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saag                                                         G. Lebovitz
Internet-Draft                                                   Juniper
Intended status: Informational                          January 23, 2009
Expires: July 24, 2009

Roadmap for Cryptographic Authentication of Routing Protocol Packets on
                                the Wire

Status of this Memo

   Distribution of this memo is unlimited.

   This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on July 24, 2009.


   In the March of 2006 the IAB held a workshop on the topic of
   "Unwanted Internet Traffic".  The report from that workshop is
   documented in RFC 4948 [RFC4948].  Section 8.2 of RFC 4948 calls for
   "[t]ightening the security of the core routing infrastructure."  Four
   main steps were identified for improving the security of the routing
   infrastructure.  One of those steps was "securing the routing
   protocols' packets on the wire."  One mechanism for securing routing
   protocol packets on the wire is the use of per-packet cryptographic
   message authentication, providing both peer authentication and
   message integrity.  Many different routing protocols exist and they
   employ a range of different transport subsystems.  Therefore there

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   must necessarily be various methods defined for applying
   cryptographic authentication to these varying protocols.  Many
   routing protocols already have some method for accomplishing
   cryptographic message authentication.  However, in many cases the
   existing methods are dated, vulnerable to attack, and/or employ
   cryptographic algorithms that have been depricated.  This document
   creates a roadmap of protocol specification work for the use of
   modern cryptogrpahic mechanisms and algorithms for message
   authentication in routing protocols.  It also defines the framework
   for a key management protocol that may be used to create and manage
   session keys for message authentication and integrity.  This roadmap
   reflects the input of both the security area and routing area in
   order to form a jointly agreed upon and prioritized work list for the

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     1.1.  Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     1.2.  Requirements Language  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     1.3.  Scope  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     1.4.  Threats  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
       1.4.1.  Threats In Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
       1.4.2.  Threats Out of Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     1.5.  Goals  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     1.6.  Non-Goals  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     1.7.  Audience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   2.  The Roadmap  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     2.1.  Categorizing Routing Protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     2.2.  Security Characterization Vectors  . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
       2.2.1.  Internal vs. External Operation  . . . . . . . . . . . 11
       2.2.2.  Unique versus Shared Keys  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
       2.2.3.  Out of Band vs. In-band Key Management . . . . . . . . 13
     2.3.  Common Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
     2.4.  Work Items Per Routing Protocol  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
     2.5.  Protocols, Categories, and Priorities  . . . . . . . . . . 19
   3.  Change History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
   4.  Needs Work in Next Draft (RFC Editor: Delete Before
       Publishing)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
   5.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
   6.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
   7.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
   8.  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
     8.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
     8.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
   Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 25

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1.  Introduction

   In March 2006 the Internet Architecture Board (IAB) held a workshop
   on the topic of "Unwanted Internet Traffic".  The report from that
   workshop is documented in RFC 4948 [RFC4948].  Section 8.1 of that
   document states that "A simple risk analysis would suggest that an
   ideal attack target of minimal cost but maximal disruption is the
   core routing infrastructure."  Section 8.2 calls for "[t]ightening
   the security of the core routing infrastructure."  Four main steps
   were identified for that tightening:

   o  More secure mechanisms and practices for operating routers.  This
      work is being addressed in the OpSec Working Group.
   o  Cleaning up the Internet Routing Registry repository [IRR], and
      securing both the database and the access, so that it can be used
      for routing verifications.  This work is being conducted through
      liaisons with the RIR's globally.
   o  Specifications for cryptographic validation of routing message
      content.  This work is being done in the SIDR Working Group.
   o  Securing the routing protocols' packets on the wire

   This document addresses the last bullet, securing the packets on the
   wire of the routing protocol exchanges.

1.1.  Terminology

   [to be filled out later]

   Base RP



   session keys

1.2.  Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

1.3.  Scope

   Four basic tactics may be employed in order to secure any piece of
   data as it is transmitted over the wire: privacy (or encryption),
   authentication, message integrity, non-repudiation.  The focus for
   this effort, and the scope for this roadmap document, will be message

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   authentication and packet integrity only.  This work explicitly
   excludes, at this point in time, the other two tactics: privacy and
   non-repudiation.  Since the objective of most routing protocols is to
   broadly advertise the routing topology, routing messages are commonly
   sent in the clear; confidentiality is not normally required for
   routing protocols.  However, the two explicitly excluded tactics may
   be addressed in future work.

   This work will also include the definition of a key management
   protocol for creating and managing session keys for the message
   authentication and data integrity functions.

   It is possible for routing protocol packets to be transmitted
   employing all four security tactics mentioned above using existing
   standards.  For example, one could run unicast, layer 3 or above
   routing protocol packets through IPsec ESP [RFC4303].  This would
   provide the added benefit of privacy, and non-repudiation.  However,
   routing products have been fine tuned over the years for the specific
   processing necessary for these routing protocols non-encapsulated
   formats.  Operators are, therefore, quite unwilling to explore new
   packet encapsulations for these tried and true protocols.

   In addition, at least in the case of BGP and LDP, these protocols
   already have existing mechanisms for cryptographically authenticating
   and integrity checking the packets on the wire.  Implemented products
   have already been produced and code has already been written and,
   both have been optimized for the existing mechanisms.

   Therefore, the scope of this roadmap of work includes:

   o  making use of existing routing protocol security protocols, where
      they exist, and enhancing or updating them as necessary for modern
      cryptographic best practices,
   o  developing a framework for using automatic key management in order
      to ease deployment, lower cost of operation, and allow for rapid
      responses to security breaches, and
   o  specifying the automated key management protocol that may be
      combined with the bits-on-the-wire mechanisms

   The work also serves as an agreement between the Routing Area and the
   Security Area about the priorities and work plan for incrementally
   delivering the above work.  This point is important.  There will be
   times when the best-security-possible will give way to vastly-
   possible, in order that incremental progress toward a more secure
   Internet may be achieved.  As such, the document will call out places
   where agreement has been reached on such trade offs.

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   The document does not contain protocol specifications.  Instead, it
   defines the areas where protocol specification work is needed and
   sets both a direction and a relative priority for addressing that
   specification work.

1.4.  Threats

   In RFC2828[RFC2828], a threat is defined as a potential for violation
   of security, which exists when there is a circumstance, capability,
   action, or event that could breach security and cause harm.  This
   section defines the threats that are in scope for this roadmap, and
   those that are explicitly out of scope.  This document leverages the
   "Generic Threats to Routing Protocols" model, RFC 4593 [RFC4593] ,
   capitalizes terms from that document, and offers a terse definition
   of those terms.  (More thorough description of routing protocol
   threats sources, motivations, consequences and actions can be found
   in RFC 4593 [RFC4593] itself).  The threat listings below expand upon
   these threat definitions.

1.4.1.  Threats In Scope

   The threats that will be addressed in this roadmap are those from
   OUTSIDERS, attackers that may reside anywhere in the Internet, have
   the ability to send IP traffic to the router, may be able to observe
   the router's replies, and may even control the path for a legitimate
   peer's traffic.  These are not legitimate participants in the routing
   protocol.  Message authentication and integrity protection
   specifically aims to identify messages originating from OUTSIDERS.

   The concept of OUTSIDERS can be further refined to include attackers
   who are terminated employees, and those sitting on-path.
   o  On-Path - attackers with control of a network resource or a tap
      along the path of packets between two routers.  An on-path
      outsider can attempt a man-in-the-middle attack, in addition to
      several other attack actions.  A man-in-the-middle (MitM) attack
      occurs when an attacker who has access to packets flowing between
      two peers tampers with those packets in such a way that both peers
      think they are talking to each other directly, when in fact they
      are actually talking to the attacker only.  Protocols conforming
      to this roadmap will use cryptographic mechanisms to prevent a
      man-in-the-middle attacker from situating himself undetected.
   o  Terminated Employees - in this context, those who had access
      router configuration that included keys or keying material like
      pre-shared keys used in securing the routing protocol.  Using this
      material, the attacker could attempt to impersonate a legitimate
      router.  The goal of addressing this source specifically is to
      call out the case where new keys or keying material becomes
      necessary very quickly, with little operational expense, upon the

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      termination of such an employee.  This grouping could also refer
      to any attacker who somehow managed to gain access to keying
      material, and said access had been detected by the operators such
      that the operators have an opportunity to move to new keys in
      order to prevent attack.

   These ATTACK ACTIONS are in scope for this roadmap:

   o  SPOOFING - when an illegitimate device assumes the identity of a
      legitimate one.  Spoofing can be used, for example, to inject
      unrealistic routing information that causes the disruption of
      network services.  Spoofing can also be used to cause a neighbor
      relationship to form that subsequently denies the formation of the
      relationship with the legitimate router.
   o  FALSIFICATION - an action whereby an attacker sends false routing
      information.  To falsify the routing information, an attacker has
      to be either the originator or a forwarder of the routing
      information.  Falsification may occur by an ORIGINATOR, or a
      MISTATEMENT of network resource reachability.  We must be careful
      to remember that in this work we are only targeting falsification
      from outsiders as may occur from tampering with packets in flight.
      Falsification from BYZANTINES (see the Threats Out of Scope
      section (Section 1.4.2) below) are not addressed by this roadmap,
      but by other work in the IETF.
   o  INTERFERENCE - when an attacker inhibits the exchanges by
      legitimate routers.  The types of interference addressed by this
      work include:
      *  Changing message content
   o  DoS attacks on transport sub-systems - when an attacker sends
      packets aimed at halting or preventing the underlying protocol
      over which the routing protocol runs, for example halting a BGP
      session by sending a TCP FIN packet.  Another example is sending
      packets which confuse or overwhelm a security mechanism itself,
      for example initiating an overwhelming load of keying protocol
      initiations from bogus sources.

1.4.2.  Threats Out of Scope

   Threats from BYZANTINE sources -- faulty, misconfigured, or subverted
   routers, i.e., legitimate participants in the routing protocol -- are
   out of scope for this roadmap.  Any of the attacks described in the
   above section (Section 1.4.1) that may be levied by a BYZANTINE

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   source are therefore also out of scope.

   In addition, these other attack actions are out of scope for this

   o  SNIFFING - passive observation of route message contents in flight
   o  FALSIFICATION by BYZANTINE sources - unauthorized message content
      by a legitimate source.
   o  INTERFERENCE due to:
      *  NOT FORWARDING PACKETS - cannot be prevented with cryptographic
      *  DELAYING MESSAGES - cannot be prevented with cryptographic
      *  DENIAL OF RECEIPT - cannot be prevented with cryptographic
         working group

1.5.  Goals

   The goals and general guidance for this work roadmap follow:

   o  Provide authentication and integrity protection for packets on the
      wire of existing routing protocols
   o  Deliver a path to incrementally improve security of the routing
      infrastructure.  The principle of crawl, walk, run will be in
      place.  Routing protocol authentication mechanisms may not go
      immediately from their current state to a state containing the
      best possible, most modern security practices.  Incremental steps
      will need to be taken for a few very practical reasons.  First,
      there is a great deal of deployed routing devices in operating
      networks that will not be able to run the most modern
      cryptographic mechanisms without significant and unacceptable
      performance penalties.  The roadmap for any one routing protocol
      MUST allow for incremental improvements on existing operational
      devices.  Second, current routing protocol performance on deployed
      devices has been achieved over the last 20 years through extensive
      tuning of software and hardware elements, and is a constant focus
      for improvement by vendors and operators alike.  The introduction
      of new security mechanisms affects this performance balance.  The
      performance impact of any incremental step of security improvement
      will need to be weighed by the community, and introduced in such a
      way that allows the vendor and operator community a path to
      adoption that upholds reasonable performance metrics.  Therefore,
      certain specification elements may be introduced carrying the
      "SHOULD" guidance, with the intention that the same mechanism will
      carry a "MUST" in the next release of the specification.  This

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      gives the vendors and implementors the guidance they need to tune
      their software and hardware appropriately over time.  Last, some
      security mechanisms require the build out of other operational
      support systems, and this will take time.  An example where these
      three reasons are at play in an incremental improvement roadmap is
      seen in the improvement of BGP's [RFC4271] security via the update
      of the TCP Authentication Option (TCP-AO)
      [I-D.ietf-tcpm-tcp-auth-opt] effort.  It would be ideal, and
      reflect best common security practice, to have a fully specified
      key management protocol for negotiating TCP-AO's authentication
      material, using certificates for peer authentication in the
      keying.  However, in the spirit of incremental deployment, we will
      first address issues like cryptographic algorithm agility, replay
      attacks, TCP session resetting in the base TCP-AO protocol before
      we layer key management on top of it.
   o  The deploy-ability of the improved security solutions on currently
      running routing infrastructure equipment.  This begs the
      consideration of the current state of processing power available
      on routers in the network today.
   o  Operational deploy-ability - A solutions acceptability will also
      be measured by how deployable the solution is by common operator
      teams using common deployment processes and infrastructures.  I.e.
      We will try to make these solutions fit as well as possible into
      current operational practices or router deployment.  This will be
      heavily influenced by operator input, to ensure that what we
      specify can -- and, more importantly, will -- be deployed once
      specified and implemented by vendors.  Deployment of incrementally
      more secure routing infrastructure in the Internet is the final
      measure of success.
   o  Address the threats enumerated above in the "Threats" section
      (Section 1.4) for each routing protocol, along a roadmap.  Not all
      threats may be able to be addressed in the first specification
      update for any one protocol.  Roadmaps will be defined so that
      both the security area and the routing area agree on how the
      threats will be addressed completely over time.
   o  Reuse common mechanisms across routing protocols whenever possible
      - For example, designers should aim to re-use the key management
      protocol that will be defined for BGP's TCP-AO key establishment
      for as many other routing protocols as possible.  This is but one
   o  Bridge any gaps between routing and security engineers by
      recording agreements on work items, roadmaps, and guidance from
      the Area leads and Internet Architecture Board (IAB, www.iab.org).
   o  Create a re-usable architecture and guidelines for various IETF
      working teams who will address these security improvements for
      various protocols

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1.6.  Non-Goals

   The following two goals are considered out-of-scope for this effort.

   o  privacy of the packets on the wire, at this point in time.  Once
      this roadmap is realized, we may revisit work on privacy.
   o  Message content security.  This work is being deal with in other
      areas, like SIDR.

1.7.  Audience

   The audience for this roadmap includes:
   o  Routing Area working group chairs and members - These people are
      charged with updates to the routing protocol specifications.  Any
      and all cryptographic authentication work on these specifications
      will occur in Routing Area working groups.
   o  Security Area reviewers of routing area documents - These people
      are delegated by the Security Area Directors to perform reviews on
      routing protocol specifications as they pass through working group
      last call or IESG review.  They will pay particular attention to
      the use of cryptographic authentication and corresponding security
      mechanisms for the routing protocols.  They will ensure that
      incremental security improvements are being made, in line with
      this roadmap.
   o  Security Area engineers partnering with routing area authors/
      designers on the security mechanisms in routing protocol
      specifications - Some of these security area engineers will be
      assigned by the Security Area Directors, while others will be
      interested parties.

2.  The Roadmap

2.1.  Categorizing Routing Protocols

   For the purpose of this security roadmap definition, we will
   categorize the routing protocols into groups and have design teams
   focus on the specification work within those groupings.  It is
   believed that the groupings will have like requirements for their
   authentication mechanisms, and that reuse of authentication
   mechanisms will be greatest within these grouping.  The first
   categorization defines three types of messaging transactions used on
   the wire by the base routing protocol, the Base RP.  They are:

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      One peer router directly and intentionally delivers a route update
      specifically to one other peer router.  Examples are BGP and LDP.
      [question to reviewers: Should we list all protocols into these
      categories right here, or just give a few examples?]

      A router peers with multiple other routers on a single network
      segment such that it creates and sends one route update message
      which is intended for consumption by multiple peers.  Examples
      would be OSPF and IS-IS.

      A client-server routing protocol is one where one router initiates
      a request for route information from another router, who then
      formulates a response to that request, and replies with the
      requested data.  Examples are ???? and ????.
      Multicast protocols have unique security properties because of the
      fact that they are inherently group-based protocols and thus have
      group keying requirements.  In addition, they are called out here
      separately because much work has already been done by the
      Multicast Security working group (MSEC,
      http://www.ietf.org/html.charters/msec-charter.html), with much of
      the specification work already completed.

   [author's note: I think the above definitions need clean up.  Routing
   area folks, especially ADs, PLEASE suggest new text.]

   The second axis of categorization groups protocols by the keying
   mechanism that will be necessary for distributing session keys to the
   actual routing protocol transports.  They are:

   Peer keying
      One router sends the keying messages directly and only to one
      other router, such that a one-to-one, unique keying security
      association (SA) is established between the two routers

   Group Keying
      One router creates and distributes a single keying message to
      multiple peers.  In this case an group SA will be established and
      used between multiple peers simultaneously.  Group keying exists
      for protocols like OSPF [RFC2328] , and also for multicast
      protocols like PIM-SM [RFC4601].

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   There must also be given consideration

   The work items placed on the roadmap will be defined and assigned
   based on these categorizations.

2.2.  Security Characterization Vectors

   A few more considerations must be made about the protocol and its use
   when initially categorizing the protocol and scoping the
   authentication work.

2.2.1.  Internal vs. External Operation

   The designers must consider whether the protocol is an internal
   routing protocol or an external one, i.e.  Does it primarily run
   between peers within a single domain of control or between two
   different domains of control?  Some protocols may be used in both
   cases, internally and externally, and as such various modes of
   authentication operation may be required for the same protocol.
   While it is preferred that all routing exchanges run with the utmost
   security mechanisms enabled in all deployments, the exhortation is
   greater for those protocols running at a peering point between two
   domains of control, and greatest for those on public exchange point
   links, because the volume of attackers are greater from the outside.
   Note however that the consequences of internal attacks maybe no less
   severe -- in fact they may be quite a bit more sever -- than an
   external attack.  An example of this internal versus external
   consideration is BGP which has both EBGP and IBGP modes.  Another
   example is a multicast protocol where the neighbors are sometimes
   within a domain of control and sometimes external, like at an
   exchange link.  It would be more acceptable to give up some security
   to get some convenience by using a group key on large broadcast
   networks within your domain, whereas operators may favor security
   over convenience and use unique keying on peering links.  In this
   case again, designers must consider both modes of operation and
   ensure the authentication mechanisms fit both.

   Operators are encouraged to run cryptographic authentication on all
   their adjacencies, but to work from the outside in, i.e.  The EBGP
   links are a higher priority than the IBGP links because they are
   externally facing.

2.2.2.  Unique versus Shared Keys

   This section discusses security considerations of when it is
   appropriate to use the same authentication key inputs for multiple
   peers and when it is not.  This is largely a debate of convenience

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   versus security.  It is often the case that the best secured
   mechanism is also the least convenient mechanism.  For example, an
   air gap between a host and the network absolutely prevents remote
   attacks on the host, but having to copy and carry files using the
   "sneaker net" is quite inconvenient and unscalable.

   Operators have erred on the side of convenience when it comes to
   securing routing protocols with cryptographic authentication.  Many
   do not use it at all.  Some use it only on external links, but not on
   internal links.  Those that do use it often use the same key for all
   peers across their entire network.  It is common to see the same key
   in use for years, and that being the same key that was entered when
   authentication was originally configured.

   The goal for designers is to create authentication mechanisms that
   are easy for the operators to deploy, and still use unique keys.
   Operators have the impression that they NEED shared keys, when in
   fact they do not.  What they need is the relative convenience they
   experience from deploying cryptographic authentication with shared
   keys, compared to the inconvenience they would experience if they
   deployed the same authentication mechanism using unique keys per
   pair.  An example is BGP Route Reflectors.  Here operators often use
   the same authentication key between each client and the route
   reflector.  The roadmaps defined from this guidance document will
   allow for unique keys to be used between each client and the peer,
   without sacrificing much convenience.  Designers should strive to
   deliver unique keying mechanisms with similar ease-of-deployment
   properties as today's shared keys.

   Operators must understand the consequences of using shared keys
   across many peers.  Unique keys are more secure than shared keys
   because the reduce both the attack target size and the attack
   consequence size.  In this context, the attack target size represents
   the number of unique routing exchanges across a network that an
   attacker may be able to observe in order to gain security association
   credentials, i.e.  Crack the keys.  If a shared key is used across
   the entire internal domain of control, then the attack target size is
   very large.  The larger the attack target, the easier it is for the
   attacker to gain access to analysis data, and greater the volume of
   analysis data he can access, both of which make his job easier.  In
   this context, the attack consequence size represents the amount of
   routing adjacencies that can be negatively affected once a breach has
   occurred, i.e.  Once the keys have been acquired by the attacker.
   Again, if a shared key is used across the internal domain, then the
   consequence size is the whole network.  Ideally, unique key pairs
   would be used for each adjacency.

   In some cases designers may need to use shared keys in order to solve

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   the given problem space.  For example, a multicast packet is sent
   once but then observed and consumed by several routing neighbors.  If
   unique keys were used per neighbor, the benefit of multicast would be
   erased because the casting peer would have to create a different
   announcement packet/stream for each listening peer.  Though this may
   be desired and acceptable in some small amount of use cases, it is
   not the norm.  Shared group keys are an acceptable solution here, and
   much work has been done already in this area (see MSEC working

2.2.3.  Out of Band vs. In-band Key Management

   [need to fill this out in next rev (ran out of time), outline points

   This section discussed the security and use case considerations for
   keys placed on devices through out-of-band configurations versus
   through in-band key management protocol exchanges with peers.

   Define in-band key management exchange as using crypto protected ID
   verification and session key negotiation.

   Drawbacks of oob - scale-ability, complexity and speed of changing if
   breech is suspected, i.e. terminated employee or compromised machine.
   Pros, set in OSS system and pushed to all devices.  Operators have
   mechanisms in place for this already.

   Pros of in-line KMP - results in key that is not recorded anywhere
   and thus not steal-able if a server or other data store is stolen or
   compromised, fresh keys, regular rekeys w/o operator involvement or
   oversight, can leverage properties of assymetric keys vs shared keys.
   Cons - more crypto overhead, though only at start up and re-key, for
   the router device.

   The desired end goal is in-band KMPs.

2.3.  Common Framework

   Each of the categories of routing protocols above will require unique
   designs for authenticating and integrity checking their protocols.
   However, a single underlying framework for delivering automatic
   keying to those solutions will be pursued.  Providing such a single
   framework will significantly reduce the complexity of each step of
   the overall roadmap.  For example, if each Base RP needed to define
   it's own key management protocol this would balloon the total amount
   of different sockets that needed to be opened and processes that
   needed to be simultaneously running on an implementation.  It would
   also significantly increase the run-time complexity and memory

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   requirements of such systems running multiple Base RPs, causing
   perhaps slower performance of such systems.  However, if we can land
   on a very small set (perhaps one or two) of automatic key management
   protocols, KMPs, that the various Base RP's can use, then we can
   reduce this implementation and run-time complexity.  We can also
   decrease the total amount of time implementers need to deliver the
   KMPs for the Base RPs that will provide better threat protection.

   The components for the framework are listed here, and described

   o  BaseRP security mechanism
   o  KMP
   o  key_store
   o  Base RP-to-KMP API
   o  Base RP-to-key_store API
   o  KMP-to-key_store API
   o  Common Base RP mechanisms
   o  Identifiers
   o  Proof of identity
   o  Profiles

   The framework is modularized for how keys and security association
   (SA) parameters generally get passed from a KMP to a transport
   protocol.  It contains three main blocks and APIs.

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                |                   |
                |    KMP Function    |
                |                   |
                |                    |
                |      Session       |
                |      Key Store     |
                |                    |
                |                    |
                |    Transport Keys  |
                |                    |

               Figure 1: Automatic Key Management Framework

   Each element of the framework is described here.

   Base RP
      Base RP security mechanism - In each case, the Base RP will
      contain a mechanism for using session keys in their security
      There will be an automated key management protocol, KMP.  This KMP
      will run between the peers.  The KMP serves as a protected channel
      between the peers, through which they can negotiate and pass
      important data required to exchange key identifiers, derive
      session keys, determine re-keying, synchronize their keying state,
      signal various keying events, notify with error messages, etc.  As
      an analogy, in the IPsec protocol [RFC 4301, 4303 and 4306] IKEv2
      is the KMP that runs between the two peers, while AH and ESP are
      two different base protocols that take session keys from IKEv2 and
      use them in their transmissions.  In the analogy, the Base RP, say
      BGP and LDP are analogous to ESP and AH, while the KMP is
      analogous to IKEv2 itself.

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      Each implementation will also contain a protocol independent
      mechanism for storing keys, called key_store.  The key_store will
      have multiple different logical containers, one container for each
      session key that any given Base RP will need.

      There will be an API for the Base RP to request a session key of
      the KMP, and be notified when the keys are available for it.  The
      API will also contain a mechanism for the KMP to notify the Base
      RP that there are new keys that it must now use, even if it didn't
      request those keys.  The API will also include a mechanism for the
      KMP to receive requests for session keys and other parameters from
      the routing protocol.  The KMP will also be aware of the various
      Base RPs and each of their unique parameters that need to be
      negotiated and returned.

   RP-key_store API
      There will be an API for Base RP to retrieve the keys from the
      key_store.  This will enable implementers to reuse the same API
      calls for all their Base RPs.  The API will necessarily include
      facility to retrieve other parameters it may need to construct
      it's packets, like key IDs or key lifetimes, etc.

   KMP-key_store API
      There will be an API for the KMP to place keys and parameters into
      the key_store after their negotiation and derivation with the
      other peer.  This will enable the implementers to reuse the same
      calls for multiple KMPs that may be needed to address the various
      categories of RPs as described in Section [Categorizing..link this

   [after writing this all up, I'm not sure we really need the key_store
   in the middle.  As long as we standardize fully all the calls needed
   from any RP to any KMP, then there can be a generic hand-down
   function from the KMP to the RP when the key and parameters are
   ready.  Let's sleep on it.]

   [will need state machines and function calls for these APIs, as one
   of the work items.  In essence, there is a need for a core team to
   develop the APIs out completely in order for the RP teams to use
   them.  Need to get this team going asap.]

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      A KMP is fed by identities.  The identities are text strings used
      by the peers to indicate to each other that each are known to the
      other, and authorized to establish connections.  Those identities
      must be represented in some standard string format, e.g. an IP
      address -- either v4 or v6, an FQDN, an RFC 822 email address, a
      Common Name [RFC PKI], etc.  Note that even though routers do not
      normally have email addresses, one could use an RFC 822 email
      address string as a formatted identifier for a router.  They would
      do so simply by putting the router's reference number or name-code
      as the "NAME" part of the address, left of the "@" symbol.  They
      would then place some locational context in the "DOMAIN" part of
      the string, right of the "@" symbol.  An example would be
      "rtr0210@sf.ca.us.company.com".  This document does not suggest
      this string value at all.  Instead, the concept is used only to
      clarify that the type of string employed does not matter.  It only
      matters that the type of string must be agreed upon by the two
      endpoints.  Further, the string can be used as an identifier in
      this context, even if the string is not actually provisioned in
      it's source domain.  For example, the email address
      "rtr0210@sf.ca.us.company.com" may not actually exist, but that
      string may still be used as an identifier in the routing protocol
      security context.  What is important is that the community decide
      on a small but flexible set of Identifiers they will all support,
      and that they decide on the exact format of those string.  The
      formats that will be used must be standardized and must be
      sensible for the routing infrastructure.

   Identity Proof
      Once the form of identity is decided, then there must be a
      cryptographic proof of that identity, that the peer really is who
      they assert themselves to be.  Proof of identity can be arranged
      between the peers in a few ways, for example pre-shared keys, raw
      assymetric keys, or a more user-friendly representation of
      assymetric keys, like a certificate.  Certificates can used in a
      way requiring very little supporting systems, as is the case with
      self-signed certificates.  Self-signed certificates will have
      somewhat lower security properties than Certificate Authority
      signed certificates [RFC Certs].  The use of these different
      identity proofs vary in ease of deployment, ease of ongoing
      management, startup effort, ongoing effort and management,
      security strength, and consequences from loss of secrets from one
      part of the system to the rest of the system, i.e.  Resistance to
      a security breach, and the effort required to remediate the whole
      system in the event of such a breach.

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      Once the KMP, Identifiers and Proofs mechanisms are converged
      upon, they must be clearly profiled for each Base RP, so that
      implementors and deployers alike understand the different pieces
      of the solution, and can have similar configurations and
      interoperability across multiple vendors' devices, so as to reduce
      management difficulty.  The profiles SHOULD also provide guidance
      on when to use which various combinations of options.  This will,
      again, simplify use and interoperability.

   Common Mechanisms - In as much as they exist, the framework will
   capture mechanisms that can be used commonly not only within a
   particular category of Base RP and Base RP to KMP, but also between
   Base RP categories.  Again, the goal here is simplifying the
   implementations and runtime code and resource requirements.  There is
   also a goal here of favoring well vetted, reviewed, operationally
   proven security mechanisms over newly brewed mechanisms that are less
   well tried in the wild.

2.4.  Work Items Per Routing Protocol

   Each Base RP will have a team (the [RP]-KMART team) working on
   incrementally improving their Base RP's security, These teams will
   have the following main work items:

   Characterize the RP
      Assess the Base RP to see what authentication mechanisms it has
      today.  Does it needs significant improvement to its existing
      mechanisms or not?  This will include determining if modern,
      strong security algorithms and parameters are present.

   Define Optimal State
      List the requirements for the Base RP's session key usage and
      format to contain to modern, strong security algorithms and
      mechanisms [RFC?????].  This includes things like cipher agility,
      keyID, overlapping keys, rolling keys, IV, etc.  The goal here is
      to determine what is needed for they Base RP alone to be used
      securely with at least manual keys.
   KMP Analysis
      Review requirements for KMPs [RFC????].  Identify any nuances for
      this particular protocol's needs and its use cases for KMP.  List
      the requirements that this RP has for being able to be use in
      conjunctions with a KMP.

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   Gap Analysis
      Enumerate the requirements for this protocol to move from its
      current security state, the first bullet, to its optimal state,
      bullet two above.
   Define the Roadmap
      Create a roadmap of the design work and release a document(s)
      Do the design and document work for a KMP to be able to generate
      the Base RP's session keys for the packets on the wire.  These
      will be the arguments passed in the API to the KMP in order to
      bootstrap the session keys to the Base RP.

   There will also be a team formed to work on the base framework
   mechanisms for each of the main categories, i.e. the blocks and API's
   represented in figure 1 (Figure 1).

2.5.  Protocols, Categories, and Priorities

   This section groups the Base RPs into like categories, according to
   attributes set forth in Categories Section (Section 2.1).  Each group
   will have a design team tasked with improving the security of the
   Base RP mechanisms and defining the KMP requirements for their group,
   then rolling both into a roadmap document upon which they will

      BGP, LDP and MSDP
      The Base RP's that fall into the category of the one-to-one
      peering messages, and will use peer keying protocols, AND are all
      transmitted over TCP include BGP RFC 4271 [RFC4271], LDP [RFC3036]
      and MSDP [RFC3618].  A team will work on one mechanism to cover
      these three protocols.  The exception is the mode where LDP is
      used directly on the LAN [RFC????].  The work for this may go into
      the Group keying category (w/ OSPF) mentioned below

      PCE over TCP
      [my notes were unclear about what to do with this]

      OSPF, ISIS, and RIP
      The Base RPs that fall into the category Group keying with one-to-
      many peering messages includes OSPF [RFC2328], ISIS [RFC1195] and
      RIP [RFC2453].  Not surprisingly, all these routing protocols have
      two other things in common.  First, they are run on a combination
      of the OSI datalink layer 2, and the OSI network layer 3.  Second,
      they are all internal gateway protocols, or IGPs.  The keying
      mechanisms and use will be much more complicated to define for

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      Because it is less of a routing protocol, per se, and more of a
      peer aliveness detection mechanism, Bidirectional Forwarding
      Detection (BFD) [RFC????] will have its own team.

      RSVP [RFC????], RSVP-TE [RFC????], and PCE
      These three protocols will be handled together. [what more
      characterisation should we give here?  Routing AD's, provide text

      PIM-SM and PIM-DM
      Finally, the multicast protocols of PIM-SM [RFC4601] and PIM-DM
      [RFC3973] will be handled together.  However, much work has been
      done in the MSEC working group on these, so it is highly likely
      that no additional work will need to be done for these.

   These protocols are deemed out-of-scope for this current iteration of
   the work roadmap.  Once all of the protocols listed above have had
   their work completed, or are clearly within site of completion, then
   the community will revisit the need and interest for working on

   o  MANET
   o  FORCES

   [need text from routing ADs on why these are out of scope]

   Resources from both the routing area and the security area will be
   applied to work on these problem spaces as quickly as possible.
   Realizing that such resources are far from unlimited, a rank order
   priority for addressing the work of incrementally securing these
   groups of routing protocols is provided:

   o  Priority 1 - BGP / LDP / MSDP
   o  Priority 2 - BFD
   o  Priority 3 - OSPF / ISIS / RIP
   o  Priority 4 - RSVP and RSVP-TE

   By far the most important group is the Priority 1 group as these are
   the protocols used on the most public and exposed segments of the
   networks, at the peering points between operators and between
   operators and their customers.  BFD, as a detection mechanism
   underlying the Priority 1 protocols is therefore second.

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3.  Change History

   [NOTE TO RFC EDITOR: this section for use during I-D stage only.
   Please remove before publishing as RFC.]

   -00-00 original rough rough rough draft for review by routing and
   security AD's

   -00- original submission

   o  adds new category = multicast protocols in category section and
      mentions mcast in group keying category description.
   o  add a lot of references where they did not exist before, or where
      there were only place holders.  Still more work needed on this.
   o  abstract filled in
   o  changed from standards track to informational (this was an
      oversight in last draft).
   o  filled out threats section with detailed descriptions, and linked
      to RPsec threats RFC
   o  made ascii art for the basic KMP framework
   o  added section on internal versus external peering and the
      requirements decisions for them
   o  added security characterization section in sect 2, added sections
      discussing internal vs external protocols, shared vs unique keys,
      oob vs in-band keying
   o  incorporates all D Ward's feedback from his initial skim of the

4.  Needs Work in Next Draft (RFC Editor: Delete Before Publishing)

   [NOTE TO RFC EDITOR: this section for use during I-D stage only.
   Please remove before publishing as RFC.]

   List of stuff that still needs work
   o  expand the framework figure to include all the framework elements
   o  move standard terminology section next to other terminology
   o  clean up the three definitions of route message type categories
   o  a: ref each of the sections for internal hopping
   o  More clarity on the work items for those defining and specifying
      the framework elements and API's themselves.
   o  What category is PCEP over TCP?  It's own, or grouped with BGP?
   o  text justifying RSVP and RSVP-TE and what we thing solving that
      problem may look like
   o  more justification for why MANET and FORCES are out of scope.
      Need ref for those RFCs.

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   o  Get RFC references and insert
   o  security section?

5.  Security Considerations

   This entire document focuses on improving the security of routing
   protocols by improving or implementing cryptographic authentication
   for each routing protocol.  Security considerations are largely
   contained within the body text of the document.

   [we can pull pieces out of body and place here, if people think it
   more appropriate].

6.  IANA Considerations

   This document has no actions for IANA.

7.  Acknowledgements

   The outline for this draft was created from discussions and
   agreements with Routing AD's Ross Callon and Dave Ward, Security AD's
   Tim Polk and Pasi Eronen, and IAB members Danny McPherson and Gregory

8.  References

8.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC2828]  Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary", RFC 2828,
              May 2000.

   [RFC4301]  Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the
              Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, December 2005.

   [RFC4303]  Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)",
              RFC 4303, December 2005.

   [RFC4593]  Barbir, A., Murphy, S., and Y. Yang, "Generic Threats to
              Routing Protocols", RFC 4593, October 2006.

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   [RFC4948]  Andersson, L., Davies, E., and L. Zhang, "Report from the
              IAB workshop on Unwanted Traffic March 9-10, 2006",
              RFC 4948, August 2007.

8.2.  Informative References

              Touch, J., Mankin, A., and R. Bonica, "The TCP
              Authentication Option", draft-ietf-tcpm-tcp-auth-opt-02
              (work in progress), November 2008.

              Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
              IANA Considerations Section in RFCs",
              draft-narten-iana-considerations-rfc2434bis-09 (work in
              progress), March 2008.

   [RFC1195]  Callon, R., "Use of OSI IS-IS for routing in TCP/IP and
              dual environments", RFC 1195, December 1990.

   [RFC2328]  Moy, J., "OSPF Version 2", STD 54, RFC 2328, April 1998.

   [RFC2453]  Malkin, G., "RIP Version 2", STD 56, RFC 2453,
              November 1998.

   [RFC3036]  Andersson, L., Doolan, P., Feldman, N., Fredette, A., and
              B. Thomas, "LDP Specification", RFC 3036, January 2001.

   [RFC3552]  Rescorla, E. and B. Korver, "Guidelines for Writing RFC
              Text on Security Considerations", BCP 72, RFC 3552,
              July 2003.

   [RFC3618]  Fenner, B. and D. Meyer, "Multicast Source Discovery
              Protocol (MSDP)", RFC 3618, October 2003.

   [RFC3973]  Adams, A., Nicholas, J., and W. Siadak, "Protocol
              Independent Multicast - Dense Mode (PIM-DM): Protocol
              Specification (Revised)", RFC 3973, January 2005.

   [RFC4271]  Rekhter, Y., Li, T., and S. Hares, "A Border Gateway
              Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, January 2006.

   [RFC4601]  Fenner, B., Handley, M., Holbrook, H., and I. Kouvelas,
              "Protocol Independent Multicast - Sparse Mode (PIM-SM):
              Protocol Specification (Revised)", RFC 4601, August 2006.

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Authors' Addresses

   Gregory Lebovitz
   Juniper Networks, Inc.
   1194 North Mathilda Ave.
   Sunnyvale, CA  94089-1206

   Email: gregory.ietf@gmail.com


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