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Link State Routing                                         K. Talaulikar
Internet-Draft                                                 P. Psenak
Intended status: Standards Track                     Cisco Systems, Inc.
Expires: September 12, 2019                               March 11, 2019


                          OSPF BFD Strict-Mode
                draft-ketant-lsr-ospf-bfd-strict-mode-01

Abstract

   This document specifies the extensions to OSPF that enables a router
   and its neighbor to signal their intention to use Bidirectional
   Forwarding Detection (BFD) for their adjacency using link-local
   advertisement between them.  The signaling of this BFD enablement,
   allows the router to block and not allow the establishment of
   adjacency with its neighbor router until a BFD session is
   successfully established between them.  The document describes this
   "strict-mode" of BFD establishment as a prerequisite to OSPF
   adjacency formation.

Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 12, 2019.






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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  LLS B-bit Flag  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Procedures  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  Operations & Management Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   5.  Backward Compatibility  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   8.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   9.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     9.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     9.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7

1.  Introduction

   Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD) [RFC5880] enables routers to
   monitor dataplane connectivity over links between them and to detect
   faults in the bidirectional path between them.  This capability is
   leveraged by routing protocols like Open Shortest Path First (OSPFv2)
   [RFC2328] and OSPFv3 [RFC5340] to detect connectivity failures for
   their adjacencies and trigger the rerouting of traffic around this
   failure more quickly than their periodic hello messaging based
   detection mechanism.

   The use of BFD for monitoring routing protocols adjacencies is
   described in [RFC5882].  When BFD monitoring is enabled for OSPF
   adjacencies, the BFD session is bootstrapped based on the neighbor
   address information discovered by the exchange of OSPF hello
   messages.  Faults in the bidirectional forwarding detected via BFD
   then result in the bringing down of the OSPF adjacency.  Note that it
   is possible in some failure scenarios for the network to be in a



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   state such that the OSPF adjacency is capable of coming up, but the
   BFD session cannot be established, and, more particularly, data
   cannot be forwarded.  In certain other scenarios, a degraded or poor
   quality link may result in OSPF adjacency formation to succeed only
   to result in BFD session establishment not being successful or the
   BFD session going down frequently due to its faster detection
   mechanism.

   To avoid such situations which result in routing churn in the
   network, it would be beneficial not to allow OSPF to establish a
   neighbor adjacency until the BFD session is successfully established
   and stabilized.  However, this would preclude the OSPF operation in
   an environment in which not all OSPF routers support BFD and are
   enabled for BFD monitoring.  A solution would be to block the
   establishment of OSPF adjacencies if both systems are willing to
   establish a BFD session but a BFD session cannot be established.
   Such a mode of BFD use by OSPF is referred to as "strict-mode"
   wherein BFD session establishment becomes a prerequisite for OSPF
   adjacency coming up.

   This document specifies the OSPF protocol extensions using link-local
   signaling (LLS) [RFC5613] for a router to indicate to its neighbor
   the willingness to establish a BFD session in the "strict-mode".

   A similar functionality for IS-IS is specified [RFC6213].

2.  LLS B-bit Flag

   A new B-bit is defined in the LLS Type 1 Extended Options and Flags
   field.  This bit is defined for the LLS block included in Hello
   packets and indicates that BFD is enabled on the link and that the
   router supports BFD strict-mode.  Section 6 describes the position of
   this new B-bit.

   A router MUST include the LLS block with the LLS Type 1 Extended
   Options and Flags TLV with the B-bit set its Hello messages when BFD
   is enabled on the link.

3.  Procedures

   A router supporting BFD strict-mode advertises this capability
   through its hello messages as described in Section 2 above.  When a
   router supporting BFD strict-mode, detects a new neighbor router that
   also supports BFD strict-mode, then it proceeds to establish
   adjacency with that neighbor as described further in this section.






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   This document updates the OSPF neighbor state machine as described in
   [RFC2328] specifically the operations related to the Init state as
   below when BFD strict-mode is used:

   Init (without BFD strict-mode)

      In this state, an Hello packet has recently been seen from the
      neighbor.  However, bidirectional communication has not yet been
      established with the neighbor (i.e., the router itself did not
      appear in the neighbor's Hello packet).  All neighbors in this
      state (or higher) are listed in the Hello packets sent from the
      associated interface.

   Init (with BFD strict-mode)

      In this state, an Hello packet has recently been seen from the
      neighbor.  However, bidirectional communication has not yet been
      established with the neighbor (i.e., the router itself did not
      appear in the neighbor's Hello packet).  A BFD session
      establishment to the neighbor is requested, if not already done
      (e.g. in the event of transition from 2-way state).  All neighbors
      in higher than Init state and those in Init state with BFD session
      up are listed in the Hello packets sent from the associated
      interface.

   Whenever the neighbor state transitions to Down state, the removal of
   the BFD session associated with that neighbor SHOULD be requested by
   OSPF and the session re-setup SHOULD similarly be requested by OSPF
   after transitioning into Init state.  This may result in the deletion
   and creation of BFD session respectively when OSPF is the only client
   interested in BFD session to the neighbor address.

   An implementation MUST NOT wait for BFD session establishment in Init
   state unless BFD strict-mode is enabled on the router and the
   specific neighbor indicates BFD strict-mode capability via its Hello
   messages.  When BFD is enabled, but the strict-mode of operation
   cannot be used, then an implementation SHOULD start the BFD session
   establishment only in 2-Way or higher state.  This makes it possible
   for router to operate a mix of BFD operation in strict-mode or normal
   mode across different interfaces or even different neighbors on the
   same multi-access LAN interface.

   Once the OSPF state machine has moved beyond the Init state, any
   change in the B-bit advertised in subsequent Hello messages MUST NOT
   result in any trigger in either the OSPF adjacency or the BFD session
   management (i.e. the B-bit is considered only when in the Init
   state).  The disabling of BFD (or BFD strict-mode) on a router would
   result in its not setting the B-bit in its subsequent Hello messages.



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   The disabling of BFD strict-mode has no change on the BFD operations
   and would not result in bringing down of any established BFD session.
   The disabling of BFD would result in the BFD session brought down due
   to Admin reason and hence would not bring down the OSPF adjacency.

   When BFD is enabled on an interface over which we already have an
   existing OSPF adjacency, it would result in the router setting the
   B-bit in its subsequent Hello messages.  If the adjacency is already
   up (i.e.  in its terminal state of Full or 2-way with non-DR routers
   on a LAN) with a neighbor that also support BFD strict-mode, then an
   implemantion SHOULD NOT bring this adjacency down and instead use the
   BFD strict-mode of operations after the next transition into Init
   state.  However, if the adjacency is not up, then an implementation
   MAY bring such an adjacency down so it can use the BFD strict-mode
   for its bring up.

4.  Operations & Management Considerations

   An implementation SHOULD report the BFD session status along with the
   OSPF Init adjacency state when operating in BFD strict-mode and
   perform logging operations on state transitions to include the BFD
   events.  This allows an operator to detect scenarios where an OSPF
   adjacency may be stuck waiting for BFD session establishment.

5.  Backward Compatibility

   An implementation MUST support OSPF adjacency formation and
   operations with a neighbor router that does not advertise the BFD
   strict-mode capability - both when that neighbor router does not
   support BFD and when it does support BFD but not in the strict-mode
   of operation as described in this document.  Implementations MAY
   provide an option to specifically enable BFD operations only in the
   strict-mode in which case, OSPF adjacency with a neighbor that does
   not support BFD strict-mode would not be established successfully.
   Implementations MAY provide an option to disable BFD strict-mode
   which results in the router not advertising the B-bit and BFD
   operations being performed in the same way as before this
   specification.

   The signaling specified in this document happens at a link-local
   level between routers on that link.  A router which does not support
   this specification would ignore the B-bit in the LLS block of hello
   messages from its neighbors and continue to bootstrap BFD sessions,
   if enabled, without holding back the OSPF adjacency formation.  Since
   the router which does not support this specification would not have
   set the B-bit in the LLS block of its own hello messages, its
   neighbor routers that support this specification would not use BFD
   strict-mode with it.  As a result, the behavior would be the same as



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   before this specification.  Therefore, there are no backward
   compatibility related issues or considerations that need to be taken
   care of when implementing this specification.

6.  IANA Considerations

   This specification updates Link Local Signaling TLV Identifiers
   registry.

   Following values are requested for allocation:

   o B-bit from "LLS Type 1 Extended Options and Flags" registry at bit
   position 0x00000010.

7.  Security Considerations

   The security considerations for "OSPF Link-Local Signaling" [RFC5613]
   also apply to the extension described in this document.
   Inappropriate use of the B-bit in the LLS block of an OSPF hello
   message could prevent an OSPF adjacency from forming or lead to
   failure to detect bidirectional forwarding failures.  If
   authentication is being used in the OSPF routing domain
   [RFC5709][RFC7474], then the Cryptographic Authentication TLV
   [RFC5613] SHOULD also be used to protect the contents of the LLS
   block.

8.  Acknowledgements

   The authors would like to acknowledge the review and inputs from Acee
   Lindem, Manish Gupta and Balaji Ganesh.

9.  References

9.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC2328]  Moy, J., "OSPF Version 2", STD 54, RFC 2328,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2328, April 1998,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2328>.

   [RFC5340]  Coltun, R., Ferguson, D., Moy, J., and A. Lindem, "OSPF
              for IPv6", RFC 5340, DOI 10.17487/RFC5340, July 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5340>.




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   [RFC5613]  Zinin, A., Roy, A., Nguyen, L., Friedman, B., and D.
              Yeung, "OSPF Link-Local Signaling", RFC 5613,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5613, August 2009,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5613>.

   [RFC5882]  Katz, D. and D. Ward, "Generic Application of
              Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD)", RFC 5882,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5882, June 2010,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5882>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

9.2.  Informative References

   [RFC5709]  Bhatia, M., Manral, V., Fanto, M., White, R., Barnes, M.,
              Li, T., and R. Atkinson, "OSPFv2 HMAC-SHA Cryptographic
              Authentication", RFC 5709, DOI 10.17487/RFC5709, October
              2009, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5709>.

   [RFC5880]  Katz, D. and D. Ward, "Bidirectional Forwarding Detection
              (BFD)", RFC 5880, DOI 10.17487/RFC5880, June 2010,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5880>.

   [RFC6213]  Hopps, C. and L. Ginsberg, "IS-IS BFD-Enabled TLV",
              RFC 6213, DOI 10.17487/RFC6213, April 2011,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6213>.

   [RFC7474]  Bhatia, M., Hartman, S., Zhang, D., and A. Lindem, Ed.,
              "Security Extension for OSPFv2 When Using Manual Key
              Management", RFC 7474, DOI 10.17487/RFC7474, April 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7474>.

Authors' Addresses

   Ketan Talaulikar
   Cisco Systems, Inc.
   India

   Email: ketant@cisco.com










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   Peter Psenak
   Cisco Systems, Inc.
   Apollo Business Center
   Mlynske nivy 43
   Bratislava  821 09
   Slovakia

   Email: ppsenak@cisco.com











































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