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Versions: 00 01 02

Network Working Group                                        J. Mattsson
Internet-Draft                                               J. Fornehed
Intended status: Standards Track                             G. Selander
Expires: May 31, 2017                                       F. Palombini
                                                                Ericsson
                                                       November 27, 2016


                    Controlling Actuators with CoAP
                 draft-mattsson-core-coap-actuators-02

Abstract

   Being able to trust information from sensors and to securely control
   actuators is essential in a world of connected and networking things
   interacting with the physical world.  In this memo we show that just
   using COAP with a security protocol like DTLS, TLS, or OSCOAP is not
   enough.  We describe several serious attacks any on-path attacker can
   do, and discusses tougher requirements and mechanisms to mitigate the
   attacks.  While this document is focused on actuators, one of the
   attacks applies equally well to sensors using DTLS.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on May 31, 2017.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents



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   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.1.  The Block Attack  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.2.  The Request Delay Attack  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.3.  The Response Delay and Mismatch Attack  . . . . . . . . .   7
     2.4.  The Relay Attack  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   3.  The Repeat Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   4.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   6.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   7.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     7.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     7.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14

1.  Introduction

   Being able to trust information from sensors and to securely control
   actuators is essential in a world of connected and networking things
   interacting with the physical world.  One protocol used to interact
   with sensors and actuators is the Constrained Application Protocol
   (CoAP) [RFC7252].  Any Internet-of-Things (IoT) deployment valuing
   security and privacy would use a security protocol such as DTLS
   [RFC6347], TLS [RFC5246], or OSCOAP
   [I-D.selander-ace-object-security] to protect CoAP, where the choice
   of security protocol depends on the transport protocol and the
   presence of intermediaries.  The use of CoAP over UDP and DTLS is
   specified in [RFC6347] and the use of CoAP over TCP and TLS is
   specified in [I-D.ietf-core-coap-tcp-tls].  OSCOAP protects CoAP end-
   to-end with the use of COSE [I-D.ietf-cose-msg] and the CoAP Object-
   Security option [I-D.selander-ace-object-security], and can therefore
   be used over any transport.  In this document we show that protecting
   CoAP with a security protocol is not enough to securely control
   actuators.  We describe several serious attacks any on-path attacker
   (i.e. not only "trusted" intermediaries) can do, and discusses
   tougher requirements and mechanisms to mitigate the attacks.  The
   request delay attack (valid for DTLS, TLS, and OSCOAP and described
   in Section 2.2) lets an attacker control an actuator at a much later
   time than the client anticipated.  The response delay and mismatch
   attack (valid for DTLS and described in Section 2.3) lets an attacker



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   respond to a client with a response meant for an older request.  In
   Section 3, a new CoAP Option, the Repeat Option, mitigating the delay
   attack in specified.

2.  Attacks

   Internet-of-Things (IoT) deployments valuing security and privacy,
   MUST use a security protocol such as DTLS, TLS, or OSCOAP to protect
   CoAP.  This is especially true for deployments of actuators where
   attacks often (but not always) have serious consequences.  The
   attacks described in this section are made under the assumption that
   CoAP is already protected with a security protocol such as DTLS, TLS,
   or OSCOAP, as an attacker otherwise can easily forge false requests
   and responses.

2.1.  The Block Attack

   An on-path attacker can block the delivery of any number of requests
   or responses.  The attack can also be performed by an attacker
   jamming the lower layer radio protocol.  This is true even if a
   security protocol like DTLS, TLS, or OSCOAP is used.  Encryption
   makes selective blocking of messages harder, but not impossible or
   even infeasible.  With DTLS and TLS, proxies have access to the
   complete CoAP message, and with OSCOAP, the CoAP header and several
   CoAP options are not encrypted.  In both security protocols, the IP-
   addresses, ports, and CoAP message lengths are available to all on-
   path attackers, which may be enough to determine the server,
   resource, and command.  The block attack is illustrated in Figure 1
   and 2.

                 Client   Foe   Server
                    |      |      |
                    +----->X      |      Code: 0.03 (PUT)
                    | PUT  |      |     Token: 0x47
                    |      |      |  Uri-Path: lock
                    |      |      |   Payload: 1 (Lock)
                    |      |      |

                 Figure 1: Blocking a Request

   Where 'X' means the attacker is blocking delivery of the message.










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               Client   Foe   Server
                  |      |      |
                  +------------>|      Code: 0.03 (PUT)
                  |      | PUT  |     Token: 0x47
                  |      |      |  Uri-Path: lock
                  |      |      |   Payload: 1 (Lock)
                  |      |      |
                  |      X<-----+      Code: 2.04 (Changed)
                  |      | 2.04 |     Token: 0x47
                  |      |      |

               Figure 2: Blocking a Response

   While blocking requests to, or responses from, a sensor is just a
   denial of service attack, blocking a request to, or a response from,
   an actuator results in the client losing information about the
   server's status.  If the actuator e.g. is a lock (door, car, etc.),
   the attack results in the client not knowing (except by using out-of-
   band information) whether the lock is unlocked or locked, just like
   the observer in the famous Schrodinger's cat thought experiment.  Due
   to the nature of the attack, the client cannot distinguish the attack
   from connectivity problems, offline servers, or unexpected behavior
   from middle boxes such as NATs and firewalls.

   Remedy: Any IoT deployment of actuators where confirmation is
   important MUST notify the user upon reception of the response, or
   warn the user when a response is not received.

2.2.  The Request Delay Attack

   An on-path attacker may not only block packets, but can also delay
   the delivery of any packet (request or response) by a chosen amount
   of time.  If CoAP is used over a reliable and ordered transport such
   as TCP with TLS or OSCOAP, no messages can be delivered before the
   delayed message.  If CoAP is used over an unreliable and unordered
   transport such as UDP with DTLS, or OSCOAP, other messages can be
   delivered before the delayed message as long as the delayed packet is
   delivered inside the replay window.  When CoAP is used over UDP, both
   DTLS and OSCOAP allow out-of-order delivery and uses sequence numbers
   together with a replay window to protect against replay attacks.  The
   replay window has a default length of 64 in both DTLS and OSCOAP.
   The attacker can control the replay window by blocking some or all
   other packets.  By first delaying a request, and then later, after
   delivery, blocking the response to the request, the client is not
   made aware of the delayed delivery except by the missing response.
   The server has in general, no way of knowing that the request was
   delayed and will therefore happily process the request.




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   If some wireless low-level protocol is used, the attack can also be
   performed by the attacker simultaneously recording what the client
   transmits while at the same time jamming the server.  The request
   delay attack is illustrated in Figure 3.

                Client   Foe   Server
                   |      |      |
                   +----->@      |      Code: 0.03 (PUT)
                   | PUT  |      |     Token: 0x9c
                   |      |      |  Uri-Path: lock
                   |      |      |   Payload: 0 (Unlock)
                   |      |      |
                     ....   ....
                   |      |      |
                   |      @----->|      Code: 0.03 (PUT)
                   |      | PUT  |     Token: 0x9c
                   |      |      |  Uri-Path: lock
                   |      |      |   Payload: 0 (Unlock)
                   |      |      |
                   |      X<-----+      Code: 2.04 (Changed)
                   |      | 2.04 |     Token: 0x9c
                   |      |      |

               Figure 3: Delaying a Request

   Where '@' means the attacker is storing and later forwarding the
   message (@ may alternatively be seen as a wormhole connecting two
   points in time).

   While an attacker delaying a request to a sensor is often not a
   security problem, an attacker delaying a request to an actuator
   performing an action is often a serious problem.  A request to an
   actuator (for example a request to unlock a lock) is often only meant
   to be valid for a short time frame, and if the request does not reach
   the actuator during this short timeframe, the request should not be
   fulfilled.  In the unlock example, if the client does not get any
   response and does not physically see the lock opening, the user is
   likely to walk away, calling the locksmith (or the IT-support).

   If a non-zero replay window is used (the default when CoAP is used
   over UDP), the attacker can let the client interact with the actuator
   before delivering the delayed request to the server (illustrated in
   Figure 4).  In the lock example, the attacker may store the first
   "unlock" request for later use.  The client will likely resend the
   request with the same token.  If DTLS is used, the resent packet will
   have a different sequence number and the attacker can forward it.  If
   OSCOAP is used, resent packets will have the same sequence number and
   the attacker must block them all until the client sends a new message



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   with a new sequence number (not shown in Figure 4).  After a while
   when the client has locked the door again, the attacker can deliver
   the delayed "unlock" message to the door, a very serious attack.

                Client   Foe   Server
                   |      |      |
                   +----->@      |      Code: 0.03 (PUT)
                   | PUT  |      |     Token: 0x9c
                   |      |      |  Uri-Path: lock
                   |      |      |   Payload: 0 (Unlock)
                   |      |      |
                   +------------>|      Code: 0.03 (PUT)
                   | PUT  |      |     Token: 0x9c
                   |      |      |  Uri-Path: lock
                   |      |      |   Payload: 0 (Unlock)
                   |      |      |
                   <-------------+      Code: 2.04 (Changed)
                   |      | 2.04 |     Token: 0x9c
                   |      |      |
                     ....   ....
                   |      |      |
                   +------------>|      Code: 0.03 (PUT)
                   | PUT  |      |     Token: 0x7a
                   |      |      |  Uri-Path: lock
                   |      |      |   Payload: 1 (Lock)
                   |      |      |
                   <-------------+      Code: 2.04 (Changed)
                   |      | 2.04 |     Token: 0x7a
                   |      |      |
                   |      @----->|      Code: 0.03 (PUT)
                   |      | PUT  |     Token: 0x9c
                   |      |      |  Uri-Path: lock
                   |      |      |   Payload: 0 (Unlock)
                   |      |      |
                   |      X<-----+      Code: 2.04 (Changed)
                   |      | 2.04 |     Token: 0x9c
                   |      |      |

               Figure 4: Delaying Request with Reordering

   While the second attack (Figure 4) can be mitigated by using a replay
   window of length zero, the first attack (Figure 3) cannot.  A
   solution must enable the server to verify that the request was
   received within a certain time frame after it was sent.  This can be
   accomplished with either a challenge-response pattern, by exchanging
   timestamps, or by only allowing requests a short period after client
   authentication.  Requiring a fresh client authentication (such as a
   new TLS/DTLS handshake or an EDHOC key exchange



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   [I-D.selander-ace-cose-ecdhe]) mitigates the problem, but requires
   larger messages and more processing than a dedicated solution.
   Security solutions based on timestamps require exactly synchronized
   time, and this is hard to control with complications such as time
   zones and daylight saving.  Even if the clocks are synchronized at
   one point in time, they may easily get out-of-sync and an attacker
   may even be able to affect the client or the server time in various
   ways such as setting up a fake NTP server, broadcasting false time
   signals to radio controlled clocks, or expose one of them to a strong
   gravity field.  As soon as client falsely believes it is time
   synchronized with the server, delay attacks are possible.  A
   challenge response mechanism is much more failure proof and easy to
   analyze.  The challenge and response may be sent in a CoAP option or
   in the CoAP payload.  One such mechanism, the CoAP Replay Option, is
   specified in Section 3.

   Remedy: The CoAP Replay Option specified in Section 3 SHALL be used
   for controlling actuators unless another application specific
   challenge-response or timestamp mechanism is used.

2.3.  The Response Delay and Mismatch Attack

   The following attack can be performed if CoAP is protected by a
   security protocol where the response is not bound to the request in
   any way except by the CoAP token.  This would include most general
   security protocols, such as DTLS and IPsec, but not OSCOAP.  The
   attacker performs the attack by delaying delivery of a response until
   the client sends a request with the same token.  As long as the
   response is inside the replay window (which the attacker can make
   sure by blocking later responses), the response will be accepted by
   the client as a valid response to the later request.  CoAP [RFC7252]
   uses a client generated token that the server echoes to match
   responses to request, but does not give any guidelines for the use of
   token with DTLS, except that the tokens currently "in use" SHOULD
   (not SHALL) be unique.

   The attack can be performed by an attacker on the wire, or an
   attacker simultaneously recording what the server transmits while at
   the same time jamming the client.  The response delay and mismatch
   attack is illustrated in Figure 5.











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             Client   Foe   Server
                |      |      |
                +------------>|      Code: 0.03 (PUT)
                | PUT  |      |     Token: 0x77
                |      |      |  Uri-Path: lock
                |      |      |   Payload: 0 (Unlock)
                |      |      |
                |      @<-----+      Code: 2.04 (Changed)
                |      | 2.04 |     Token: 0x77
                |      |      |
                  ....   ....
                |      |      |
                +----->X      |      Code: 0.03 (PUT)
                | PUT  |      |     Token: 0x77
                |      |      |  Uri-Path: lock
                |      |      |   Payload: 0 (Lock)
                |      |      |
                <------@      |      Code: 2.04 (Changed)
                | 2.04 |      |     Token: 0x77
                |      |      |

            Figure 5: Delaying and Mismatching Response to PUT

   If we once again take a lock as an example, the security consequences
   may be severe as the client receives a response message likely to be
   interpreted as confirmation of a locked door, while the received
   response message is in fact confirming an earlier unlock of the door.
   As the client is likely to leave the (believed to be locked) door
   unattended, the attacker may enter the home, enterprise, or car
   protected by the lock.

   The same attack may be performed on sensors, also this with serious
   consequences.  As illustrated in Figure 6, an attacker may convince
   the client that the lock is locked, when it in fact is not.  The
   "Unlock" request may be also be sent by another client authorized to
   control the lock.















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             Client   Foe   Server
                |      |      |
                +------------>|      Code: 0.01 (GET)
                | GET  |      |     Token: 0x77
                |      |      |  Uri-Path: lock
                |      |      |
                |      @<-----+      Code: 2.05 (Content)
                |      | 2.05 |     Token: 0x77
                |      |      |   Payload: 1 (Locked)
                |      |      |
                +------------>|      Code: 0.03 (PUT)
                | PUT  |      |     Token: 0x34
                |      |      |  Uri-Path: lock
                |      |      |   Payload: 1 (Unlock)
                |      |      |
                |      X<-----+      Code: 2.04 (Changed)
                |      | 2.04 |     Token: 0x34
                |      |      |
                +----->X      |      Code: 0.01 (GET)
                | GET  |      |     Token: 0x77
                |      |      |  Uri-Path: lock
                |      |      |
                <------@      |      Code: 2.05 (Content)
                | 2.05 |      |     Token: 0x77
                |      |      |   Payload: 1 (Locked)
                |      |      |

            Figure 6: Delaying and Mismatching Response to GET

   As illustrated in Figure 7, an attacker may even mix responses from
   different resources as long as the two resources share the same DTLS
   connection on some part of the path towards the client.  This can
   happen if the resources are located behind a common gateway, or are
   served by the same CoAP proxy.  An on-path attacker (not necessarily
   a DTLS endpoint such as a proxy) may e.g. deceive a client that the
   living room is on fire by responding with an earlier delayed response
   from the oven (temperatures in degree Celsius).














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       Client   Foe   Server
          |      |      |
          +------------>|      Code: 0.01 (GET)
          | GET  |      |     Token: 0x77
          |      |      |  Uri-Path: oven/temperature
          |      |      |
          |      @<-----+      Code: 2.05 (Content)
          |      | 2.05 |     Token: 0x77
          |      |      |   Payload: 225
          |      |      |
            ....   ....
          |      |      |
          +----->X      |      Code: 0.01 (GET)
          | GET  |      |     Token: 0x77
          |      |      |  Uri-Path: livingroom/temperature
          |      |      |
          <------@      |      Code: 2.05 (Content)
          | 2.05 |      |     Token: 0x77
          |      |      |   Payload: 225
          |      |      |

      Figure 7: Delaying and Mismatching Response from other resource

   Remedy: If CoAP is protected with a security protocol not providing
   bindings between requests and responses (e.g.  DTLS) the client MUST
   NOT reuse any tokens for a given source/destination which the client
   has not received responses to.  The easiest way to accomplish this is
   to implement the token as a counter and never reuse any tokens at
   all, this approach SHOULD be followed.

2.4.  The Relay Attack

   Yet another type of attack can be performed in deployments where
   actuator actions are triggered automatically based on proximity and
   without any user interaction, e.g. a car (the client) constantly
   polling for the car key (the server) and unlocking both doors and
   engine as soon as the car key responds.  An attacker (or pair of
   attackers) may simply relay the CoAP messages out-of-band, using for
   examples some other radio technology.  By doing this, the actuator
   (i.e. the car) believes that the client is close by and performs
   actions based on that false assumption.  The attack is illustrated in
   Figure 8.  In this example the car is using an application specific
   challenge-response mechanism transferred as CoAP payloads.








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   Client   Foe         Foe   Server
      |      |           |      |
      +----->| ......... +----->|      Code: 0.02 (POST)
      | POST |           | POST |     Token: 0x3a
      |      |           |      |  Uri-Path: lock
      |      |           |      |   Payload: JwePR2iCe8b0ux (Challenge)
      |      |           |      |
      |<-----+ ......... |<-----+      Code: 2.04 (Changed)
      | 2.04 |           | 2.04 |     Token: 0x3a
      |      |           |      |   Payload: RM8i13G8D5vfXK (Response)
      |      |           |      |

         Figure 8: Relay Attack (the client is the actuator)

   The consequences may be severe, and in the case of a car, lead to the
   attacker unlocking and driving away with the car, an attack that
   unfortunately is happening in practice.

   Remedy: Getting a response over a short-range radio MUST NOT be taken
   as proof of proximity and therefore MUST NOT be used to take actions
   based on such proximity.  Any automatically triggered mechanisms
   relying on proximity MUST use other stronger mechanisms to guarantee
   proximity.  Mechanisms that MAY be used are: measuring the round-trip
   time and calculate the maximum possible distance based on the speed
   of light, or using radio with an extremely short range like NFC
   (centimeters instead of meters).  Another option is to including
   geographical coordinates (from e.g.  GPS) in the messages and
   calculate proximity based on these, but in this case the location
   measurements MUST be very precise and the system MUST make sure that
   an attacker cannot influence the location estimation, something that
   is very hard in practice.

3.  The Repeat Option

   The Repeat Option is a challenge-response mechanism for CoAP, binding
   a resent request to an earlier 4.03 forbidden response.  The
   challenge (for the client) is simply to echo the Repeat Option value
   in a new request.  The Repeat Option enables the server to verify the
   freshness of a request, thus mitigating the Delay Attack described in
   Section 2.2.  An example message flow is illustrated in Figure 9.











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                Client  Server
                   |      |
                   +----->|        Code: 0.03 (PUT)
                   | PUT  |       Token: 0x41
                   |      |    Uri-Path: lock
                   |      |     Payload: 0 (Unlock)
                   |      |
                   |<-----+ t0     Code: 4.03 (Forbidden)
                   | 4.03 |       Token: 0x41
                   |      |      Repeat: 0x6c880d41167ba807
                   |      |
                   +----->| t1     Code: 0.03 (PUT)
                   | PUT  |       Token: 0x42
                   |      |    Uri-Path: lock
                   |      |      Repeat: 0x6c880d41167ba807
                   |      |     Payload: 0 (Unlock)
                   |      |
                   |<-----+        Code: 2.04 (Changed)
                   | 2.04 |       Token: 0x42
                   |      |

                Figure 9: The Repeat Option

   The Repeat Option may be used for all Methods and Response Codes.  In
   responses, the value MUST be a (pseudo-)random bit string with a
   length of at least 64 bits.  A new (pseudo-)random bit string MUST be
   generated for each response.  In requests, the Repeat Option MUST
   echo the value from a previously received response.

   The Repeat Option is critical, Safe-to-Forward, not part of the
   Cache-Key, and not repeatable.

   Upon receiving a request without the Repeat Option to a resource with
   freshness requirements, the server sends a 4.03 Forbidden response
   with a Repeat Option and stores the option value and the response
   transmit time t0.

   Upon receiving a 4.03 Forbidden response with the Repeat Option, the
   client SHOULD resend the request, echoing the Repeat Option value.

   Upon receiving a request with the Repeat Option, the server verifies
   that the option value equals the previously sent value; otherwise the
   request is not processed further.  The server calculates the round-
   trip time RTT = (t1 - t0), where t1 is the request receive time.  The
   server MUST only accept requests with a round-trip time below a
   certain threshold T, i.e. RTT < T, otherwise the request is not
   processed further, and an error message MAY be send.  The threshold T
   is application specific.



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   EDITORS NOTE: The mechanism described above is secure and gives the
   server freshness guarantee independently of what the client does.
   The disadvantages are that the mechanism always takes two round-trips
   and that the server has to save the option value and the time t0.
   Two different solutions involving time overcomes these disadvantages:

   o  The server may simply send the client the current time in its
      timescale, i.e. a timestamp (option value = t0).  The client may
      then use this timestamp to estimate the current time in the
      servers timescale when sending future requests (i.e. not echoing).
      This approach has the benefit of reducing round-trips and server
      state, but has the security problems discussed in Section 2.2.

   o  The server may instead of a pseudorandom value send an encrypted
      timestamp (option value = E(k, t0)).  CTR-mode would from a
      security point be like sending (value = t0).  ECB-mode or CCM-mode
      would work, but would expand the value length.  With CCM, the
      server might also bind the option value to request (value =
      AEAD(k, t0, parts of request)).  This approach does not reduce the
      number of round-trips but eliminates server state.

   TODO: Update the Repeat Option to use a combination of these two
   solutions instead.

4.  IANA Considerations

   This document defines the following Option Number, whose value have
   been assigned to the CoAP Option Numbers Registry defined by
   [RFC7252].

                       +--------+------------------+
                       | Number | Name             |
                       +--------+------------------+
                       |     29 | Repeat           |
                       +--------+------------------+

5.  Security Considerations

   The whole document can be seen as security considerations for CoAP.

6.  Acknowledgements

   The authors would like to thank Carsten Bormann, Klaus Hartke, Ari
   Keranen, Matthias Kovatsch, Sandeep Kumar, and Andras Mehes for their
   valuable comments and feedback.






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7.  References

7.1.  Normative References

   [RFC7252]  Shelby, Z., Hartke, K., and C. Bormann, "The Constrained
              Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7252,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7252, June 2014,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7252>.

7.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.ietf-core-coap-tcp-tls]
              Bormann, C., Lemay, S., Tschofenig, H., Hartke, K.,
              Silverajan, B., and B. Raymor, "CoAP (Constrained
              Application Protocol) over TCP, TLS, and WebSockets",
              draft-ietf-core-coap-tcp-tls-05 (work in progress),
              October 2016.

   [I-D.ietf-cose-msg]
              Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)",
              draft-ietf-cose-msg-24 (work in progress), November 2016.

   [I-D.selander-ace-cose-ecdhe]
              Selander, G., Mattsson, J., and F. Palombini, "Ephemeral
              Diffie-Hellman Over COSE (EDHOC)", draft-selander-ace-
              cose-ecdhe-04 (work in progress), October 2016.

   [I-D.selander-ace-object-security]
              Selander, G., Mattsson, J., Palombini, F., and L. Seitz,
              "Object Security of CoAP (OSCOAP)", draft-selander-ace-
              object-security-06 (work in progress), October 2016.

   [RFC5246]  Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
              (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>.

   [RFC6347]  Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer
              Security Version 1.2", RFC 6347, DOI 10.17487/RFC6347,
              January 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6347>.

Authors' Addresses









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   John Mattsson
   Ericsson AB
   SE-164 80 Stockholm
   Sweden

   Email: john.mattsson@ericsson.com


   John Fornehed
   Ericsson AB
   SE-164 80 Stockholm
   Sweden

   Email: john.fornehed@ericsson.com


   Goran Selander
   Ericsson AB
   SE-164 80 Stockholm
   Sweden

   Email: goran.selander@ericsson.com


   Francesca Palombini
   Ericsson AB
   SE-164 80 Stockholm
   Sweden

   Email: francesca.palombini@ericsson.com





















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