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Network Working Group M. Schulze
Internet-Draft Matthew.Schulze@mapics.com
April 1, 2005 W. Lohsen
William.Lohsen@GTRI.gatech.edu
IP over Burrito Carriers
draft-lohsen-ip-burrito-00
Status of this Memo
This memo defines an Experimental Protocol for the Internet
community. It does not specify an Internet standard of any kind.
Discussion and suggestions for improvement are requested.
Distribution of this memo is unlimited.
By submitting this Internet-Draft, I certify that any applicable
patent or other IPR claims of which I am aware have been disclosed,
and any of which I become aware will be disclosed, in accordance with
RFC 3668.
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This Internet-Draft will expire in October, 2005.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005). All Rights Reserved.
Schulze, Lohsen [Page 1]
INTERNET-DRAFT IP over Burrito Carriers April 2005
Abstract
IP over Burrito Carriers describes an experimental method for the
creation of edible data packets. This standard is intended to be
implemented in metropolitan area networks due to the preexisting
burrito delivery infrastructure. While currently only flour tortillas
have been found acceptable for encapsulating the data contained in
the packet, tests are underway to determine the viability of using
corn tortillas. One must be wary of disreputable IP over Burrito
service providers as packet corruption and bad data handling can
result in damage to the receiving unit and may result in an extremely
messy packet rejection. Conveniently, there is a rating system
already in place. While the rating by the health department doesn't
ensure proper data encapsulation, it does allow the end user to
determine if the service provider's quality to cost ratio is
adequate. This is an experimental standard, not a recommended
standard.
Introduction
In today's wireless hotspot, WAP enabled, WiFi zoned world of dining
there exists a discrimination against diners who prefer to eat
outside the established confines of the restaurant. The IP over
Burrito standard was developed to create an edible solution to the
growing rift in the availability of free internet access between
sit-down and delivery/carry out diners. While considerable research
has yet to be performed on the IP over Burrito standard, multiple
simulations in a controlled environment have proven to be both
successful and filling. Some concerns that must be addressed
in the future include the ability of the hosts buffer to
accommodate a large number of packets while they are processed. Also
the fact that a buffer overflow would cause a catastrophic system
failure resulting in a purging of all previously processed datagrams
is of major concern. Currently datagrams are encapsulated in a flour
tortilla. Future projects will determine the viability of using corn
tortillas but for now the standard requires the use of a flour
tortilla for all datagram encapsulation.
Schulze, Lohsen [Page 2]
INTERNET-DRAFT IP over Burrito Carriers April 2005
Packet Format
Packets will follow the standard Internet Header Format [RFC-791]
(Figure 1). Each field (Figure 1) has been sublimated with a tangible
equivalent (Figure 2) to binary representation that is both tasty and
filling.
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|Version| IHL |Type of Service| Total Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Identification |Flags| Fragment Offset |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Time to Live | Protocol | Header Checksum |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Source Address |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Destination Address |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Data |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The Internet Header Format [RFC-791]
Figure 1.
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|Obvious| Onion | Jalapenos | Physical Length (mm) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Number Written on Foil |Bean Type| Number of Beans |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Given Delivery Time | Guacamole | Receipt |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Lettuce |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Rice |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Beef |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The Burrito Internet Header Format
Figure 2.
Schulze, Lohsen [Page 3]
INTERNET-DRAFT IP over Burrito Carriers April 2005
Version: Obvious
The Version field is indicated by the obvious. It is a burrito.
As the IP over Burrito standard is designed to work solely
with modern equipment, it supports only IPv4 packets.
IHL: Onion
Internet Header Length is specified by the number of onions placed
in the burrito.
Type of Service: Jalapenos
The 8 bits of this header are specified by 8 jalapeno slices. A
half slice indicates a zero and a whole slice indicates a one.
Total Length: Physical Burrito Length
The length of the burrito in centimeters multiplied by 4096 gives
the total length of the datagram, in octets.
Identification: Number written on foil wrapper.
Flags: Type of Beans
Black Beans = Don't Fragment
Red Beans = Fragment
Pinto Beans = Last Fragment
Kidney Beans = More Fragments
Fragment Offset: Total Number of Beans.
Time to Live: Specified by source host in minutes.
Commonly in the range of 35-45 minutes, given traffic conditions.
Protocol: Guacamole
The chunkiness, quality, and amount of Guacamole determine this
data.
Schulze, Lohsen [Page 4]
INTERNET-DRAFT IP over Burrito Carriers April 2005
Header Checksum: Receipt
The data on the receipt should match the specifications of the
burrito datagram.
Source Address: Lettuce
Given the size of this field it is necessary to break it down
into subsections. The lettuce is placed in 4 discrete groups.
Also, the lettuce is colored with food coloring to be either
red, green, or blue. Red lettuce indicates the most significant
digit, green the middle digit, and blue the least significant
digit. Thus limiting the amount of lettuce on the burrito to a
manageable level in respect to determining the data and fitting
in the tortilla.
Destination Address: Rice
Given the size of this field it is necessary to break it down
into subsections. The rice is placed in 4 discrete groups.
Also, the rice is colored with food coloring to be either
red, green, or blue. Red rice indicates the most significant
digit, green the middle digit, and blue the least significant
digit. Thus limiting the amount of rice on the burrito to a
manageable level in respect to determining the data and fitting
in the tortilla.
Data: Beef
The data will be transmitted in a beef representation of
hexadecimal. Each beef cluster will be counted as a decimal
representation of a hexadecimal digit. Each beef field will be
separated by a slice of chicken. There will be a maximum of 15
chunks of beef and a minimum of 0 chunks of beef per unit chicken.
Approximately 16 bytes of data can be stored per burrito packet.
Packet Routing
Should a node become damaged or congested (i.e. traffic jam,
construction, etc) and be unable to accommodate Burrito encapsulated
packets in a timely fashion then the packet will be routed by the
delivery boy around any obstructions in an attempt to make a
delivery inside of the packets given TTL.
Schulze, Lohsen [Page 5]
INTERNET-DRAFT IP over Burrito Carriers April 2005
Security Considerations
The IP over Burrito service can be considered secure for almost any
non-tactical use. Before transmission, the data contents of the
packet are sterilized, killing most viruses that might be transmitted
via the packet. Unfortunately, due to the nature of the packet, this
uninfected state is only temporary. Unlike the current IP
transmission standard, packets created by the IP over Burrito Carrier
service are vulnerable to infection during transmission. Infected
packets will usually be detected two to four hours after the packet
is destroyed.
As every packet is encapsulated in an opaque wrapper, the data inside
the packet is impossible to access via standard packet sniffing
procedures. Attempts to breach the encapsulation of the package in
transit will likely cause permanent damage to the encapsulation,
thereby signaling to the original recipients of the packet that data
interception was attempted. Re-encapsulation of the original data is
impossible, as the packet data is tightly integrated with the
encapsulation. Due to the long delay between packet transmission and
packet reception, however, there is sufficient time for a third party
to duplicate the packet data and forward it to the original
recipient. The detection of this interception is likely only if the
recipient should follow the standard packet disposal process and be
well acquainted with the peculiarities of packets created by a given
server.
Packet transportation uses a highly advanced algorithm to prevent
damage to the packet and to prevent its reception by third parties.
As the packet transportation system is highly vulnerable to social
engineering, however, the use of encryption is recommended for the
transmission of any secure data.
Although the packets decay naturally over time, the slow rate of
natural packet decay will likely make user-induced destruction
mandatory to prevent third parties from examining the packet data
after the packet has been received. Unfortunately, the packet
delivery system works poorly in a tactical environment, as the packet
can be easily waylaid by hostile forces.
Due to the extended time that packet creation requires, servers will
be highly vulnerable to message flooding. and responses will be
delayed greatly; however, the likeliness of a IP over Burrito DOS
attack can be considered negligible, as the clients are charged for
each packet that the server sends to them.
Schulze, Lohsen [Page 6]
INTERNET-DRAFT IP over Burrito Carriers April 2005
Of more concern is the extended time that packet processing requires
on the receiving hosts end. Should a host attempt to process more
than 5 packets a in a one hour period a buffer overflow could occur
and data might be lost, or worse: it could be disseminated in a
disorganized and partially processed state all over any nearby
objects. This could result in damage to secondary systems and the
server storage facility. Unfortunately a buffer overflow on one host
can cause hosts in the immediate vicinity to suffer similar buffer
overflows.
Also a matter of great concern is the ability of viruses to spread
by IP over Burrito. Should the server or packet itself be infected
then infection of the host is highly likely. When dealing with an
unknown server it is advisable to carefully examine the packet for
any sign of damage or infection (i.e. rotten smell, slick covering
to the meat, etc).
IANA Considerations
This document has no actions for IANA.
Normative References
[RFC791] Postel, J., "Internet Protocol", STD 5, RFC 791, September
1981.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2434] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 2434,
October 1998.
Schulze, Lohsen [Page 7]
INTERNET-DRAFT IP over Burrito Carriers April 2005
Authors' Addresses
Matthew Schulze
Paragon Systems International
1000 Windward Concourse Parkway, suite 140
Alpharetta, GA, 30005
EMail: Matthew.Schulze@mapics.com
William Lohsen
Georgia Tech Research Institute
347 Ferst Drive
Atlanta, Georgia 30332-0821
EMail: William.Lohsen@GTRI.gatech.edu
Full Copyright Statement
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005). This document is subject
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except as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights.
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Schulze, Lohsen [Page 8]
INTERNET-DRAFT IP over Burrito Carriers April 2005
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Schulze, Lohsen [Page 9]
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