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DICE Working Group                                         S. Kumar, Ed.
Internet-Draft                                          Philips Research
Intended status: Standards Track                                 S. Keoh
Expires: April 23, 2015                  University of Glasgow Singapore
                                                       O. Garcia-Morchon
                                                        Philips Research
                                                        October 20, 2014


                DTLS Relay for Constrained Environments
                     draft-kumar-dice-dtls-relay-02

Abstract

   The 6LoWPAN and CoAP standards defined for resource-constrained
   devices are fast emerging as the de-facto protocols for enabling the
   Internet-of-Things (IoTs).  Security is an important concern in IoTs
   and the DTLS protocol has been chosen as the preferred method for
   securing CoAP messages.  DTLS is a point-to-point protocol relying on
   IP routing to deliver messages between the client and the server.
   However in some low-power lossy networks (LLNs) with multi-hop, a new
   "joining" device may not be initially IP-routable.  Moreover, it
   exists in a separate, unauthenticated domain at the point of first
   contact and therefore cannot be initially trusted.  This puts
   limitations on the ability to use DTLS as an authentication and
   confidentiality protocol at this stage.  These devices being
   Resource-constrained often cannot accommodate more than one security
   protocol in their code memory.  To overcome this problem we suggest
   DTLS as the single protocol and therefore, we present a DTLS Relay
   solution for the non-IP routable "joining" device to enable it to
   establish a secure DTLS connection with a DTLS Server.  Furthermore
   we present a stateful and stateless mode of operation for the DTLS
   Relay.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."



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   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 23, 2015.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
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   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Use Case  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  DTLS Relay  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.1.  DTLS Relay in Stateful mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.2.  DTLS Relay in Stateless mode  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     3.3.  Comparison between the two modes  . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   4.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   6.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   7.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     7.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     7.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13

1.  Introduction

   For the Internet of Things (IoT) to become a reality, it will require
   the participation of constrained nodes in constrained networks
   [RFC7228].  These constrained nodes typically implement the IPv6 over
   Low-Power Wireless Personal Area Networks (6LoWPAN) [RFC4944] and
   Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) [RFC7252] standards.  The
   6LoWPAN adaptation layer allows for transmission of IPv6 Packets over
   IEEE 802.15.4 networks [ieee802.15.4], thereby enabling end-to-end
   IPv6 connectivity between constrained nodes and other devices on the
   Internet.  CoAP is a web protocol based on REST architecture designed
   for constrained node networks.  It supports binding to UDP [RFC0768],
   which has advantages over TCP [RFC0793] when used in low-power lossy
   networks (LLNs) such as IEEE 802.15.4 [ieee802.15.4].




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   Security is an important concern in such a constrained node network,
   which could be used in various application domains such as smart
   energy and building automation.  However, security protocols are
   often heavy-weight in terms of both code and network processing.  Use
   of multiple security protocols for different purposes and at
   different networking layers is problematic in constrained devices,
   therefore the use of a single security protocol to fulfil multiple
   security requirements is greatly preferred.

   CoAP has chosen Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) [RFC6347] as
   the preferred security protocol for authenticity and confidentiality
   of the messages.  It is based on Transport Layer Security (TLS)
   [RFC5246] with modifications to run over UDP.  DTLS makes use of
   additional reliability mechanisms in its handshake due to the lack of
   TCP reliable transmission mechanisms that are available to TLS.

   DTLS is a client-server protocol relying on the underlying IP layer
   to perform the routing between the DTLS Client and the DTLS Server.
   However in some LLNs with multi-hop, a new "joining" device may not
   be initially IP routable until it is authenticated to the network.  A
   new "joining" device can only initially use a link-local IPv6 address
   to communicate with a neighbour node using neighbour discovery
   [RFC6775] until it receives the necessary network configuration
   parameters.  However, before the device can receive these
   configuration parameters, it may need to authenticate itself or wish
   to authenticate the network to which it connects.  Although DTLS is a
   suitable protocol for such authentication and secure transfer of
   configuration parameters, it would not work due to the lack of IP
   routability of DTLS messages between DTLS Client and DTLS Server.

   We present a DTLS Relay solution to overcome this problem for the
   "joining" device to establish a DTLS connection with a DTLS Server.
   This draft is inspired by the Protocol for carrying Authentication
   for Network Access (PANA) Relay Element [RFC6345] which is intended
   to solve a similar problem when PANA [RFC5191] is used as the
   transport protocol for Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)
   [RFC3748] based network access.  Recently there has been interest in
   transporting EAP over CoAP
   [I-D.marin-ace-wg-coap-eap][I-D.ohba-core-eap-based-bootstrapping]
   and presented DTLS Relay solution can be used to secure these
   messages.  Further, we present a stateful and stateless mode of
   operation for the DTLS Relay.

   This draft is an early description of the solutions and does not
   provide the complete details yet.  This draft is structured as
   follows: we present a use-case for the DTLS Relay in Section 2, then
   present the DTLS Relay solution in Section 3 for stateful and
   stateless mode of operation.  We compare these two solutions in



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   Section 3.3.  Further we present some security considerations in
   Section 5.

2.  Use Case

   We present here a target usecase based on
   [I-D.jennings-core-transitive-trust-enrollment] describing a
   rendezvous protocol that allows a constrained IoT device to securely
   connect into a system or network.  The main idea is that the joining
   Device has a pre-established trust relationship with a "Transfer
   Agent" entity, for e.g.  Pre-Shared Keys provisioned during
   manufacturing.  This "Transfer Agent" provides the needed trust
   credentials to the Device and/or a Controller in the system to
   establish a secured connection to perform further authentication and
   transfer of system/network configuration parameters.  This step is
   enabled by an "Introducer" entity which informs the "Transfer Agent"
   about the details of Controller to which the joining Device should
   connect, and provide to the Controller the identity including one-
   time credentials for enable secure connection to the Device.  The
   transitive trust trust establishment procedure is explained in detail
   in [I-D.jennings-core-transitive-trust-enrollment] and we focus here
   on how to enable this using DTLS.

   As depicted in the Figure 1, the joining Device (D) is more than one
   hop away from the Controller (C) and not yet authenticated into the
   network.  At this stage, it can only communicate one-hop to its
   nearest neighbour (N) using their link-local IPv6 addresses.
   However, the Device needs to communicate with end-to-end security
   with a Transfer Agent (T) or a Controller (C) to authenticate and get
   the relevant system/network parameters.  If the Device (D) initiates
   a DTLS connection to the Transfer Agent whose IP address has been
   pre-configured, then the packets are dropped at the neighbour (N)
   since the Device (D) is not yet admitted to the network or there is
   no IP routability to Device (D) for any returned messages.

















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             Transfer Agent
                 ++++
                 |T |
                 |  |             +--+
                 ++++             |N'|
                   |             --+--+
                   |  ++++    /
                   |  |C |----       +--+        +--+
                    --|  |    \      |N |........|D |
                      ++++     \-----|  |        |  |
                   Controller        +--+        +--+
                                 Neighbour   "Joining" Device


            Figure 1: Use case depiction in a multi-hop network

   Furthermore, the Device (D) may wish to establish a secure connection
   to the Controller (C) in the network assuming appropriate credentials
   are exchanged out-of-band, e.g. a hash of the Device (D)'s raw public
   key could be provided to the Controller (C).  However, the Device (D)
   is unaware of the IP address of the Controller (C) to initiate a DTLS
   connection and perform authentication with.

   To overcome these problems with non-routability of DTLS packets and/
   or discovery of the destination address of the DTLS Server to
   contact, we define a DTLS Relay solution.  This DTLS Relay ability is
   configured into all authenticated devices in the network which may
   act as the Neighbour (N) device for newly joining nodes.  The DTLS
   Relay allows for relaying of the packets from the Neighbour (N) using
   IP routing to the intended DTLS Server.  Furthermore, if the DTLS
   Server address is not known to the joining Device (D), then messages
   are delivered to a pre-configured DTLS Server address (most likely
   the Controller (C)) known to the DTLS Relay.

3.  DTLS Relay

   In this section, we describe how the DTLS Relay functionality can be
   achieved.  When a joining device as a client attempts a DTLS
   connection (for example to a "Transfer Agent"), it uses its link-
   local IP address as its IP source address.  This message is
   transmitted one-hop to a neighbour node.  Under normal circumstances,
   this message would be dropped at the neighbour node since the joining
   device is not yet IP routable or it is not yet authenticated to send
   messages through the network.  However, if the neighbour device has
   the DTLS Relay functionality enabled, it relays the DTLS message to a
   specific DTLS Server.  Additional security mechanisms need to exist
   to prevent this relaying functionality being used by rogue nodes to




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   bypass any network authentication procedures.  These mechanisms are
   discussed in Section 5.

   The DTLS Relay can operate in two different modes: stateful and
   stateless.  We present here both modes, however for inter-
   operability, only one of the modes should be mandated.  Within each
   mode, the DTLS Relay can further relay packets based on the client-
   defined DTLS Server address or a DTLS Server address that has been
   configured into the DTLS Relay.

3.1.  DTLS Relay in Stateful mode

   On receiving a DTLS message from a joining device, the neighbour node
   enters into DTLS Relay stateful mode.  In this mode, the neighbour
   node has the additional DTLS Relay functionality to send DTLS
   messages further to the end-point DTLS Server the joining device
   wishes to contact.  In the stateful mode of operation, the message is
   transmitted to the end-point DTLS Server as if it originated from the
   DTLS Relay, by replacing the IP address and port to the DTLS Relay's
   own IP address and a randomly chosen port.  The DTLS message itself
   is not modified.

   Additionally, the DTLS Relay must track the ongoing DTLS connections
   based on the following 4-tuple stored locally:

   o  DTLS Client source link-local IP address (IP_C)

   o  DTLS Client source port (p_C)

   o  DTLS Server IP address (IP_S)

   o  DTLS Relay source port (p_R)

   The DTLS Server communicates with the DTLS Relay as if it were
   communicating with the DTLS Client, without any modification required
   to the DTLS messages.  On receiving a DTLS message from the DTLS
   Server, the DTLS Relay looks up its locally stored 4-tuple array to
   identify to which DTLS Client (if multiple exist) the message
   belongs.  The DTLS message's destination address and port are
   replaced with the link-local address and port of the corresponding
   DTLS Client respectively and the DTLS message is then forwarded to
   the DTLS Client.  The DTLS Relay does not modify the DTLS packets and
   therefore the normal processing and security of DTLS is unaffected.

   The following message flow diagram indicates the various steps of the
   process where the DTLS Server address in known to the joining device:





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+---------------+---------------+----------------+---------------------------+
|  DTLS Client  |   DTLS Relay  |   DTLS Server  |          Message          |
|     (C)       |       (R)     |       (S)      | Src_IP:port | Dst_IP:port |
+---------------+---------------+----------------+-------------+-------------+
|      --ClientHello-->                          |   IP_C:p_C  | IP_S:5684   |
|                          --ClientHello-->      |   IP_R:p_R  | IP_S:5684   |
|                                                |             |             |
|                          <--ServerHello--      |   IP_S:5684 | IP_R:p_R    |
|                                  :             |             |             |
|            <--ServerHello--                    |   IP_S:5684 | IP_C:p_C    |
|                    :                           |             |             |
|                        ::                      |       :     |    :        |
|                        ::                      |       :     |    :        |
|        --Finished-->                           |   IP_C:p_C  | IP_S:5684   |
|                            --Finished-->       |   IP_R:p_R  | IP_S:5684   |
|                                                |             |             |
|                            <--Finished--       |   IP_S:5684 | IP_R:p_R    |
|        <--Finished--                           |   IP_S:5684 | IP_C:p_C    |
|                       ::                       |      :      |     :       |
+------------------------------------------------+-------------+-------------+
IP_C:p_C = Link-local IP address and port of DTLS Client
IP_S:5684 = IP address and coaps port of DTLS Server
IP_R:p_R = IP address and port of DTLS Relay


    Figure 2: Message flow in Stateful mode with DTLS Server defined by
                                DTLS Client

   In the situation where the joining device is unaware of the IP
   address of the DTLS Server it needs to contact, for e.g. the
   Controller of the network, the DTLS Relay can be configured with IP
   destination of the default DTLS Server that a DTLS client (joining
   device) needs to contact.  The DTLS client initiates its DTLS request
   as if the DTLS Relay is the intended end-point DTLS Server.  The DTLS
   Relay changes the IP packet (without modifying the DTLS message) as
   in the previous case by modifying both the source and destination IP
   addresses to forward the message to the intended DTLS Server.  The
   DTLS Relay keeps a similar 4-tuple array to enable translation of the
   DTLS messages received from the DTLS Server and forward it to the
   DTLS Client.  The following message flow indicates this process:











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+---------------+---------------+----------------+---------------------------+
|  DTLS Client  |   DTLS Relay  |   DTLS Server  |          Message          |
|     (C)       |       (R)     |       (S)      | Src_IP:port | Dst_IP:port |
+---------------+---------------+----------------+-------------+-------------+
|      --ClientHello-->                          |   IP_C:p_C  | IP_Ra:5684  |
|                          --ClientHello-->      |   IP_Rb:p_Rb| IP_S:5684   |
|                                                |             |             |
|                          <--ServerHello--      |   IP_S:5684 | IP_Rb:p_Rb  |
|                                  :             |             |             |
|            <--ServerHello--                    |   IP_Ra:5684| IP_C:p_C    |
|                    :                           |             |             |
|                        ::                      |       :     |    :        |
|                        ::                      |       :     |    :        |
|        --Finished-->                           |   IP_C:p_C  | IP_Ra:5684  |
|                            --Finished-->       |   IP_Rb:p_Rb| IP_S:5684   |
|                                                |             |             |
|                            <--Finished--       |   IP_S:5684 | IP_Rb:p_Rb  |
|        <--Finished--                           |   IP_Ra:5684| IP_C:p_C    |
|                       ::                       |      :      |     :       |
+------------------------------------------------+-------------+-------------+
IP_C:p_C = Link-local IP address and port of DTLS Client
IP_S:5684 = IP address and coaps port of DTLS Server
IP_Ra:5684 = Link-local IP address and coaps port of DTLS Relay
IP_Rb:p_Rb = IP address (can be same as IP_Ra) and port of DTLS Relay


    Figure 3: Message flow in Stateful mode with DTLS Server defined by
                                DTLS Relay

3.2.  DTLS Relay in Stateless mode

   In the alternative mode of operation for the DTLS Relay, a stateless
   approach is applied where the DTLS Relay does not need to store a
   local 4-tuple array.  Just as in the previous case, if an untrusted
   DTLS Client that can only use link-local addressing wants to contact
   a trusted end-point DTLS Server, it send the DTLS message to the DTLS
   Relay.  Instead of changing the IP addresses and port of the IP
   packet, the DTLS Relay encapsulates this message into a new type of
   message called DTLS Relay (DRY) message.  The DRY message consists of
   two parts:

   o  Header (H) field: consisting of the source link-local address and
      port of the DTLS Client device, and

   o  Contents (C) field: containing the original DTLS message.

   On receiving the DRY message, the DTLS Server decapsulates it to
   retrieve the two parts.  It uses the Header field information to



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   transiently store the DTLS Client's address and port.  The DTLS
   Server then performs the normal DTLS operations on the DTLS message
   from the Contents field.  However, when the DTLS Server replies, it
   also encapsulates its DTLS message in a DRY message back to the DTLS
   Relay.  The Header contains the original source link-local address
   and port of the DTLS Client from the transient state stored earlier
   (which can now be discarded) and the Contents field contains the DTLS
   message.

   On receiving the DRY message, the DTLS Relay decapsulates it to
   retrieve the two parts.  It uses the Header field to relay the DTLS
   message retrieved from the Contents field to the right DTLS Client.

   The following figure depicts the message flow diagram when the DTLS
   Server end-point address is known only to the Relay:


+----------------+---------------------+---------------------+---------------------------+
|  DTLS Client   |      DTLS Relay     |      DTLS Server    |         Message           |
|     (C)        |          (R)        |          (S)        | Src_IP:port | Dst_IP:port |
+----------------+---------------------+---------------------+-------------+-------------+
|         --ClientHello-->                                   |   IP_C:p_C  | IP_Ra:5684  |
|                      --DRY[H(IP_C:p_C),C(ClientHello)]-->  |   IP_Rb:p_Rb| IP_S:5684   |
|                                                            |             |             |
|                      <--DRY[H(IP_C:p_C),C(ServerHello)]--  |   IP_S:5684 | IP_Rb:p_Rb  |
|                                           :                |             |             |
|         <--ServerHello--                                   |   IP_Ra:5684| IP_C:p_C    |
|                 :                                          |             |             |
|                              ::                            |       :     |    :        |
|                              ::                            |       :     |    :        |
|          --Finished-->                                     |   IP_C:p_C  | IP_Ra:5684  |
|                         --DRY[H(IP_C:p_C),C(Finished)]-->  |   IP_Rb:p_Rb| IP_S:5684   |
|                                                            |             |             |
|                         <--DRY[H(IP_C:p_C),C(Finished)]--  |   IP_S:5684 | IP_Rb:p_Rb  |
|          <--Finished--                                     |   IP_Ra:5684| IP_C:p_C    |
|                              ::                            |      :      |     :       |
+------------------------------------------------------------+-------------+-------------+
IP_C:p_C = Link-local IP address and port of DTLS Client
IP_S:5684 = IP address and coaps port of DTLS Server
IP_Ra:5684 = Link-local IP address and coaps port of DTLS Relay
IP_Rb:p_Rb = IP address(can be same as IP_Ra) and port of DTLS Relay

DRY[H(),C()] = DTLS Relay message with header H and content C


   Figure 4: Message flow in Stateless mode with DTLS Server defined by
                                DTLS Relay




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   The message flow for the case in which the DTLS Client is aware of
   the end-point DTLS Server's IP address is similar and not described
   further.  It can be derived based on Figure 2 and Figure 4.

3.3.  Comparison between the two modes

   The stateful and stateless mode of operation for the DTLS Relay have
   their advantages and disadvantages.  This comparison should enable to
   make a good choice between the two based on the available device
   resources and network bandwidth in a given deployment.


+-------------------+-----------------------------------+--------------------------------+
|     Properties    |           Stateful mode           |          Stateless mode        |
+-------------------+-----------------------------------+--------------------------------+
| State information |The Relay needs additional storage | No information is maintained by|
|                   |to maintain mapping of the joining | the Relay.                     |
|                   |device's address with the port     |                                |
|                   |number being used to communicate   |                                |
|                   |with the Server.                   |                                |
+-------------------+-----------------------------------+--------------------------------+
|    Packet size    |The size of the relayed message is |The size of the relayed  message|
|                   |the same as the original message .  |is bigger than the original, it |
|                   |                                   |includes additional source and  |
|                   |                                   |destination addresses.          |
+-------------------+-----------------------------------+--------------------------------+
| Standardization   |The additional functionalities of  |New DRY message to encapsulate  |
|  requirements     |the Relay to maintain state        |DTLS message. The Server and the|
|                   |information, and modify the source |Relay have to understand the DRY|
|                   |and destination addresses of the   |message in order to process it. |
|                   |DTLS handshake messages.           |                                |
+-------------------+-----------------------------------+--------------------------------+

Table 1: Comparison between stateful and stateless mode DTLS Relay


                                 Figure 5

4.  IANA Considerations

   tbd

   Note to RFC Editor: this section may be removed on publication as an
   RFC.







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5.  Security Considerations

   Additional security considerations need to be taken into account when
   forwarding messages from devices through a network to which it has
   not yet been admitted since this can lead to denial-of-service (DoS)
   attacks or misuse of network resources without proper authentication.
   There are various solution options by which one could try to limit
   the damage that an attacker can cause by DoS.  One way to overcome
   any large scale misuse of the network is to have a management message
   from the Controller that initiates already authenticated devices in
   the network to enable or disable the DTLS Relay mode.  This is often
   possible since the administrator of the network is aware when new
   devices join the network either because of the "Introduction" phase
   or commissioning phase.  Alternatively the management message can be
   used to control a different networking layer on the relay nodes that
   disable new nodes from joining.  Such solution options are orthogonal
   to the DTLS relay functionality and should be built in based on the
   underlying network capabilities and deployment scenario.

   In terms of the two different modes, Stateful mode has additional
   security issues since the DTLS Relay has to store state from an
   unauthenticated node and then relay a message, expecting a
   corresponding reply sometime in the future.  Furthermore, the DTLS
   Server has to store state as well but it is more transient.  This
   could lead to a simple localised attack on a DTLS Relay whereby a
   rogue device could use up state storage on a DTLS Relay quite easily,
   thus denying a legitimate device from being able to gain access.

   In comparison, in the Stateless mode the DTLS Relay does not store
   any state, and therefore an attack as described above is not
   possible.  Also a DTLS Server can legitimately silently discard a
   DTLS message without concern as the DTLS Relay has no further
   knowledge or state stored of the DTLS Client.  The DTLS cookie
   mechanism is a good addition to a stateless transaction which
   improves the likelihood a DTLS Server is talking to a genuine DTLS
   Client.

6.  Acknowledgements

   The authors would like to thank Sahil Sharma, Ernest Ma, Dee
   Denteneer, Peter Lenoir and Martin Turon for the valuable
   discussions.  Also thank Robert Craige for his valuable comments and
   edits.








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7.  References

7.1.  Normative References

   [RFC6347]  Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer
              Security Version 1.2", RFC 6347, January 2012.

7.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.jennings-core-transitive-trust-enrollment]
              Jennings, C., "Transitive Trust Enrollment for Constrained
              Devices", draft-jennings-core-transitive-trust-
              enrollment-01 (work in progress), October 2012.

   [I-D.marin-ace-wg-coap-eap]
              Garcia, D., "EAP-based Authentication Service for CoAP",
              draft-marin-ace-wg-coap-eap-01 (work in progress), October
              2014.

   [I-D.ohba-core-eap-based-bootstrapping]
              Das, S. and Y. Ohba, "Provisioning Credentials for CoAP
              Applications using EAP", draft-ohba-core-eap-based-
              bootstrapping-01 (work in progress), March 2012.

   [RFC0768]  Postel, J., "User Datagram Protocol", STD 6, RFC 768,
              August 1980.

   [RFC0793]  Postel, J., "Transmission Control Protocol", STD 7, RFC
              793, September 1981.

   [RFC3748]  Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J., and H.
              Levkowetz, "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)", RFC
              3748, June 2004.

   [RFC4944]  Montenegro, G., Kushalnagar, N., Hui, J., and D. Culler,
              "Transmission of IPv6 Packets over IEEE 802.15.4
              Networks", RFC 4944, September 2007.

   [RFC5191]  Forsberg, D., Ohba, Y., Patil, B., Tschofenig, H., and A.
              Yegin, "Protocol for Carrying Authentication for Network
              Access (PANA)", RFC 5191, May 2008.

   [RFC5246]  Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
              (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.

   [RFC6345]  Duffy, P., Chakrabarti, S., Cragie, R., Ohba, Y., and A.
              Yegin, "Protocol for Carrying Authentication for Network
              Access (PANA) Relay Element", RFC 6345, August 2011.



Kumar, et al.            Expires April 23, 2015                [Page 12]


Internet-Draft                 DTLS Relay                   October 2014


   [RFC6775]  Shelby, Z., Chakrabarti, S., Nordmark, E., and C. Bormann,
              "Neighbor Discovery Optimization for IPv6 over Low-Power
              Wireless Personal Area Networks (6LoWPANs)", RFC 6775,
              November 2012.

   [RFC7228]  Bormann, C., Ersue, M., and A. Keranen, "Terminology for
              Constrained-Node Networks", RFC 7228, May 2014.

   [RFC7252]  Shelby, Z., Hartke, K., and C. Bormann, "The Constrained
              Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7252, June 2014.

   [ieee802.15.4]
              IEEE Computer Society, , "IEEE Std. 802.15.4-2003",
              October 2003.

Authors' Addresses

   Sandeep S. Kumar (editor)
   Philips Research
   High Tech Campus 34
   Eindhoven  5656 AE
   NL

   Email: ietf@sandeep.de


   Sye Loong Keoh
   University of Glasgow Singapore
   Republic PolyTechnic, 9 Woodlands Ave 9
   Singapore  838964
   SG

   Email: SyeLoong.Keoh@glasgow.ac.uk


   Oscar Garcia-Morchon
   Philips Research
   High Tech Campus 34
   Eindhoven  5656 AE
   NL

   Email: oscar.garcia@philips.com









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