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DICE Working Group                                               S. Keoh
Internet-Draft                           University of Glasgow Singapore
Intended status: Standards Track                           S. Kumar, Ed.
Expires: November 10, 2014                             O. Garcia-Morchon
                                                                 E. Dijk
                                                        Philips Research
                                                               A. Rahman
                                                            InterDigital
                                                             May 9, 2014


       DTLS-based Multicast Security in Constrained Environments
                 draft-keoh-dice-multicast-security-07

Abstract

   The CoAP standard is fast emerging as a key protocol in the area of
   resource-constrained devices.  Such IP-based systems are foreseen to
   be used for building and lighting control systems where devices
   interconnect with each other, forming, for example, low-power and
   lossy networks (LLNs).  Both multicast and its security are key needs
   in these networks.  This draft presents a method for securing IPv6
   multicast communication based on the DTLS which is already supported
   for unicast communication for CoAP devices.  This draft deals with
   the adaptation of the DTLS record layer to protect multicast group
   communication, assuming that all group members already have the group
   security association parameters in their possession.  The adapted
   DTLS record layer provides message confidentiality, integrity and
   replay protection to group messages using the group keying material
   before sending the message via IPv6 multicast to the group.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on November 10, 2014.




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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.1.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     1.2.  Outline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   2.  Use Cases and Requirements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.1.  Group Communication Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.2.  Security Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   3.  Overview of DTLS-based Secure Multicast . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     3.1.  IP Multicast  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     3.2.  Securing Multicast in Constrained Networks  . . . . . . .  10
   4.  Multicast Data Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     4.1.  SecurityParameter derivation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     4.2.  Record layer adaptation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     4.3.  Sending Secure Multicast Messages . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     4.4.  Receiving Secure Multicast Messages . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     4.5.  Unicast Responses to Multicast Messages . . . . . . . . .  15
     4.6.  Proxy Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   5.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     6.1.  Group level security  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     6.2.  Late joiners  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     6.3.  Uniqueness of SenderIDs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     6.4.  Reduced sequence number space . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
   7.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
   8.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     8.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     8.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
   Appendix A.  Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21






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1.  Introduction

   There is an increased use of wireless control networks in
   environmental monitoring, industrial automation, lighting controls
   and building management systems.  This is mainly driven by the fact
   that the independence from physical control wires allows for freedom
   of placement, portability and for reducing the cost of installation
   as less cable placement and drilling are required.  Consequently,
   there is an ever growing number of electronic devices, sensors and
   actuators that have become Internet connected, thus creating a trend
   towards the Internet-of-Things (IoT).  These connected devices are
   equipped with communication capability that enables them to interact
   with each other as well as with the wider Internet services.
   However, the devices in such wireless control networks are
   characterized by power constraints (as these are usually battery-
   operated), have limited computational resources (low CPU clock, small
   RAM and flash storage) and often, the communication bandwidth is
   limited and unreliable (e.g., IEEE 802.15.4 radio).  Hence, such
   wireless control networks are also known as Low-power and Lossy
   Networks (LLNs).

   In addition to the usual device-to-device unicast communication that
   allow devices to directly interact with each other, group
   communication is an important feature in constrained environments.
   It is more effective in constrained environments to convey messages
   to a group of devices without requiring the sender to perform
   multiple time and energy consuming unicast transmissions to reach
   each individual group member.  For example, in a building and
   lighting control system, the heating, ventilation, air-conditioning
   and lighting devices are often grouped according to the layout of the
   building, and control commands are issued simultaneously to a group
   of devices.  Group communication is based on the Constrained
   Application Protocol (CoAP) [I-D.ietf-core-coap]  sent over IP-
   multicast [I-D.ietf-core-groupcomm].

   Currently, CoAP messages are protected using Datagram Transport Layer
   Security (DTLS) [RFC6347].  However, DTLS is currently used to secure
   a connection between two endpoints and it cannot be used to protect
   multicast group communication.  Group communication in constrained
   environments is equally important and should be secured as it is also
   vulnerable to the usual attacks over the air (eavesdropping,
   tampering, message forgery, replay, etc).  There have been a lot of
   previous efforts in IETF to standardize mechanisms to secure
   multicast communication such as [RFC3830], [RFC4082], [RFC3740],
   [RFC4046], and [RFC4535].  However, these approaches are not
   necessarily suitable for constrained environments which have much
   more limited bandwidth and resources.  For example, the MIKEY
   Architecture [RFC3830] is mainly designed to facilitate multimedia



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   distribution, while TESLA [RFC4082] is proposed as a protocol for
   broadcast authentication of the source and not for protecting the
   confidentiality of multicast messages.  [RFC3740] and [RFC4046]
   provide reference architectures for multicast security.  [RFC4535]
   describes Group Secure Association Key Management Protocol (GSAKMP),
   a security framework for creating and managing cryptographic groups
   on a network which can be reused for key management in our context
   with any needed adaptation for constrained networks.

   This draft describes an approach to use DTLS as mandated in CoAP
   unicast to also support multicast security.  We will assume that all
   devices in the group already have a group security association
   parameters based on a key management mechanism which is outside the
   scope of this draft.  This draft focuses primarily on the adaptation
   of the DTLS record layer to protect multicast messages to be sent to
   the group, and thus providing confidentiality, integrity and replay
   protection to the CoAP group messages.

   Lastly, even though this draft is written from the perspective of
   securing CoAP based group communication, it is important to note that
   DTLS is a powerful and flexible security protocol.  Thus use of DTLS-
   based multicast for application layer protocols other than CoAP are
   possible as long as they follow the approach outlined in this draft.

1.1.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

   This specification uses the following terminology:

   o  Group Controller: The entity that is responsible for creating a
      multicast group and establishing security associations among
      authorized group members.  It is also responsible for renewing/
      updating the multicast group keys.

   o  Sender: The Sender is an entity that sends data to the multicast
      group.  In a 1-to-N multicast group only a single sender is
      authorized to transmit data to the group.  In an M-to-N multicast
      group (where M and N are not necessarily the same value), M group
      members are authorized to be senders.

   o  Listener: The entity that receives multicast messages when
      listening to a multicast IP address.

   o  Security Association (SA): A set of policy and cryptographic keys
      that provide security services to network traffic that matches



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      that policy [RFC3740].  A Security Association usually contains
      the following attributes:

      *  selectors, such as source and destination transport addresses.

      *  properties, such as identities.

      *  cryptographic policy, such as the algorithms, modes, key
         lifetimes, and key lengths used for authentication or
         confidentiality.

      *  keying material for authentication, encryption and signing.

   o  Group Security Association (GSA): A bundling of security
      associations (SAs) that together define how a group communicates
      securely.  [RFC3740]

   o  Keying material: Data that is specified as part of the SA which is
      needed to establish and maintain a cryptographic security
      association, such as keys, key pairs, and IVs [RFC4949].

1.2.  Outline

   This draft is structured as follows: Section 2 motivates the proposed
   solution with group communication use cases in LLNs and derives a set
   of requirements.  Section 3 provides an overview of the proposed
   DTLS-based multicast security assuming that all devices in the group
   already have a group security association parameters in their
   possession.  In Section 4, we describe the details of the adaptation
   of DTLS record layer for confidentiality and integrity protection of
   the multicast messages.  Section 6 presents the security
   considerations.

2.  Use Cases and Requirements

   This section defines the use cases for group communication in LLNs
   and specifies a set of security requirements for these use cases.

2.1.  Group Communication Use Cases

   The "Group Communication for CoAP" draft [I-D.ietf-core-groupcomm]
   provides the necessary background for multicast based CoAP
   communication in constrained environments (e.g. LLNs).  and the
   interested reader is encouraged to first read this document to
   understand the non-security related details.  This document also
   lists a few multicast group communication uses cases with detailed
   descriptions and some are listed here briefly:




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   a.  Lighting control: enabling synchronous operation of a group of
       6LoWPAN [RFC4944] [RFC6282] connected lights in a room/floor/
       building.  This ensures that the light preset like on/off/dim-
       level of a large group of luminaries are changed at the same
       time, hence providing a visual synchronicity of light effects to
       the user.

   b.  Parameter update: configuration settings of a group of similar
       devices are updated simultaneously and efficiently.

   c.  Device and Service discovery: information about the devices in
       the local network and their capabilities can be queried and
       requested using multicast, e.g. by a commissioning device.  The
       responses are sent back in unicast.

   Elaborating on one of the main use cases that this document
   addresses, Lighting control, consider a building equipped with
   6LoWPAN IP-connected lighting devices, switches, and 6LoWPAN border
   routers; the devices are organized in groups according to their
   physical location in the building, e.g., lighting devices and
   switches in a room/floor can be configured as a single multicast
   group.  The switches are then used to control the lighting devices in
   the group by sending on/off/dimming commands to all lighting devices
   in the group. 6LoWPAN border routers that are connected to an IPv6
   network backbone (which is also multicast enabled) are used to
   interconnect 6LoWPANs in the building.  Consequently, this would also
   enable multicast groups to be formed across different physical
   subnets (which may be individually protected with L2 security).  In
   such a multicast group, group messages can traverse from one physical
   subnet to another physical subnet through a IPv6 backbone which may
   not be protected.  Additionally, other non-lighting devices (like
   window blind controls) may share the physical subnet for networking.

2.2.  Security Requirements

   The "Miscellaneous CoAP Group Communication Topics" draft
   [I-D.dijk-core-groupcomm-misc] already defines a set of security
   requirements for CoAP group communications We re-iterate and further
   describe those security requirements in this section with respect to
   the use cases:

   a.  Multicast communication topology: We consider both 1-to-N (one
       sender with multiple listeners) and M-to-N (multiple senders with
       multiple listeners) communication topologies.  The 1-to-N
       communication topology is the simplest group communication
       scenario that would serve the needs of a typical LLN.  For
       example, in the simple lighting control use case, the switch is
       the only entity that is responsible for sending control commands



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       to a group of lighting devices.  In more advanced lighting
       control use cases, a N-to-M communication topology would be
       required, for example if multiple sensors (presence or day-light)
       are responsible to trigger events to a group of lighting devices.

   b.  Multicast group size: The security solutions should support the
       typical group sizes that "Group Communication for CoAP" draft
       [I-D.ietf-core-groupcomm] intends to support.  Group size is the
       combination of the number of Senders and Listeners in a group
       with possible overlap (a Sender can also be a Listener but need
       not be always).  In LLN use cases mentioned in the document, the
       number of Senders (normally the controlling devices) is much
       smaller than the number of Listeners (the controlled devices).  A
       security solution that supports 1 to 50 Senders would cover the
       group sizes required for most use cases that are relevant for
       this document.  The total number of group devices must be in the
       range of 2 to 100 devices.  Groups larger than these should be
       divided into smaller independent multicast groups such as
       grouping lights of a building per floor.

   c.  Establishment of a GSA: A secure mechanism must be used to
       distribute keying materials, multicast security policies and
       security parameters to members of a multicast group.  A GSA must
       be established by the group controller (which manages the
       multicast group) among the group members.  The 6LoWPAN border
       router, a device in the 6LoWPAN, or a remote server outside the
       6LoWPAN could play the role of the group controller.  However,
       GSA establishment is outside the scope of this draft, and it is
       anticipated that an activity in IETF dedicated to the design of a
       generic key management scheme for the LLN will include this
       feature preferably based on [RFC3740], [RFC4046] and [RFC4535].

   d.  Multicast data confidentiality: Multicast message should be
       encrypted, as some control commands when sent in the clear could
       pose unforeseen privacy risks to the users of the system.

   e.  Multicast data replay protection: It must not be possible to
       replay a multicast message as this would disrupt the operation of
       the group communication.

   f.  Multicast data group authentication and integrity: It is
       essential to ensure that a multicast message originated from a
       member of the group and that messages have not been tampered with
       by attackers who are not members.  The multicast group key which
       is known to all group members is used to provide authenticity to
       the multicast messages (e.g., using a Message Authentication
       Code, MAC).  This assumes that all other group members are
       trusted not to tamper with the multicast message.



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   g.  Multicast data security ciphersuite: All group members must use
       the same ciphersuite to protect the authenticity, integrity and
       confidentiality of multicast messages.  The ciphersuite is part
       of the GSA.  Typically authenticity is more important than
       confidentiality in LLNs.  Therefore the proposed multicast data
       security protocol must support at least ciphersuites with MAC
       only (NULL encryption) and AEAD [RFC5116] ciphersuites.  Other
       ciphersuites that are defined for data record security in DTLS
       should also be preferably supported.

   h.  Multicast data source authentication: Source authenticity is
       required if the group members are assumed to be untrusted and can
       tamper with the multicast messages.  This can happen if nodes of
       the group can be easily compromised.  Source authenticity helps
       to minimize the risk of any node compromise leading to the
       compromise of the whole multicast group.  Source authenticity can
       be typically provided using public-key cryptography in which
       every multicast message is signed by the sender.  Alternatively,
       a lightweight broadcast authentication, i.e., TESLA [RFC4082] can
       be deployed, however it requires devices in the multicast group
       to have a trusted clock and have the ability to loosely
       synchronize their clocks with the sender.  Source authenticity
       mechanisms should be preferably defined at the application layer.
       The transport layer group level security can provide an
       additional layer of security for the source authenticity
       mechanism against DoS attacks.  However, even with source
       authenticity the risk still remains that compromise of a sender
       can still compromise the whole group.

   i.  Forward security: Devices that leave the group should not have
       access to any future GSAs.  This ensures that a past member
       device cannot continue to decrypt confidential data that is sent
       in the group.  It also ensures that this device cannot send
       encrypted and/or integrity protected data after it leaves the
       group.  The GSA update mechanism has to be defined as part of the
       key management scheme.

   j.  Backward confidentiality: A new device joining the group should
       not have access to any old GSAs.  This ensures that a new member
       device cannot decrypt data sent before it joins the group.  The
       key management scheme should ensure that the GSA is updated to
       ensure backward confidentiality.

3.  Overview of DTLS-based Secure Multicast

   The goal of this draft is to secure CoAP Group communication by
   extending the use of the DTLS security protocol to allow for the use
   of DTLS record layer with minimal adaptation.  The IETF CoRE WG has



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   selected DTLS [RFC6347] as the default must-implement security
   protocol for securing CoAP, therefore it is desirable that DTLS be
   extended to facilitate CoAP-based group communication.  Reusing DTLS
   for different purposes while guaranteeing the required security
   properties can avoid the need to implement multiple security
   protocols and this is especially beneficial when the target
   deployment consists of resource-constrained embedded devices.  This
   section first describes group communication based on IP multicast,
   and subsequently sketches a solution for securing group communication
   using DTLS.

3.1.  IP Multicast

   Devices in the network (e.g. LLN) are categorized into two roles, (1)
   sender and (2) listener.  Any node may have one of these roles, or
   both roles.  The application(s) running on a device basically
   determine these roles by the function calls they execute on the IP
   stack of the device.

   In principle, a sender or listener does not require any prior access
   procedures or authentication to send or listen to a multicast message
   [RFC5374].  A sender to an IPv6 multicast group sets the destination
   of the packet to an IPv6 address that has been allocated for IPv6
   multicast.  A device becomes a listener by "joining" to the specific
   IPv6 multicast group by registering with a network routing device,
   signaling its intent to receive packets sent to that particular IPv6
   multicast group.  Figure 1 depicts a 1-to-N multicast communication
   and the roles of the nodes.  Any device can in principle decide to
   listen to any IPv6 multicast address.  This also means applications
   on the other devices do not know, or do not get notified, when new
   listeners join the network.  More details on the IPv6 multicast and
   CoAP group communication can be found in [I-D.ietf-core-groupcomm].
   This draft does not intend to modify any of the underlying group
   communication or multicast routing protocols.

















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                                       ++++
                                       |. |
                                     --| ++++
                            ++++    /  ++|. |
                            |A |---------| ++++
                            |  |    \    ++|B |
                            ++++     \-----|  |
                           Sender          ++++
                                         Listeners


     Figure 1: The roles of nodes in a 1-to-N multicast communication
                                 topology

3.2.  Securing Multicast in Constrained Networks

   A group controller in a constrained network creates a multicast
   group.  The group controller may be hosted by a remote server, or a
   border router that creates a new group over the network.  In some
   cases, devices may be configured using a commissioning tool that
   mediates the communication between the devices and the group
   controller.  The controller in the network can be discovered by the
   devices using various methods defined in [I-D.vanderstok-core-dna]
   such as DNS-SD [RFC6763] and Resource Directory
   [I-D.ietf-core-resource-directory].  The group controller
   communicates with individual devices to add them to the new group.
   Additionally it distributes the GSA consisting of keying material,
   security policies security parameters and ciphersuites using a
   standardized key management for constrained networks which is outside
   the scope of this draft.  Additional ciphersuites may need to be
   defined to convey the bulk cipher algorithm, MAC algorithm and key
   lengths within the key management protocol.  We provide two examples
   of ciphersuites (based on the security requirements) that could be
   defined as part of a future key management mechanism:


       Ciphersuite MTS_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 = {TBD1, TBD2}
       Ciphersuite MTS_WITH_NULL_SHA256   = {TBD3, TBD4}

   Ciphersuite MTS_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 is used to provide
   confidentiality, integrity and authenticity to the multicast messages
   where the encryption algorithm is AES [FIPS.197.2001], key length is
   128-bit, and the authentication function is CCM [RFC6655] with a
   Message Authentication Code (MAC) length of 8 octets.  Similar to
   [RFC4785], the ciphersuite MTS_WITH_NULL_SHA is used when
   confidentiality of multicast messages is not required, it only
   provides integrity and authenticity protection to the multicast
   message.  When this ciphersuite is used, the message is not encrypted



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   but the MAC must be included in which it is computed using a HMAC
   [RFC2104] that is based on Secure Hash Function SHA256
   [FIPS.180-2.2002].  Depending on the future needs, other ciphersuites
   with different cipher algorithms and MAC length may be supported.

   Senders in the group can encrypt and authenticate the CoAP group
   messages from the application using the keying material into the DTLS
   record.  The authenticated encrypted message is passed down to the
   lower layer of the IPv6 protocol stack for transmission to the
   multicast address as depicted in Figure 2.  The listeners when
   receiving the message, use the multicast IPv6 destination address and
   port (i.e., Multicast identifier) to look up the GSA needed for that
   group connection.  The received message is then decrypted and the
   authenticity is verified using the keying material for that
   connection.


       +--------+-------------------------------------------------+
       |        | +--------+------------------------------------+ |
       |        | |        | +-------------+------------------+ | |
       |        | |        | |             | +--------------+ | | |
       |   IP   | |   UDP  | | DTLS Record | |   multicast  | | | |
       | header | | header | |    Header   | |    message   | | | |
       |        | |        | |             | +--------------+ | | |
       |        | |        | +-------------+------------------+ | |
       |        | +--------+------------------------------------+ |
       +--------+-------------------------------------------------+


     Figure 2: Sending a multicast message protected using DTLS Record
                                   Layer

4.  Multicast Data Security

   This section describes in detail the use of DTLS record layer to
   secure multicast messages.  This assumes that group membership has
   been configured by the group controller, and all member devices in
   the group have the GSA.

4.1.  SecurityParameter derivation

   The GSA is used to derive the same "SecurityParameters" structure as
   defined in [RFC5246] for all devices.

   The SecurityParameters.ConnectionEnd should be set to "server" for
   senders and "client" for listeners.  The current read and write
   states can be derived from SecurityParameters by generating the six
   keying materials:



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       client write MAC key
       server write MAC key
       client write encryption key
       server write encryption key
       client write IV
       server write IV


   This requires that the client_random and server_random within the
   SecurityParameters are also set to the same value for all devices as
   part of the GSA to derive the same keying material for all devices in
   the group with the PRF function defined in Section 6.3 of [RFC5246] .
   Alternatively, the GSA could directly include the above six keying
   material when being configured in all group devices.

   The current read and write states are instantiated for all group
   members based on the keying material and according to their roles:
   senders use "server write" parameters for the write state and
   listeners use "server write" parameters for the read state.
   Additionally each connection state contains the sequence number which
   is incremented for each record sent; the first record sent has the
   sequence number 0.

4.2.  Record layer adaptation

   In this section, we describe in detail the adaptation of the DTLS
   Record layer to enable multiple senders in the group to securely send
   information using a common group key, while preserving the
   confidentiality, integrity and freshness of the messages.

   The following Figure 3 illustrates the structure of the DTLS record
   layer header, the epoch and seq_number are used to ensure message
   freshness and to detect message replays.


   +---------+---------+--------+--------+--------+------------+-------+
   | 1 Byte  | 2 Byte  | 2 Byte | 6 Byte | 2 Byte |            |       |
   +---------+---------+--------+--------+--------+------------+-------+
   | Content | Version | epoch  |  seq_  | Length | Ciphertext |  MAC  |
   |   Type  | Ma | Mi |        | number |        |   (Enc)    | (Enc) |
   +---------+---------+--------+--------+--------+------------+-------+


      Figure 3: The DTLS record layer header and optionally encrypted
                              payload and MAC

   The epoch is fixed by the DTLS handshake and the seq_number is
   initialized to 0.  The seq_number is increased by one whenever a



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   sender sends a new record message.  This is the mechanism of DTLS to
   detect message replay.  Finally, the message is protected (encrypted
   and authenticated with a MAC) using the session keys in the "server
   write" parameters.

   One of the problems with supporting multiple senders is that, the
   seq_number used by senders need to be synchronized to avoid their
   reuse, otherwise packets sent by different senders may get discarded
   as replayed packets.  Further, the bigger problem is using a single
   key in a multiple sender scenario leads to nonce reuse in AEAD cipher
   suites like AES-CCM [RFC6655] and AES-GCM [RFC5288] as defined in
   DTLS.  Nonce reuse can completely break the security of these cipher
   suites.

   According to the AES-CCM for TLS, Section 3 [RFC6655], the CCMNonce
   is a combination of a salt value and the sequence number.


                         struct {
                             opaque salt[4];
                             opaque nonce_explicit[8];
                         } CCMNonce;

   The salt is the "client write IV" (when the client is sending) or the
   "server write IV" (when the server is sending) as defined in the
   "SecurityParameters".  Further [RFC6655] requires that the value of
   the nonce_explicit MUST be distinct for each distinct invocation of
   the CCM encrypt function for any fixed key.  When the nonce_explicit
   is equal to the sequence number of the TLS packets, the CCMNonce has
   the structure as below:


              struct {
                  uint32 client_write_IV; // low order 32-bits
                  uint64 seq_num;         // TLS sequence number
              } CCMClientNonce.

              struct {
                  uint32 server_write_IV; // low order 32-bits
                  uint64 seq_num;         // TLS sequence number
              } CCMServerNonce.

   In DTLS, the 64-bit sequence number is the 16-bit epoch concatenated
   with the 48-bit seq_number.  Therefore to prevent that the CCMNonce
   is reused, either all senders need to synchronize or separate non-
   overlapping sequence number spaces need to be created for each
   sender.  Synchronization between senders is especially hard in
   constrained networks and therefore we go for the second approach of



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   separating the sequence number spaces by embedding a unique sender
   identifier in the sequence number as suggested in [RFC5288].

   Thus in addition to configuring each device in the group with the
   GSA, the controller needs to assign a unique SenderID to each device
   which has the sender role in the group.  The size of the SenderID is
   1-octet based on the requirement for the supported group size
   mentioned in Section 2.2.  The list of SenderIDs are then distributed
   to all the group members by the controller.

   The existing DTLS record layer header is adapted such that the
   6-octet seq_number field is split into a 1-octet SenderID field and a
   5-octet "truncated" trunc_seq_number field.  Figure 4 illustrates the
   adapted DTLS record layer header.


         +---------+---------+--------+--------+-----------+--------+
         | 1 Byte  | 2 Byte  | 2 Byte | 1 Byte | 5 Byte    | 2 Byte |
         +---------+---------+--------+--------+-----------+--------+
         | Content | Version | Epoch  | Sender | trunc_seq_| Length |
         |   Type  | Ma | Mi |        |   ID   | number    |        |
         +---------+---------+--------+--------+-----------+--------+


              Figure 4: The adapted DTLS record layer header

4.3.  Sending Secure Multicast Messages

   Senders in the multicast group when sending a CoAP group message from
   the application, create the adapted DTLS record payload based on the
   "server write" parameters.  Each sender in the group uses its own
   unique SenderID in the DTLS record layer header.  It also manages its
   own epoch and trunc_seq_number in the "server write" connection
   state; the first record sent has the trunc_seq_number 0.  After
   creating the DTLS record, the trun_seq_number is incremented in the
   "server write" connection state.  The adapted DTLS record is then
   passed down to UDP and IPv6 layer for transmission on the multicast
   IPv6 destination address and port.

4.4.  Receiving Secure Multicast Messages

   When a listeners receives a protected multicast message from the
   sender, it looks up the corresponding "client read" connection state
   based on the multicast IP destination and port of the packet.  This
   is fundamentally different from standard DTLS logic in that the
   current "client read" connection state is bound to the source IP
   address and port.




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   Listener devices in a multiple senders multicast group, need to store
   multiple "client read" connection states for the different senders
   linked to the SenderIDs.  The keying material is same for all senders
   however the epoch and the trunc_seq_number of the last received
   packets needs to be kept different for different senders.

   The listeners first perform a "server write" keys lookup by using the
   multicast IPv6 destination address and port of the packet.  By
   knowing the keys, the listeners decrypt and check the MAC of the
   message.  This guarantees that no one outside the group has spoofed
   the SenderID, as it is protected by the MAC.  Subsequently, by
   authenticating the SenderID field, the listeners retrieve the "client
   read" connection state which contains the last stored epoch and
   trunc_seq_number of the sender, which is used to check the freshness
   of the message received.  The listeners must ensure that the epoch is
   the same and trunc_seq_number in the message received is higher than
   the stored value, otherwise the message is discarded.  Alternatively
   a windowing mechanism can be used to accept genuine out-of-order
   packets.  Once the authenticity and freshness of the message have
   been checked, the listeners can pass the message to the higher layer
   protocols.  The epoch and the trunc_seq_number in the corresponding
   "client read" connection state are updated as well.

4.5.  Unicast Responses to Multicast Messages

   In CoAP, responses to multicast messages are always sent back as
   unicast.  That is, the group members that receive a multicast message
   may individually decide to send (or suppress) a unicast response as
   described in Section 2.5 of [I-D.ietf-core-groupcomm].  The unicast
   responses to a DTLS-based multicast message may optionally be secure.
   Specifically, the unicast response may be sent back as a unicast DTLS
   as described in Section 9.1 of [I-D.ietf-core-coap].  This requires
   that a unicast DTLS handshake was previously initiated between the
   multicast message sender and listener.

   Either the multicast message sender or listener may initiate the
   unicast DTLS handshake.  If the DTLS handshake was initiated by the
   multicast message sender, it requires that the sender be aware of the
   membership of the multicast group.  This can be accomplished, for
   example, as described in Section 2.6 of [I-D.ietf-core-coap].  If the
   listener initiated the DTLS handshake, it may have done so, for
   example, after receiving a multicast message for the first time.

   In the extreme scenario, a multicast sender may attempt to initiate
   the unicast DTLS handshake with all, or a subset of, known listeners
   just after it sends out the DTLS-based multicast message.  This may
   result in the multicast sender having to process unicast DTLS




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   handshake messages from multiple multicast listeners in a short
   period.

   Note: There is an obvious timing and processing load issue for the
   multicast sender in the scenario where it attempts to initiate the
   unicast DTLS handshakes with all/some of its known listeners just
   after it sends out the DTLS-based multicast message.  In this case,
   the processing load in the multicast sender (i.e. unicast DTLS
   client) is reduced somewhat by the fact that CoAP requires a back-off
   and randomization of the unicast response by the Leisure timer
   mechanism as described in Section 8.2 of [I-D.ietf-core-coap].

4.6.  Proxy Operation

   CoAP allows a client to designate a (forward) proxy to process its
   CoAP request for both unicast and multicast scenarios as described in
   Section 2.10 of [I-D.ietf-core-groupcomm].  In this case, the proxy
   (and not the client) appears as the originating point to the
   destination server for the CoAP request.

   As mentioned in Section 11.2 of [I-D.ietf-core-coap], proxies are by
   their nature men-in-the-middle and break DTLS protection of CoAP
   message exchanges.  Therefore, in a DTLS-based multicast scenario
   involving a proxy, a two-step approach is required.  First, the
   client will send a unicast DTLS request to the proxy.  The proxy will
   then receive and decrypt the unicast message.  The proxy will then
   take the contents of the received message and create a new multicast
   message and secure it using DTLS-based multicast before sending it
   out to the group.  For this approach to work properly, the client
   needs to be able to designate the proxy as an authorized sender.  The
   mechanism for this authorization is outside the scope of this draft.

5.  IANA Considerations

   This memo includes no request to IANA.

6.  Security Considerations

   Some of the security issues that should be taken into consideration
   are discussed below.

6.1.  Group level security

   This proposal uses a single group key to protect communication within
   the group.  This requires that all group members are trusted, for
   e.g. they do not forge messages as a different sender in the group.
   In many use case, the devices in a group belong to a common authority
   and are configured by a commissioner.  In a professional lighting



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   scenario, the roles of the senders and listeners are configured by
   the lighting commissioner and devices follow those roles.

   The use of the protocol should take into consideration the risk of
   compromise of a group device in a deployment scenario.  Therefore the
   group size should be limited to 100 devices unless additional source
   authenticity mechanisms are implemented at the application layer.
   Further, the damage due to a compromised key can be limited by
   increasing the frequency of re-keying based on the unique unicast
   key-pair shared by each device with the controller.  Additionally the
   risk of compromise is reduced when deployments are in physically
   secured locations, like lighting inside office buildings.

6.2.  Late joiners

   Listeners who are late joiners to a multicast group, do not know the
   current epoch and trun_seq_number being used by different senders.
   When they receive a packet from a sender with a random
   trunc_seq_number in it, it is impossible for the listener to verify
   if the packet is fresh and has not been replayed by an attacker.  To
   overcome this late joiner security issue, we can use the techniques
   similar to AERO [I-D.mcgrew-aero] where the late joining listener on
   receiving the first packet from a particular sender, initialize its
   last seen epoch and trunc_seq_number in the "client read" state for
   that sender, however does not pass this packet to the application
   layer and instead drops it.  This provides a reference point to
   identify if future packets are fresher than the last seen packet.
   Alternatively, the group controller which can act as a listener in
   the multicast group can maintain the epoch and trunc_seq_number of
   each sender.  When late joiners send a request to the group
   controller to join the multicast group, the group controller can send
   the list of epoch and trunc_seq_numbers as part of the GSA.

6.3.  Uniqueness of SenderIDs

   It is important that SenderIDs are unique to maintain the security
   properties of the DTLS record layer messages.  However in the event
   that two or more senders are configured with the same SenderID, a
   mechanism needs to be present to avoid a security weakness and
   recover from the situation.  One such mechanism is that all senders
   of the multicast group are also listeners.  This allows a sender
   which receives a packet from a different device with its own SenderID
   in the DTLS header to become aware of a clash.  Once aware, the
   sender can inform the controller on a secure channel about the clash
   along with the source IP address.  The controller can then provide a
   different SenderID to either device or both.





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6.4.  Reduced sequence number space

   The DTLS record layer seq_number is truncated from 6 octets to 5
   octets.  This reduction of the seq_number space should be taken into
   account to ensure that epoch is incremented before the
   trunc_seq_number wraps over.  The sender or the controller can
   increase the epoch number by sending a ChangeCipherSpec message
   whenever the trunc_seq_number has been exhausted.  This should be
   done as part of the key management mechanism which is not defined in
   this draft.

7.  Acknowledgements

   The authors greatly acknowledge discussion, comments and feedback
   from Dee Denteneer, Peter van der Stok, Zach Shelby, Michael StJohns
   and Marco Tiloca.  Additionally thanks to David McGrew for suggesting
   options for recovering from a SenderID clash, and John Foley for the
   extensive review and pointing us to the AERO draft.  We also
   appreciate prototyping and implementation efforts by Pedro Moreno
   Sanchez who worked as an intern at Philips Research.

8.  References

8.1.  Normative References

   [I-D.ietf-core-coap]
              Shelby, Z., Hartke, K., and C. Bormann, "Constrained
              Application Protocol (CoAP)", draft-ietf-core-coap-18
              (work in progress), June 2013.

   [I-D.ietf-core-groupcomm]
              Rahman, A. and E. Dijk, "Group Communication for CoAP",
              draft-ietf-core-groupcomm-18 (work in progress), December
              2013.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC5116]  McGrew, D., "An Interface and Algorithms for Authenticated
              Encryption", RFC 5116, January 2008.

   [RFC5246]  Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
              (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.

   [RFC5288]  Salowey, J., Choudhury, A., and D. McGrew, "AES Galois
              Counter Mode (GCM) Cipher Suites for TLS", RFC 5288,
              August 2008.




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   [RFC6347]  Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer
              Security Version 1.2", RFC 6347, January 2012.

   [RFC6655]  McGrew, D. and D. Bailey, "AES-CCM Cipher Suites for
              Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 6655, July 2012.

8.2.  Informative References

   [FIPS.180-2.2002]
              National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Secure
              Hash Standard", FIPS PUB 180-2, August 2002,
              <http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips180-2/
              fips180-2.pdf>.

   [FIPS.197.2001]
              National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Advanced
              Encryption Standard (AES)", FIPS PUB 197, November 2001,
              <http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/
              fips-197.pdf>.

   [I-D.dijk-core-groupcomm-misc]
              Dijk, E. and A. Rahman, "Miscellaneous CoAP Group
              Communication Topics", draft-dijk-core-groupcomm-misc-05
              (work in progress), December 2013.

   [I-D.ietf-core-resource-directory]
              Shelby, Z., Bormann, C., and S. Krco, "CoRE Resource
              Directory", draft-ietf-core-resource-directory-01 (work in
              progress), December 2013.

   [I-D.mcgrew-aero]
              McGrew, D. and J. Foley, "Authenticated Encryption with
              Replay prOtection (AERO)", draft-mcgrew-aero-01 (work in
              progress), February 2014.

   [I-D.vanderstok-core-dna]
              Stok, P., Lynn, K., and A. Brandt, "CoRE Discovery,
              Naming, and Addressing", draft-vanderstok-core-dna-02
              (work in progress), July 2012.

   [RFC2104]  Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
              Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104, February
              1997.

   [RFC3740]  Hardjono, T. and B. Weis, "The Multicast Group Security
              Architecture", RFC 3740, March 2004.





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   [RFC3830]  Arkko, J., Carrara, E., Lindholm, F., Naslund, M., and K.
              Norrman, "MIKEY: Multimedia Internet KEYing", RFC 3830,
              August 2004.

   [RFC4046]  Baugher, M., Canetti, R., Dondeti, L., and F. Lindholm,
              "Multicast Security (MSEC) Group Key Management
              Architecture", RFC 4046, April 2005.

   [RFC4082]  Perrig, A., Song, D., Canetti, R., Tygar, J., and B.
              Briscoe, "Timed Efficient Stream Loss-Tolerant
              Authentication (TESLA): Multicast Source Authentication
              Transform Introduction", RFC 4082, June 2005.

   [RFC4535]  Harney, H., Meth, U., Colegrove, A., and G. Gross,
              "GSAKMP: Group Secure Association Key Management
              Protocol", RFC 4535, June 2006.

   [RFC4785]  Blumenthal, U. and P. Goel, "Pre-Shared Key (PSK)
              Ciphersuites with NULL Encryption for Transport Layer
              Security (TLS)", RFC 4785, January 2007.

   [RFC4944]  Montenegro, G., Kushalnagar, N., Hui, J., and D. Culler,
              "Transmission of IPv6 Packets over IEEE 802.15.4
              Networks", RFC 4944, September 2007.

   [RFC4949]  Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2", RFC
              4949, August 2007.

   [RFC5374]  Weis, B., Gross, G., and D. Ignjatic, "Multicast
              Extensions to the Security Architecture for the Internet
              Protocol", RFC 5374, November 2008.

   [RFC6282]  Hui, J. and P. Thubert, "Compression Format for IPv6
              Datagrams over IEEE 802.15.4-Based Networks", RFC 6282,
              September 2011.

   [RFC6763]  Cheshire, S. and M. Krochmal, "DNS-Based Service
              Discovery", RFC 6763, February 2013.

Appendix A.  Change Log

   (To be removed by RFC editor before publication.)

   Changes from keoh-03 to keoh-04:

   o  Added description of Proxy operation in a DTLS-based multicast
      scenario in Section 4.5 (Proxy Operation).




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   o  Corrected text in Section 2.2 (Security Requirements), item "h",
      to indicate that multicast source authentication is not specified
      in this version of the draft.

   o  Clarified that draft is written primarily for securing of CoAP
      based group communication, but that other protocols may also be
      supported if they have similar characteristics.  See Section 1
      (Introduction).

   o  Ran IETF spell checker and ID-Nits tools and corrected various
      issues throughout the document.

   o  Various editorial updates.

   Changes from keoh-04 to keoh-05:

   o  In section 2.1, removed the firmware upgrade usecase and clarified
      the commissioning use case.  The lighting use-case expanded with
      shared and multiple subnets issues.

   o  In Section 2.2, (b) reduced the group size to 100; (h) clarified
      data source authenticity

   o  Added new Section 6.1 (Group level security) in security
      considerations to make clear the risks of the single group key.

   Changes from keoh-05 to keoh-06:

   o  Added description of protection of unicast responses to multicast
      request in new Section 4.5 (Unicast Responses to Multicast
      Messages).

   o  Clarified that CoAP may be run over either LLNs or regular
      networks.  This also included changing the title of the I-D.

   o  Various editorial updates.

Authors' Addresses

   Sye Loong Keoh
   University of Glasgow Singapore
   Republic PolyTechnic, 9 Woodlands Ave 9
   Singapore  838964
   SG

   Email: SyeLoong.Keoh@glasgow.ac.uk





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   Sandeep S. Kumar (editor)
   Philips Research
   High Tech Campus 34
   Eindhoven  5656 AE
   NL

   Email: sandeep.kumar@philips.com


   Oscar Garcia-Morchon
   Philips Research
   High Tech Campus 34
   Eindhoven  5656 AE
   NL

   Email: oscar.garcia@philips.com


   Esko Dijk
   Philips Research
   High Tech Campus 34
   Eindhoven  5656 AE
   NL

   Email: esko.dijk@philips.com


   Akbar Rahman
   InterDigital
   1000 Sherbrooke Street West
   Montreal  H3A 3G4
   CA

   Email: akbar.rahman@interdigital.com

















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