[Docs] [txt|pdf|xml|html] [Tracker] [Email] [Nits]

Versions: 00 01 draft-ietf-sidr-route-server-rpki-light

Network Working Group                                            T. King
Internet-Draft                                                   D. Kopp
Intended status: Standards Track                                  DE-CIX
Expires: June 16, 2016                                   A. Lambrianidis
                                                                  AMS-IX
                                                              A. Fenioux
                                                               France-IX
                                                       December 14, 2015


     Signaling RPKI Validation Results from a Route-Server to Peers
               draft-kklf-sidr-route-server-rpki-light-00

Abstract

   This document defines the usage of the BGP Prefix Origin Validation
   State Extended Community [I-D.ietf-sidr-origin-validation-signaling]
   to signal RPKI validation results from a route-server to its peers.
   Upon reception of RPKI validation results peers can use this
   information in their local routing decision process.

Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" are to
   be interpreted as described in [RFC2119] only when they appear in all
   upper case.  They may also appear in lower or mixed case as English
   words, without normative meaning.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on June 16, 2016.






King, et al.              Expires June 16, 2016                 [Page 1]


Internet-DraftSignaling RPKI Validation Results from a RoutDecember 2015


Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Signaling RPKI Validation Results from a Route-Server to
       Peers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Operational Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     3.1.  Local Routing Decision Process  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     3.2.  Route-Server Receiving the BGP Prefix Origin Validation
           State Extended Community  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     3.3.  Error Handling at Peers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   6.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     6.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     6.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5

1.  Introduction

   RPKI-based route origin validation [RFC6480] can be a significant
   operational burden for BGP peers to implement and adopt.  In order to
   boost acceptance and usage of RPKI and ultimately increase the
   security of the Internet routing system, IXPs may provide RPKI-based
   route origin validation at the route-server
   [I-D.ietf-idr-ix-bgp-route-server].  The result of this route origin
   validation is signaled to peers by using the BGP Prefix Origin
   Validation State Extended Community as introduced in
   [I-D.ietf-sidr-origin-validation-signaling].

   Peers receiving the route origin validation result from the route-
   server(s) can use this information in their local routing decision
   process for acceptance, rejection, preference, or other traffic
   engineering purposes of a particular route.



King, et al.              Expires June 16, 2016                 [Page 2]


Internet-DraftSignaling RPKI Validation Results from a RoutDecember 2015


2.  Signaling RPKI Validation Results from a Route-Server to Peers

   The BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended Community (as defined
   in [I-D.ietf-sidr-origin-validation-signaling]) is utilized for
   signaling RPKI validation result from a route-server to peers.

   [I-D.ietf-sidr-origin-validation-signaling] proposes an encoding of
   the RPKI validation result [RFC6811] as follows:

                           +-------+-----------+
                           | Value | Meaning   |
                           +-------+-----------+
                           |   0   | Valid     |
                           |   1   | Not found |
                           |   2   | Invalid   |
                           +-------+-----------+

                                  Table 1

   This encoding is re-used.  Route-servers providing RPKI-based route
   origin validation set the validation state according to the RPKI
   validation result (see [I-D.ietf-sidr-rpki-validation-reconsidered]).

3.  Operational Recommendations

3.1.  Local Routing Decision Process

   A peer receiving an RPKI validation result from the route server MAY
   use the information in its own local routing decision process.  The
   local routing decision process SHOULD apply to the rules as described
   in section 5 [RFC6811].

   A peer receiving an RPKI validation result from the route server MAY
   redistribute this information within its own AS.

3.2.  Route-Server Receiving the BGP Prefix Origin Validation State
      Extended Community

   An IXP route-server receiving routes from its peers containing the
   BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended Community MUST remove the
   extended community before the route is re-distributed to its peers.
   This is required regardless of whether the route-server is executing
   RPKI origin validation or not.

   Failure to do so would allow opportunistic peers to advertise routes
   tagged with arbitrary RPKI validation results via a route-server,
   influencing maliciously the decision process of other route-server
   peers.



King, et al.              Expires June 16, 2016                 [Page 3]


Internet-DraftSignaling RPKI Validation Results from a RoutDecember 2015


3.3.  Error Handling at Peers

   A route sent by a route-server SHOULD only contain none or one BGP
   Prefix Origin Validation State Extended Community.

   A peer receiving a route from a route-server containing more than one
   BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended Community SHOULD only
   consider the largest value (as described in Table 1) in the
   validation result field and disregard the other values.  Values
   larger than two in the validation result field MUST be disregarded.

4.  IANA Considerations

   None.

5.  Security Considerations

   A route-server could be misused to spread malicious RPKI validation
   results.  However, peers have to trust the route-server anyway as it
   collects and redistributes BGP routing information to other peers.

   The introduction of a mechanisms described in this document does not
   pose a new class of attack vectors to the relationship between route-
   servers and peers.

6.  References

6.1.  Normative References

   [I-D.ietf-sidr-rpki-validation-reconsidered]
              Huston, G., Michaelson, G., Martinez, C., Bruijnzeels, T.,
              Newton, A., and A. Aina, "RPKI Validation Reconsidered",
              draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-validation-reconsidered-02 (work in
              progress), October 2015.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/
              RFC2119, March 1997,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC4360]  Sangli, S., Tappan, D., and Y. Rekhter, "BGP Extended
              Communities Attribute", RFC 4360, DOI 10.17487/RFC4360,
              February 2006, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4360>.

   [RFC6811]  Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R.
              Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811, DOI
              10.17487/RFC6811, January 2013,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6811>.



King, et al.              Expires June 16, 2016                 [Page 4]


Internet-DraftSignaling RPKI Validation Results from a RoutDecember 2015


6.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.ietf-idr-ix-bgp-route-server]
              Jasinska, E., Hilliard, N., Raszuk, R., and N. Bakker,
              "Internet Exchange BGP Route Server", draft-ietf-idr-ix-
              bgp-route-server-09 (work in progress), October 2015.

   [I-D.ietf-sidr-origin-validation-signaling]
              Mohapatra, P., Patel, K., Scudder, J., Ward, D., and R.
              Bush, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended
              Community", draft-ietf-sidr-origin-validation-signaling-07
              (work in progress), November 2015.

   [RFC6480]  Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
              Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, DOI 10.17487/RFC6480,
              February 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6480>.

Authors' Addresses

   Thomas King
   DE-CIX Management GmbH
   Lichtstrasse 43i
   Cologne  50825
   DE

   Email: thomas.king@de-cix.net


   Daniel Kopp
   DE-CIX Management GmbH
   Lichtstrasse 43i
   Cologne  50825
   DE

   Email: daniel.kopp@de-cix.net


   Aristidis Lambrianidis
   Amsterdam Internet Exchange
   Frederiksplein 42
   Amsterdam  1017 XN
   NL

   Email: aristidis.lambrianidis@ams-ix.net







King, et al.              Expires June 16, 2016                 [Page 5]


Internet-DraftSignaling RPKI Validation Results from a RoutDecember 2015


   Arnaud Fenioux
   France-IX
   88 Avenue Des Ternes
   Paris  75017
   FR

   Email: afenioux@franceix.net












































King, et al.              Expires June 16, 2016                 [Page 6]


Html markup produced by rfcmarkup 1.129b, available from https://tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcmarkup/