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Versions: 00 01 02

Network Working Group                                          N. Madden
Internet-Draft                                                 ForgeRock
Intended status: Standards Track                         August 13, 2019
Expires: February 14, 2020


         Public Key Authenticated Encryption for JOSE: ECDH-1PU
                     draft-madden-jose-ecdh-1pu-02

Abstract

   This document describes the ECDH-1PU public key authenticated
   encryption algorithm for JWE.  The algorithm is similar to the
   existing ECDH-ES encryption algorithm, but adds an additional ECDH
   key agreement between static keys of the sender and recipient.  This
   additional step allows the recipient to be assured of sender
   authenticity without requiring a nested signed-then-encrypted message
   structure.

Status of This Memo

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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of



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   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Requirements Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Key Agreement with Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman One-Pass
       Unified Model (ECDH-1PU)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.1.  Header Parameters used for ECDH Key Agreement . . . . . .   4
       2.1.1.  "skid" Header Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.2.  Key Derivation for ECDH-1PU Key Agreement . . . . . . . .   5
   3.  IANA considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.1.  JSON Web Signature and Encryption Algorithms Registration   6
       3.1.1.  ECDH-1PU  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     3.2.  JSON Web Signature and Encryption Header Parameters
           Registration  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       3.2.1.  skid  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   4.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   5.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     5.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     5.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   Appendix A.  Example ECDH-1PU Key Agreement Computation with
                A256GCM  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   Appendix B.  Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12

1.  Introduction

   JSON Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE) defines a number of
   encryption (JWE) [RFC7516] and digital signature (JWS) [RFC7515]
   algorithms.  When symmetric cryptography is used, JWE provides
   authenticated encryption that ensures both confidentiality and sender
   authentication.  However, for public key cryptography the existing
   JWE encryption algorithms provide only confidentiality and some level
   of ciphertext integrity.  When sender authentication is required,
   users must resort to nested signed-then-encrypted structures, which
   increases the overhead and size of resulting messages.  This document
   describes an alternative encryption algorithm called ECDH-1PU that
   provides public key authenticated encryption, allowing the benefits
   of authenticated encryption to be enjoyed for public key JWE as it
   currently is for symmetric cryptography.

   ECDH-1PU is based on the One-Pass Unified Model for Elliptic Curve
   Diffie-Hellman key agreement described in [NIST.800-56A].






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   The advantages of public key authenticated encryption with ECDH-1PU
   compared to using nested signed-then-encrypted documents include the
   following:

   o  The resulting message size is more compact as an additional layer
      of headers and base64url-encoding is avoided.  A 500-byte payload
      when encrypted and authenticated with ECDH-1PU (with P-256 keys
      and "A256GCM" Content Encryption Method) results in a 1087-byte
      JWE in Compact Encoding.  An equivalent nested signed-then-
      encrypted JOSE message using the same keys and encryption method
      is 1489 bytes (37% larger).

   o  The same primitives are used for both confidentiality and
      authenticity, providing savings in code size for constrained
      environments.

   o  The generic composition of signatures and public key encryption
      involves a number of subtle details that are essential to security
      [PKAE].  Providing a dedicated algorithm for public key
      authenticated encryption reduces complexity for users of JOSE
      libraries.

   o  ECDH-1PU provides only authenticity and not the stronger security
      properties of non-repudiation or third-party verifiability.  This
      can be an advantage in applications where privacy, anonymity, or
      plausible deniability are goals.

1.1.  Requirements Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as
   shown here.

2.  Key Agreement with Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman One-Pass Unified
    Model (ECDH-1PU)

   This section defines the specifics of key agreement with Elliptic
   Curve Diffie-Hellman One-Pass Unified Model, in combination with the
   one-step KDF, as defined in Section 5.8.2.1 of [NIST.800-56A] using
   the Concatenation Format of Section 5.8.2.1.1.  This is identical to
   the ConcatKDF function used by the existing JWE ECDH-ES algorithm
   defined in Section 4.6 of [RFC7518].  As for ECDH-ES, the key
   agreement result can be used in one of two ways:

   1.  directly as the Content Encryption Key (CEK) for the "enc"
       algorithm, in the Direct Key Agreement mode, or



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   2.  as a symmetric key used to wrap the CEK with the "A128KW",
       "A192KW", or "A256KW" algorithms, in the Key Agreement with Key
       Wrapping mode.

   A new ephemeral public key value MUST be generated for each key
   agreement operation.

   In Direct Key Agreement mode, the output of the KDF MUST be a key of
   the same length as that used by the "enc" algorithm.  In this case,
   the empty octet sequence is used as the JWE Encrypted Key value.  The
   "alg" (algorithm) Header Parameter value "ECDH-1PU" is used in Direct
   Key Agreement mode.

   In Key Agreement with Key Wrapping mode, the output of the KDF MUST
   be a key of the length needed for the specified key wrapping
   algorithm.  In this case, the JWE Encrypted Key is the CEK wrapped
   with the agreed-upon key.

   The following "alg" (algorithm) Header Parameter values are used to
   indicate the JWE Encrypted Key is the result of encrypting the CEK
   using the result of the key agreement algorithm as the key encryption
   key for the corresponding key wrapping algorithm:

   +-----------------+-------------------------------------------------+
   | "alg" Param     | Key Management Algorithm                        |
   | Value           |                                                 |
   +-----------------+-------------------------------------------------+
   | ECDH-1PU+A128KW | ECDH-1PU using one-pass KDF and CEK wrapped     |
   |                 | with "A128KW"                                   |
   | ECDH-1PU+A192KW | ECDH-1PU using one-pass KDF and CEK wrapped     |
   |                 | with "A192KW"                                   |
   | ECDH-1PU+A256KW | ECDH-1PU using one-pass KDF and CEK wrapped     |
   |                 | with "A256KW"                                   |
   +-----------------+-------------------------------------------------+

2.1.  Header Parameters used for ECDH Key Agreement

   The "epk" (ephemeral public key), "apu" (Agreement PartyUInfo), and
   "apv" (Agreement PartyVInfo) header parameters are used in ECDH-1PU
   exactly as defined in Section 4.6.1 of [RFC7518].

   When no other values are supplied, it is RECOMMENDED that the
   producer software initializes the "apu" header to the base64url-
   encoding of the SHA-256 hash of the concatenation of the sender's
   static public key and the ephemeral public key, and the "apv" header
   to the base64url-encoding of the SHA-256 hash of the recipient's
   static public key.  This ensures that all keys involved in the key
   agreement are cryptographically bound to the derived keys.



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2.1.1.  "skid" Header Parameter

   A new Header Parameter "skid" (Sender Key ID) is registered as a hint
   as to which of the sender's keys was used to authenticate the JWE.
   The structure of the "skid" value is unspecified.  Its value MUST be
   a case-sensitive string.  Use of this Header Parameter is OPTIONAL.
   When used with a JWK, the "skid" value is used to match a JWK "kid"
   parameter value [RFC7517].

2.2.  Key Derivation for ECDH-1PU Key Agreement

   The key derivation process derives the agreed-upon key from the
   shared secret Z established through the ECDH algorithm, per
   Section 6.2.1.2 of [NIST.800-56A].  For the NIST prime order curves
   "P-256", "P-384", and "P-521", the ECC CDH primitive for cofactor
   Diffie-Hellman defined in Section 5.7.1.2 of [NIST.800-56A] is used
   (taking note that the cofactor for all these curves is 1).  For
   curves "X25519" and "X448" the appropriate ECDH primitive from
   Section 5 of [RFC7748] is used.

   Key derivation is performed using the one-step KDF, as defined in
   Section 5.8.1 and Section 5.8.2.1 of [NIST.800-56A] using the
   Concatenation Format of Section 5.8.2.1.1, where the Auxilary
   Function H is SHA-256.  The KDF parameters are set as follows:

   Z  This is set to the representation of the shared secret Z as an
      octet sequence.  As per Section 6.2.1.2 of [NIST.800-56A] Z is the
      concatenation of Ze and Zs, where Ze is the shared secret derived
      from applying the ECDH primitive to the sender's ephemeral private
      key and the recipient's static public key.  Zs is the shared
      secret derived from applying the ECDH primitive to the sender's
      static private key and the recipient's static public key.

   keydatalen  This is set to the number of bits in the desired output
      key.  For "ECDH-1PU", this is the length of the key used by the
      "enc" algorithm.  For "ECDH-1PU+A128KW", "ECDH-1PU+A192KW", and
      "ECDH-1PU+A256KW", this is 128, 192, and 256, respectively.

   AlgorithmID  The AlgorithmID values is of the form Datalen || Data,
      where Data is a variable-length string of zero or more octets, and
      Datalen is a fixed-length, big-endian 32-bit counter that
      indicates the length (in octets) of Data.  In the Direct Key
      Agreement case, Data is set to the octets of the ASCII
      representation of the "enc" Header Parameter value.  In the Key
      Agreement with Key Wrapping case, Data is set to the octets of the
      ASCII representation of the "alg" (algorithm) Header Parameter
      value.




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   PartyUInfo  The PartyUInfo value is of the form Datalen || Data,
      where Data is a variable-length string of zero or more octets, and
      Datalen is a fixed-length, big-endian 32-bit counter that
      indicates the length (in octets) of Data.  If an "apu" (agreement
      PartyUInfo) Header Parameter is present, Data is set to the result
      of base64url decoding the "apu" value and Datalen is set to the
      number of octets in Data.  Otherwise, Datalen is set to 0 and Data
      is set to the empty octet sequence.

   PartyVInfo  The PartyVInfo value is of the form Datalen || Data,
      where Data is a variable-length string of zero or more octets, and
      Datalen is a fixed-length, big-endian 32-bit counter that
      indicates the length (in octets) of Data.  If an "apv" (agreement
      PartyVInfo) Header Parameter is present, Data is set to the result
      of base64url decoding the "apv" value and Datalen is set to the
      number of octets in Data.  Otherwise, Datalen is set to 0 and Data
      is set to the empty octet sequence.

   SuppPubInfo  This is set to the keydatalen represented as a 32-bit
      big-endian integer.

   SuppPrivInfo  This is set to the empty octet sequence.

   Applications need to specify how the "apu" and "apv" Header
   Parameters are used for that application.  The "apu" and "apv" values
   MUST be distinct, when used.  Applications wishing to conform to
   [NIST.800-56A] need to provide values that meet the requirements of
   that doucument, e.g., by using values that identify the producer and
   consumer.

   See Appendix A for an example key agreement computation using this
   method.

3.  IANA considerations

   This section registers identifiers under the IANA JSON Web Signature
   and Encryption Algorithms Registry established by [RFC7518] and the
   IANA JSON Web Signature and Encryption Header Parameters registry
   established by [RFC7515].

3.1.  JSON Web Signature and Encryption Algorithms Registration

   This section registers JWE algorithms as per the registry established
   in [RFC7518].







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3.1.1.  ECDH-1PU

      Algorithm Name: "ECDH-1PU"
      Algorithm Description: ECDH One-Pass Unified Model using one-pass
      KDF
      Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg"
      JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional
      Change Controller: IESG
      Specification Document(s): Section 2
      Algorithm Analysis Document(s): [NIST.800-56A] (Section 7.3),
      [PKAE]

3.2.  JSON Web Signature and Encryption Header Parameters Registration

   This section registers new Header Parameters as per the registry
   established in [RFC7515].

3.2.1.  skid

      Header Parameter Name: "skid"
      Header Parameter Description: Sender Key ID
      Header Parameter Usage Location(s): JWE
      Change Controller: IESG
      Specification Document(s): Section 2.1.1

4.  Security Considerations

   The security considerations of [RFC7516] and [RFC7518] relevant to
   ECDH-ES also apply to this specification.

   The security considerations of [NIST.800-56A] apply here.

   When performing an ECDH key agreement between a static private key
   and any untrusted public key, care should be taken to ensure that the
   public key is a valid point on the same curve as the private key.
   Failure to do so may result in compromise of the static private key.
   For the NIST curves P-256, P-384, and P-521, appropriate validation
   routines are given in Section 5.6.2.3.3 of [NIST.800-56A].  For the
   curves used by X25519 and X448, consult the security considerations
   of [RFC7748].

   The ECDH-1PU algorithm is vulnerable to Key Compromise Impersonation
   (KCI) attacks.  If the long-term static private key of a party is
   compromised, then the attacker can not only impersonate that party to
   other parties, but also impersonate any other party when
   communicating with the compromised party.  If resistance to KCI is
   desired in a single message, then it is RECOMMENDED to use a nested




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   JWS signature over the content.  An interactive handshake protocol,
   such as those described in [Noise] can also be used to prevent KCI.

   When Key Agreement with Key Wrapping is used, with the same Content
   Encryption Key (CEK) reused for multiple recipients, any of those
   recipients can produce a new message that appears to come from the
   original sender.  The new message will be indistinguishable from a
   genuine message from the original sender to any of the other
   participants.  The sender SHOULD use a unique CEK for each recipient
   of a message.

   The security properties of the one-pass unified model are given in
   Section 7.3 of [NIST.800-56A].

5.  References

5.1.  Normative References

   [NIST.800-56A]
              Barker, E., Chen, L., Roginsky, A., Vassilev, A., and R.
              Davis, "Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment
              Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography Revision 3.", NIST
              Special Publication 800-56A, April 2018.

   [RFC7515]  Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
              Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May
              2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7515>.

   [RFC7516]  Jones, M. and J. Hildebrand, "JSON Web Encryption (JWE)",
              RFC 7516, DOI 10.17487/RFC7516, May 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7516>.

   [RFC7517]  Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", RFC 7517,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7517, May 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7517>.

   [RFC7518]  Jones, M., "JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)", RFC 7518,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7518, May 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7518>.

   [RFC7748]  Langley, A., Hamburg, M., and S. Turner, "Elliptic Curves
              for Security", RFC 7748, DOI 10.17487/RFC7748, January
              2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7748>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.




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5.2.  Informative References

   [Noise]    Perrin, T., "The Noise Protocol Framework, Revision 34",
              July 2018.

   [PKAE]     An, J., "Authenticated Encryption in the Public-Key
              Setting: Security Notions and Analyses", IACR ePrint
              2001/079, 2001.

Appendix A.  Example ECDH-1PU Key Agreement Computation with A256GCM

   This example uses ECDH-1PU in Direct Key Agreement mode ("alg" value
   "ECDH-1PU") to produce an agreed-upon key for AES GCM with a 256-bit
   key ("enc" value "A256GCM").  The example re-uses the keys and
   parameters of the example computation in Appendix C of [RFC7518],
   with the addition of an extra static key-pair for Alice.

   When used in this way, ECDH-1PU has similar security properties to
   the "K" one-way handshake pattern of [Noise], although it is quite
   different in details.

   In this example, a producer Alice is encrypting content to a consumer
   Bob. Alice's static key-pair (in JWK format) used for the key
   agreement in this example (including the private part) is:

         {"kty":"EC",
          "crv":"P-256",
          "x":"WKn-ZIGevcwGIyyrzFoZNBdaq9_TsqzGl96oc0CWuis",
          "y":"y77t-RvAHRKTsSGdIYUfweuOvwrvDD-Q3Hv5J0fSKbE",
          "d":"Hndv7ZZjs_ke8o9zXYo3iq-Yr8SewI5vrqd0pAvEPqg"}

   Bob's static key-pair (in JWK format) is:

         {"kty":"EC",
          "crv":"P-256",
          "x":"weNJy2HscCSM6AEDTDg04biOvhFhyyWvOHQfeF_PxMQ",
          "y":"e8lnCO-AlStT-NJVX-crhB7QRYhiix03illJOVAOyck",
          "d":"VEmDZpDXXK8p8N0Cndsxs924q6nS1RXFASRl6BfUqdw"}

   The producer (Alice) generates an ephemeral key for the key agreement
   computation.  Alice's ephemeral key (in JWK format) is:

         {"kty":"EC",
          "crv":"P-256",
          "x":"gI0GAILBdu7T53akrFmMyGcsF3n5dO7MmwNBHKW5SV0",
          "y":"SLW_xSffzlPWrHEVI30DHM_4egVwt3NQqeUD7nMFpps",
          "d":"0_NxaRPUMQoAJt50Gz8YiTr8gRTwyEaCumd-MToTmIo"}




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   Header Parameter values used in this example are as follows.  The
   "apu" (agreement PartyUInfo) Header Parameter value is the base64url
   encoding of the UTF-8 string "Alice" and the "apv" (agreement
   PartyVInfo) Header Parameter value is the base64url encoding of the
   UTF-8 string "Bob".  The "epk" (ephemeral public key) Header
   Parameter is used to communicate the producer's (Alice's) ephemeral
   public key value to the consumer (Bob).

        {"alg":"ECDH-1PU",
         "enc":"A256GCM",
         "apu":"QWxpY2U",
         "apv":"Qm9i",
         "epk":
          {"kty":"EC",
           "crv":"P-256",
           "x":"gI0GAILBdu7T53akrFmMyGcsF3n5dO7MmwNBHKW5SV0",
           "y":"SLW_xSffzlPWrHEVI30DHM_4egVwt3NQqeUD7nMFpps"
          }
        }

   The resulting one-pass KDF [NIST.800-56A] parameter values are:

   Ze This is set to the output of the ECDH key agreement between
      Alice's ephemeral private key and Bob's static public key.  In
      this example, Ze is the following octet sequence (in hexadecimal
      notation):

         9e 56 d9 1d 81 71 35 d3 72 83 42 83 bf 84 26 9c
         fb 31 6e a3 da 80 6a 48 f6 da a7 79 8c fe 90 c4

   Zs This is set to the output of the ECDH key agreement between
      Alice's static private key and Bob's static public key.  In this
      example, Zs is the following octet sequence (in hexadecimal
      notation):

         e3 ca 34 74 38 4c 9f 62 b3 0b fd 4c 68 8b 3e 7d
         41 10 a1 b4 ba dc 3c c5 4e f7 b8 12 41 ef d5 0d

   Z  This is set to the concatenation of Ze followed by Zs.  In this
      example, Z is the following octet sequence (in hexadecimal
      notation):

         9e 56 d9 1d 81 71 35 d3 72 83 42 83 bf 84 26 9c
         fb 31 6e a3 da 80 6a 48 f6 da a7 79 8c fe 90 c4
         e3 ca 34 74 38 4c 9f 62 b3 0b fd 4c 68 8b 3e 7d
         41 10 a1 b4 ba dc 3c c5 4e f7 b8 12 41 ef d5 0d





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   keydatalen  This value is 256 - the number of bits in the desired
      output key (because "A256GCM" uses a 256-bit key).
   AlgorithmID  This is set to the octets representing the 32-bit big-
      endian value 7 - 00 00 00 07 in hexadecimal notation - the number
      of octets in the AlgorithmID content "A256GCM", followed by the
      octets representing the ASCII string "A256GCM" - 41 32 35 36 47 43
      4d (in hex).  The complete value is therefore: 00 00 00 07 41 32
      35 36 47 43 4d
   PartyUInfo  This is set to the octets representing the 32-bit big-
      endian value 5, followed by the octets representing the UTF-8
      string "Alice".  In hexadecimal notation: 00 00 00 05 41 6c 69 63
      65
   PartyVInfo  This is set to the octets representing the 32-bit big-
      endian value 3, followed by the octets representing the UTF-8
      string "Bob".  In hexadecimal notation: 00 00 00 03 42 6f 62
   SuppPubInfo  This is set to the octets representing the 32-bit big-
      endian value 256 - the keydatalen value.  In hexadecimal notation:
      00 00 01 00
   SuppPrivInfo  This is set to the empty octet sequence.

   Concatenating the parameters AlgorithmID through SuppPrivInfo results
   in a FixedInfo value in Concatenation Format (as per
   Section 5.8.2.1.1 of [NIST.800-56A]) of (in hexidecimal notation):

         00 00 00 07 41 32 35 36 47 43 4d 00 00 00 05 41
         6c 69 63 65 00 00 00 03 42 6f 62 00 00 01 00

   Concatenating the round number 1 (00 00 00 01), Z, and the FixedInfo
   value results in a one-pass KDF round 1 hash input of (hexadecimal):

         00 00 00 01 9e 56 d9 1d 81 71 35 d3 72 83 42 83
         bf 84 26 9c fb 31 6e a3 da 80 6a 48 f6 da a7 79
         8c fe 90 c4 e3 ca 34 74 38 4c 9f 62 b3 0b fd 4c
         68 8b 3e 7d 41 10 a1 b4 ba dc 3c c5 4e f7 b8 12
         41 ef d5 0d 00 00 00 07 41 32 35 36 47 43 4d 00
         00 00 05 41 6c 69 63 65 00 00 00 03 42 6f 62 00
         00 01 00

   The resulting derived key, which is the full 256 bits of the round 1
   hash output is:

         6c af 13 72 3d 14 85 0a d4 b4 2c d6 dd e9 35 bf
         fd 2f ff 00 a9 ba 70 de 05 c2 03 a5 e1 72 2c a7

   The base64url-encoded representation of this derived key is:

         bK8Tcj0UhQrUtCzW3ek1v_0v_wCpunDeBcIDpeFyLKc




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Internet-Draft                JOSE ECDH-1PU                  August 2019


Appendix B.  Document History

   -02  Removed two-way interactive handshake protocol section and
      example after discussion with Hannes Tschofenig.
   -01  Added examples in Appendix A and a two-way handshake example.
      Added "skid" Header Parameter and registration.  Fleshed out
      Security Considerations.

Author's Address

   Neil Madden
   ForgeRock
   Broad Quay House
   Prince Street
   Bristol  BS1 4DJ
   United Kingdom

   Email: neil.madden@forgerock.com

































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