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Network Working Group                                    A. D. Keromytis
Internet Draft                                       Columbia University
draft-keromytis-ike-id-00.txt                            Bill Sommerfeld
                                                        Sun Microsystems




                   The "suggested ID" extension for IKE

Status of this Memo

   This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
   all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six
   months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other
   documents at any time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet- Drafts
   as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in
   progress."

   The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt

   The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.


Abstract

   This document describes an extension to IKE Phase 1 exchanges that
   increases its usefulness in certain scenarios.


1.  Introduction

   In the IKE key negotiation protocol [RFC2409], the Responder in a
   Phase 1 exchange picks their Phase 1 identity based on the IP
   address of the remote host, the local IP address used in the
   negotiation, and the identity of the Initiator.

   There are some circumstances where the Initiator wishes to
   establish a security association with a specific identity that the
   Responder has.  For example, when IPsec [RFC2401] is used for
   protecting user-to-user traffic, it is desirable to inform the
   Responder's IKE daemon which Identity (and, by extension,
   authentication material) to use.

   The proposed extension to IKE is to allow the Initiator to send a
   suggested Responder ID in the 5th message of main mode, along with
   the Initiator ID normally sent.  The Responder should treat this as
   a hint; the Responder may return a different Phase 1 ID.  The
   Initiator should verify that the returned Phase 1 ID is the same as
   the suggested and, if not, whether the returned Phase 1 ID is
   acceptable.  The suggested ID is included in all encryption and
   authentication operations; for the HASH computation, HASH_I is
   computed over both the Initiator's identity and the suggested
   Responder identity.  Following the notation in [RFC2409]:

   HASH_I = prf(SKEYID, g^xi | g^xr | CKY-I | CKY-R | SAi_b | IDii_b |
                        IDir_s )

   where IDir_s is the "suggested" Responder ID.


2.  Security Considerations

   This documents discusses an extension to the IKE protocol that
   extends its functionality.  The extension has no security
   implications: the Responder's identity is privacy-protected in the
   same way the Initiator's identity is.


3.  IANA Considerations

   No actions by IANA are required.


References:

   [RFC2401]  Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "Security Architecture for the
              Internet Protocol", RFC 2401,  November 1998.

   [RFC2409]  Harkins, D. and D. Carrel, "The Internet Key Exchange
              (IKE)", RFC 2409, November 1998.


Authors' addresses:

   Angelos D. Keromytis
   Columbia University, CS Department
   515 CS Building
   1214 Amsterdam Avenue, Mailstop 0401
   New York, New York 10027-7003

   Phone: +1 212 939 7095
   Email: angelos@cs.columbia.edu

   Bill Sommerfeld
   1 Network Drive, UBUR02-212
   Burlington, MA 01803

   Phone: +1 781 442 3458
   Email: sommerfeld@eng.sun.com


Expiration and File Name

   This draft expires in March 2002

   Its file name is draft-keromytis-ike-id-00.txt


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