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Versions: 00 01 02 03 draft-ietf-regext-dnsoperator-to-rrr-protocol

Network Working Group                                          J. Latour
Internet-Draft                                                      CIRA
Intended status: Informational                            O. Gudmundsson
Expires: September 22, 2016                             Cloudflare, Inc.
                                                              P. Wouters
                                                                 Red Hat
                                                             M. Pounsett
                                                   Rightside Group, Ltd.
                                                          March 21, 2016


       Third Party DNS operator to Registrars/Registries Protocol
            draft-latour-dnsoperator-to-rrr-protocol-03.txt

Abstract

   There are several problems that arise in the standard
   Registrant/Registrar/Registry model when the operator of a zone is
   neither the Registrant nor the Registrar for the delegation.
   Historically the issues have been minor, and limited to difficulty
   guiding the Registrant through the initial changes to the NS records
   for the delegation.  As this is usually a one time activity when the
   operator first takes charge of the zone it has not been treated as a
   serious issue.

   When the domain on the other hand uses DNSSEC it necessary for the
   Registrant in this situation to make regular (sometimes annual)
   changes to the delegation in order to track KSK rollover, by updating
   the delegation's DS record(s).  Under the current model this is prone
   to Registrant error and significant delays.  Even when the Registrant
   has outsourced the operation of DNS to a third party the registrant
   still has to be in the loop to update the DS record.

   There is a need for a simple protocol that allows a third party DNS
   operator to update DS and NS records in a trusted manner for a
   delegation without involving the registrant for each operation.

   The protocol described in this draft is REST based, and when used
   through an authenticated channel can be used to establish the DNSSEC
   Initial Trust (to turn on DNSSEC or bootstrap DNSSEC).  Once DNSSEC
   trust is established this channel can be used to trigger maintenance
   of delegation records such as DS, NS, and glue records.  The protocol
   is kept as simple as possible.








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Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 22, 2016.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Notional Conventions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.1.  Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.2.  RFC2119 Keywords  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  What is the goal? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.1.  Why DNSSEC? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.2.  How does a child signal its parent it wants DNSSEC Trust
           Anchor?  The child  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.3.  What checks are needed by parent? . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   4.  OP-3-DNS-RR RESTful API . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     4.1.  Authentication  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.2.  Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.3.  Base URL Locator  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.4.  CDS resource  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6



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       4.4.1.  Initial Trust Establishment (Enable DNSSEC
               validation) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       4.4.2.  Removing a DS (turn off DNSSEC) . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       4.4.3.  DS Maintenance (Key roll over)  . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     4.5.  Tokens resource . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       4.5.1.  Setup Initial Trust Establishment with Challenge  . .   8
     4.6.  Customized Error Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     4.7.  How to react to 403 on POST cds . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   5.  Security considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   6.  IANA Actions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   7.  Internationalization Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   8.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     8.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     8.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   Appendix A.  Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     A.1.  Version 03  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     A.2.  Version 02  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     A.3.  Version 01  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     A.4.  Version 00  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10

1.  Introduction

   Why is this needed?  DNS registration systems today are designed
   around making registrations easy and fast.  After the domain has been
   registered the there are really three options on who maintains the
   DNS zone that is loaded on the "primary" DNS servers for the domain
   this can be the Registrant, Registrar, or a third party DNS Operator.

   Unfortunately the ease to make changes differs for each one of these
   options.  The Registrant needs to use the interface that the
   registrar provides to update NS and DS records.  The Registrar on the
   other hand can make changes directly into the registration system.
   The third party DNS Operator on the hand needs to go through the
   Registrant to update any delegation information.

   Current system does not work well, there are many examples of
   failures including the inability to upload DS records due to non-
   support by Registrar interface, the registrant forgets/does-not
   perform action but tools proceed with key roll-over without checking
   that the new DS is in place.  Another common failure is the DS record
   is not removed when the DNS Operator changes from one that supports
   DNSSEC signing to one that does not.

   The failures result either inability to use DNSSEC or in validation
   failures that case the domain to become invalid and all users that
   are behind validating resolvers will not be able to to access the
   domain.



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2.  Notional Conventions

2.1.  Definitions

   For the purposes of this draft, a third-party DNS Operator is any DNS
   Operator responsible for a zone where the operator is neither the
   Registrant nor the Registrar of record for the delegation.

   Uses of the word 'Registrar' in this document may also be applied to
   resellers: an entity that sells delegations through a registrar with
   whom the entity has a reseller agreement.

2.2.  RFC2119 Keywords

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

3.  What is the goal?

   The primary goal is to use the DNS protocol to provide information
   from child zone to the parent zone, to maintain the delegation
   information.  The precondition for this to be practical is that the
   domain is DNSSEC signed.

   In the general case there should be a way to find the right
   Registrar/Registry entity to talk to but that does not exist.
   Whois[] is the natural protocol to carry such information but that
   protocol is unreliable and hard to parse.  Its proposed successor
   RDAP [RFC7480] has yet be deployed on most TLD's.

   The preferred communication mechanism is to use is to use a REST
   [RFC6690] call to start processing of the requested delegation
   information.

3.1.  Why DNSSEC?

   DNSSEC [RFC4035] provides data authentication for DNS answers, having
   DNSSEC enabled makes it possible to trust the answers.  The biggest
   stumbling block is deploying DNSSEC is the initial configuration of
   the DNSSEC domain trust anchor in the parent, DS record.

3.2.  How does a child signal its parent it wants DNSSEC Trust Anchor?
      The child

   needs first to sign the domain, then the child can "upload" the DS
   record to its parent.  The "normal" way to upload is to go through
   registration interface, but that fails frequently.  The DNS Operator



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   may not have access to the interface thus the registrant needs to
   relay the information.  For large operations this does not scale, as
   evident in lack of Trust Anchors for signed deployments that are
   operated by third parties.

   The child can signal its desire to have DNSSEC validation enabled by
   publishing one of the special DNS records CDS and/or CDNSKEY[RFC7344]
   and its proposed extension [I-D.ietf-dnsop-maintain-ds].

   Once the "parent" "sees" these records it SHOULD start acceptance
   processing.  This document will cover below how to make the CDS
   records visible to the right parental agent.

   We and [I-D.ogud-dnsop-maintain-ds] argue that the publication of
   CDS/CDNSKEY record is sufficient for the parent to start the
   acceptance processing.  The main point is to provide authentication
   thus if the child is in "good" state then the DS upload should be
   simple to accept and publish.  If there is a problem the parent has
   ability to not add the DS.

3.3.  What checks are needed by parent?

   The parent upon receiving a signal that it check the child for desire
   for DS record publication.  The basic tests include,

   1. The zone is signed
   2. The zone has a CDS signed by a KSK referenced in the current DS,
      referring to a at least one key in the current DNSKEY RRset
   3. All the name-servers for the zone agree on the CDS RRset contents

   Parents can have additional tests, defined delays, queries over TCP,
   and even ask the DNS Operator to prove they can add data to the zone,
   or provide a code that is tied to the affected zone.  The protocol is
   partially-synchronous, i.e. the server can elect to hold connection
   open until the operation has concluded or it can return that it
   received the request.  It is up to the child to monitor the parent
   for completion of the operation and issue possible follow-up calls.

4.  OP-3-DNS-RR RESTful API

   The specification of this API is minimalist, but a realistic one.
   Question: How to respond if the party contacted is not ALLOWED to
   make the requested change?








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4.1.  Authentication

   The API does not impose any unique server authentication
   requirements.  The server authentication provided by TLS fully
   addresses the needs.  In general, for the API SHOULD be provided over
   TLS-protected transport (e.g., HTTPS) or VPN.

4.2.  Authorization

   Authorization is out of scope of this document.  The CDS records
   present in the zone file are indications of intention to sign/unsign/
   update the DS records of the domain in the parent zone.  This means
   the proceeding of the action is not determined by who issued the
   request.  Therefore, authorization is out of the scope.  Registries
   and registrars who plan to provide this service can, however,
   implement their own policy such as IP white listing, API key, etc.

4.3.  Base URL Locator

   The base URL for registries or registrars who want to provide this
   service to DNS Operators can be made auto-discoverable as an RDAP
   extension.

4.4.  CDS resource

   Path: /domains/{domain}/cds {domain}: is the domain name to be
   operated on

4.4.1.  Initial Trust Establishment (Enable DNSSEC validation)

4.4.1.1.  Request

   Syntax: POST /domains/{domain}/cds

   A DS record based on the CDS record in the child zone file will be
   inserted into the registry and the parent zone file upon the
   successful completion of such request.  If there are multiple CDS
   records in the CDS RRset, multiple DS records will be added.

   Either the CDS/CDNSKEY or the DNSKEY can be used to create the DS
   record.  Note: entity expecting CDNSKEY is still expected accept the
   /cds command.

4.4.1.2.  Response

   o  HTTP Status code 201 indicates a success.

   o  HTTP Status code 400 indicates a failure due to validation.



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   o  HTTP Status code 403 indicates a failure due to an invalid
      challenge token.

   o  HTTP Status code 404 indicates the domain does not exist.

   o  HTTP Status code 500 indicates a failure due to unforeseeable
      reasons.

4.4.2.  Removing a DS (turn off DNSSEC)

4.4.2.1.  Request

                   Syntax: DELETE /domains/{domain}/cds

4.4.2.2.  Response

   o  HTTP Status code 200 indicates a success.

   o  HTTP Status code 400 indicates a failure due to validation.

   o  HTTP Status code 404 indicates the domain does not exist.

   o  HTTP Status code 500 indicates a failure due to unforeseeable
      reasons.

4.4.3.  DS Maintenance (Key roll over)

4.4.3.1.  Request

                     Syntax: PUT /domains/{domain}/cds

4.4.3.2.  Response

   o  HTTP Status code 200 indicates a success.

   o  HTTP Status code 400 indicates a failure due to validation.

   o  HTTP Status code 404 indicates the domain does not exist.

   o  HTTP Status code 500 indicates a failure due to unforeseeable
      reasons.

4.5.  Tokens resource

   Path: /domains/{domain}/tokens {domain}: is the domain name to be
   operated on





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4.5.1.  Setup Initial Trust Establishment with Challenge

4.5.1.1.  Request

                   Syntax: POST /domains/{domain}/tokens

   A random token to be included as a _delegate TXT record prior
   establishing the DNSSEC initial trust.

4.5.1.2.  Response

   o  HTTP Status code 200 indicates a success.  Token included in the
      body of the response, as a valid TXT record

   o  HTTP Status code 404 indicates the domain does not exist.

   o  HTTP Status code 500 indicates a failure due to unforeseeable
      reasons.


4.6.  Customized Error Messages

   Service providers can provide a customized error message in the
   response body in addition to the HTTP status code defined in the
   previous section.

   This can include an Identifiying number/string that can be used to
   track the requests.

   #Using the definitions This section at the moment contains comments
   from early implementers

4.7.  How to react to 403 on POST cds

   The basic reaction to a 403 on POST /domains/{domain}/cds is to issue
   POST /domains/{domain}/tokens command to fetch the challenge to
   insert into the zone.

5.  Security considerations

   TBD This will hopefully get more zones to become validated thus
   overall the security gain out weights the possible drawbacks.

   risk of takeover ? risk of validation errors < declines transfer
   issues






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6.  IANA Actions

   URI ??? TBD

7.  Internationalization Considerations

   This protocol is designed for machine to machine communications

8.  References

8.1.  Normative References

   [I-D.ietf-dnsop-maintain-ds]
              Gu[eth]mundsson, O. and P. Wouters, "Managing DS records
              from parent via CDS/CDNSKEY", draft-ietf-dnsop-maintain-
              ds-00 (work in progress), December 2015.

   [RFC4035]  Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
              Rose, "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security
              Extensions", RFC 4035, DOI 10.17487/RFC4035, March 2005,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4035>.

   [RFC7344]  Kumari, W., Gudmundsson, O., and G. Barwood, "Automating
              DNSSEC Delegation Trust Maintenance", RFC 7344, DOI
              10.17487/RFC7344, September 2014,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7344>.

8.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.ogud-dnsop-maintain-ds]
              Gu[eth]mundsson, O. and P. Wouters, "Managing DS records
              from parent via CDS/CDNSKEY", draft-ogud-dnsop-maintain-
              ds-00 (work in progress), October 2015.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/
              RFC2119, March 1997,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC6690]  Shelby, Z., "Constrained RESTful Environments (CoRE) Link
              Format", RFC 6690, DOI 10.17487/RFC6690, August 2012,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6690>.

   [RFC7480]  Newton, A., Ellacott, B., and N. Kong, "HTTP Usage in the
              Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)", RFC 7480, DOI
              10.17487/RFC7480, March 2015,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7480>.




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Appendix A.  Document History

A.1.  Version 03

   Clarified based on comments and questions from early implementors

A.2.  Version 02

   Reflected comments on mailing lists

A.3.  Version 01

   This version adds a full REST definition this is based on suggestions
   from Jakob Schlyter.

A.4.  Version 00

   First rough version

Authors' Addresses

   Jacques Latour
   CIRA

   Email: jacques.latour@cira.ca


   Olafur Gudmundsson
   Cloudflare, Inc.

   Email: olafur+ietf@cloudflare.com


   Paul Wouters
   Red Hat

   Email: paul@nohats.ca


   Matthew Pounsett
   Rightside Group, Ltd.

   Email: matt@conundrum.com








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