
c=1, dkLen=64) =
55 ac 04 6e 56 e3 08 9f ec 16 91 c2 25 44 b6 05
f9 41 85 21 6d de 04 65 e6 8b 9d 57 c2 0d ac bc
49 ca 9c cc f1 79 b6 45 99 16 64 b3 9d 77 ef 31
7c 71 b8 45 b1 e3 0b d5 09 11 20 41 d3 a1 97 83
PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA-256 (P="Password", S="NaCl",
c=80000, dkLen=64) =
4d dc d8 f6 0b 98 be 21 83 0c ee 5e f2 27 01 f9
64 1a 44 18 d0 4c 04 14 ae ff 08 87 6b 34 ab 56
a1 d4 25 a1 22 58 33 54 9a db 84 1b 51 c9 b3 17
6a 27 2b de bb a1 d0 78 47 8f 62 b3 97 f3 3c 8d
Percival & Josefsson Expires March 28, 2013 [Page 13]
Internet-Draft scrypt September 2012
11. Test Vectors for scrypt
For reference purposes, we provide the following test vectors for
scrypt, where the password and salt strings are passed as sequences
of ASCII [ANSI.X3-4.1986] octets.
The parameters to the scrypt function below are, in order, the
password P (octet string), the salt S (octet string), the CPU/Memory
cost parameter N, the block size parameter r, and the parallelization
parameter p, and the output size dkLen. The output is hex encoded
and whitespace is inserted for readability.
scrypt (P="", S="",
N=16, r=1, p=1, dklen=64) =
77 d6 57 62 38 65 7b 20 3b 19 ca 42 c1 8a 04 97
f1 6b 48 44 e3 07 4a e8 df df fa 3f ed e2 14 42
fc d0 06 9d ed 09 48 f8 32 6a 75 3a 0f c8 1f 17
e8 d3 e0 fb 2e 0d 36 28 cf 35 e2 0c 38 d1 89 06
scrypt (P="password", S="NaCl",
N=1024, r=8, p=16, dkLen=64) =
fd ba be 1c 9d 34 72 00 78 56 e7 19 0d 01 e9 fe
7c 6a d7 cb c8 23 78 30 e7 73 76 63 4b 37 31 62
2e af 30 d9 2e 22 a3 88 6f f1 09 27 9d 98 30 da
c7 27 af b9 4a 83 ee 6d 83 60 cb df a2 cc 06 40
scrypt (P="pleaseletmein", S="SodiumChloride",
N=16384, r=8, p=1, dkLen=64) =
70 23 bd cb 3a fd 73 48 46 1c 06 cd 81 fd 38 eb
fd a8 fb ba 90 4f 8e 3e a9 b5 43 f6 54 5d a1 f2
d5 43 29 55 61 3f 0f cf 62 d4 97 05 24 2a 9a f9
e6 1e 85 dc 0d 65 1e 40 df cf 01 7b 45 57 58 87
scrypt (P="pleaseletmein", S="SodiumChloride",
N=1048576, r=8, p=1, dkLen=64) =
21 01 cb 9b 6a 51 1a ae ad db be 09 cf 70 f8 81
ec 56 8d 57 4a 2f fd 4d ab e5 ee 98 20 ad aa 47
8e 56 fd 8f 4b a5 d0 9f fa 1c 6d 92 7c 40 f4 c3
37 30 40 49 e8 a9 52 fb cb f4 5c 6f a7 7a 41 a4
Percival & Josefsson Expires March 28, 2013 [Page 14]
Internet-Draft scrypt September 2012
12. Copying Conditions
The authors agree to grant third parties the irrevocable right to
copy, use and distribute this entire document or any portion of it,
with or without modification, in any medium, without royalty,
provided that, unless separate permission is granted, redistributed
modified works do not contain misleading author, version, name of
work, or endorsement information.
Percival & Josefsson Expires March 28, 2013 [Page 15]
Internet-Draft scrypt September 2012
13. Acknowledgements
Text in this document was borrowed from [SCRYPT] and [RFC2898].
Feedback on this document were received from Dmitry Chestnykh,
Alexander Klink, Rob Kendrick, Royce Williams Ted Rolle, Jr., and
Eitan Adler.
Percival & Josefsson Expires March 28, 2013 [Page 16]
Internet-Draft scrypt September 2012
14. IANA Considerations
None.
Percival & Josefsson Expires March 28, 2013 [Page 17]
Internet-Draft scrypt September 2012
15. Security Considerations
This document specifies a cryptographic algorithm. The reader must
follow cryptographic research of published attacks. ROMix has been
proven sequential memory-hard under the Random Oracle model for the
hash function. The security of scrypt relies on the assumption that
BlockMix with Salsa20/8 Core does not exhibit any "shortcuts" which
would allow it to be iterated more easily than a random oracle. For
other claims about the security properties see [SCRYPT].
Passwords and other sensitive data, such as intermediate values, may
continue to be stored in memory, core dumps, swap areas, etc, for a
long time after the implementation has processed them. This makes
attacks on the implementation easier. Thus, implementation should
consider storing sensitive data in protected memory areas. How to
achieve this is system dependent.
By nature and depending on parameters, running the scrypt algorithm
may require large amounts of memory. Systems should protect against
a denial of service attack resulting from attackers presenting
unreasonably large parameters.
Percival & Josefsson Expires March 28, 2013 [Page 18]
Internet-Draft scrypt September 2012
16. References
16.1. Normative References
[RFC2898] Kaliski, B., "PKCS #5: Password-Based Cryptography
Specification Version 2.0", RFC 2898, September 2000.
[RFC6234] Eastlake, D. and T. Hansen, "US Secure Hash Algorithms
(SHA and SHA-based HMAC and HKDF)", RFC 6234, May 2011.
[SALSA20CORE]
Bernstein, D., "The Salsa20 Core",
WWW http://cr.yp.to/salsa20.html, March 2005.
16.2. Informative References
[ANSI.X3-4.1986]
American National Standards Institute, "Coded Character
Set - 7-bit American Standard Code for Information
Interchange", ANSI X3.4, 1986.
[SCRYPT] Percival, C., "Stronger key derivation via sequential
memory-hard functions",
BSDCan'09 http://www.tarsnap.com/scrypt/scrypt.pdf,
May 2009.
Percival & Josefsson Expires March 28, 2013 [Page 19]
Internet-Draft scrypt September 2012
Authors' Addresses
Colin Percival
Tarsnap
Email: cperciva@tarsnap.com
Simon Josefsson
SJD AB
Email: simon@josefsson.org
URI: http://josefsson.org/
Percival & Josefsson Expires March 28, 2013 [Page 20]
Html markup produced by rfcmarkup 1.111, available from
https://tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcmarkup/