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Versions: 00 01 02 03

Network Working Group                                            C. Luck
Internet-Draft                                            pEp Foundation
Intended status: Informational                             July 05, 2019
Expires: January 6, 2020


        pretty Easy privacy (pEp): Progressive Header Disclosure
               draft-luck-lamps-pep-header-protection-03

Abstract

   Issues with email header protection in S/MIME have been recently
   raised in the IETF LAMPS Working Group.  The need for amendments to
   the existing specification regarding header protection was expressed.

   The pretty Easy privacy (pEp) implementations currently use a
   mechanism quite similar to the currently standardized message
   wrapping for S/MIME.  The main difference is that pEp is using PGP/
   MIME instead, and adds space for carrying public keys next to the
   protected message.

   In LAMPS, it has been expressed that whatever mechanism will be
   chosen, it should not be limited to S/MIME, but also applicable to
   PGP/MIME.

   This document aims to contribute to this discussion and share the pEp
   implementation experience with email header protection.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 6, 2020.







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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.1.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     1.2.  Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   2.  Message Format for Progressive Header Disclosure  . . . . . .   4
     2.1.  Compatibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.2.  Inner Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.3.  Content-Type Parameter "forwarded"  . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.4.  Outer Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.5.  Transport Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     2.6.  S/MIME Compatibility  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   3.  Candidate Header Fields for Header Protection . . . . . . . .   9
   4.  Stub Outside Headers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   5.  Processing Incoming Email under Progressive Header Disclosure  10
     5.1.  Processing of Signed-only Email . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     5.2.  Incoming Filter Processing  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       5.2.1.  Staged Filtering of Inbound Messages  . . . . . . . .  11
     5.3.  Outgoing Filter Processing  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   7.  Privacy Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   8.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   9.  Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     9.1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     9.2.  Current software implementing pEp . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   10. Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   11. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     11.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     11.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   Appendix A.  About pEp Design Principles  . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   Appendix B.  Document Changelog . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   Appendix C.  Open Issues  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17



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1.  Introduction

   A range of protocols for the protection of electronic mail (email)
   exist, which allow to assess the authenticity and integrity of the
   email headers section, or selected header fields, but limited to a
   domain-level perspective.  Specifically these are DomainKeys
   Identified Mail (DKIM) [RFC6376] and Sender Policy Framework (SPF)
   [RFC7208] and Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting, and
   Conformance (DMARC) [RFC7489].  These protocols, while essential to
   responding to a range of attacks on email, do not offer full End-to-
   End protection to the headers section and are not capable of
   providing privacy regarding the information represented therein.

   The need for means of Data Minimization, which includes data
   spareness and hiding of all information technically hideable, has
   grown in importance over the past years.

   A standard for End-to-End protection of the email headers section
   exists for S/MIME since version 3.1. (cf.  [RFC8551]):

      In order to protect outer, non-content-related message header
      fields (for instance, the "Subject", "To", "From", and "Cc"
      fields), the sending client MAY wrap a full MIME message in a
      message/rfc822 wrapper in order to apply S/MIME security services
      to these header fields.

   No mechanism for header protection has been standardized for
   [PGPMIME] yet.

   End-to-End protection for the email headers section is currently not
   widely implemented - neither for messages protected by means of
   S/MIME nor PGP/MIME.  At least two variants of header protection are
   known to be implemented.  A recently submitted Internet-Draft
   [I-D.melnikov-lamps-header-protection] discusses the two variants and
   the challenges with header protection for S/MIME.  The two variants
   are referred to as:

   o  Option 1: Memory Hole

   o  Option 2: Wrapping with message/rfc822 or message/global

   pEp (pretty Easy privacy) [I-D.birk-pep] for email
   [I-D.marques-pep-email] already implements an option quite similar to
   Option 2, adapting the S/MIME standards to PGP/MIME (cf.  Section 2,
   ff.).  Existing implementations of pEp have also added inbound
   support for "Memory Hole" referred to above as Option 1, thus being
   able to study the differences and the implementator's challenges.




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   pEp now also supports the "forwarded=no" attribute proposed in
   [I-D.melnikov-lamps-header-protection], and further described in
   Section 2.3.

   Interoperability and implementation symmetry between PGP/MIME and
   S/MIME is planned by pEp, but still in an early stage of development.

   This document describes Progressive Header Disclosure as implemented
   in the "pEp message format version 2".  This format inherently offers
   header protection as a side effect, but is only intended for use only
   with signed-and-encrypted messages.  The feature of protecting
   headers may be used independently by mail user agents otherwise not
   wanting to conform to pEp standards (Section 2, ff.).

1.1.  Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

1.2.  Terms

   The following terms are defined for the scope of this document:

   o  Man-in-the-middle attack (MITM): cf. [RFC4949]

2.  Message Format for Progressive Header Disclosure

2.1.  Compatibility

   The pEp message format version 2 is designed such that a receiving
   Mail User Agent (MUA), which is OpenPGP-compliant but not pEp-
   compliant, still has built-in capability to properly verify the
   integrity of the mail, decode it and display all information of the
   original mail to the user.  The recovered protected message is
   selfsufficiently described, including all protected header fields.

   The pEp message format version 2 (as used by all the various pEp
   implementations, cf. Section 9) is similar to what is standardized
   for S/MIME in [RFC8551]:

      In order to protect outer, non-content-related message header
      fields (for instance, the "Subject", "To", "From", and "Cc"
      fields), the sending client MAY wrap a full MIME message in a
      message/rfc822 wrapper in order to apply S/MIME security services
      to these header fields.  It is up to the receiving client to
      decide how to present this "inner" header along with the
      unprotected "outer" header.



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      When an S/MIME message is received, if the top-level protected
      MIME entity has a Content-Type of message/rfc822, it can be
      assumed that the intent was to provide header protection.  This
      entity SHOULD be presented as the top-level message, [...].

2.2.  Inner Message

   *Note*: this section is for your information only.  It does not add
   requirements for the header protection feature to work.

   The pEp message format requires the innermost protected message to
   follow a fixed MIME structure and to consist of exactly one human-
   readable message which is represented in plain or HTML format.  Both
   plain and html entities MUST represent the same message to the user.
   Any attachment to the message must be laid out in a flat list.  No
   additional multipart entities are allowed in the pEp message.

   These restrictions permit to build mail user agents which are immune
   to the EFAIL attacks.

   This message is herein further referred to as the "pEp inner
   message".

   A mail user agent wanting to follow this standard, SHOULD transform
   any "original message" into a "pEp inner message" for safe
   representation on the receiving side.

2.3.  Content-Type Parameter "forwarded"

   One caveat of the design is that the user interaction with message/
   rfc822 entities varies considerably across different mail user
   agents.  No standard is currently available which enables MUAs to
   reliably determine whenever a nested message/rfc822 entity is meant
   to blend the containing message, or if it was effectively intended to
   be forwarded as a file document. pEp currently implements the
   proposal described by [I-D.melnikov-lamps-header-protection], 3.2,
   which defines a new Content-Type header field parameter with name
   "forwarded", for the MUA to distinguish between a forwarded message
   and a nested message for the purpose of header protection, i.e.,
   using "forwarded=no".

2.4.  Outer Message

   With pEp message format version 2, the pEp standardized message is
   equally wrapped in a message/rfc822 entity, but this time being in
   turn wrapped in a multipart/mixed entity.  The purpose of the
   additional nesting is to allow for public keys of the sender to be




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   stored alongside the original message while being protected by the
   same mechanism.

   For the case of PGP/MIME, the currently only implemented MIME
   encryption protocol implemented in pEp, the top-level entity called
   the "outer message" MUST contain:

   o  exactly one entity of type message/rfc822, and

   o  one or more entity of type application/pgp-keys

   Notes on the current pEp client implementations:

   o  the current pEp implementation also adds a text/plain entity
      containing "pEp-Wrapped-Message-Info: OUTER" as first element in
      the MIME tree.  This element is not strictly necessary, but is in
      place for better backwards compatibility when manually navigating
      the nested message structure.  This is part of the study of
      various solutions to maximize backwards compatibility, and has
      been omitted from the following examples.

   o  the current pEp implementation prepends "pEp-Wrapped-Message-Info:
      INNER<CR><LF>" to the original message body.  This is an
      implementation detail which should be ignored, and has been
      omitted in the following examples.

   o  the current pEp implementation may render a text/plain directly in
      place of the multipart/alternate, when no HTML representation was
      generated by the sending MUA.  This is not strict according to
      pEp's own specification, and is currently being investigated.

   This is an example of the top-level MIME entity, before being
   encrypted and signed:


















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       MIME-Version: 1.0
       Content-Type: multipart/mixed;
                     boundary="6b8b4567327b23c6643c986966334873"


       --6b8b4567327b23c6643c986966334873
       Content-Type: message/rfc822; forwarded="no"

       From: John Doe <jdoe@machine.example>
       To: Mary Smith <mary@example.net>
       Subject: Example
       Date: Fri, 30 Jun 2018 09:55:06 +0200
       Message-ID: <05d0526e-41c4-11e9-8828@pretty.Easy.privacy>
       X-Pep-Version: 2.0
       MIME-Version: 1.0
       Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
                     boundary="29fe9d2b2d7f6a703c1bffc47c162a8c"

       --29fe9d2b2d7f6a703c1bffc47c162a8c
       Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
       Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
       Content-Disposition: inline; filename="msg.txt"

       p=E2=89=A1p for Privacy by Default.
       -- =20
       Sent from my p=E2=89=A1p for Android.

       --29fe9d2b2d7f6a703c1bffc47c162a8c
       Content-Type: text/html; charset="utf-8"
       Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

       p=E2=89=A1p for Privacy by Default.<br>
       -- <br>
       Sent from my p=E2=89=A1p for Android.<br>

       --29fe9d2b2d7f6a703c1bffc47c162a8c--
       --6b8b4567327b23c6643c986966334873
       Content-Type: application/pgp-keys
       Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="pEpkey.asc"

       -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

       ...
       -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

       --6b8b4567327b23c6643c986966334873--





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2.5.  Transport Message

   In pEp message format 2 the "outer message" consists of a full RFC822
   message with body and a minimal set of header fields, just those
   necessary to conform to MIME multipart standards.

   The "outer message" should be encrypted and carry a signature
   according to the MIME encryption standards.  The resulting message is
   the transport message which a root entity of type multipart/
   encrypted.

   A minimal set of header fields should be set on the "transport
   message", as to permit delivery, without disclosing private
   information.

   The structure of the transport message may be altered in-transit,
   e.g. through mailing list agents, or inspection gateways.

   Signing and encrypting a message with MIME Security with [PGPMIME],
   yields a message with the following complete MIME structure, seen
   across the encryption layer:

       = multipart/encrypted; protocol="application/pgp-encrypted";
         + application/pgp-encrypted [ Version: 1 ]
         + application/octet-stream; name="msg.asc"
           {
             Content-Disposition: inline; filename="msg.asc";
           }
              |
             [ opaque encrypted structure ]
              |
              { minimal headers }
              + multipart/mixed
                + message/rfc822; forwarded="no";
                     |
                    { protected message headers }
                    + multipart/mixed
                      + multipart/alternate
                        + text/plain
                        + text/html
                      + application/octet-stream [ attachmet_1 ]
                      + application/octet-stream [ attachmet_2 ]
                + application/pgp-keys


   The header fields of the sub-part of type application/octet-stream
   SHOULD be modified to ensure that:




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   o  the Content-Type header field's

      *  "name" parameter is set to the value "msg.asc", and

      *  parameter "forwarded" is set to "no", and

   o  the Content-Disposition header field value is set to "inline"

      *  and the "filename" parameter is set to "msg.asc".

2.6.  S/MIME Compatibility

   Interoperability and implementation symmetry between PGP/MIME and
   S/MIME is on the roadmap of pEp.

3.  Candidate Header Fields for Header Protection

   By default, all headers of the original message SHOULD be wrapped
   with the original message, with one exception:

   o  the header field "Bcc" MUST NOT be added to the protected headers.

4.  Stub Outside Headers

   The outer message requires a minimal set of headers to be in place
   for being eligible for transport.  This includes the "From", "To",
   "Cc", "Bcc", "Subject" and "Message-ID" header fields.  The protocol
   hereby defined also depends on the "MIME-Version", "Content-Type",
   "Content-Disposition" and eventually the "Content-Transport-Encoding"
   header field to be present.

   Submission and forwarding based on SMTP carries "from" and
   "receivers" information out-of-band, so that the "From" and "To"
   header fields are not strictly necessary.  Nevertheless, "From",
   "Date", and at least one destination header field is mandatory as per
   [RFC5322].  They SHOULD be conserved for reliability.

   The following header fields should contain a verbatim copy of the
   header fields of the inner message:

   o  Date

   o  From

   o  To

   o  Cc (*)




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   o  Bcc (*)

   The entries with an asterisk mark (*) should only be set if also
   present in the original message.

   Clients which follow pEp standards MUST set the header field value
   for "Subject" to "=?utf-8?Q?p=E2=89=A1p?=" or "pEp".  Clients which
   do not adhere to all pEp standards should set the header field value
   of "Subject" to a descriptive stub value.  An example used in
   practice is

   o  Subject: Encrypted message

   The following header fields MUST be initialized with proper values
   according to the MIME standards:

   o  Content-Type

   o  Content-Disposition

   o  Content-Transport-Encoding (if necessary)

5.  Processing Incoming Email under Progressive Header Disclosure

   [[ TODO ]]

5.1.  Processing of Signed-only Email

   pEp either engages in a signed-and-encrypted communication or in an
   unsigned plaintext communication.  Inbound signatures attached to
   plaintext messages are duly verified but cannot enhance the perceived
   quality of the message in the user interface (while an invalid
   signature degrades the perception) [I-D.birk-pep].

5.2.  Incoming Filter Processing

   The Mail User Agent may implement outgoing filtering of mails, which
   may veto, alter, redirect or replicate the messages.  The
   functionality may be implemented on the mailbox server and be
   configurable through a well-known protocol, e.g., by means of The
   Sieve Mail-Filtering Language [RFC5490], or be implemented client-
   side, or in a combination of both.

   A mailbox server, which is required to process the full range of
   possible filters, is requiring plaintext access to the header fields.

   In an End-to-End-encryption context, which pEp enforces by default,
   upon first reception of the message the mailbox server is limited to



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   see the transport- relevant headers of the outer wrapper message.  A
   pEp client configured to trust the server ("trusted server" setting
   [I-D.marques-pep-email]) will later download the encrypted message,
   decrypt it and replace the copy on the server by the decrypted copy.

5.2.1.  Staged Filtering of Inbound Messages

   Inbound messages are expected to be delivered to the inbox while
   still being encrypted.  At this point in time, server-side filtering
   can only evaluate the unprotected header fields in the wrapper
   message.

   In an End-to-End-encryption context, which pEp enforces by default,
   the mailbox server is limited to see the transport-relevant headers
   of the outer wrapper message only upon first delivery.  A pEp client
   configured to trust the server ("trusted server" setting
   [I-D.marques-pep-email]) will eventually download the encrypted
   message, decrypt it locally and replace the copy on the server by the
   decrypted copy.  Server-side message filters SHOULD be able to detect
   such post-processed messages, and apply the pending filters.  The
   client SHOULD easily reflect the post-filtered messages in the user
   interface.

5.3.  Outgoing Filter Processing

   The Mail User Agent may implement outgoing filtering of emails, which
   may veto, alter or replicate the email.  They may also hint the MUA
   to store a copy in an alternate "Sent" folder.

   Filters which veto the sending or do alter the mail or replicate it
   (e.g., mass-mail generators) SHOULD be completed prior to applying
   protection, and thus also prior to applying header protection.
   Redirection to alternate "Sent" folders MUST NOT be decided prior to
   applying protection, but MUAs MAY abide from this restriction if they
   implement the "trusted server" option and the option is selected for
   the specific mailbox server; in this case, MUAs MUST NOT allow to
   redirect a message to an untrusted server by these rules, to prevent
   information leakage to the untrusted server.

   [[ TODO: Mention implicit filter for minimal color-rating for message
   replication. ]]

   [[ TODO: How to produce key-export-mails manually this way?  That is,
   what about non-pEp-mode? ]]







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6.  Security Considerations

   [[ TODO ]]

7.  Privacy Considerations

   [[ TODO ]]

8.  IANA Considerations

   This document has no actions for IANA.

9.  Implementation Status

9.1.  Introduction

   This section records the status of known implementations of the
   protocol defined by this specification at the time of posting of this
   Internet-Draft, and is based on a proposal described in [RFC7942].
   The description of implementations in this section is intended to
   assist the IETF in its decision processes in progressing drafts to
   RFCs.  Please note that the listing of any individual implementation
   here does not imply endorsement by the IETF.  Furthermore, no effort
   has been spent to verify the information presented here that was
   supplied by IETF contributors.  This is not intended as, and must not
   be construed to be, a catalog of available implementations or their
   features.  Readers are advised to note that other implementations may
   exist.

   According to [RFC7942], "[...] this will allow reviewers and working
   groups to assign due consideration to documents that have the benefit
   of running code, which may serve as evidence of valuable
   experimentation and feedback that have made the implemented protocols
   more mature.  It is up to the individual working groups to use this
   information as they see fit."

9.2.  Current software implementing pEp

   The following software implementing the pEp protocols (to varying
   degrees) already exists:

   o  pEp for Outlook as add-on for Microsoft Outlook, release
      [SRC.pepforoutlook]

   o  pEp for Android (based on a fork of the K9 MUA), release
      [SRC.pepforandroid]





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   o  Enigmail/pEp as add-on for Mozilla Thunderbird, release
      [SRC.enigmailpep]

   o  pEp for iOS (implemented in a new MUA), beta [SRC.pepforios]

   pEp for Android, iOS and Outlook are provided by pEp Security, a
   commercial entity specializing in end-user software implementing pEp
   while Enigmail/pEp is pursued as community project, supported by the
   pEp Foundation.

   All software is available as Free Software and published also in
   source form.

10.  Acknowledgements

   The authors would like to thank the following people who have
   provided significant contributions or feedback for the development of
   this document: Krista Bennett, Volker Birk, Bernie Hoeneisen and
   Hernani Marques.

11.  References

11.1.  Normative References

   [I-D.birk-pep]
              Marques, H. and B. Hoeneisen, "pretty Easy privacy (pEp):
              Privacy by Default", draft-birk-pep-03 (work in progress),
              March 2019.

   [I-D.marques-pep-email]
              Marques, H., "pretty Easy privacy (pEp): Email Formats and
              Protocols", draft-marques-pep-email-02 (work in progress),
              October 2018.

   [I-D.melnikov-lamps-header-protection]
              Melnikov, A., "Considerations for protecting Email header
              with S/MIME", draft-melnikov-lamps-header-protection-00
              (work in progress), October 2018.

   [PGPMIME]  Elkins, M., Del Torto, D., Levien, R., and T. Roessler,
              "MIME Security with OpenPGP", RFC 3156,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3156, August 2001,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3156>.

   [RFC2046]  Freed, N. and N. Borenstein, "Multipurpose Internet Mail
              Extensions (MIME) Part Two: Media Types", RFC 2046,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2046, November 1996,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2046>.



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   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC4880]  Callas, J., Donnerhacke, L., Finney, H., Shaw, D., and R.
              Thayer, "OpenPGP Message Format", RFC 4880,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4880, November 2007,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4880>.

   [RFC4949]  Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2",
              FYI 36, RFC 4949, DOI 10.17487/RFC4949, August 2007,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4949>.

   [RFC5322]  Resnick, P., Ed., "Internet Message Format", RFC 5322,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5322, October 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5322>.

   [RFC5490]  Melnikov, A., "The Sieve Mail-Filtering Language --
              Extensions for Checking Mailbox Status and Accessing
              Mailbox Metadata", RFC 5490, DOI 10.17487/RFC5490, March
              2009, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5490>.

   [RFC6376]  Crocker, D., Ed., Hansen, T., Ed., and M. Kucherawy, Ed.,
              "DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) Signatures", STD 76,
              RFC 6376, DOI 10.17487/RFC6376, September 2011,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6376>.

   [RFC7208]  Kitterman, S., "Sender Policy Framework (SPF) for
              Authorizing Use of Domains in Email, Version 1", RFC 7208,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7208, April 2014,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7208>.

   [RFC7489]  Kucherawy, M., Ed. and E. Zwicky, Ed., "Domain-based
              Message Authentication, Reporting, and Conformance
              (DMARC)", RFC 7489, DOI 10.17487/RFC7489, March 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7489>.

   [RFC8551]  Schaad, J., Ramsdell, B., and S. Turner, "Secure/
              Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) Version 4.0
              Message Specification", RFC 8551, DOI 10.17487/RFC8551,
              April 2019, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8551>.

11.2.  Informative References







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   [RFC7942]  Sheffer, Y. and A. Farrel, "Improving Awareness of Running
              Code: The Implementation Status Section", BCP 205,
              RFC 7942, DOI 10.17487/RFC7942, July 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7942>.

   [SRC.enigmailpep]
              "Source code for Enigmail/pEp", July 2019,
              <https://enigmail.net/index.php/en/download/source-code>.

   [SRC.pepforandroid]
              "Source code for pEp for Android", July 2019,
              <https://pep-security.lu/gitlab/android/pep>.

   [SRC.pepforios]
              "Source code for pEp for iOS", July 2019,
              <https://pep-security.ch/dev/repos/pEp_for_iOS/>.

   [SRC.pepforoutlook]
              "Source code for pEp for Outlook", July 2019,
              <https://pep-security.lu/dev/repos/pEp_for_Outlook/>.

Appendix A.  About pEp Design Principles

   pretty Easy privacy (pEp) is working on bringing state-of-the-art
   automatic cryptography known from areas like TLS to electronic mail
   (email) communication. pEp is determined to evolve the existing
   standards as fundamentally and comprehensively as needed to gain easy
   implementation and integration, and for easy use for regular Internet
   users. pEp for email wants to attain to good security practice while
   still retaining backward compatibility for implementations
   widespread.

   To provide the required stability as a foundation for good security
   practice, pEp for email defines a fixed MIME structure for its
   innermost message structure, so to remove most attack vectors which
   have permitted the numerous EFAIL vulnerabilities.  (TBD: ref)

   Security comes just next after privacy in pEp, for which reason the
   application of signatures without encryption to messages in transit
   is not considered purposeful. pEp for email herein referenced, and
   further described in [I-D.marques-pep-email], either expects to
   transfer messages in cleartext without signature or encryption, or
   transfer them encrypted and with enclosed signature and necessary
   public keys so that replies can be immediately upgraded to encrypted
   messages.

   The pEp message format is equivalent to the S/MIME standard in
   ensuring header protection, in that the whole message is protected



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   instead, by wrapping it and providing cryptographic services to the
   whole original message.  The pEp message format is different compared
   to the S/MIME standard in that the pEp protocols propose
   opportunistic End-to-End security and signature, by allowing the
   transport of the necessary public key material along with the
   original messages.

   For the purpose of allowing the insertion of such public keys, the
   root entity of the protected message is thus nested once more into an
   additional multipart/mixed MIME entity.  The current pEp proposal is
   for PGP/MIME, while an extension to S/MIME is next.

   pEp's proposal is strict in that it requires that the cryptographic
   services applied to the protected message MUST include encryption.
   It also mandates a fixed MIME structure for the protected message,
   which always MUST include a plaintext and optionally an HTML
   representation (if HTML is used) of the same message, and requires
   that all other optional elements to be eventually presented as
   attachments.  Alternatively the whole protected message could
   represent in turn a wrapped pEp wrapper, which makes the message
   structure fully recursive on purpose (e.g., for the purpose of
   anonymization through onion routing).

   For the purpose of implementing mixnet routing for email, it is
   foreseen to nest pEp messages recursively.  A protected message can
   in turn contain a protected message due for forwarding.  This is for
   the purpose to increase privacy and counter the necessary leakage of
   plaintext addressing in the envelope of the email.

   The recursive nature of the pEp message format allows for the
   implementation of progressive disclosure of the necessary transport
   relevant header fields just as-needed to the next mail transport
   agents along the transmission path.

Appendix B.  Document Changelog

   [[ RFC Editor: This section is to be removed before publication ]]

   o  draft-luck-lamps-pep-header-protection-03

      *  Remove Use Cases / Requirements sections (move to new doc)

      *  Adjust title of the document

      *  Added note on implementation done of forwarded=no

   o  draft-luck-lamps-pep-header-protection-02




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      *  Add Privacy and IANA Considerations sections

      *  Added / Adjusted requirements

   o  draft-luck-lamps-pep-header-protection-01

      *  Major rewrite and update of whole document

   o  draft-luck-lamps-pep-header-protection-00

      *  Initial version

Appendix C.  Open Issues

   [[ RFC Editor: This section should be empty and is to be removed
   before publication. ]]

   o  Align with specification for MIME Content-Type message/partial

      *  We probably have issues and overlapping specifications about
         encoding for nested message/rfc822 entities, specified in
         [RFC2046].  Further study is needed to find and understand the
         issues.

Author's Address

   Claudio Luck
   pEp Foundation
   Oberer Graben 4
   CH-8400 Winterthur
   Switzerland

   Email: claudio.luck@pep.foundation
   URI:   https://pep.foundation/

















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