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KARP                                                         G. Lebovitz
Internet-Draft                                                   Juniper
Intended status: Informational                         November 05, 2009
Expires: May 9, 2010


Roadmap for Cryptographic Authentication of Routing Protocol Packets on
                                the Wire
                    draft-lebovitz-kmart-roadmap-03

Abstract

   In the March of 2006 the IAB held a workshop on the topic of
   "Unwanted Internet Traffic".  The report from that workshop is
   documented in RFC 4948 [RFC4948].  Section 8.2 of RFC 4948 calls for
   "[t]ightening the security of the core routing infrastructure."  Four
   main steps were identified for improving the security of the routing
   infrastructure.  One of those steps was "securing the routing
   protocols' packets on the wire."  One mechanism for securing routing
   protocol packets on the wire is the use of per-packet cryptographic
   message authentication, providing both peer authentication and
   message integrity.  Many different routing protocols exist and they
   employ a range of different transport subsystems.  Therefore there
   must necessarily be various methods defined for applying
   cryptographic authentication to these varying protocols.  Many
   routing protocols already have some method for accomplishing
   cryptographic message authentication.  However, in many cases the
   existing methods are dated, vulnerable to attack, and/or employ
   cryptographic algorithms that have been deprecated.  This document
   creates a roadmap of protocol specification work for the use of
   modern cryptogrpahic mechanisms and algorithms for message
   authentication in routing protocols.  It also defines the framework
   for a key management protocol that may be used to create and manage
   session keys for message authentication and integrity.  This roadmap
   reflects the input of both the security area and routing area in
   order to form a jointly agreed upon and prioritized work list for the
   effort.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups.  Note that
   other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
   Drafts.




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   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on May 9, 2010.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2009 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the BSD License.
























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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     1.1.  Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     1.2.  Requirements Language  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     1.3.  Scope  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     1.4.  Goals  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     1.5.  Non-Goals  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     1.6.  Audience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
   2.  Threats  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
     2.1.  Threats In Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
     2.2.  Threats Out of Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
   3.  Categorizing Routing Protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
     3.1.  Category: Messaging Transaction Type . . . . . . . . . . . 16
     3.2.  Category: Peer vs. Group Keying  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
     3.3.  Category:  Update vs. Discovery Protocol . . . . . . . . . 18
     3.4.  Security Characterization Vectors  . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
       3.4.1.  Internal vs. External Operation  . . . . . . . . . . . 18
       3.4.2.  Unique versus Shared Keys  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
       3.4.3.  Out-of-Band vs. In-line Key Management . . . . . . . . 20
   4.  The Roadmap  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
     4.1.  Work Phases on any Particular Protocol . . . . . . . . . . 22
     4.2.  Requirements for Phase 1 Routing Protocols' Security
           Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
     4.3.  Common Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
     4.4.  Work Items Per Routing Protocol  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
     4.5.  Protocols in Categories  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
     4.6.  Priorites  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
   5.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
   6.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
   7.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
   8.  Change History (RFC Editor: Delete Before Publishing)  . . . . 37
   9.  Needs Work in Next Draft (RFC Editor: Delete Before
       Publishing)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
   10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
     10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
     10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42













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1.  Introduction

   In March 2006 the Internet Architecture Board (IAB) held a workshop
   on the topic of "Unwanted Internet Traffic".  The report from that
   workshop is documented in RFC 4948 [RFC4948].  Section 8.1 of that
   document states that "A simple risk analysis would suggest that an
   ideal attack target of minimal cost but maximal disruption is the
   core routing infrastructure."  Section 8.2 calls for "[t]ightening
   the security of the core routing infrastructure."  Four main steps
   were identified for that tightening:

   o  More secure mechanisms and practices for operating routers.  This
      work is being addressed in the OPSEC Working Group.
   o  Cleaning up the Internet Routing Registry repository [IRR], and
      securing both the database and the access, so that it can be used
      for routing verifications.  This work should be addressed through
      liaisons with those running the IRR's globally.
   o  Specifications for cryptographic validation of routing message
      content.  This work will likely be addressed in the SIDR Working
      Group.
   o  Securing the routing protocols' packets on the wire

   This document addresses the last bullet, securing the packets on the
   wire of the routing protocol exchanges.  The document addresses
   Keying and Authentication for Routing Protocols, aka "KARP".

   It is unlikely that this document, in its current form, will become
   an RFC.  More likely is that this document will be split up into
   several smaller documents which may look something like:

   o  Scope & Goals sections will likely become part of the KARP WG
      charter
   o  Threat document
   o  Requirements document (may be combined with Threat document)
   o  Framework document
   o  RoutingProtocol Design Team Work Plan document.  This would
      include sections like Work Phases, Priorities, Security
      Considerations, etc.
   For now, the document serves as the catch all for the set of thoughts
   around the KARP effort.  As a working group is formed, decisions will
   be made about the creation of specific documents.

   Editor's Note on "KMART" vs "KARP": The first few versions of this
   document were called "draft-lebovitz-kmart-roadmap-xx".  Upon the
   creation of the BoF for IETF76, the IESG requested the name of the
   effort change so as to avoid any potential trademark issues.  The new
   name of the effort is KARP.  Version -03 will go out titled
   "draft-lebovitz-kmart-roadmap-03", so as to avoid confusion.  As soon



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   as the I-D editor queue opens again (Monday, 09 Nov) the document
   will be submitted with s/kmart/karp/ in the title.

1.1.  Terminology

   Within the scope of this document, the following words, when
   beginning with a capital letter, or spelled in all capitals, hold the
   meanings described to the right of each term.  If the same word is
   used uncapitalized, then it is intended to have its common english
   definition.

   PSK            Pre-Shared Key. A key used by both peers in a secure
                  configuration.  Usually exchanged out-of-band prior to
                  a first connection.

   Routing Protocol  When used with capital "R" and "P" in this document
                  the term refers the Routing Protocol for which work is
                  being done to provide or enhance its peer
                  authentication mechanisms.

   PRF            Pseudorandom number function, or sometimes called
                  pseudorandom number generator (PRNG).  An algorithm
                  for generating a sequence of numbers that approximates
                  the properties of random numbers.  The sequence is not
                  truly random, in that it is completely determined by a
                  relatively small set of initial values that are passed
                  into the function.  An exmaple is SHA-256.

   KDF            Key derivation function.  A particular specified use
                  of a PRF that takes a PSK, combines it with other
                  inputs to the PRF, and produces a result that is
                  suitable for use as a Traffic Key.

   Identifier     The type and value used by one peer of an
                  authenticated message exchange to signify to the other
                  peer who they are.  The Identifier is used by the
                  receiver as a lookup index into a table containing
                  further information about the peer that is required to
                  continue processing the message, for example a
                  Security Association (SA) or keys.

   Identity Proof A cryptographic proof for an asserted identity, that
                  the peer really is who they assert themselves to be.
                  Proof of identity can be arranged between the peers in
                  a few ways, for example PSK, raw assymetric keys, or a
                  more user-friendly representation of assymetric keys,
                  like a certificate.




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   Security Association or SA  The parameters and keys that together
                  form the required information for processing secure
                  sessions between peers.  Examples of items that may
                  exist in an SA include: Identifier, PSK, Traffic Key,
                  cryptographic algorithms, key lifetimes.

   KMP            Key Management Protocol.  A protocol used between
                  peers to exchange SA parameters and Traffic Keys.
                  Examples of KMPs include IKE, TLS, and SSH.

   KMP Function   Any actual KMP used in the general KARP solution
                  framework

   Peer Key       Keys that are used between peers as the identity
                  proof.  These keys may or may not be connection
                  specific, depending on who they were established, and
                  what form of identity and identity proof is being used
                  in the system.

   Traffic Key    The actual key used on each packet of a message.

   Definitions of items specific to the general KARP framework are
   described in more detail in the Framework section Section 4.3.

1.2.  Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC2119 [RFC2119].

   When used in lower case, these words convey their typical use in
   common language, and are not to be interpreted as described in
   RFC2119 [RFC2119].

1.3.  Scope

   Four basic tactics may be employed in order to secure any piece of
   data as it is transmitted over the wire: privacy (or encryption),
   authentication, message integrity, and non-repudiation.  The focus
   for this effort, and the scope for this roadmap document, will be
   message authentication and packet integrity only.  This work
   explicitly excludes, at this point in time, the other two tactics:
   privacy and non-repudiation.  Since the objective of most routing
   protocols is to broadly advertise the routing topology, routing
   messages are commonly sent in the clear; confidentiality is not
   normally required for routing protocols.  However, ensuring that
   routing peers truly are the trusted peers expected, and that no roque



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   peers or messages can compromise the stability of the routing
   environment is critical, and thus our focus.  The other two
   explicitly excluded tactics, privacy and non-repudiation, may be
   addressed in future work.

   It is possible for routing protocol packets to be transmitted
   employing all four security tactics mentioned above using existing
   standards.  For example, one could run unicast, layer 3 or above
   routing protocol packets through IPsec ESP [RFC4303].  This would
   provide the added benefit of privacy, and non-repudiation.  However,
   router platforms and systems have been fine tuned over the years for
   the specific processing necessary for routing protocols' non-
   encapsulated formats.  Operators are, therefore, quite reluctant to
   explore new packet encapsulations for these tried and true protocols.

   In addition, at least in the case of BGP and LDP, these protocols
   already have existing mechanisms for cryptographically authenticating
   and integrity checking the packets on the wire.  Products with these
   mechanisms have already been produced, code has already been written
   and both have been optimized for the existing mechanisms.  Rather
   than turn away from these mechanisms, we want to enhance them,
   updating them to modern and secure levels.

   There are two main work phases for this roadmap, and for any Routing
   Protocol work undertaken as part of this roadmap (discussed further
   in the Work Phases (Section 4.1) section).  The first is to enhance
   the Routing Protocol's current authentication mechanism, ensuring it
   employs modern cryptographic algorithms and methods for its basic
   operational model, fulfilling the requirements defined in the
   Requirements (Section 4.2) section, and protecting against as many of
   the threats as possible as defined in the Threats (Section 2.1)
   section.  Many of the Routing Protocols' current mechanisms use
   manual keys, so the first phase updates will focus on shoring up the
   manual key mechanisms that exist.

   The second work phase is to define the use of a key management
   protocol (KMP) for creating and managing session keys used in the
   Routing Protocols' message authentication and data integrity
   functions.  It is intended that a general KMP framework -- or a small
   number of frameworks -- can be defined and leveraged for many Routing
   Protocols.

   Therefore, the scope of this roadmap of work includes:








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   o  Making use of existing routing protocol security protocols, where
      they exist, and enhancing or updating them as necessary for modern
      cryptographic best practices,

   o  Developing a framework for using automatic key management in order
      to ease deployment, lower cost of operation, and allow for rapid
      responses to security breaches, and

   o  Specifying the automated key management protocol that may be
      combined with the bits-on-the-wire mechanisms.

   The work also serves as an agreement between the Routing Area and the
   Security Area about the priorities and work plan for incrementally
   delivering the above work.  This point is important.  There will be
   times when the best-security-possible will give way to vastly-
   improved-over-current-security-but-admittedly-not-yet-best-security-
   possible, in order that incremental progress toward a more secure
   Internet may be achieved.  As such, this document will call out
   places where agreement has been reached on such trade offs.

   This document does not contain protocol specifications.  Instead, it
   defines the areas where protocol specification work is needed and
   sets a direction, a set of requirements, and a relative priority for
   addressing that specification work.

   There are a set of threats to routing protocols that are considered
   in-scope for this document/roadmap, and a set considered out-of-
   scope.  These are described in detail in the Threats (Section 2)
   section below.

1.4.  Goals

   The goals and general guidance for this work roadmap follow:

   1. Provide authentication and integrity protection for packets on the
      wire of existing routing protocols

   2. Deliver a path to incrementally improve security of the routing
      infrastructure.  The principle of crawl, walk, run will be in
      place.  Routing protocol authentication mechanisms may not go
      immediately from their current state to a state containing the
      best possible, most modern security practices.  Incremental steps
      will need to be taken for a few very practical reasons.  First,
      there are a considerable number of deployed routing devices in
      operating networks that will not be able to run the most modern
      cryptographic mechanisms without significant and unacceptable
      performance penalties.  The roadmap for any one routing protocol
      MUST allow for incremental improvements on existing operational



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      devices.  Second, current routing protocol performance on deployed
      devices has been achieved over the last 20 years through extensive
      tuning of software and hardware elements, and is a constant focus
      for improvement by vendors and operators alike.  The introduction
      of new security mechanisms affects this performance balance.  The
      performance impact of any incremental step of security improvement
      will need to be weighed by the community, and introduced in such a
      way that allows the vendor and operator community a path to
      adoption that upholds reasonable performance metrics.  Therefore,
      certain specification elements may be introduced carrying the
      "SHOULD" guidance, with the intention that the same mechanism will
      carry a "MUST" in the next release of the specification.  This
      gives the vendors and implementors the guidance they need to tune
      their software and hardware appropriately over time.  Last, some
      security mechanisms require the build out of other operational
      support systems, and this will take time.  An example where these
      three reasons are at play in an incremental improvement roadmap is
      seen in the improvement of BGP's [RFC4271] security via the update
      of the TCP Authentication Option (TCP-AO)
      [I-D.ietf-tcpm-tcp-auth-opt] effort.  It would be ideal, and
      reflect best common security practice, to have a fully specified
      key management protocol for negotiating TCP-AO's authentication
      material, using certificates for peer authentication in the
      keying.  However, in the spirit of incremental deployment, we will
      first address issues like cryptographic algorithm agility, replay
      attacks, TCP session resetting in the base TCP-AO protocol before
      we layer key management on top of it.

   3. The deploy-ability of the improved security solutions on currently
      running routing infrastructure equipment.  This begs the
      consideration of the current state of processing power available
      on routers in the network today.

   4. Operational deploy-ability - A solutions acceptability will also
      be measured by how deployable the solution is by common operator
      teams using common deployment processes and infrastructures.  I.e.
      We will try to make these solutions fit as well as possible into
      current operational practices or router deployment.  This will be
      heavily influenced by operator input, to ensure that what we
      specify can -- and, more importantly, will -- be deployed once
      specified and implemented by vendors.  Deployment of incrementally
      more secure routing infrastructure in the Internet is the final
      measure of success.  Measurably, we would like to see an increase
      in the number of surveyed respondents who report deploying the
      updated authentication mechanisms anywhere across their network,
      as well as a sharp rise in usage for the total percentage of their
      network's routers.




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      Interviews with operators show several points about routing
      security.  First, over 70% of operators have deployed transport
      connection protection via TCP-MD5 on their EBGP [ISR2008] .  Over
      55% also deploy MD5 on their IBGP connections, and 50% deploy MD5
      on some other IGP.  The survey states that "a considerable
      increase was observed over previous editions of the survey for use
      of TCP MD5 with external peers (eBGP), internal peers (iBGP) and
      MD5 extensions for IGPs."  Though the data is not captured in the
      report, the authors believe anecdotally that of those who have
      deployed MD5 somewhere in their network, only about 25-30% of the
      routers in their network are deployed with the authentication
      enabled.  None report using IPsec to protect the routing protocol,
      and this was a decline from the few that reported doing so in the
      previous year's report.
      From my personal conversations with operators, of those using MD5,
      almost all report deploying with one single manual key throughout
      the entire network.  These same operators report that the one
      single key has not been changed since it was originally installed,
      sometimes five or more years ago.  When asked why, particularly
      for the case of BGP using TCP MD5, the following reasons are often
      given:


      A.  Changing the keys triggers a TCP reset, and thus bounces the
          links/adjacencies, undermining Service Level Agreements
          (SLAs).
      B.  For external peers, difficulty of coordination with the other
          organization is an issue.  Once they find the correct contact
          at the other organization (not always so easy), the
          coordination function is serialized and on a per peer/AS
          basis.  The coordination is very cumbersome and tedious to
          execute in practice.
      C.  Keys must be changed at precisely the same time, or at least
          within 60 seconds (as supported by two major vendors) in order
          to limit connectivity outage duration.  This is incredibly
          difficult to do, operationally, especially between different
          organizations.
      D.  Relatively low priority compared to other operatoinal issues.
      E.  Lack of staff to implement the changes device by device.
      F.  There are three use cases for operational peering at play
          here: peers and interconnection with other operators, Internal
          BGP and other routing sessions within a single operator, and
          operator-to-customer-CPE devices.  All three have very
          different properties, and all are reported as cumbersome.  One
          operator reported that the same key is used for all customer
          premise equipment.  The same operator reported that if the
          customer mandated, a unique key could be created, although the



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          last time this occurred it created such an operational
          headache that the administrators now usually tell customers
          that the option doesn't even exist, to avoid the difficulties.
          These customer-uniqe keys are never changed, unless the
          customer demands so.
      The main threat at play here is that a terminated employee from
      such an operator who had access to the one (or few) keys used for
      authentication in these environments could easily wage an attack
      -- or offer the keys to others who would wage the attack -- and
      bring down many of the adjacencies, causing destabilization to the
      routing system.

      Whatever mechanisms we specify need to be easier than the current
      methods to deploy, and should provide obvious operational
      efficiency gains along with significantly better security and
      threat protection.  This combination of value may be enough to
      drive much broader adoption.

   5. Address the threats enumerated above in the "Threats" section
      (Section 2) for each routing protocol, along a roadmap.  Not all
      threats may be able to be addressed in the first specification
      update for any one protocol.  Roadmaps will be defined so that
      both the security area and the routing area agree on how the
      threats will be addressed completely over time.

   6. Create a re-usable architecture, framework, and guidelines for
      various IETF working teams who will address these security
      improvements for various Routing Protocols.  The crux of the KARP
      work is to re-use that framework as much as possible across
      relevant Routing Protocols.  For example, designers should aim to
      re-use the key management protocol that will be defined for BGP's
      TCP-AO key establishment for as many other routing protocols as
      possible.  This is but one example.

   7. Bridge any gaps between IETF's Routing and Security Areas by
      recording agreements on work items, roadmaps, and guidance from
      the Area leads and Internet Architecture Board (IAB, www.iab.org).


1.5.  Non-Goals

   The following two goals are considered out-of-scope for this effort:

   o  Privacy of the packets on the wire, at this point in time.  Once
      this roadmap is realized, we may revisit work on privacy.






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   o  Message content security.  This work is being addressed in other
      IETF efforts, like SIDR.

1.6.  Audience

   The audience for this roadmap includes:

   o  Routing Area working group chairs and participants -   These
        people are charged with updates to the Routing Protocol
        specifications.  Any and all cryptographic authentication work
        on these specifications will occur in Routing Area working
        groups, with close partnership with the Security Area.  Co-
        advisors from Security Area may often be named for these
        partnership efforts.

   o  Security Area reviewers of routing area documents -   These people
        are delegated by the Security Area Directors to perform reviews
        on routing protocol specifications as they pass through working
        group last call or IESG review.  They will pay particular
        attention to the use of cryptographic authentication and
        corresponding security mechanisms for the routing protocols.
        They will ensure that incremental security improvements are
        being made, in line with this roadmap.

   o  Security Area engineers -   These people partner with routing area
        authors/designers on the security mechanisms in routing protocol
        specifications.  Some of these security area engineers will be
        assigned by the Security Area Directors, while others will be
        interested parties in the relevant working groups.

   o  Operators -   The operators are a key audience for this work, as
        the work is considered to have succeeded if the operators deploy
        the technology, presumably due to a perception of significantly
        improved security value coupled with relative similarity to
        deployment complexity and cost.  Conversely, the work will be
        considered a failure if the operators do not care to deploy it,
        either due to lack of value or perceived (or real) over-
        complexity of operations.  And as such, the GROW and OPSEC WGs
        should be kept squarely in the loop as well.




2.  Threats

   In RFC4949[RFC4949], a threat is defined as a potential for violation
   of security, which exists when there is a circumstance, capability,



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   action, or event that could breach security and cause harm.  This
   section defines the threats that are in scope for this roadmap, and
   those that are explicitly out of scope.  This document leverages the
   "Generic Threats to Routing Protocols" model, RFC 4593 [RFC4593] ,
   capitalizes terms from that document, and offers a terse definition
   of those terms.  (More thorough description of routing protocol
   threats sources, motivations, consequences and actions can be found
   in RFC 4593 [RFC4593] itself).  The threat listings below expand upon
   these threat definitions.

2.1.  Threats In Scope

   The threats that will be addressed in this roadmap are those from
   OUTSIDERS, attackers that may reside anywhere in the Internet, have
   the ability to send IP traffic to the router, may be able to observe
   the router's replies, and may even control the path for a legitimate
   peer's traffic.  These are not legitimate participants in the routing
   protocol.  Message authentication and integrity protection
   specifically aims to identify messages originating from OUTSIDERS.

   The concept of OUTSIDERS can be further refined to include attackers
   who are terminated employees, and those sitting on-path.

   o  On-Path - attackers with control of a network resource or a tap
      along the path of packets between two routers.  An on-path
      outsider can attempt a man-in-the-middle attack, in addition to
      several other attack classes.  A man-in-the-middle (MitM) attack
      occurs when an attacker who has access to packets flowing between
      two peers tampers with those packets in such a way that both peers
      think they are talking to each other directly, when in fact they
      are actually talking to the attacker only.  Protocols conforming
      to this roadmap will use cryptographic mechanisms to prevent a
      man-in-the-middle attacker from situating himself undetected.

   o  Terminated Employees - in this context, those who had access
      router configuration that included keys or keying material like
      pre-shared keys used in securing the routing protocol.  Using this
      material, the attacker could send properly MAC'd spoofed packets
      appearing to come from router A to router B, and thus impersonate
      an authorized peer.  The attacker could then send false traffic
      that changes the network behavior from its operator's design.  The
      goal of addressing this source specifically is to call out the
      case where new keys or keying material becomes necessary very
      quickly, with little operational expense, upon the termination of
      such an employee.  This grouping could also refer to any attacker
      who somehow managed to gain access to keying material, and said
      access had been detected by the operators such that the operators
      have an opportunity to move to new keys in order to prevent an



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      attack.

   These ATTACK ACTIONS are in scope for this roadmap:

   o  SPOOFING - when an unauthorized device assumes the identity of an
      authorized one.  Spoofing can be used, for example, to inject
      malicious routing information that causes the disruption of
      network services.  Spoofing can also be used to cause a neighbor
      relationship to form that subsequently denies the formation of the
      relationship with the legitimate router.

   o  FALSIFICATION - an action whereby an attacker sends false routing
      information.  To falsify the routing information, an attacker has
      to be either the originator or a forwarder of the routing
      information.  Falsification may occur by an ORIGINATOR, or a
      FORWARDER, and may involve OVERCLAIMING, MISCLAIMING, or
      MISTATEMENT of network resource reachability.  We must be careful
      to remember that in this work we are only targeting falsification
      from outsiders as may occur from tampering with packets in flight.
      Falsification from BYZANTINES (see the Threats Out of Scope
      section (Section 2.2) below) are not addressed by the KARP effort.

   o  INTERFERENCE - when an attacker inhibits the exchanges by
      legitimate routers.  The types of interference addressed by this
      work include:
      *  ADDING NOISE
      *  REPLAYING OUT-DATED PACKETS
      *  INSERTING MESSAGES
      *  CORRUPTING MESSAGES
      *  BREAKING SYNCHRONIZATION
      *  Changing message content

   o  DoS attacks on transport sub-systems - This includes any other DoS
      attacks specifically based on the above attack types.  This is
      when an attacker sends spoofed packets aimed at halting or
      preventing the underlying protocol over which the routing protocol
      runs, for example halting a BGP session by sending a TCP FIN or
      RST packet.  Since this attack depends on spoofing, operators are
      encouraged to deploy

   o  DoS attacks using the authentication mechanism - This includes an
      attacker sending packets which confuse or overwhelm a security
      mechanism itself.  An example is initiating an overwhelming load
      of spoofed authenticated route messages so that the receiver needs
      to process the MAC check, only to discard the packet, sending CPU
      levels rising.  Another example is when an attacker sends an
      overwhelming load of keying protocol initiations from bogus
      sources.  All other possible DoS attacks are out of scope (see



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      next section).

   o  Brute Foce Attacks Against Password/Keys - This includes either
      online or offline attacks where attempts are made repeatedly using
      different keys/passwords until a match is found.  While it is
      impossible to make brute force attacks on keys completely
      unsuccessful, proper design can make such attacks much harder to
      succeed.  For exmaple, the key length should be sufficiently long
      so that covering the entire space of possible keys is improbable
      using computational power expected to be available 10 years out or
      more.  Also, frequently changing the keys may render useless a
      successful guess some time in the future, as those keys may no
      longer be in use.

2.2.  Threats Out of Scope

   Threats from BYZANTINE sources -- faulty, misconfigured, or subverted
   routers, i.e., legitimate participants in the routing protocol -- are
   out of scope for this roadmap.  Any of the attacks described in the
   above section (Section 2.1) that may be levied by a BYZANTINE source
   are therefore also out of scope.

   In addition, these other attack actions are out of scope for this
   work:

   o  SNIFFING - passive observation of route message contents in flight
   o  FALSIFICATION by BYZANTINE sources - unauthorized message content
      by a legitimate authorized source.
   o  INTERFERENCE due to:
      *  NOT FORWARDING PACKETS - cannot be prevented with cryptographic
         authentication
      *  DELAYING MESSAGES - cannot be prevented with cryptographic
         authentication
      *  DENIAL OF RECEIPT - cannot be prevented with cryptographic
         authentication
      *  UNAUTHORIZED MESSAGE CONTENT - the work of the IETF's SIDR
         working group
         (http://www.ietf.org/html.charters/sidr-charter.html).
      *  Any other type of DoS attack.  For example, a flood of traffic
         that fills the link ahead of the router, so that the router is
         rendered unusable and unreachable by valid packets is NOT an
         attack that this work will address.  Many other such examples
         could be contrived.








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3.  Categorizing Routing Protocols

   For the purpose of this security roadmap definition, we will
   categorize the routing protocols into groups and have design teams
   focus on the specification work within those groupings.  It is
   believed that the groupings will have like requirements for their
   authentication mechanisms, and that reuse of authentication
   mechanisms will be greatest within these grouping.  The work items
   placed on the roadmap will be defined and assigned based on these
   categorizations.  It is also hoped that, down the road in the Phase 2
   work, we can create one KMP per category (if not for several
   categories) so that the work can be easily leveraged by the various
   Routing Protocol teams.  KMPs are useful for allowing simple,
   automated updates of the traffic keys used in a base protocol.  KMPs
   replace the need for humans, or OSS routines, to periodically replace
   keys on running systems.  It also removes the need for a chain of
   manual keys to be chosen or configured.  When configured properly, a
   KMP will enforce the key freshness policy of two peers by keeping
   track of the key lifetime and negotiating a new key at the defined
   interval.

3.1.  Category: Messaging Transaction Type

   The first categorization defines four types of messaging transactions
   used on the wire by the base Routing Protocol.  They are:


   One-to-One     One peer router directly and intentionally delivers a
                  route update specifically to one other peer router.
                  Examples are BGP and LDP.  Point-to-point modes of
                  both IS-IS and OSPF, when sent over both traditional
                  point-to-point links and when using multi-access
                  layers, may both also fall into this category.
                  [question to reviewers: Should we list all protocols
                  into these categories right here, or just give a few
                  examples?]

   One-to-Many    A router peers with multiple other routers on a single
                  network segment -- i.e. on link local -- such that it
                  creates and sends one route update message which is
                  intended for consumption by multiple peers.  Examples
                  would be OSPF and IS-IS in their broadcast, non-point-
                  to-point modes.








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   Client-Server  A client-server routing protocol is one where one
                  router initiates a request for route information from
                  another router, who then formulates a response to that
                  request, and replies with the requested data.
                  Examples are a BGP Route Reflector and [????  Are
                  there other examples?  Is this the right example?  Do
                  discovery protocols fall under this category?].

   Multicast      Multicast protocols have unique security properties
                  because of the fact that they are inherently group-
                  based protocols and thus have group keying
                  requirements at the routing level where link-local
                  routing messages are multicasted.  Also, at least in
                  the case of PIM-SM, some messages are are sent unicast
                  to a given peer(s), as is the case with router-close-
                  to-sender and the "Rendezvous Point".  Some work for
                  application layer message security has been done in
                  the Multicast Security working group (MSEC,
                  http://www.ietf.org/html.charters/msec-charter.html)
                  and may be helpful to review, but is not directly
                  applicable.

   [author's note: I think the above definitions need clean up.  Routing
   area folks, especially ADs, PLEASE suggest new text.]

3.2.  Category: Peer vs. Group Keying

   The second axis of categorization groups protocols by the keying
   mechanism that will be necessary for distributing session keys to the
   actual Routing Protocol transports.  They are:


   Peer keying    One router sends the keying messages directly and only
                  to one other router, such that a one-to-one, unique
                  keying security association (SA) is established
                  between the two routers

   Group Keying   One router creates and distributes a single keying
                  message to multiple peers.  In this case an group SA
                  will be established and used between multiple peers
                  simultaneously.  Group keying exists for protocols
                  like OSPF [RFC2328] , and also for multicast protocols
                  like PIM-SM [RFC4601].








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3.3.  Category:  Update vs. Discovery Protocol

   The third category group considers protocols by the contents of the
   messages being exchanged in the Routing Protocol.  They are:


   Updates        Messages that carry route advertisements or update
                  information from peer to peer

   Discovery      Messages sent as part of a policy, peer, or service
                  discovery process.  These messages are normally
                  exchanged prior to any adjacency being formed, and
                  before any updates are sent.  For example, end-point
                  discovery mechanisms are common in L2VPN and L3VPN
                  solutions.

   [QUESTION TO REVIEWERS: is this really just what's described in 3.1
   as "Client-Server" and/or "One-to-One"?  Is there really such a
   different in discovery protocols that they need their own category to
   figure out how to authenticate them?  Can someone provide a few
   examples?

3.4.  Security Characterization Vectors

   A few more considerations must be made about the protocol and its use
   when initially categorizing the protocol and scoping the
   authentication work.

3.4.1.  Internal vs. External Operation

   The designers must consider whether the protocol is an internal
   routing protocol or an external one, i.e.  Does it primarily run
   between peers within a single domain of control or between two
   different domains of control?  Some protocols may be used in both
   cases, internally and externally, and as such various modes of
   authentication operation may be required for the same protocol.
   While it is preferred that all routing exchanges run with the utmost
   security mechanisms enabled in all deployments, this exhortation is
   greater for those protocols running on inter-domain point-to-point
   links, and greatest for those on shared access link layers with
   several different domains interchanging together, because the volume
   of attackers are greater from the outside.  Note however that the
   consequences of internal attacks maybe no less severe -- in fact they
   may be quite a bit more severe -- than an external attack.  An
   example of this internal versus external consideration is BGP which
   has both EBGP and IBGP modes.  Another example is a multicast
   protocol where the neighbors are sometimes within a domain of control
   and sometimes at an inter-domain exchange point.  In the case of



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   PIM-SM running on an internal multi-access link, It would be
   acceptable to give up some security to get some convenience by using
   a group key between the peers on the link.  On the other hand, in the
   case of PIM-SM running over a multi-access link at a public exchange
   point, operators may favor security over convenience by using unique
   pair-wise keys for every peer.  Designers must consider both modes of
   operation and ensure the authentication mechanisms fit both.

   Operators are encouraged to run cryptographic authentication on all
   their adjacencies, but to work from the outside in, i.e.  The EBGP
   links are a higher priority than the IBGP links because they are
   externally facing, and, as a result, more likely to be targeted in an
   attack.

3.4.2.  Unique versus Shared Keys

   This section discusses security considerations regarding when it is
   appropriate to use the same authentication key inputs for multiple
   peers and when it is not.  This is largely a debate of convenience
   versus security.  It is often the case that the best secured
   mechanism is also the least convenient mechanism.  For example, an
   air gap between a host and the network absolutely prevents remote
   attacks on the host, but having to copy and carry files using the
   "sneaker net" is quite inconvenient and unscalable.

   Operators have erred on the side of convenience when it comes to
   securing routing protocols with cryptographic authentication.  Many
   do not use it at all.  Some use it only on external links, but not on
   internal links.  Those that do use it often use the same key for all
   peers across their entire network.  It is common to see the same key
   in use for years, and that being the same key that was entered when
   authentication was originally configured, or the routing gear
   deployed.

   The goal for designers is to create authentication mechanisms that
   are easy for the operators to deploy and manage, and still use unique
   keys between peers (or small groups on multi-access links), and
   within between sessions.  Operators have the impression that they
   NEED one key shared across the network, when in fact they do not.
   What they need is the relative convenience they experience from
   deploying cryptographic authentication with one (or few) key,
   compared to the inconvenience they would experience if they deployed
   the same authentication mechanism using unique pair-wise keys.  An
   example is BGP Route Reflectors.  Here operators often use the same
   authentication key between each client and the route reflector.  The
   roadmaps defined from this guidance document will allow for unique
   keys to be used between each client and the peer, without sacrificing
   much convenience.  Designers should strive to deliver peer-wise



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   unique keying mechanisms with similar ease-of-deployment properties
   as today's one-key method.

   Operators must understand the consequences of using the same keys
   across many peers.  Unique keys are more secure than shared keys
   because they reduce both the attack target size and the attack
   consequence size.  In this context, the attack target size represents
   the number of unique routing exchanges across a network that an
   attacker may be able to observe in order to gain security association
   credentials, i.e. crack the keys.  If a shared key is used across the
   entire internal domain of control, then the attack target size is
   very large.  The larger the attack target, the easier it is for the
   attacker to gain access to analysis data, and greater the volume of
   analysis data he can access in a given time frame, both of which make
   his job easier.  Using the same key across the network makes the
   attack vulnerability surface more penetrable than unique keys.
   Consider also the attack consequence size, the amount of routing
   adjacencies that can be negatively affected once a breach has
   occurred, i.e. once the keys have been acquired by the attacker.
   Again, if a shared key is used across the internal domain, then the
   consequence size is the whole network.  Ideally, unique key pairs
   would be used for each adjacency.

   In some cases designers may need to use shared keys in order to solve
   the given problem space.  For example, a multicast packet is sent
   once but then observed and consumed by several routing neighbors.  If
   unique keys were used per neighbor, the benefit of multicast would be
   erased because the casting peer would have to create a different
   announcement packet/stream for each listening peer.  Though this may
   be desired and acceptable in some small amount of use cases, it is
   not the norm.  Shared group keys are an acceptable solution here, and
   much work has been done already in this area (see MSEC working
   group).

3.4.3.  Out-of-Band vs. In-line Key Management

   This section discusses the security and use case considerations for
   keys placed on devices through out-of-band configurations versus
   through one routing peer-to-peer key management protocol exchanges.
   Note, when we say here "Peer-to-Peer KMP" we do not mean in-band to
   the Routing Protocol.  Instead, we mean that the exchange occurs in-
   line, over IP, between the two routing peers directly.  In in-line
   KMP the peers themselves handle the key and security association
   negotiation between themselves directly, whereas in an out-of-band
   system the keys are placed onto the device through some other
   configuration or management method or interface.

   An example of an out-of-band mechanism could be an administrator who



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   makes a remote management connection (e.g. using SSH) to a router and
   manually enters the keying information -- like the algorithm, the
   key(s), the lifetimes, etc.  Another example could be an OSS system
   which inputs the same information via a script over an SSH
   connection, or by pushing configuration through some other management
   connection, standard (Netconf-based) or proprietary.

   The drawbacks of an out-of-band mechanism include: lack of scale-
   ability, complexity and speed of changing if a breach is suspected.
   For example, if an employee who had access to keys was was
   terminated, or if a machine holding those keys was belived
   compromised, then the system would be considered insecure and
   vulnerable until new keys were defined by a human.  Those keys then
   need to be placed into the OSS system, manually, and the OSS system
   then needs to push the change -- often during a very limited change
   window -- into the relevant devices.  If there are multiple
   organizations involved in these connections, this process is greatly
   complicated.

   The benefits of out-of-band mechanism is that once the new keys/
   parameters are set in OSS system they can be pushed automatically to
   all devices within the OSS's domain of control.  Operators have
   mechanisms in place for this already.  In small environments with few
   routers, a manual system is not difficult to employ.

   We further define an in-line key exchange as using cryptographicly
   protected identity verification, session key negotiation, and
   security association parameter negotiation between the two routing
   peers.  The KMP between the two peers may also include the
   negotiation of parameters, like algorithms, cryptographic inputs
   (e.g. initialization vectors), key life-times, etc.

   The benefits an in-line KMP are several.  An in-line KMP results in
   key(s) that are privately generated, and not recorded permanently
   anywhere.  Since the traffic keys used in a particular connection are
   not a fixed part of a device configuration no steal-able data exists
   anywhere else in the operator's systems which can be stolen, e.g. in
   the case of a terminated or turned employee.  If a server or other
   data store is stolen or compromised, the thieves gain no access to
   current traffic keys.  They may gain access to key derivation
   material, like a PSK, but not current traffic keys in use.  In this
   example, these PSKs can be updated into the device configurations
   (either manually or through an OSS) without bouncing or impacting the
   existing session at all.  In the case of using raw assymetric keys or
   certificates, instead of PSKs, the data theft would likely not even
   result in any compromise, as the key pairs would have been generated
   on the routers, and never leave those routers.  In such a case no
   changes are needed on the routers; the connections will continue to



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   be secure, uncompromised.  Additionally, with a KMP regular re-keys
   operations occur without any operator involvement or oversight.  This
   keeps keys fresh.

   The drawbacks to using a KMP are few.  First, a KMP requires more
   cryptographic processing for the router at the very beginning of a
   connection.  This will add some minor start-up time to connection
   establishment versus a purely manual key approach.  Once a connection
   with traffic keys have been established via a KMP, the performance is
   the same in the KMP and the out-of-band case.  KMPs also add another
   layer of protocol and configuration complexity which can fail or be
   misconfigured.  This was more of an issue when these KMPs were first
   deployed, but less so as these implementaitons and operational
   experience with them has matured.

   The desired end goal is in-line KMPs.


4.  The Roadmap

4.1.  Work Phases on any Particular Protocol

   The desired endstate for the KARP work contains several items.
   First, the people desiring to deploy securely authenticated and
   integrity validated packets between routing peers have the tools
   specified, implemented and shipping in order to deploy.  These tools
   should be fairly simple to implement, and not more complex than the
   security mechanisms to which the operators are already accustomed.
   (Examples of security mechanisms to which router operators are
   accustomed include: the use of assymetric keys for authentication in
   SSH for router configuration, the use of pre-shared keys (PSKs) in
   TCP MD5 for BGP protection, the use of self-signed certificates for
   HTTPS access to device Web-based user interfaces, the use of strongly
   constructed passwords and/or identity tokens for user identification
   when logging into routers and management systems.)  While the tools
   that we intend to specify may not be able to stop a deployment from
   using "foobar" as an input key for every device across their entire
   routing domain, we intend to make a solid, modern security system
   that is not too much more difficult than that.  In other words,
   simplicity and deployability are keys to success.  The Routing
   Protocols will specify modern cryptographic algorithms and security
   mechanisms.  Routing peers will be able to employ unique, pair-wise
   keys per peering instance, with reasonable key lifetimes, and
   updating those keys on a somewhat regular basis will be operationally
   easy, causing no service interruption.

   Achieving the above described end-state using manual keys may only be
   pragmatic in very small deployments.  In larger deployments, this end



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   state will be much more operationally difficult to reach with only
   manual keys.  Thus, there will be a need for key life cycle
   management, in the form of a key management protocol, or KMP.  We
   expect that the two forms, manual key usage and KMP usage, will co-
   exist in the real world.  For example, a provider's edge router at a
   public exchange peering point will want to use a KMP for ensuring
   unique and fresh keys with external peers, while a manual key may be
   used between a provider's access edge router and each of the same
   provider's customer premise routers with which it peers.

   In accordance with the desired end state just described, we define
   two main work phases for each Routing Protocol:

   1.  Enhance the Routing Protocol's current authentication mechanism.
       This work involves enhancing a Routing Protocol's current
       security mechanisms in order to achieve a consistent, modern
       level of security functionality within its existing keying
       framework.  It is understood and accepted that the existing
       keying frameworks are largely based on manual keys.  Since many
       operators have already built operational support systems (OSS)
       around these manual key implementations, there is some automation
       available for an operator to leverage in that way, if the
       underlying mechanisms are themselves secure.  In this phase, we
       explicitly exclude embedding or creating a KMP.  A list of the
       requirements for Phase 1 work are below in the section
       "Requirements for Phase 1 Routing Protocols' Security Updates
       (Section 4.2).

   2.  Develop an automated keying framework.  The second phase will
       focus on the development of an automated keying framework to
       faciliate unique pair-wise (or perhaps group-wise, where
       applicable) keys per peering instance.  This involves the use of
       a KMP.  A KMP is helpful because it negotiates unique, pair wise,
       random keys without administrator involvement.  It also
       negotiates several of the SA parameters required for the secure
       connection, including key life times.  It keeps track of those
       lifetimes using counters, and negotiates new keys and parameters
       before they expire, again, without administrator interaction.
       Additionally, in the event of a breach, changing the KMP key will
       immediately cause a rekey to occur for the Traffic Key, and those
       new Traffic Keys will be installed and used in the current
       connection.  In summary, a KMP provides a protected channel
       between the peers through which they can negotiate and pass
       important data required to exchange proof of key identifiers,
       derive Traffic Keys, determine re-keying, synchronize their
       keying state, signal various keying events, notify with error
       messages, etc.  To address brute force attacks [RFC3562]
       recommends a key management practice to minimize the possibility



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       of successful attack-- frequent key rotation, limited key
       sharing, key length restrictions, etc.  Advances in computational
       power due to Moore's law are making that management burden
       untenable-- keys must be of a size and composition that makes
       configuration and maintance difficult or keys must be rotated
       with an unreasonable frequency.  A KMP will help immensely with
       this growing problem.

       The framework for any one Routing Protocol will fall under, and
       be able to leverage, the generic framework described below in
       section Section 4.3.

4.2.  Requirements for Phase 1 Routing Protocols' Security Update

   Here is a proposed list of requirements that SHOULD be addressed by
   Phase 1 (according to "1." above) security updates to Routing
   Protocols [to be reviewed after -01 is released]:

   1.   Clear definitions of which elements of the transmission (frame,
        packet, segment, etc.) are protected by the authentication
        mechanism
   2.   Strong algorithms, and defined and accepted by the security
        community, MUST be specified.  The option should use algorithms
        considered accepted by the security community, which are
        considered appropriately safe.  The use of non-standard or
        unpublished algorithms SHOULD BE avoided.
   3.   Algorithm agility for the cryptograhpic algorithms used in the
        authentication MUST be specified, i.e. more than one algorithm
        MUST be specified and it MUST be clear how new algorithms MAY be
        specified and used within the protocol.  This requirement exists
        in case one algorithm gets broken suddenly.  Research to
        identify weakness in algorithms is constant.  Breaking a cipher
        isn't a matter of if, but when it will occur. t's highly
        unlikely that two different algorithms will be broken
        simultaneously.  So, if two are supported, and one gets broken,
        we can use the other until we get a new one in place.  Having
        the ability within the protocol specification to support such an
        event, having algorithm agility, is essential.  Mandating two
        algorithms provides both a redundancy, and a mechanism for
        enacting that redundancy when needed.
   4.   Secure use of simple PSKs, offering both operational convenience
        as well as building something of a fence around stupidity, MUST
        be specified.
   5.   Inter-connection replay protection.  Packets captured from one
        connection MUST NOT be able to be re-sent and accepted during a
        later connection.





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   6.   Intra-connection replay protection.  Packets captured during a
        connection MUST NOT be able to be re-sent and accepted during
        that same connection, to deal with long-lived connections.
   7.   A change of security parameters REQUIRES, and even forces, a
        change of session traffic keys
   8.   Intra-connection re-keying which occurs without a break or
        interruption to the current peering session, and, if possible,
        without data loss, MUST be specified.
   9.   Efficient re-keying SHOULD be provided.  The specificaion SHOULD
        support rekeying during a connection without the need to expend
        undue computational resources.  In particular, the specification
        SHOULD avoid the need to try/compute multiple keys on a given
        packet.
   10.  Prevent DoS attacks as those described as in-scope in the
        threats section Section 2.1 above.
   11.  Default mechanisms and algorithms specified and defined as
        REQUIRED for all implementations
   12.  Manual keying MUST be supported.
   13.  Convergence times of the Routing Protocols SHOULD NOT be
        materially affected.  Materially here is defined as anything
        greater than a 5% convergence time increase.  Note that
        convergence is different than boot time.  Also note that
        convergence time has a lot to do with the speed of processors
        used on individual routing peers, and this increases by Moore's
        law over time.  Therefore, this requirement should be considered
        only in terms of total number of messages that must be
        exchanged, and less for the computational intensity of
        processing any one message.
   14.  The changes or addition of security mechanisms SHOULD NOT cause
        a refresh of route updates or cause additional route updates to
        be generated
   15.  Architecture of the specification MUST consider and allow for
        future use of a KMP.

4.3.  Common Framework

   Each of the categories of routing protocols above will require unique
   designs for authenticating and integrity checking their protocols.
   However, a single underlying framework for delivering automatic
   keying to those solutions will be pursued.  Providing such a single
   framework will significantly reduce the complexity of each step of
   the overall roadmap.  For example, if each Routing Protocol needed to
   define it's own key management protocol this would balloon the total
   amount of different sockets that are needed to be opened and
   processes that are needed to be simultaneously running on an
   implementation.  It would also significantly increase the run-time
   complexity and memory requirements of such systems running multiple
   Routing Protocols, causing perhaps slower performance of such



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   systems.  However, if we can land on a very small set (perhaps one or
   two) of automatic key management protocols, KMPs, that the various
   Routing Protocols can use, then we can reduce this implementation and
   run-time complexity.  We can also decrease the total amount of time
   implementers need to deliver the KMPs for the Routing Protocols that
   will provide better threat protection.

   The components for the framework are listed here, and described
   below:

   o  Routing Protocol security mechanism
   o  KMP
   o  KeyStore
   o  Traffic Key
   o  RoutingProtocol-to-KMP API
   o  RoutingProtocol-to-KeyStore API
   o  KMP-to-KeyStore API
   o  Common Routing Protocol mechanisms
   o  Identifiers
   o  Proof of identity
   o  Profiles

   The framework is modularized for how keys and security association
   (SA) parameters generally get passed from a KMP to a transport
   protocol.  It contains three main blocks and APIs.


























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      +------------+   +--------------------+
      |            |   |                    | Check     +-----------+
      | Identifier +-->|                    +---------->|           |
      |            |   |    KMP Function    |           |  Identity |
      +----------- +   |                    |<----------+   Proof   |
                       |                    |  Approve  |           |
                       +-+--------------+---+           +-----------+
                         |              |
         KMP-to-KeyStore |              |
            API          |              |
                        \|/             |
                 +-------+-------+      |
                 |               |      | KMP-to-RoutingProtocol
                 |               |      |  API
                 |    KeyStore   |      |
                 |               |      |
                 +-------+-------+      |
                         |              |
                         |              |
           KeyStore-to-  |              |
    RoutingProtocol API  |              |
                         |             \|/
             +--------------------------+-------------+
             |           |                            |
             |          \|/          Common RtgProto  |
             |   +-------+-------+   Authentication   |
             |   |               |   Mechanisms       |
             +---|  Traffic      |-----+--------------+
             |   |   Key(s)      |                    |
             |   |               |                    |
             |   +---------------+   Specific         |
             |                       RoutingProtocol  |
             |                       Authentication   |
             |                       Security         |
             |                       Mechanism        |
             +----------------------------------------+


               Figure 1: Automatic Key Management Framework

   Each element of the framework is described here:


   o  Routing Protocol -  Routing protocol security mechanism - In each
           case, the Routing Protocol will contain a mechanism for using
           session keys in their security option.  When the Routing
           Protocol uses a transport substrate, e.g. the way BGP, LDP
           and MSDP use TCP, then this applies to the security mechanism



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           the includes that substrate.

   o  KeyStore -   Each implementation will also contain a protocol
           independent mechanism for storing keys, called KeyStore.  The
           KeyStore will have multiple different logical containers, one
           container for each session key that any given Routing
           Protocol will need.  Keys stored here may be a Peer Key or a
           Traffic Key. There may also be associated parameters as
           required by the SA for any given Routing Protocol.

   o  Peer Key  A key used between peers from which a traffic key is
           derived.  An example is a PSK.

   o  Traffic Key  The actual key used on each packet of a message.
           This key may be derived from the key existing in the
           KeyStore.  This will depend on whether the key in KeyStore
           was a manual PSK for the peers, or whether a connection-aware
           KMP created the key.  Further, it will be connection
           specific, so as to provide inter- and intra-connection replay
           protection.

   o  RoutingProtocol-KeyStore API -   There will be an API for Routing
           Protocol to retrieve (or receive; it could be a push or a
           pull) the keys from the KeyStore.  This will enable
           implementers to reuse the same API calls for all their
           Routing Protocols.  The API will necessarily include facility
           to retrieve other SA parameters required for the construction
           of the Routing Protocol's packets, like key IDs or key
           lifetimes, etc.

   o  KMP -   There will be an automated key management protocol, KMP.
           This KMP will run between the peers.  The KMP serves as a
           protected channel between the peers, through which they can
           negotiate and pass important data required to exchange proof
           of key identifiers, derive session keys, determine re-keying,
           synchronize their keying state, signal various keying events,
           notify with error messages, etc.  As an analogy, in the IPsec
           protocol (RFC4301 [RFC4301], RFC4303 [RFC4303] and RFC4306
           [RFC4306]) IKEv2 is the KMP that runs between the two peers,
           while AH and ESP are two different base protocols that take
           session keys from IKEv2 and use them in their transmissions.
           In the analogy, the Routing Protocol, say BGP and LDP, are
           analogous to ESP and AH, while the KMP is analogous to IKEv2
           itself.







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   o  RoutingProtocol-KMP API -   There will be an API for the Routing
           Protocol to request a session key of the KMP, and be notified
           when the keys are available for it.  The API will also
           contain a mechanism for the KMP to notify the Routing
           Protocol that there are new keys that it must now use, even
           if it didn't request those keys.  The API will also include a
           mechanism for the KMP to receive requests for session keys
           and other parameters from the routing protocol.  The KMP will
           also be aware of the various Routing Protocols and each of
           their unique parameters that need to be negotiated and
           returned.

   o  KMP-KeyStore API -   There will be an API for the KMP to place
           keys and parameters into the KeyStore after their negotiation
           and derivation with the other peer.  This will enable the
           implementers to reuse the same calls for multiple KMPs that
           may be needed to address the various categories of Routing
           Protocols as described in the section definingcategories
           (Section 3).


   [after writing this all up, I'm not sure we really need the key_store
   in the middle.  As long as we standardize fully all the calls needed
   from any Routing Protocol to any KMP, then there can be a generic
   hand-down function from the KMP to the Routing Protocol when the key
   and parameters are ready.  Let's sleep on it.]

   [will need state machines and function calls for these APIs, as one
   of the work items.  In essence, there is a need for a core team to
   develop the APIs out completely in order for the Routing Protocol
   teams to use them.  Need to get this team going asap.]


   o Identifiers -   A KMP is fed by identities.  The identities are
           text strings used by the peers to indicate to each other that
           each are known to the other, and authorized to establish
           connections.  Those identities must be represented in some
           standard string format, e.g. an IP address -- either v4 or
           v6, an FQDN, an RFC 822 email address, a Common Name [RFC
           PKI], etc.  Note that even though routers do not normally
           have email addresses, one could use an RFC 822 email address
           string as a formatted identifier for a router.  They would do
           so simply by putting the router's reference number or name-
           code as the "NAME" part of the address, left of the "@"
           symbol.  They would then place some locational context in the
           "DOMAIN" part of the string, right of the "@" symbol.  An
           example would be "rtr0210@sf.ca.us.company.com".  This



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           document does not suggest this string value at all.  Instead,
           the concept is used only to clarify that the type of string
           employed does not matter.  It also does not matter what
           specific text you chose to place in that string type.  It
           only matters that the type of string -- and it's format --
           must be agreed upon by the two endpoints.  Further, the
           string can be used as an identifier in this context, even if
           the string is not actually provisioned in it's source domain.
           For example, the email address "rtr0210@sf.ca.us.company.com"
           may not actually exist as an email address in that domain,
           but that string of characters may still be used as an
           identifier type(s) in the routing protocol security context.
           What is important is that the community decide on a small but
           flexible set of Identifiers they will all support, and that
           they decide on the exact format of those string.  The formats
           that will be used must be standardized and must be sensible
           for the routing infrastructure.

   o  Identity Proof -   Once the form of identity is decided, then
           there must be a cryptographic proof of that identity, that
           the peer really is who they assert themselves to be.  Proof
           of identity can be arranged between the peers in a few ways,
           for example pre-shared keys, raw assymetric keys, or a more
           user-friendly representation of assymetric keys, like a
           certificate.  Certificates can be used in a way requiring no
           additional supporting systems -- e.g. public keys for each
           peer can be maintained locally for verification upon contact.
           Certificate management can be made more simple and scalable
           with the use minor additional supporting systems, as is the
           case with self-signed certificates and a flat file list of
           "approved thumbprints".  Self-signed certificates will have
           somewhat lower security properties than Certificate Authority
           signed certificates [RFC Certs].  The use of these different
           identity proofs vary in ease of deployment, ease of ongoing
           management, startup effort, ongoing effort and management,
           security strength, and consequences from loss of secrets from
           one part of the system to the rest of the system.  For
           example, they differ in resistance to a security breach, and
           the effort required to remediate the whole system in the
           event of such a breach.  The point here is that there are
           options, many of which are quite simple to employ and deploy.

   o  Profiles -   Once the KMP, Identifiers and Proofs mechanisms are
           converged upon, they must be clearly profiled for each
           Routing Protocol, so that implementors and deployers alike
           understand the different pieces of the solution, and can have
           similar configurations and interoperability across multiple
           vendors' devices, so as to reduce management difficulty.  The



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           profiles SHOULD also provide guidance on when to use which
           various combinations of options.  This will, again, simplify
           use and interoperability.

   In addition to other business, administrative, and operational terms
   they must already exchange prior to forming first adjacencies, it is
   assumed that two parties deploying message authentication on their
   routing protocol will also need to decide upon acceptable security
   parameters for the connection.  This will include the form and
   content of the identity each use to represent the other.  It will
   also include the type of keys to be used, e.g.  PSK, raw assymetric
   keys, certificate.  And it will include the acceptable cryptographic
   algorithms, or algorithm suite.  This agreement is necessary in order
   for each to properly configure the connection on their respective
   devices.  The manner in which they agree upon and exchange this
   policy information is normally via phone call or written exchange,
   and is outside the scope of the KARP effort, but assumed to have
   occured.  We take as a given that each party knows the identity types
   and values, key types and values, and acceptable cryptographic
   algorithms for both their own device and the peer that form the
   security policy for configuration on their device.

   Common Mechanisms - In as much as they exist, the framework will
   capture mechanisms that can be used commonly not only within a
   particular category of Routing Protocol and Routing Protocol to KMP,
   but also between Routing Protocol categories.  Again, the goal here
   is simplifying the implementations and runtime code and resource
   requirements.  There is also a goal here of favoring well vetted,
   reviewed, operationally proven security mechanisms over newly brewed
   mechanisms that are less well tried in the wild.

4.4.  Work Items Per Routing Protocol

   Each Routing Protocol will have a team (the [Routing_Protocol]-KARP
   team) working on incrementally improving their Routing Protocol's
   security, These teams will have the following main work items:

   PHASE 1:

   Characterize the RP
      Assess the Routing Protocol to see what authentication mechanisms
      it has today.  Does it needs significant improvement to its
      existing mechanisms or not?  This will include determining if
      modern, strong security algorithms and parameters are present.







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   Define Optimal State
      List the requirements for the Routing Protocol's session key usage
      and format to contain to modern, strong security algorithms and
      mechanisms, per the Requirements (Section 4.2) section above.  The
      goal here is to determine what is needed for they Routing Protocol
      alone to be used securely with at least manual keys.

   Gap Analysis
      Enumerate the requirements for this protocol to move from its
      current security state, the first bullet, to its optimal state, as
      listed just above.

   Transition and Deployment Considerations  Document the operational
      transition plan for moving from the old to the new security
      mechanism.  Will adjacencies need to bounce?  What new elements/
      servers/services in the infrastructure will be required?  What is
      an example work flow that an operator will take?  The best
      possible case is if the adjacency does not break, but this may not
      always be possible.

   Define, Assign, Design
      Create a deliverables list of the design and specification work,
      with milestones.  Define owners.  Release a document(s)


   PHASE 2:

   KMP Analysis
      Review requirements for KMPs [RFC????].  Identify any nuances for
      this particular protocol's needs and its use cases for KMP.  List
      the requirements that this Routing Protocol has for being able to
      be use in conjunctions with a KMP.  Define the optimal state.

   Gap Analysis
      Enumerate the requirements for this protocol to move from its
      current security state to its optimal state.

   Define, Assign, Design
      Create a deliverabels list of the design and specification work,
      with miletsones.  Define owners.  Do the design and document work
      for a KMP to be able to generate the Routing Protocol's session
      keys for the packets on the wire.  These will be the arguments
      passed in the API to the KMP in order to bootstrap the session
      keys to the Routing Protocol.

   There will also be a team formed to work on the base framework
   mechanisms for each of the main categories, i.e. the blocks and API's



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   represented in figure 1 (Figure 1).

4.5.  Protocols in Categories

   This section groups the Routing Protocols into like categories,
   according to attributes set forth in Categories Section (Section 3).
   Each group will have a design team tasked with improving the security
   of the Routing Protocol mechanisms and defining the KMP requirements
   for their group, then rolling both into a roadmap document upon which
   they will execute.

   BGP, LDP and MSDP
       The Routing Protocol's that fall into the category of the one-to-
       one peering messages, and will use peer keying protocols, AND are
       all transmitted over TCP include BGP RFC 4271 [RFC4271], LDP
       [RFC5036] and MSDP [RFC3618].  A team will work on one mechanism
       to cover these three protocols.  Much of the work on the Routing
       Protocol update for its existing authentication mechanism is
       already occuring in the TCPM Working Group, on the TCP-AO
       [I-D.ietf-tcpm-tcp-auth-opt] document, as well as its
       cryptography-helper document, TCP-AO-CRYPTO [I-D.ao-crypto].  The
       exception is the mode where LDP is used directly on the LAN
       [RFC????].  The work for this may go into the Group keying
       category (w/ OSPF) mentioned below.

   OSPF, ISIS, and RIP
       The Routing Protocols that fall into the category Group keying
       with one-to-many peering messages includes OSPF [RFC2328], ISIS
       [RFC1195] and RIP [RFC2453].  Not surprisingly, all these routing
       protocols have two other things in common.  First, they are run
       on a combination of the OSI datalink layer 2, and the OSI network
       layer 3.  By this we mean that they have a component of how the
       routing protocol works which is specified in Layer 2 as well as
       in Layer 3.  Second, they are all internal gateway protocols, or
       IGPs.  The keying mechanisms and use will be much more
       complicated to define for these than for a one-to-one messaging
       protocol.

   BFD
       Because it is less of a routing protocol, per se, and more of a
       peer aliveness detection mechanism, Bidirectional Forwarding
       Detection (BFD) [RFC????] will have its own team.

   RSVP [RFC????], RSVP-TE [RFC????], and PCE







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       These three protocols will be handled together. [what more
       characterisation should we give here?  Routing AD's, provide text
       pls?]

   PIM-SM and PIM-DM
       Finally, the multicast protocols of PIM-SM [RFC4601] and PIM-DM
       [RFC3973] will be handled together.  PIM-SM multicasts routing
       information (Hello, Join/Prune, Assert) on a link-local basis,
       using a defined multicast address.  In addition, it specifies
       unicast communication for exchange of information (Register,
       Register-Stop) between the router closest to a group sender and
       the "rendezvous point" (RP).  The RP is typically not "on-link"
       for a particular router.  While much work has been done on
       multicast security for application-layer groups, little has been
       done to address the problem of managing hundreds or thousands of
       small one-to-many groups with link-local scope.  Such an
       authentication mechanism should be considered along with the
       router-to-Rendezvous Point authentication mechanism.  The most
       important issue is ensuring that only the "authorized neighbors"
       get the keys for (S,G), so that rogue routers cannot participate
       in the exchanges.  Another issue is that some of the
       communication may occur intra-domain, e.g. the link-local
       messages in an enterprise, while others for the same (*,G) may
       occur inter-domain, e.g. the router-to-Rendezvous Point messges
       may be from one enterprise's router to another.  One possible
       solution proposes a region-wide "master" key server (possibly
       replicated), and one "local" key server per speaking router.
       There is no issue with propagating the messages outside the link,
       because link-local messages, by definition, are not forwarded.
       This solution is offered only as an example of how work may
       progress; further discussion should occur in this work team.
       Specification of a link-local protection mechanism for PIM-SM
       occurred in RFC 4601 [RFC4601], and this work is being updated in
       PIM-SM-LINKLOCAL [I-D.ietf-pim-sm-linklocal].  However, the KMP
       part is completely unspecified, and will require work outside the
       expertise of the PIM working group to accomplish, which is why
       this roadmap is being created.

   These protocols are deemed out-of-scope for this current iteration of
   the work roadmap.  Once all of the protocols listed above have had
   their work completed, or are clearly within site of completion, then
   the community will revisit the need and interest for working on
   these:

   o  MANET
   o  FORCES

   [need text from routing ADs on why these are out of scope]



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4.6.  Priorites

   Resources from both the routing area and the security area will be
   applied to work on these problem spaces as quickly as possible.
   Realizing that such resources are far from unlimited, a rank order
   priority for addressing the work of incrementally securing these
   groups of routing protocols is provided:

   o  Priority 1 - BGP / LDP / MSDP - almost done with Phase 1 on these,
      via TCP-AO [I-D.ietf-tcpm-tcp-auth-opt] .
   o  Priority 2 - PIM-SM
   o  Priority 3 - OSPF / ISIS / RIP
   o  Priority 4 - BFD
   o  Priority 5 - RSVP and RSVP-TE

   By far the most important group is the Priority 1 group as these are
   the protocols used on the most public and exposed segments of the
   networks, at the peering points between operators and between
   operators and their customers.  BFD, as a detection mechanism
   underlying the Priority 1 protocols is therefore second.


5.  Security Considerations

   As mentioned in the Introduction , RFC4948 identifies additional
   steps needed to achieve the overall goal of improving the security of
   the core routing infrastructure.  Those include validation of route
   origin announcements, path validation, cleaning up the IRR databases
   for accuracy, and operational security practicies that prevent
   routers from being compromised devices.  The KARP work is but one
   step in a necessary system of security improvements.

   The security of cryptographic-based systems depends on both the
   strength of the cryptographic algorithms chosen and the strength of
   the keys used with those algorithms.  The security also depends on
   the engineering of the protocol used by the system to ensure that
   there are no non-cryptographic ways to bypass the security of the
   overall system.

   Care should also be taken to ensure that the selected key is
   unpredictable, avoiding any keys known to be weak for the algorithm
   in use.  [RFC4086] contains helpful information on both key
   generation techniques and cryptographic randomness.

   In addition to using a stong key/PSK of appropriate length and
   randomness, deployers of KARP protocols SHOULD use different keys
   between different routing peers whenever operationally possible.
   RFC3562 [RFC3562] provides some very sound guidance.  It was meant



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   specifically for the use of TCP MD5 for BGP, but it is more or less
   applicable to Routing Protocol authentication work that would result
   from KARP.  It states three main points: (1) key lengths SHOULD be
   between 12 and 24 bytes (this will vary depending on the MAC/KDF in
   use), with larger keys having effectively zero additional
   computational costs when compared to shorter keys, (2) key sharing
   SHOULD be limited so that keys aren't shared among multiple BGP
   peering arrangements, and (3) Keys SHOULD be changed at least every
   90 days (this could be longer for stronger MAC algorithms, but it is
   generally a wise idea).

   This is especially true when the Routing Protocol takes a static
   Traffic Key as opposed to a Traffic Key derived per-connection by a
   KDF.  The burdon for doing so is understandable much higher than for
   using the same static Traffic Key across all peering routers.  This
   is why use of a KMP network-wide increases peer-wise security so
   greatly, because now each set of peers can enjoys a unique Traffic
   Key, and if an attacker sitting between two routers learns or guesses
   the Traffic Key for that connection, she doesn't gain access to all
   the other connections as well.

   However, whenever using manual keys, it is best to design a system
   where a given PSK will be used in a KDF, mixed with connection
   specific material, in order to generate session unique -- and
   therefore peer-wise -- Traffic Keys.  Doing so has the following
   advantages: the Traffic Keys used in the per-message MAC operation
   are peer-wise unique, it provides inter-connection replay protection,
   and, if the per-message MAC covers some connection counter, intra-
   connection replay protection.

   Note that in the composition of certain key derivation functions
   (e.g.  KDF_AES_128_CMAC, as used in TCP-AO [I-D.ao-crypto]), the
   pseudorandom function (PRF) used in the KDF may require a key of a
   certain fixed size as an input.  For example, AES_128_CMAC requires a
   128 bit (16 byte) key as the seed.  However, for convenience to the
   administrators/deployers, a specification may not want to force the
   deployer to enter a PSK of exactly 16 bytes.  Instead, a
   specification may call for a sub-key routine that could handle a
   variable length PSK, one that might be less than 16 bytes (see
   [RFC4615], section 3, as an example).  That sub-key routine would act
   as a key extractor to derive a second key of exactly the required
   length, and thus suitable as a seed to the PRF.  This does NOT mean
   that administrators are safe to use weak keys.  Administrators are
   encouraged to follow [RFC4086] as listed above.  We simply attempted
   to "put a fence around stupidity", in as much as possible.

   A better option, from a security perspective, is to use some
   representation of a device-specific assymetric key pair as the



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   identity proof, as described in Section 3.4.2.

   When it comes time for the KARP WG to design the re-usable model for
   a KMP, The Guidelines for Cryptographic Key Management, RFC4107
   [RFC4107] should be will be consulted.

   [[QUESTION TO REVIEWERS: it may be worthwhile to pull the last few
   paragraphs, along with some guidance along the same lines, into
   section 4, in a new sub-section with a title something like "Security
   tips for KARP design teams working on Routing Protocol reviews and
   updates".  Or maybe even into its own info document, "Security
   Guidelines for KARP Design Teams".Thoughts?]]

   The mechanisms that will be defined under this roadmap aim to improve
   the security, better protect against more threats, and provider far
   greater operational efficiencies than the state of things at the time
   of this writing.  However, none of these changes will improve
   Internet security unless they are implemented and deployed.  Other
   influences must be brought to bare upon operators and organizations
   to create incentives for deployment.  Such incentives may take the
   form of PCI-like industry compliance/certifications, well advertised
   BCPs profiling the use of this roadmap's output, end-user demand or
   insistance.


6.  IANA Considerations

   This document has no actions for IANA.


7.  Acknowledgements

   The outline for this draft was created from discussions and
   agreements with Routing AD's Ross Callon and Dave Ward, Security AD's
   Tim Polk and Pasi Eronen, and IAB members Danny McPherson and Gregory
   Lebovitz.

   Mat Ford and Bill Atwood provided reviews to -00.

   Danny McPherson provided an extremely detailed and useful review of
   -01.


8.  Change History (RFC Editor: Delete Before Publishing)

   [NOTE TO RFC EDITOR: this section for use during I-D stage only.
   Please remove before publishing as RFC.]




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   -00-00 original rough rough rough draft for review by routing and
   security AD's

   -00- original submission

   o  adds new category = multicast protocols in category section and
      mentions mcast in group keying category description.
   o  add a lot of references where they did not exist before, or where
      there were only place holders.  Still more work needed on this.
   o  abstract filled in
   o  changed from standards track to informational (this was an
      oversight in last draft).
   o  filled out threats section with detailed descriptions, and linked
      to RPsec threats RFC
   o  made ascii art for the basic KMP framework
   o  added section on internal versus external peering and the
      requirements decisions for them
   o  added security characterization section in sect 2, added sections
      discussing internal vs external protocols, shared vs unique keys,
      oob vs in-band keying
   o  incorporates all D Ward's feedback from his initial skim of the
      document.

   -01-

   o  Updated framework (Figure 1) diagram to include all listed and
      described elements.  Needs review and honing.  Gregory Lebovitz
      (GL).
   o  Added comment in protocols (Section 4.5) section that much of the
      BGP/LDP Phase 1 work is already being done in tcp-ao and ao-
      crypto.  GL.
   o  Updated Scope making the 2 work phases more clear earlier in the
      document.  GL.
   o  Broke work items (Section 4.4) section into two Phases, 1 for
      manual key update, and second for KMP work.  GL.
   o  Re-org'd doc.  Brought Threats (Section 2) section out into its
      own top-level section.  Did same with Categorization (Section 3)
      section, leaving Roadmap section more focused.  Moved ToDo list
      and Change History to end of doc, after Acknowledgements.  GL.
   o  added new sect 2.3 (Section 4.1) on main roadmap phases.  Previous
      section Common Framework (Section 4.3) moved to 2.4.  Tim Polk
      (TP).
   o  Added Section 2.3.1 Requirements for Phase 1 Routing Protocols'
      Security Update (Section 4.2).  This provides a nice starter set
      of requirements for any work team.  GL.
   o  Filled out text for Out vs In-band Key Mgmt (Section 3.4.3)
      section, significantly.  Changed the term from "in-band" to "in-
      line".



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   o  Section Threats (Section 2) Clarified DoS threats in and out of
      scope better.  We are not preventing all DoS attacks.  Just those
      we can reasonably via authentication.  TP.
   o  Sect In-band vs Out-of-Band (Section 3.4.3)clarified that In-band
      does not mean in-band to Routing Protocol, but rather over IP
      between the Routing Protocols, rather than pushed down by some
      external management entity.  TP.
   o  In roadmap (Section 3) section, added "it is also hoped that we
      can create one kmp per category..."  Also explained value of a
      KMP.  TP.
   o  Added "operators" to audience (Section 1.6) list.  Matt Ford (MF).
   o  Described why BGP (and LDP) security is not deployed very often.
      Added this Scope (Section 1.3) section, point 4.  If mechanisms
      aren't being deployed, why is that?  What, if anything, could be
      done to improve deployment?  Tried to address these.  Need
      references (see To Do list below).  MF.
   o  Added some text to security section to address this from MF: say
      something here about the limitations of this approach, if any -
      and refer back to the need for other pieces of the puzzle.  May
      need more work.
   o  Cleaned up text for multicast part of Message Type (Section 3.1)
      section and Protocols (Section 4.5) section, clarifying PIM's two
      message types, mcast and unicast, in both places.  Bill Atwood
      (BA).
   o  In section Protocols (Section 4.5), added references to 4601 and
      PIM-SM-LINKLOCAL.  BA.
   o  Editorial changes pointed out various folks.

   -02-

   o  Re-submitted due to expiration.  Text did not change.  Substantive
      update coming shortly.
   o
   o

   - 03 -

   o  changed "BaseRP" to "Routing Protocol" throughout the doc - man
   o  filled out the Terminology section
   o  changed "KMART" to "KARP" in everything but the title, since the
      -00 deadline had long since passed.  Will change the title of the
      doc to KARP as soon as the window re-opens.
   o  priorities in sect 4.6 changed.  Added PIM-SM.  Lowered OSPF and
      BFD, based on feedback by a few people.
   o  many edits resulting from Danny McPherson's review.
   o  added "Brute Foce Attacks Against Password/Keys" to Threats
      Section 2.1 section.




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   o  Significant updates to Security Considerations section
   o  Added a few references throughout to RFC3562
   o  4.3 2nd to last P - added a comment to clarify that two parties
      (or an org) must discuss ahead of time what they want their
      connections' secruity properties to be. - dward
   o  added to 4.4 Phase 1 - New Section: Transition and Deployment
      Considerations. ea wg must call out the operational transition
      plan from old to new security.  Best if don't bounce link. - dward
   o  added 3.3 (but not sure if this is right)- endpoint discovery
      mechanisms? endpoint discovery mechanism (L2VPN, L3VPN, etc).
      Discovery is much different security properties than passing
      Routing updates. - dward
   o  More requirements: Added to 4.2: X - convergence SHOULD not be
      affected by what we choose; adding security SHOULD not cause a
      refresh of route updates or cause additional route updates to be
      generated; adding auth should not be an attack vector itself.
      AKA, the use of MD5 is so expensive that spoofing BGP packets w/
      MD5 causes the control plane to be attacked because CPU went to
      100% - dward
   o  updated stats on MD5 usage, and cited [ISR2008]. - mchpherson


9.  Needs Work in Next Draft (RFC Editor: Delete Before Publishing)

   [NOTE TO RFC EDITOR: this section for use during I-D stage only.
   Please remove before publishing as RFC.]

   List of stuff that still needs work
   o  RTG AD's or delegates: clean up the three definitions of route
      message type categories.  Need RTG Area folks input on this.
   o  More clarity on the work items for those defining and specifying
      the framework elements and API's themselves.
   o  RTG AD's or delegates: text justifying RSVP and RSVP-TE and what
      we think solving that problem may look like
   o  RTG AD's or delegates: more justification for why MANET and FORCES
      are out of scope.  Need ref for those RFCs.
   o  Danny McPherson: Get reference for BGP auth usage stats in Scope
      (Section 1.3) section, item 4.
   o
   o  security section: pull out security guidance to routing protocol
      design teams stuff and place into its own section?
   o
   o


10.  References





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10.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC4593]  Barbir, A., Murphy, S., and Y. Yang, "Generic Threats to
              Routing Protocols", RFC 4593, October 2006.

   [RFC4948]  Andersson, L., Davies, E., and L. Zhang, "Report from the
              IAB workshop on Unwanted Traffic March 9-10, 2006",
              RFC 4948, August 2007.

10.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.ao-crypto]
              Lebovitz, G., "Cryptographic Algorithms, Use and
              Implementation Requirements for TCP Authentication
              Option", March 2009, <http://tools.ietf.org/html/
              draft-lebovitz-ietf-tcpm-tcp-ao-crypto-00>.

   [I-D.ietf-pim-sm-linklocal]
              Atwood, W., Islam, S., and M. Siami, "Authentication and
              Confidentiality in PIM-SM Link-local Messages",
              draft-ietf-pim-sm-linklocal-09 (work in progress),
              October 2009.

   [I-D.ietf-tcpm-tcp-auth-opt]
              Touch, J., Mankin, A., and R. Bonica, "The TCP
              Authentication Option", draft-ietf-tcpm-tcp-auth-opt-08
              (work in progress), October 2009.

   [ISR2008]  McPherson, D. and C. Labovitz, "Worldwide Infrastructure
              Security Report", October 2008,
              <http://www.arbornetworks.com/dmdocuments/ISR2008_US.pdf>.

   [RFC1195]  Callon, R., "Use of OSI IS-IS for routing in TCP/IP and
              dual environments", RFC 1195, December 1990.

   [RFC2328]  Moy, J., "OSPF Version 2", STD 54, RFC 2328, April 1998.

   [RFC2453]  Malkin, G., "RIP Version 2", STD 56, RFC 2453,
              November 1998.

   [RFC3562]  Leech, M., "Key Management Considerations for the TCP MD5
              Signature Option", RFC 3562, July 2003.

   [RFC3618]  Fenner, B. and D. Meyer, "Multicast Source Discovery
              Protocol (MSDP)", RFC 3618, October 2003.



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   [RFC3973]  Adams, A., Nicholas, J., and W. Siadak, "Protocol
              Independent Multicast - Dense Mode (PIM-DM): Protocol
              Specification (Revised)", RFC 3973, January 2005.

   [RFC4086]  Eastlake, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker, "Randomness
              Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086, June 2005.

   [RFC4107]  Bellovin, S. and R. Housley, "Guidelines for Cryptographic
              Key Management", BCP 107, RFC 4107, June 2005.

   [RFC4271]  Rekhter, Y., Li, T., and S. Hares, "A Border Gateway
              Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, January 2006.

   [RFC4301]  Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the
              Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, December 2005.

   [RFC4303]  Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)",
              RFC 4303, December 2005.

   [RFC4306]  Kaufman, C., "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol",
              RFC 4306, December 2005.

   [RFC4601]  Fenner, B., Handley, M., Holbrook, H., and I. Kouvelas,
              "Protocol Independent Multicast - Sparse Mode (PIM-SM):
              Protocol Specification (Revised)", RFC 4601, August 2006.

   [RFC4615]  Song, J., Poovendran, R., Lee, J., and T. Iwata, "The
              Advanced Encryption Standard-Cipher-based Message
              Authentication Code-Pseudo-Random Function-128 (AES-CMAC-
              PRF-128) Algorithm for the Internet Key Exchange Protocol
              (IKE)", RFC 4615, August 2006.

   [RFC4949]  Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2",
              RFC 4949, August 2007.

   [RFC5036]  Andersson, L., Minei, I., and B. Thomas, "LDP
              Specification", RFC 5036, October 2007.

   [RFC5226]  Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
              IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226,
              May 2008.










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Authors' Addresses

   Gregory Lebovitz
   Juniper Networks, Inc.
   1194 North Mathilda Ave.
   Sunnyvale, CA  94089-1206
   US

   Phone:
   Email: gregory.ietf@gmail.com




   Phone:
   Email:



































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