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Versions: 00 01 02 draft-ietf-oauth-iss-auth-resp

Web Authorization Protocol                         K. Meyer zu Selhausen
Internet-Draft                                                 Hackmanit
Intended status: Standards Track                                 D. Fett
Expires: 21 May 2021                                             yes.com
                                                        17 November 2020


   OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server Issuer Identifier in Authorization
                                Response
             draft-meyerzuselhausen-oauth-iss-auth-resp-02

Abstract

   This document specifies a new parameter "iss" that is used to
   explicitly include the issuer identifier of the authorization server
   in the authorization response of an OAuth authorization flow.  If
   implemented correctly, the "iss" parameter serves as an effective
   countermeasure to "mix-up attacks".

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
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   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on 21 May 2021.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.











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   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
   and restrictions with respect to this document.  Code Components
   extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text
   as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
   provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Conventions and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Response Parameter "iss"  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.1.  Example Authorization Response  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.2.  Example Error Response  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.3.  Providing the Issuer Identifier "iss" . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.4.  Validation of the Issuer Identifier "iss" . . . . . . . .   5
   3.  Authorization Server Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   4.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   5.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     5.1.  OAuth Authorization Server Metadata . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     5.2.  OAuth Parameters Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   6.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   7.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   8.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   Appendix A.  Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10

1.  Introduction

   The OAuth authorization framework [RFC6749] allows clients to
   interact with multiple independent authorization servers under the
   control of separate entities.  Some OAuth grant types utilize the
   resource owner's user-agent to deliver the authorization server's
   response to the OAuth client.  One example of this pattern is the
   authorization response of the authorization code grant.

   The authorization response as specified in Section 4.1.2. of
   [RFC6479] does not contain any information about the identity of the
   authorization server which issued the response.  Therefore, clients
   receiving a response from the resource owner's user-agent cannot be
   sure who initially issued the response.  The lack of certainty about
   the origin of the response benefits a class of attacks called "mix-up
   attacks".






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   This type of attack is a threat to all OAuth clients that interact
   with multiple authorization servers when at least one of these
   authorization servers is under an attacker's control.  There are
   multiple ways in which an attacker can gain control over an
   authorization server supported by the client: For example, an
   authorization server could become compromised, or the attacker could
   register their own authorization server if the client supports
   multiple authorization servers and dynamic client registration
   ([RFC7591]).

   OAuth clients that interact with only one authorization server are
   not vulnerable to mix-up attacks.  However, when such clients decide
   to add support for a second authorization server in the future they
   become vulnerable and need to apply countermeasures to mix-up
   attacks.

   Mix-up attacks aim to steal an authorization code or access token by
   tricking the client into sending the authorization code or access
   token to the attacker instead of the honest authorization or resource
   server.  This marks a severe threat to the confidentiality and
   integrity of resources whose access is managed with OAuth.  A
   detailed description and different variants of the mix-up attack
   class can be found in Section 4.4. of the OAuth Security Best Current
   Practices [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics].

   This document defines a new parameter in the authorization response
   called "iss".  The "iss" parameter allows the authorization server to
   include its identity in the authorization response explicitly.  The
   client can compare the value of the "iss" parameter to the issuer
   identifier of the authorization server (e.g., retrieved from its
   metadata) it believes it is interacting with.  The "iss" parameter
   gives the client certainty about the authorization server's identity
   and enables it to send credentials such as authorization codes and
   access tokens only to the intended recipients.  Therefore, the
   implementation of the "iss" parameter serves as an effective
   countermeasure to mix-up attacks.

1.1.  Conventions and Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

   This specification uses the terms "access token", "authorization
   code", "authorization code grant", "authorization server", "resource
   server", "authorization response", "grant type", and "client" defined



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   by the OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework [RFC6749] and the term
   "issuer identifier" defined by OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server
   Metadata [RFC8414].

2.  Response Parameter "iss"

   In authorization responses to the client, including error responses,
   an authorization server supporting this specification MUST indicate
   its identity by including the "iss" parameter in the response.

   The "iss" parameter value is the issuer identifier of the
   authorization server which created the authorization response, as
   defined in [RFC8414].  Its value MUST be a URL that uses the "https"
   scheme without any query or fragment components.  If the
   authorization server provides metadata as defined in [RFC8414], the
   value of the parameter "iss" MUST be identical to the authorization
   server metadata value "issuer".

2.1.  Example Authorization Response

   The following example shows an authorization response from the
   authorization server whose issuer identifier is
   "https://honest.as.example" (extra line breaks and indentation are
   for display purposes only):

   HTTP/1.1 302 Found
   Location: https://client.example/cb?
     code=x1848ZT64p4IirMPT0R-X3141MFPTuBX-VFL_cvaplMH58
     &state=ZWVlNDBlYzA1NjdkMDNhYjg3ZjUxZjAyNGQzMTM2NzI
     &iss=https%3A%2F%2Fhonest.as.example

2.2.  Example Error Response

   The following example shows an error response from the same
   authorization server (extra line breaks and indentation are for
   display purposes only):

   HTTP/1.1 302 Found
   Location: https://client.example/cb?
     error=access_denied
     &state=ZWVlNDBlYzA1NjdkMDNhYjg3ZjUxZjAyNGQzMTM2NzI
     &iss=https%3A%2F%2Fhonest.as.example

2.3.  Providing the Issuer Identifier "iss"

   Authorization servers supporting this specification MUST provide
   their issuer identifier to enable clients to validate the "iss"
   parameter effectively.



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   For authorization servers publishing metadata according to [RFC8414],
   the following rules apply:

   *  The issuer identifier included in the server's metadata value
      "issuer" MUST be identical to the "iss" parameter's value.

   *  The server MUST indicate its support for the "iss" parameter by
      setting the metadata parameter
      "authorization_response_iss_parameter_supported", defined in
      Section 3, to "true".

   Authorization servers MAY additionally provide the issuer identifier
   to clients by any other mechanism which is outside of the scope of
   this specification.

2.4.  Validation of the Issuer Identifier "iss"

   Clients that support this specification MUST extract the value of the
   "iss" parameter from authorization responses they receive if the
   parameter is present.  Clients MUST compare the extracted and URL-
   decoded value to the issuer identifier of the authorization server
   where the authorization request was sent to.  This comparison MUST
   use simple string comparison as defined in Section 6.2.1. of
   [RFC3986].  If the value does not match the expected issuer
   identifier, clients MUST reject the authorization response and MUST
   NOT proceed with the authorization grant.  For error responses,
   clients MUST NOT assume that the error originates from the intended
   authorization server.

   More precisely, clients that interact with authorization servers
   supporting OAuth metadata [RFC8414] MUST compare the "iss" parameter
   value to the "issuer" value in the server's metadata document.  If
   OAuth metadata is not used, clients MUST use deployment-specific
   ways, for example a static configuration, to decide if the returned
   "iss" value is the expected value in the current flow (see also
   Section 4).

   If clients interact with both authorization servers supporting this
   specification and authorization servers not supporting this
   specification, clients SHOULD store the information which
   authorization server supports the "iss" parameter.  Clients MUST
   reject authorization responses without the "iss" parameter from
   authorization servers which do support the parameter according to the
   client's configuration.

   In general, clients that support this specification MAY accept
   authorization responses that do not contain the "iss" parameter or
   reject them and exclusively support authorization servers which



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   provide the "iss" parameter in the authorization response.  This
   decision is individual for every scenario and it is not in the scope
   of this specification.

   In OpenID Connect [OIDC.Core] flows where an ID Token is returned
   from the authorization endpoint, the value in the "iss" parameter
   MUST always be identical to the "iss" claim in the ID Token.

   Section 4.1.2. of [RFC6479] already mandates that clients that do not
   support this specification MUST ignore the unrecognized "iss"
   parameter.

   Note: The "JWT Secured Authorization Response Mode for OAuth 2.0
   (JARM)" [JARM] forbids the use of additional parameters in the
   authorization response.  Therefore, the "iss" parameter MUST NOT be
   used when JARM is used.  However, JARM responses contain an "iss"
   claim that provides the same protection if it is validated as
   described in Section 2.4.

3.  Authorization Server Metadata

   The following parameter for the authorization server metadata
   [RFC8414] is introduced to signal the authorization server's support
   for this specification:

   "authorization_response_iss_parameter_supported"  Boolean parameter
      indicating whether the authorization server provides the "iss"
      parameter in the authorization response as defined in Section 2.
      If omitted, the default value is false.

4.  Security Considerations

   The authorization response parameter "iss" defined in this
   specification serves as a countermeasure to mix-up attacks described
   in Section 4.4. of the OAuth Security Best Current Practices
   [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics] and in detail in "On the security of
   modern Single Sign-On Protocols: Second-Order Vulnerabilities in
   OpenID Connect" [arXiv.1508.04324] and "A Comprehensive Formal
   Security Analysis of OAuth 2.0" [arXiv.1601.01229].  The latter
   provides a formal proof of the effectiveness of the countermeasure.

   Clients MUST validate the "iss" parameter precisely as described in
   Section 2.4 and MUST NOT allow multiple authorization servers to use
   the same issuer identifier.  In particular, when authorization server
   details can be manually configured in the client, the client MUST
   ensure that the accepted "iss" values are unique for each
   authorization server.




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   The "iss" parameter enables a client to decide if an authorization
   server "expects" to be used in an OAuth flow together with a certain
   token endpoint and potentially other endpoints, like the userinfo
   endpoint ([OIDC.Core]).  When OAuth metadata is used, the "iss"
   parameter identifies the issuer and therefore the respective OAuth
   metadata document which points to the other endpoints.  When OAuth
   metadata is not used, the client can use, for example, a statically
   configured expected "iss" value for each configured authorization
   server.

   The issuer identifier contained in the authorization response is not
   cryptographically protected against tampering.  In general,
   mechanisms such as JWTs (as specified in JARM [JARM]) could be used
   to protect the integrity of the authorization response.  However, in
   mix-up attacks, the client generally receives the authorization
   response from an uncompromised authorization server.  If an attacker
   can tamper this authorization response before it is received by the
   client, the attacker would also have direct access to the
   authorization code.  The attacker does not need to execute a mix-up
   attack to steal the authorization code.  Therefore, integrity
   protection for the authorization response is not necessary to defend
   against mix-up attacks.

   There are also alternative countermeasures to mix-up attacks.  When
   an authorization response already includes an authorization server's
   issuer identifier by other means, and this identifier is checked as
   laid out in Section 2.4, the use and verification of the "iss"
   parameter is not necessary and MAY be omitted.  This is the case when
   OpenID Connect response types that return an ID token from the
   authorization endpoint (e.g., "response_type=code id_token") or JARM
   response mode are used, for example.  However, if a client receives
   an authorization response that contains multiple issuer identifiers,
   the client MUST reject the response if these issuer identifiers do
   not match.  The details of alternative countermeasures are outside of
   the scope of this specification.

   Mix-up attacks are only relevant to clients that interact with
   multiple authorization servers.  However, clients interacting with
   only one authorization server might add support for a second
   authorization server in the future.  By supporting multiple
   authorization servers they become vulnerable to mix-up attacks and
   need to apply countermeasures.

5.  IANA Considerations







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5.1.  OAuth Authorization Server Metadata

   This specification requests registration of the following values in
   the IANA "OAuth Authorization Server Metadata" registry of
   [IANA.OAuth.Parameters] established by [RFC8414].

   Metadata Name:  "authorization_response_iss_parameter_supported"
   Metadata Description:  Boolean value indicating whether the
      authorization server provides the "iss" parameter in the
      authorization response.
   Change Controller:  IESG
   Specification Document(s):  Section 3 of [[ this document ]]

5.2.  OAuth Parameters Registration

   This specification requests registration of the following values in
   the IANA "OAuth Parameters" registry of [IANA.OAuth.Parameters]
   established by [RFC6749].

   Parameter name:  "iss"
   Parameter usage location:  authorization response
   Change Controller:  IESG
   Specification Document(s):  Section 2 of [[ this document ]]

6.  Acknowledgements

   TBD

7.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC3986]  Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
              Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
              RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>.

   [RFC6479]  Zhang, X. and T. Tsou, "IPsec Anti-Replay Algorithm
              without Bit Shifting", RFC 6479, DOI 10.17487/RFC6479,
              January 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6479>.








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   [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics]
              Lodderstedt, T., Bradley, J., Labunets, A., and D. Fett,
              "OAuth 2.0 Security Best Current Practice", Work in
              Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-oauth-security-
              topics-16, 5 October 2020, <https://tools.ietf.org/html/
              draft-ietf-oauth-security-topics-16>.

   [IANA.OAuth.Parameters]
              IANA, "OAuth Parameters",
              <http://www.iana.org/assignments/oauth-parameters>.

   [RFC6749]  Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework",
              RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6749>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

   [RFC8414]  Jones, M., Sakimura, N., and J. Bradley, "OAuth 2.0
              Authorization Server Metadata", RFC 8414,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8414, June 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8414>.

8.  Informative References

   [OIDC.Core]
              Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., de Medeiros, B., and
              C. Mortimore, "OpenID Connect Core 1.0 incorporating
              errata set 1", 8 November 2014,
              <http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html>.

   [arXiv.1508.04324]
              Mainka, C., Mladenov, V., and J. Schwenk, "On the security
              of modern Single Sign-On Protocols: Second-Order
              Vulnerabilities in OpenID Connect", 18 August 2015,
              <http://arxiv.org/abs/1508.04324>.

   [arXiv.1601.01229]
              Fett, D., Kuesters, R., and G. Schmitz, "A Comprehensive
              Formal Security Analysis of OAuth 2.0", 6 January 2016,
              <https://arxiv.org/abs/1601.01229>.

   [RFC7591]  Richer, J., Ed., Jones, M., Bradley, J., Machulak, M., and
              P. Hunt, "OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration Protocol",
              RFC 7591, DOI 10.17487/RFC7591, July 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7591>.




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   [JARM]     Lodderstedt, T. and B. Campbell, "Financial-grade API: JWT
              Secured Authorization Response Mode for OAuth 2.0 (JARM)",
              17 October 2018,
              <https://openid.net/specs/openid-financial-api-jarm.html>.

Appendix A.  Document History

   [[ To be removed from the final specification ]]

   -02
   *  Incorporated WG feedback
   *  Clarifications for unique issuer identifier
   *  Clarifications when multiple issuer identifier could be present
   *  Added note that iss parameter MUST NOT be used with JARM
   *  Added note on error responses and example for error response
   *  Editorial changes

   -01

   *  Incorporated first WG feedback
   *  Clarifications for use with OIDC
   *  Added note that clients supporting just one AS are not vulnerable
   *  Renamed metadata parameter
   *  Various editorial changes

   -00

   *  initial draft

Authors' Addresses

   Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen
   Hackmanit

   Email: karsten.meyerzuselhausen@hackmanit.de


   Daniel Fett
   yes.com

   Email: mail@danielfett.de










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