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TLS Working Group                                                S. Keoh
Internet-Draft                                         O. Garcia-Morchon
Intended status: Standards Track                                S. Kumar
Expires: April 18, 2013                                          E. Dijk
                                                        Philips Research
                                                        October 15, 2012

 DTLS-based Multicast Security for Low-Power and Lossy Networks (LLNs)


   Wireless IP-based systems will be increasingly used for building
   control systems in the future where wireless devices interconnect
   with each other, forming low-power and lossy networks (LLNs).  The
   CoAP/6LoWPAN standards are emerging as the de-facto protocols in this
   area for resource-constrained devices.  Both multicast and security
   are key needs in these networks.  This draft presents a method for
   securing multicast communication in LLNs based on the DTLS security
   protocol which is already present in CoAP devices.  This is achieved
   by using unicast DTLS-protected communication channel to distribute
   keying material and security parameters to group members.  Group keys
   consisting of a Traffic Encryption Key (TEK) and a Traffic
   Authentication Key (TAK) are generated by group members based on the
   keying material received.  A group member uses its DTLS record layer
   implementation to encrypt a multicast message and provide message
   authentication using the group keys before sending the message via IP
   multicast to the group.

Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months

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   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 18, 2013.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     1.1.  Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     1.2.  Outline  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
   2.  Use Cases and Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     2.1.  Use Cases  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     2.2.  Security Requirements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   3.  Overview of DTLS-based Secure Multicast  . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     3.1.  IP Multicast . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     3.2.  Securing Multicast in LLNs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   4.  Multicast Group Keys Generation and Distribution . . . . . . . 11
     4.1.  DTLS based Group Security Association (GSA)  . . . . . . . 11
     4.2.  Generation of Group Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
   5.  Multicast Data Security  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
     5.1.  Sending Secure Multicast Messages  . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
     5.2.  Receiving Secure Multicast Messages  . . . . . . . . . . . 16
   6.  Group Keys Renewal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
   7.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
   8.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
   9.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
   10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
     10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
     10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

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1.  Introduction

   There is an increased use of wireless control networks in city
   infrastructure, environmental monitoring, industrial automation, and
   building management systems.  This is mainly driven by the fact that
   the independence from physical control wires allows for freedom of
   placement, portability and for reducing the cost of installation as
   less cable placement and drilling are required.  Consequently, there
   is an ever growing number of electronic devices, sensors and
   actuators that have become Internet connected, thus creating a trend
   towards Internet of Things (IoT).  These connected devices are
   equipped with communication capability that enables them to interact
   with each other as well as with Internet services at anytime and
   anyplace.  However, the devices in such wireless control networks are
   usually battery-operated or powered by scavenged energy, they have
   limited computational resources (low CPU clock, small RAM and flash
   storage) and often, the communication bandwidth is limited (e.g.,
   IEEE 802.15.4 radio), and also the transmission is unreliable.
   Hence, such wireless control networks are also known as Low-power and
   Lossy Networks (LLNs).

   In addition to the usual device-to-device unicast communication that
   would allow devices to interact with each other, group communication
   is an important feature in LLNs that can be effectively used to
   convey messages to a group of devices without requiring the sender to
   perform time- and energy-consuming multiple unicast transmissions to
   reach group members.  For example, in a building control management
   system, Heating, Ventilation and Air-Conditioning (HVAC) and lighting
   devices can be grouped according to the layout of the building, and
   control commands can be issued to a group of devices.  Group
   communication for LLNs has been made possible using the Constrained
   Application Protocol (CoAP) [I-D.ietf-core-coap] based on IP-

   Currently, CoAP can be protected using Datagram Transport Layer
   Security (DTLS) [RFC4347].  However, DTLS is mainly used to secure a
   connection between two endpoints and it cannot be used to protect
   multicast group communication.  We believe that group communication
   in LLNs is equally important and should be secured as it is also
   vulnerable to the usual attacks over the air (eavesdropping,
   tampering, message forgery, replay, etc).  Although there have been a
   lot of efforts in IETF to standardize mechanisms to secure multicast
   communication, they are not necessarily suitable for LLNs which have
   much more limited bandwidth and resources.  For example, the MIKEY
   Architecture [RFC3830] is mainly designed to facilitate multimedia
   distribution, while TESLA [RFC4082] is proposed as a protocol for
   broadcast authentication of the source and not for protecting the
   confidentiality of multicast messages.

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   This draft describes an approach to use DTLS as mandated in CoAP to
   support multicast security.  The secure channel established with DTLS
   is used to distribute keying material (including a TEK Generation Key
   (TGK), security parameters, multicast security policy) to members of
   a multicast group, which then allows a group member to securely
   generate group keys, known as Traffic Encryption Key (TEK) for
   multicast encryption/decryption and Traffic Authentication Key (TAK)
   for multicast authentication.  Multicast messages are protected using
   the DTLS record layer in order to provide integrity, confidentiality
   and authenticity to the IP multicast messages in the LLN.

1.1.  Terminology

   This specification defines the following terminology:

   Crypto Session ID (CS_ID): Unique identifier for a secure multicast

   Controller: The entity that is responsible for creating a multicast
   group, adding members, and distributing keying material to members of
   the group.  It is also responsible for renewing/updating the
   multicast group keys.  It is not necessarily the sender in the
   multicast group.

   Sender: The entity that sends multicast messages to the multicast

   Listener: The entity that receives multicast messages when listening
   to a multicast IP address.

   Group Security Association (GSA): A bi-directional secure channel
   between the controller and the member device that guarantees the
   confidentiality, integrity and authenticity of the messages exchanged
   between them.

   TEK Generation Key (TGK): A bit string generated randomly and then
   distributed by the controller to all members of a multicast group.
   From the TGK, the multicast group keys (Traffic Encryption Key and
   Traffic Authentication Key) can then be generated.

   Traffic Encryption Key (TEK): The key used to encrypt the multicast

   Traffic Authentication Key (TAK): The key used to compute the Message
   Authentication Code (MAC) of the multicast message.

   PRF(k,x): A keyed pseudo-random function.

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   ||: Denotes concatenation of two bit strings.

   XOR: Exclusive OR

1.2.  Outline

   This draft is structured as follows: Section 2 motivates the proposed
   solution with multicast use cases in LLNs and derives a set of
   requirements.  Section 3 provides an overview of the DTLS-based
   multicast security.  In Section 4, we describe the creation of a
   group security association (GSA) using DTLS to distribute keying
   materials, and the generation of group keys based on the MIKEY
   Architecture [RFC3830].  Section 5 proposes the use of DTLS record
   layer to encrypt and integrity protect multicast messages, while
   Section 6 discusses the group key renewal.  Section 7 and Section 8
   describe Security and IANA considerations.

2.  Use Cases and Requirements

   This section defines the use cases for multicast and specifies a set
   of security requirements for these use cases.

2.1.  Use Cases

   As stated in the Group Communication for CoAP Internet Draft
   [I-D.ietf-core-groupcomm] in the IETF CoRE WG, multicast is essential
   in several application use cases.  Consider a building equipped with
   6LoWPAN [RFC4944] [RFC6282] IP-connected lighting devices, switches,
   and 6LoWPAN border routers; the devices are organized as groups
   according to their location in the building, e.g., lighting devices
   and switches in a room/floor can be configured as a multicast group,
   the switches are then used to control the lighting devices in the
   group by sending on/off/dimming commands to the group. 6LoWPAN border
   routers that are connected to an IPv6 network backbone (which is also
   multicast enabled) are used to interconnect 6LoWPANs in the building.
   Consequently, this would also enable multicast groups to be formed
   across different subnets in the entire building.  The following lists
   a few multicast group communication uses cases in a building
   management system; a detailed description of each use case can be
   found in Group Communication for CoAP Internet Draft

   a.  Lighting control: enabling synchronous operation of a group of
       6LoWPAN connected lights in a room/floor/building.  This ensures
       that the light preset of a large group of luminaires are changed
       at the same time, hence providing a visual synchronicity of light
       effects to the user.

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   b.  Firmware update: firmware of devices in a building or a campus
       control application are updated simultaneously, avoiding an
       excessive load on the LLN due to unicast firmware updates.

   c.  Parameter update: settings of devices are updated simultaneously
       and efficiently.

   d.  Commissioning of above systems: information about the devices in
       the local network and their capabilities can be queried and
       requested, e.g. by a commissioning device.

2.2.  Security Requirements

   The Miscellaneous CoAP Group Communication Topics Internet Draft
   [I-D.dijk-core-groupcomm-misc] has defined a set of security
   requirements for group communication in LLNs.  We re-iterate and
   further describe those security requirements in this section with
   respect to the use cases as presented in Section 2.1:

   a.  Multicast communication topology: We only consider a one-to-many
       communication topology in this draft where there is only one
       sender device sending multicast messages to the group.  This is
       the simplest group communication scenario that would serve the
       needs of a typical LLN.  For example, in the lighting control use
       case, the switch is the only entity that is responsible for
       sending control commands to a group of lighting devices.  These
       lighting devices are actuators that do not issue commands to each
       other.  Although in other use cases, a many-to-many multicast
       communication topology would be required, it is much more complex
       and it poses greater security challenges, therefore considered as
       out of scope in this draft.

   b.  Establishment of a Group Security Association (GSA) [RFC3740]: A
       secure channel must be used to distribute keying material,
       multicast security policy and security parameters to members of a
       multicast group.  A GSA must be established between the
       controller (which manages the multicast group and may be a
       different device than the sender) and the group members.  The
       6LoWPAN border router, a device in the 6LoWPAN, or a remote
       server outside the 6LoWPAN could play the role of controller for
       distributing keying materials.  Since the keying material is used
       to derive subsequent group keys to protect multicast messages, it
       is important that it is encrypted, integrity protected and
       authenticated when it is distributed.

   c.  Multicast security policy: All group members must use the same
       ciphersuite to protect the authenticity, integrity and
       confidentiality of multicast messages.  The ciphersuite can

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       either be negotiated or set by the controller and then
       distributed to the group members.  It is generally very complex
       and difficult to require all devices to negotiate and agree with
       each other on the ciphersuite to be used, it is therefore more
       effective that the multicast security policy is set by the

   d.  Multicast data group authentication: It is essential to ensure
       that a multicast message is originated from a member of the
       group.  The multicast group key which is known to all group
       members is used to provide authenticity to the multicast messages
       (e.g., using a Message Authentication Code, MAC).  This assumes
       that only the sender of the multicast group is sending the
       message, and that all other group members are trusted not to send
       nor to tamper with the multicast message.  In a one-to-many
       communication topology, the lighting devices that serve as
       actuators only receive control commands from an authorized switch
       and do not issue commands to other lighting devices in the group.

   e.  Multicast data source authentication: Source authenticity is
       optional.  It can typically be provided using public-key
       cryptography in which every multicast message is signed by the
       sender.  This requires much higher computational resources on
       both the sender and the receivers, thus incurring too much
       overhead and computational requirements on devices in LLNs.
       Alternatively, a lightweight broadcast authentication, i.e.,
       TESLA [RFC4082] can be deployed, however it requires devices in
       the multicast group to have a trusted clock and have the ability
       to loosely synchronize their clocks with the sender.
       Consequently, given that the targeted devices have limited
       resources, and the need for source authenticity is not critical,
       it is advocated that source authenticity is made optional.

   f.  Multicast data integrity: A group level integrity is required to
       ensure that messages have not been tampered with by attackers who
       are not members of the multicast group.

   g.  Multicast data confidentiality: Multicast message should be
       encrypted, as some control commands when sent in the clear could
       pose privacy risks to the users.

   h.  Multicast data replay protection: It must not be possible to
       replay a multicast message as this would disrupt the operation of
       the group communication.

   i.  Multicast key management: Group keys used to protect the
       multicast communication must be renewed periodically.  When
       members have left the multicast group, the group keys might be

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       leaked; and when a device is detected to have been compromised,
       this also implies that the group keys could have been compromised
       too.  In these situations, the controller must perform a re-key
       protocol to renew the group keys.

3.  Overview of DTLS-based Secure Multicast

   The goal of this draft is to secure IP multicast operations as used
   in 6LoWPAN networks, by extending the use of the DTLS security
   protocol to allow for group keys distribution, and using the DTLS
   record layer to provide protection to multicast messages,
   specifically CoAP group communication.  The IETF CoRE WG has selected
   DTLS [RFC4347] as the default must-implement security protocol for
   securing CoAP, therefore it is conceivable that DTLS can be extended
   to facilitate CoAP-based group communication.  Reusing DTLS for
   different purposes while guaranteeing the required security
   properties can avoid the need to implement multiple security
   handshake protocols and this is especially beneficial when the target
   deployment consists of resource-constrained embedded devices.  This
   section first describes group communication based on IP multicast,
   and subsequently sketches a solution for securing group communication
   using DTLS.

3.1.  IP Multicast

   Devices in the LLN are categorized into two roles, (1) sender and (2)
   listener.  Any node in the LLN may have one of these roles, or both
   roles.  The application(s) running on a device basically determine
   these roles by the function calls they execute on the IP stack of the
   device.  In principle, a sender does not require any prior access
   procedures or authentication to send a multicast message, a sender
   with a valid multicast group key can essentially send a secure
   multicast message to the group.  A device becomes a listener to a
   specific IP multicast group by listening to the associated IP
   multicast address.  Any device can in principle decide to listen to
   any IP multicast address, and can use the associated valid group key
   to authenticate and decrypt the multicast messages.  This also means
   that no prior access procedure is required to be a listener nor do
   applications on the other devices know, or get notified, of new
   listeners in the LLN.

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                                       |. |
                                     --| ++++
                            ++++    /  ++|. |
                            |A |---------| ++++
                            |  |    \    ++|B |
                            ++++     \-----|  |
                           Sender          ++++

         Figure 3.1: The roles of nodes in a one-to-many multicast
                          communication topology

3.2.  Securing Multicast in LLNs

   A controller in an LLN creates a multicast group.  The controller may
   be hosted by a remote server, or a border router that creates a new
   group over the network.  In some cases, devices may be configured
   using a commissioning tool that mediates the communication between
   the devices and the controller.  The controller in the network can be
   discovered by the devices using various methods defined in
   [I-D.vanderstok-core-dna] such as DNS-SD [I-D.cheshire-dnsext-dns-sd]
   and Resource Directory [I-D.shelby-core-resource-directory].  The
   controller communicates with individual device to add them to the new
   group.  The controller establishes a GSA with each member device by
   performing a DTLS handshake protocol.  The estabished DTLS secure
   channel (DTLS session) is then used by the controller to securely
   distribute over the network:

   a.  Keying material (known as the TEK Generation Key, TGK), used for
       deriving multicast group keys.

   b.  Multicast identifier, a unique identifier for the multicast
       group.  This is typically the multicast IP address.

   c.  Multicast security policy, which defines the ciphersuite for
       multicast encryption and authentication.

   d.  Security parameters, used for generating group keys.

   These parameters must be the same for all members of the group.
   Based on the TGK and the security parameters received, each member
   generates a multicast Traffic Encryption Key (TEK), and a Traffic
   Authentication Key (TAK) to be used for the multicast session.  Each
   member also creates a Crypto Session (CS) to store security
   information (e.g., TGK, TEK, TAK, multicast identifier, ciphersuite,
   etc) relevant to the multicast session.

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   A designated sender in the group can encrypt application messages
   using the TEK and signs the message using the TAK.  The message is
   then encapsulated using the DTLS record layer before it is sent using
   IP multicast.  For example, a CoAP message addressed to a multicast
   group is protected using DTLS record layer and then sent to a
   multicast group.  The listeners when receiving the message, use the
   multicast IP address (i.e., Multicast identifier) to look up the
   corresponding crypto session to obtain the TEK and TAK.  The received
   message is decrypted using the TEK, and the authenticity is verified
   using the TAK.

   The TEK and TAK can be renewed and updated using a re-key protocol.
   The controller sends new security parameters for renewing TEK and TAK
   over the DTLS unicast channel it has established with each group
   member.  Using the secure unicast channels provides better
   reliability and security as members can individually acknowledge
   receipts of the new security parameters, and secondly the security
   parameters are protected with each member's DTLS unicast session key.
   One of the reasons to renew the multicast group key is that the
   current TEK and TAK could have been compromised, hence it defeats the
   purpose of the re-keying process if the controller were to distribute
   the new security parameters via multicast.  The controller has a re-
   key schedule and in general the controller should update the group
   keys when the group membership changes.

4.  Multicast Group Keys Generation and Distribution

   This section describes the usage of DTLS handshake protocol to
   establish a GSA with all group members in order to facilitate group
   key distribution and management.  Participating devices shall have
   been pre-configured with a Pre-Shared Key (PSK), raw public-key
   [I-D.ietf-tls-oob-pubkey] or public-key certificate, preferably
   individual per device.  When PSK and raw public key are used, they
   shall also be known to the controller (through an out-of-band
   communication channel), so that the controller is able to
   authenticate and establish a secure channel with each participating

4.1.  DTLS based Group Security Association (GSA)

   The controller is commissioned to set up a multicast group.  The
   controller performs the standard DTLS handshake protocol with each
   participating device in order to establish a pairwise DTLS session
   key.  Similar to the use of DTLS in CoAP [I-D.ietf-core-coap], the
   DTLS handshake protocol can be performed based on PSK mode, raw
   public key mode or public key certificate mode.  In the end, the
   controller establishes a DTLS security channel with each member of

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   the multicast group in the sense that each session is distinct from
   the other.  The DTLS handshake protocol is shown as below:

         Client                                               Server

                                      <--------        HelloRequest*
         ClientHello                  -------->
                                      <--------  HelloVerifyRequest*
         ClientHello (Cookie)         -------->
                                      <--------      ServerHelloDone
         Finished                     -------->
                                      <--------             Finished

                    Figure 4.1: DTLS handshake protocol

   * indicates optional messages in DTLS.  When PSK is used, the
   ServerKeyExchange message may contain a PSK Identity hint, and the
   ClientKeyExchange contains a PSK identity.

   Depending on the implementation, both the controller and the device
   may be implemented as a DTLS Client or a DTLS Server.  Regardless of
   their roles, it is advocated that the controller initiates the DTLS
   handshake.  When the controller implements the DTLS Client, it sends
   a ClientHello message to the device, otherwise it sends a
   HelloRequest message to initiate the DTLS handshake protocol.

   The established DTLS secure channel must provide both confidentiality
   and integrity of the messages exchanged between the controller and
   the member device.  Through this secure channel, the controller
   distributes a TEK Generation Key (TGK), a multicast security policy
   and security parameters to the member device over the DTLS secure
   channel.  The TGK is generated using a pseudorandom function, and it
   SHALL serve as the 'master' key to derive the TEK and TAK for
   securing multicast communication.  The TGK SHALL be at least 128-bit
   in length.  The security parameters consist of a Multicast Identifier
   (Mul_ID), a Crypto Session identifier (CS_ID), and a random number
   (RAND).  In this context, the Mul_ID is the multicast address of the
   group, the CS_ID is a unique identifier for the crypto session and
   the RAND MUST be a (at least) 128-bit pseudo-random bit string.

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   These parameters must be the same for all members of the multicast
   group.  This draft defines a multicast security policy which consists
   of only two ciphersuites to protect multicast messages.  All member
   devices must support the following ciphersuites:

        Ciphersuite MTS_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 = {TBD1, TBD2}
        Ciphersuite MTS_WITH_NULL_SHA256   = {TBD3, TBD4}

   Ciphersuite MTS_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 is used to provide
   confidentiality, integrity and authenticity to the multicast messages
   where the encryption algorithm is AES [AES], key length is 128-bit,
   and the authentication function is CCM [RFC6655] with a Message
   Authentication Code (MAC) length of 8 bytes.  Similar to [RFC4785],
   the ciphersuite MTS_WITH_NULL_SHA is used when confidentiality of
   multicast messages is not required, it only provides integrity and
   authentictiy protection to the multicast message.  When this
   ciphersuite is used, the message is not encrypted but the MAC must be
   included in which it is computed using a HMAC [RFC2104] that is based
   on Secure Hash Function (SHA256) [SHA].  Depending on the future
   needs, other ciphersuites with different cipher algorithms and MAC
   length may be supported.

   The GSA (i.e., the DTLS secure channel) established is kept to
   facilitate group key renewals, thus allowing the controller to
   distribute new security parameters to members of the multicast group
   to update the group keys.  This is further described in Section 6.

4.2.  Generation of Group Keys

   Once the member device has received the security parameters,
   multicast security policy and the TGK from the controller, the device
   generates the Traffic Encryption Key (TEK) and Traffic Authentication
   Key (TAK) using the Pseudo Random Function (PRF) as defined in
   Section 4.1 in MIKEY [RFC3830].  The TEK is used as the common group
   key known to all members of the group to encrypt multicast messages,
   while the TAK is used to create a MAC for the message.  The DTLS
   record layer advocates the use of different key for encryption and

   Similar to MIKEY [RFC3830], the following input parameters are

   inkey      : the input key to the key generation function.
   inkey_len  : the length in bits of the input key.
   label      : a specific label, dependent on the type of the key to be
                generated, the random number, and the session IDs.
   outkey_len : desired length in bits of the output key.

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   The key generation function has the following output:

   outkey: the output key of desired length.

   The following defines the input parameters to the group keys
   generation function.  These input parameters are distributed by the
   controller and used by the devices in a multicast group to generate
   group keys.

   inkey       : TGK
   inkey_len   : bit length of TGK
   label       : constant || mul_id || cs_id || RAND
   outkey_len  : bit length of the output key.

   As defined in MIKEY [RFC3830], the constant part of label depends on
   the type of key that is to be generated.  The constant 0x2AD01C64 is
   used to generate a TEK from TGK, while the the constant 0x1B5C7973 is
   used to generate a TAK.  The outkey_len SHALL be set to 128 bit.  A
   crypto session should be created to store information about the
   multicast session, providing a mapping of the multicast identifier to
   the TEK, TAK, the security parameters and the multicast security
   policy as well as the information about the controller that is
   associated with the multicast session.

   The following re-iterates the key generation procedure as described
   in MIKEY [RFC3830] with the difference that SHA256 is used instead of

   The PRF(inkey,label) that is based on the P-function in MIKEY
   [RFC3830] is applied to compute the output keys (TEK and TAK):

   o  Let n = inkey_len / 256, rounded up to the nearest integer if not
      already an integer

   o  Split the inkey into n blocks, inkey = s_1 || ... || s_n, where
      all s_i, except possibly s_n, are 256 bits each

   o  Let m = outkey_len / 256, rounded up to the nearest integer if not
      already an integer

   (The values "256" equal half the input block-size and full output
   hash size of the SHA256 as part of the P-function.)

   Then, the output key, outkey, is obtained as the outkey_len most
   significant bits of

   PRF(inkey, label) = P(s_1, label, m) XOR P(s_2, label, m) XOR ...
   XOR P(s_n, label, m).

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5.  Multicast Data Security

   This section describes the use of DTLS record layer to secure
   multicast messages.

5.1.  Sending Secure Multicast Messages

   All messages addressed to the multicast group must be secured using
   the TEK and TAK.  Using the DTLS record layer, multicast messages are
   encrypted using the TEK and a Message Authentication Code (MAC) is
   generated using the TAK according to the ciphersuite defined in the
   multicast security policy.  The MAC is appended to the encrypted
   message before it is passed down to the lower layer of the IP
   protocol stack for transmission to the multicast address.

   As described in Section 4.1, the ciphersuite MTS_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8
   defines that the multicast message must be encrypted using AES with a
   128-bit TEK.  Since the CCM mode of operation is used for
   authenticated encryption, the same TEK is used to compute the MAC and
   the TAK is not used.  As for the ciphersuite MTS_WITH_NULL_SHA, the
   multicast message must not be encrypted, but a MAC must be computed
   using the TAK key.

         |        | +--------+------------------------------------+ |
         |        | |        | +-------------+------------------+ | |
         |        | |        | |             | +--------------+ | | |
         |   IP   | |   UDP  | | DTLS Record | |   multicast  | | | |
         | header | | header | |    Header   | |    message   | | | |
         |        | |        | |             | +--------------+ | | |
         |        | |        | +-------------+------------------+ | |
         |        | +--------+------------------------------------+ |

    Figure 5.1: Sending a multicast message protected using DTLS Record

   The DTLS record layer header contains a 48-bit sequence number that
   is used for (1) allowing the recipient to correctly verify the DTLS
   MAC, (2) preventing message replay.  The current use of the sequence
   number is adequate in a one-to-many multicast communication topology.
   The sequence number is generated by the sender as specified in DTLS.
   The sequence number field in the DTLS record layer header is
   incremented whenever the sender sends a multicast message.  This
   requires all member devices to keep track of the sequence number
   received, so that the message freshness can be verified.

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5.2.  Receiving Secure Multicast Messages

   Member devices receiving the multicast message, look up the crypto
   session to find the corresponding TEK and TAK to decrypt and verify
   the MAC of the multicast message.  The destination multicast IP
   address which serves as the Multicast identifier (Mul_ID) can be used
   to locate the crypto session in order to obtain the TEK and TAK.  The
   crypto session must also contain the last received message's epoch
   and sequence number, enabling the member devices to detect message
   replay.  Multicast messages received with a sequence number less than
   or equal to the value stored in the crypto session must be dropped.
   The epoch number in the received message must also match the epoch
   number stored in the corresponding crypto session.  As a consequence
   of this mechanism, a message that arrives out-of-order (i.e. with a
   sequence number less than the value stored in the crypto session)
   will be ignored.

   This replay detection mechanism only applies to one-to-many
   communication topology, where member devices are assumed to be
   trusted not to tamper with the messages.

6.  Group Keys Renewal

   The controller can initiate re-key of the TEK and TAK according to a
   key renewal schedule and when the group membership changes.  It is
   important that the group keys, i.e., TEK and TAK are renewed
   periodically to prevent potential attacks and cryptanalysis.  When
   performing re-key, the controller generates a new Random number
   (RAND), and a new crypto session ID (CS_ID), and subsequently sends
   this information through the unicast DTLS secure channel established
   with each member.  The new TEK and TAK are then generated by each
   member based on the algorithm described in Section 4.2, using the new
   RAND and CS_ID received from the controller.  The TGK which serves as
   the 'master' group key does not change.  When the TEK and TAK have
   been updated, the epoch number maintained in the multicast crypto
   session must be incremented.

7.  IANA Considerations


   Note to RFC Editor: this section may be removed on publication as an

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8.  Security Considerations


9.  Acknowledgements

   The authors greatly acknowledge discussion, comments and feedback
   from Dee Denteneer, Peter van der Stok and Zach Shelby.  We also
   appreciate prototyping and implementation efforts by Pedro Moreno
   Sanchez who works as an intern at Philips Research.

10.  References

10.1.  Normative References

   [AES]      National Institute of Standards and Technology,
              "Specification for the Advanced Encryption Statndard
              (AES)", FIPS 197, Nov 2001.

   [RFC2104]  Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
              Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
              February 1997.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC3740]  Hardjono, T. and B. Weis, "The Multicast Group Security
              Architecture", RFC 3740, March 2004.

   [RFC3830]  Arkko, J., Carrara, E., Lindholm, F., Naslund, M., and K.
              Norrman, "MIKEY: Multimedia Internet KEYing", RFC 3830,
              August 2004.

   [RFC4347]  Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer
              Security", RFC 4347, April 2006.

   [RFC6655]  McGrew, D. and D. Bailey, "AES-CCM Cipher Suites for
              Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 6655, July 2012.

   [SHA]      National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Secure
              Hash Standard", FIPS 180-2, Aug 2002.

10.2.  Informative References

              Cheshire, S. and M. Krochmal, "DNS-Based Service

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              Discovery", draft-cheshire-dnsext-dns-sd-11 (work in
              progress), December 2011.

              Dijk, E. and A. Rahman, "Miscellaneous CoAP Group
              Communication Topics", draft-dijk-core-groupcomm-misc-01
              (work in progress), July 2012.

              Shelby, Z., Hartke, K., Bormann, C., and B. Frank,
              "Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP)",
              draft-ietf-core-coap-12 (work in progress), October 2012.

              Rahman, A. and E. Dijk, "Group Communication for CoAP",
              draft-ietf-core-groupcomm-02 (work in progress),
              July 2012.

              Wouters, P., Gilmore, J., Weiler, S., Kivinen, T., and H.
              Tschofenig, "Out-of-Band Public Key Validation for
              Transport Layer Security", draft-ietf-tls-oob-pubkey-04
              (work in progress), July 2012.

              Shelby, Z., Krco, S., and C. Bormann, "CoRE Resource
              Directory", draft-shelby-core-resource-directory-04 (work
              in progress), July 2012.

              Stok, P., Lynn, K., and A. Brandt, "CoRE Discovery,
              Naming, and Addressing", draft-vanderstok-core-dna-02
              (work in progress), July 2012.

   [RFC4082]  Perrig, A., Song, D., Canetti, R., Tygar, J., and B.
              Briscoe, "Timed Efficient Stream Loss-Tolerant
              Authentication (TESLA): Multicast Source Authentication
              Transform Introduction", RFC 4082, June 2005.

   [RFC4785]  Blumenthal, U. and P. Goel, "Pre-Shared Key (PSK)
              Ciphersuites with NULL Encryption for Transport Layer
              Security (TLS)", RFC 4785, January 2007.

   [RFC4944]  Montenegro, G., Kushalnagar, N., Hui, J., and D. Culler,
              "Transmission of IPv6 Packets over IEEE 802.15.4
              Networks", RFC 4944, September 2007.

   [RFC6282]  Hui, J. and P. Thubert, "Compression Format for IPv6

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              Datagrams over IEEE 802.15.4-Based Networks", RFC 6282,
              September 2011.

Authors' Addresses

   Sye Loong Keoh
   Philips Research
   High Tech Campus 34
   Eindhoven  5656 AE

   Email: sye.loong.keoh@philips.com

   Oscar Garcia Morchon
   Philips Research
   High Tech Campus 34
   Eindhoven  5656 AE

   Email: oscar.garcia@philips.com

   Sandeep S. Kumar
   Philips Research
   High Tech Campus 34
   Eindhoven  5656 AE

   Email: sandeep.kumar@philips.com

   Esko Dijk
   Philips Research
   High Tech Campus 34
   Eindhoven  5656 AE

   Email: esko.dijk@philips.com

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