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Versions: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 RFC 7791

IPSECME                                                  D. Migault (Ed)
Internet-Draft                                                    Orange
Intended status: Standards Track                       February 13, 2014
Expires: August 17, 2014


                         Clone IKE SA Extension
                 draft-mglt-ipsecme-clone-ike-sa-00.txt

Abstract

   This document considers a VPN End User setting a VPN with a security
   gateway where at least one of the peer has multiple interfaces.

   With the current IKEv2, the outer IP addresses of the VPN are
   determined by those used by IKEv2 channel.  As a result using
   multiple interfaces requires to set an IKEv2 channel on each
   interface, or on each paths if both the VPN Client and the security
   gateway have multiple interfaces.  Setting multiple IKEv2 channel
   involves multiple authentications which MAY each require multiple
   round trips and delay the VPN establishment.  In addition multiple
   authentications unnecessarily load the VPN client and the
   authentication infrastructure.

   This document presents the Clone IKE_SA extension, where an
   additional IKEv2 channel is derived from an already authenticated
   IKEv2 channel.  The newly created IKEv2 channel is set without the
   IKEv2 authentication exchange.  The newly created IKEv2 channel can
   then be assigned to another interface using MOBIKE.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on August 17, 2014.





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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Requirements notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  Protocol Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   5.  Payload Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   6.  Protocol Description  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     6.1.  CLONE_IKE_SA_SUPPORTED Notify Payload . . . . . . . . . .   7
     6.2.  CLONE_IKE_SA Notify Payload . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   7.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   8.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   9.  Acknowledgment  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   10. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     10.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     10.2.  Informational References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   Appendix A.  Document Change Log  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   Appendix B.  Setting a VPN on Multiple Interfaces . . . . . . . .   9
     B.1.  Setting VPN_0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     B.2.  Creating an additional IKEv2 Channel  . . . . . . . . . .  11
     B.3.  Creation of the Child SA for VPN_1  . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     B.4.  Moving VPN_1 on Interface_1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     B.5.  Reduced Exchange  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14

1.  Requirements notation

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].






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2.  Introduction

   The main scenario that motivated this document is a VPN End User
   setting its VPN with a Security Gateway, and at least one of the
   peers has multiple interfaces.  Figure 1 represents the case where
   the VPN has multiple interfaces, figure 2 represents the case where
   the Security Gateway has multiple interfaces, and figure 3 represents
   the case where both the VPN End User and the Security Gateway has
   multiple interfaces.  With figure 1 and figure 2, one of the peer has
   n = 2 interfaces and the other has a single interface.  This results
   in the creating of up to n = 2 VPNs.  With figure 3, the VPN End User
   has n = 2 interfaces and the Security Gateway has m = 2 interfaces.
   This can lead to up to m x n VPNs.

   +------------+                                +------------+
   |            | Interface_0 : VPN_0            |            |
   |            ===================              |  Security  |
   |    VPN     |                  v             |  Gateway   |
   |  End User  |                   ==============            |
   |            ========================^        |            |
   |            | Interface_1 : VPN_1            |            |
   +------------+                                +------------+

               Figure 1:  VPN End User with Multiple Interfaces

   +------------+                                +------------+
   |            |            Interface_0 : VPN_0 |            |
   |            |                    =============  Security  |
   |    VPN     |                   v            |  Gateway   |
   |  End User  ===================              |            |
   |            |                   ^ ============            |
   |            |            Interface_1 : VPN_1 |            |
   +------------+                                +------------+

               Figure 2:  Security Gateway with Multiple Interfaces

   +------------+                                +------------+
   |            | Interface_0       Interface_0' |            |
   |            =================================   Security  |
   |    VPN     |                \\ //           |  Gateway   |
   |  End User  |                // \\           |            |
   |            =================================             |
   |            | Interface_1       Interface_1' |            |
   +------------+                                +------------+

               Figure3:  VPN End User and Security Gateway
                         with Multiple Interfaces




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   With the current IKEv2 [RFC5996], each VPN requires an IKEv2 channel,
   and setting an IKEv2 channel requires an authentication.
   Authentication can involve multiple round trips like EAP-SIM
   [RFC4186] as well as crypto operations that MAY delay the
   connectivity.

   This document presents the Clone IKE_SA extension.  The main idea is
   that the peer with multiple interfaces sets an first authenticated
   IKEv2 channel.  Then it takes advantage of this authentication and
   derives as many parallel IKEv2 channels as VPNs.  On each IKEv2
   channel a VPN is negotiated.  This results in parallel VPNS.  Then
   the VPN End User moves the VPNs to their proper places using MOBIKE.
   Alternatively, the VPN End User can also move the IKEv2 channels and
   then negotiate the VPNs.

   Several documents have addressed the issue of IPsec and multiple
   interfaces.  [I-D.mglt-mif-security-requirements] provides a problem
   statement for IPsec and multiple interfaces.
   [I-D.arora-ipsecme-ikev2-alt-tunnel-addresses] and
   [I-D.mglt-ipsecme-alternate-outer-address] have been proposed so
   tunnel outer IP address can differ from those of the IKEv2 channel.

   The advantage of the Clone IKE SA extension is that is requires very
   few modifications to already existing IKEv2 implementations.  Then,
   it reuses already existing and widely deployed protocol such as
   MOBIKE [RFC4555].  Finally by keeping a dedicated IKEv2 channel for
   each VPN, it eases reachability tests.

   Note also that that the Clone IKE SA extension is independent of
   MOBIKE and MAY also address other future scenarios.

3.  Terminology

   This section defines terms and acronyms used in this document.

   - VPN End User:   designates the end user that initiates the VPN with
         a Security Gateway.  This end user may be mobile and moves its
         VPN from on Security Gateway to the other.

   - Security Gateway:   designates a point of attachment for the VPN
         service.  In this document, the VPN service is provided by
         multiple Security Gateways.  Each Security Gateway may be
         considered as a specific hardware.

   - Security Association (SA):   The Security Association is defined in
         [RFC4301].





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4.  Protocol Overview

   The goal of the document is to specify how to create a new IKEv2
   channel.  IKEv2 [RFC5996] specifies the CREATE_CHILD_SA that makes
   possible to rekey an IKE_SA, create or rekey a new Child SA.

   The difference between rekeying an IKE_SA and creating a new IKE_SA
   is that the old IKE_SA MUST NOT be deleted, either by starting a
   Delete exchange or removing the IKE_SA without the Delete exchange.

   Note that IKEv2 [RFC5996] Section 1.3.2 or Section 2.18 does not
   explicitly mentions that the old IKE_SA MUST be deleted.  However,
   there are currently no signaling advertising the IKE_SA has not been
   deleted.  The purpose of this document is to avoid this uncertainty
   when rekeying the IKE_SA.  In other words, the document avoids that
   one peer expects a additional IKE_SA to be created whereas the other
   simply proceeds to a replacement of the old IKE_SA.

   Currently, one MAY check whether or not the old IKE_SA has been
   deleted or not by waiting a for a given time and then initiate and
   empty INFORMATIONAL exchange using the old IKE_SA.  The absence of
   response MAY indicate the old IKE_SA has been removed.

   The initiator and the responder indicate they support the Clone IKE
   SA extension with CLONE_IKE_SA_SUPPORTED Notify Payload.  These
   Notify Payloads can be sent at any time after the IKE_SA has been
   negotiated.  In the example below, the CLONE_IKE_SA_SUPPORTED
   exchange is performed during the IKEv2 negotiation.  The initiator
   and the responder support the Clone IKE SA extension, which means
   both peers can explicitly specify, when a IKE_SA is rekeyed, if the
   IKE SA MUST be cloned, or MAY be removed.  The CLONE_IKE_SA_SUPPORTED
   Notify Payload can be sent in IKE_AUTH or INFORMATIONAL IKEv2
   exchange.

   Initiator                         Responder
   -------------------------------------------------------------------
   HDR, SAi1, KEi, Ni -->
                                <-- HDR, SAr1, KEr, Nr
   HDR, SK { IDi, CERT, AUTH,
                   CP(CFG_REQUEST),
                   SAi2, TSi, TSr,
                   N(CLONE_IKE_SA_SUPPORTED) }
                                <-- HDR, SK { IDr, CERT, AUTH,
                                    CP(CFG_REPLY), SAr2, TSi, TSr,
                                     N(CLONE_IKE_SA_SUPPORTED) }

   The initiator of the rekey exchange sends the CLONE_IKE_SA Notify
   Payload in a CREATE_CHILD_SA request for rekeying the IKE_SA.  The



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   CLONE_IKE_SA Notify Payload indicates the current IKE_SA MUST NOT be
   deleted.  Instead two parallel IKEv2 channel are expected to coexist.
   The current IKE_SA becomes the old IKE_SA and the newly negotiated
   IKE_SA becomes the new IKE_SA.  If the Initiator does not want or
   does not care that two parallel IKE SA exists, the CLONE_IKE_SA
   Notify Payload SHOULD be omitted.  The CLONE_IKE_SA Notify Payload is
   always part of a CREATE_CHILD_SA IKEv2 exchange.

   Initiator                         Responder
   -------------------------------------------------------------------
   HDR, SK {N(CLONE_IKE_SA) SA, Ni, KEi} -->

   The responder supports the CLONE_IKE_SA Notify Payload as it provided
   a CLONE_IKE_SA_SUPPORTED Notify Payload.  If the CREATE_CHILD_SA
   request concerns a IKE_SA rekey.  The responder MUST proceed to the
   IKE_SA rekey, create the new IKE_SA, and keep the old IKE_SA and
   respond with a CLONE_IKE_SA Notify Payload as represented below:

                                <--  HDR, SK { N(CLONE_IKE_SA)
                                               SA, Nr, KEr}

   If the CLONE_IKE_SA Notify Payload is not associated to a IKE_SA
   rekey, the responder MUST return an INVALID_SYNTAX Notification as
   described in section 3.10.1 of [RFC5996].  The exchange will be:

                                <--  HDR, SK {SA, Nr, KEr
                                              N(INVALID_SYNTAX)}

5.  Payload Description

   Figure 7 illustrates the Notify Payload packet format as described in
   section 3. 10 of [RFC5996].  This is the format we use for both the
   CLONE_IKE_SA or CLONE_IKE_SA_SUPPORTED Notify Payload.

   The CLONE_IKE_SA_SUPPORTED Notify Payload is used in an IKEv2
   exchange of type INFORMATIONAL or IKE_AUTH and the CLONE_IKE_SA is
   used in an IKEv2 exchange of type CREATE_CHILD_SA.

                           1                   2                   3
       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      | Next Payload  |C|  RESERVED   |         Payload Length        |
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |  Protocol ID  |   SPI Size    |      Notify Message Type      |
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

      Figure 7:  Notify Payload




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   - Next Payload (1 octet):  Indicates the type of payload that follows
         after the header.

   - Critical Bit (1 bit):  Indicates how the responder handles the
         Notify Payload.  In this document the Critical Bit is not set.

   - RESERVED (7 bits):  MUST be set as zero; MUST be ignored on
         receipt.

   - Payload Length (2 octet):  Length in octets of the current payload,
         including the generic payload header.

   - Protocol ID (1 octet):  set to zero.

   - SPI Size (1 octet):  set to zero.

   - Notify Message Type (2 octets):  Specifies the type of notification
         message.  It is set to CLONE_IKE_SA or CLONE_IKE_SA_SUPPORTED
         in this document.

6.  Protocol Description

6.1.  CLONE_IKE_SA_SUPPORTED Notify Payload

   The CLONE_IKE_SA_SUPPORTED Notify Payload is sent by the initiator of
   the INFORMATIONAL or IKE_AUTH exchange to announce its support of the
   Clone IKE SA extension.

   If the CLONE_IKE_SA_SUPPORTED in not send in a message of type
   INFORMATIONAL or IKE_AUTH, the responder SHOULD send an
   INVALID_SYNTAX Notify Payload.

   Upon reception of the CLONE_IKE_SA_SUPPORTED Notify Payload, the
   responder that supports the Clone IKE SA extension SHOULD sent a
   CLONE_IKE_SA_SUPPORTED Notify Payload as a response.  This indicates
   the initiator the responder also supports the Clone IKE SA extension.
   A responder that does not support the Clone IKE SA extension MUST
   ignore the CLONE_IKE_SA_SUPPORTED Notify Payload as specified in
   [RFC5996].

   The Clone IKE SA extension is considered supported by both peers if
   and only if the initiator and the responder have sent and received a
   CLONE_IKE_SA_SUPPORTED Notify Payload.  In any other case the
   extension is considered not supported and SHOULD NOT be used in
   latter exchanges.






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6.2.  CLONE_IKE_SA Notify Payload

   The CLONE_IKE_SA Notify Payload SHOULD be used only if the Clone IKE
   SA extension is supported by the two peers.

   The CLONE_IKE_SA Notify Payload MUST always been sent in a
   CREATE_CHILD_SA message that concerns an IKE_SA rekey as described in
   section 1.3.2 of [RFC5996].  If not, a INVALID_SYNTAX Notify Payload
   MUST be sent.

   Upon reception of a CLONE_IKE_SA Notify Payload from the responder,
   the initiator got the confirmation two parallel IKE_SA have been
   created on the responder.

7.  IANA Considerations

   The new fields and number are the following:

   IKEv2 Notify Message Types - Status Types
   -----------------------------------------
   CLONE_IKE_SA            - TBD
   CLONE_IKE_SA_SUPPORTED  - TBD

8.  Security Considerations

   The protocol defined in this document does not modifies IKEv2.  It
   signalizes what has been implementation dependent on how to manage an
   old IKE_SA after a rekey.

9.  Acknowledgment

   The ideas of this draft came from various inputs from the ipsecme and
   discussions with Tero Kivinen and Michael Richardson.  Yaron Sheffer,
   Tero Kivinen and Valery Smyslov provided significant inputs to set
   the current design of the protocol as well as its designation.

10.  References

10.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC4301]  Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the
              Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, December 2005.

   [RFC4555]  Eronen, P., "IKEv2 Mobility and Multihoming Protocol
              (MOBIKE)", RFC 4555, June 2006.



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   [RFC5996]  Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., and P. Eronen,
              "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)", RFC
              5996, September 2010.

10.2.  Informational References

   [I-D.arora-ipsecme-ikev2-alt-tunnel-addresses]
              Arora, J. and P. Kumar, "Alternate Tunnel Addresses for
              IKEv2", draft-arora-ipsecme-ikev2-alt-tunnel-addresses-00
              (work in progress), April 2010.

   [I-D.mglt-ipsecme-alternate-outer-address]
              Migault, D., "IKEv2 Alternate Outer IP Address Extension",
              draft-mglt-ipsecme-alternate-outer-address-00 (work in
              progress), February 2013.

   [I-D.mglt-mif-security-requirements]
              Migault, D. and C. Williams, "IPsec Multiple Interfaces
              Problem Statement", draft-mglt-mif-security-
              requirements-03 (work in progress), November 2012.

   [RFC4186]  Haverinen, H. and J. Salowey, "Extensible Authentication
              Protocol Method for Global System for Mobile
              Communications (GSM) Subscriber Identity Modules (EAP-
              SIM)", RFC 4186, January 2006.

Appendix A.  Document Change Log

   [RFC Editor: This section is to be removed before publication]

   -00: Comments from Valery Smyslov, Tero Kivinen and Yaron Sheffer.
   SUPPORTED Notify Payload can be placed in a INFORMATIONAL or IKE_AUTH
   exchange.  CLONE_IKE_SA is sent in a CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange and is
   provided both in the query and in the response.

   -00: First version published. draft-mglt-ipsecme-keep-old-ike-sa-00

Appendix B.  Setting a VPN on Multiple Interfaces

   This section is informational and exposes how a VPN End User as
   illustrated in Figure 1 can builds two VPNs on its two interfaces
   without multiple authentications.  Other cases represented in figure
   2 and 3 are similar and can be easily derived from the case.  The
   mechanism is based on the CLONE_IKE_SA extension and the MOBIKE
   extension [RFC4555].






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B.1.  Setting VPN_0

   First, the VPN End User negotiates a VPN using one interface.  This
   involves a regular IKEv2 setting.  In addition, the VPN End User and
   the Security Gateway advertise they support MOBIKE.  At the end of
   the exchange, VPN_0 is set as represented in figure 4.

   +------------+                                +------------+
   |            | Interface_0 : VPN_0            |            |
   |            ===================              |  Security  |
   |    VPN     |                  v             |  Gateway   |
   |  End User  |                   ==============            |
   |            =                                |            |
   |            | Interface_1                    |            |
   +------------+                                +------------+

               Figure 4:  VPN End User Establishing VPN_0

   The exchange is completely described in [RFC4555].  First the
   negotiates the IKE_SA.  In the figure below peers also proceed to NAT
   detection because of the use of MOBIKE.

   Initiator                         Responder
   -------------------------------------------------------------------
   (IP_I1:500 -> IP_R1:500)
   HDR, SAi1, KEi, Ni,
        N(NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP),
        N(NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP)  -->

                         <--  (IP_R1:500 -> IP_I1:500)
                              HDR, SAr1, KEr, Nr,
                                   N(NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP),
                                   N(NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP)

   The initiators and the responder proceed to the authentication
   exchange, advertise they support MOBIKE and the Clone IKE SA
   extension - with the MOBIKE_SUPPORTED and the CLONE_IKE_SA_SUPPORTED
   Notify Payloads - and negotiate the SA for VPN_0.  Optionally, the
   initiator and the Security Gateway MAY advertise their multiple
   interfaces using the ADDITIONAL_IP4_ADDRESS and/or
   ADDITIONAL_IP6_ADDRESS Notify Payload.










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   (IP_I1:4500 -> IP_R1:4500)
   HDR, SK { IDi, CERT, AUTH,
             CP(CFG_REQUEST),
             SAi2, TSi, TSr,
             N(CLONE_IKE_SA_SUPPORTED)
             N(MOBIKE_SUPPORTED),
             N(ADDITIONAL_IP*_ADDRESS)+ }  -->

                         <--  (IP_R1:4500 -> IP_I1:4500)
                              HDR, SK { IDr, CERT, AUTH,
                                        CP(CFG_REPLY),
                                        SAr2, TSi, TSr,
                                        N(CLONE_IKE_SA_SUPPORTED)
                                        N(MOBIKE_SUPPORTED),
                                        N(ADDITIONAL_IP*_ADDRESS)+}

B.2.  Creating an additional IKEv2 Channel

   In our case the the initiator wants to set establish a VPN with its
   Interface_1 between the VPN End User and the Security Gateway.  The
   VPN End User will first establish a parallel IKE_SA using a
   CREATE_CHILD_SA that concerns an IKE_SA rekey associated to a
   CLONE_IKE_SA Notify Payload.  This results in two different IKE_SA
   between the VPN End User and the Security Gateway.  Currently both
   IKE_SA are set using Interface 0 of the VPN End User.

   Initiator                         Responder
   -------------------------------------------------------------------
   (IP_I1:4500 -> IP_R1:4500)
   HDR, SK { N(CLONE_IKE_SA),
             SA, Ni, KEi} -->
                         <--  (IP_R1:4500 -> IP_I1:4500)
                              HDR, SK { N(CLONE_IKE_SA),
                                        SA, Nr, KEr}

B.3.  Creation of the Child SA for VPN_1

   Once the new IKEv2 channel has been created, the VPN End User MAY
   initiate a CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange that concerns the creation of a
   Child SA for VPN_1.  The newly created VPN_1 will use Interface_0 of
   the VPN End User.

   It is out of scope of the document to define how the VPN End User
   handles traffic with multiple interfaces.  The VPN End User MAY use
   the same IP inner address on its multiple interfaces.  In this case,
   the same Traffic Selectors (that is the IP address used for VPN_0 and
   VPN_1) MAY match for both VPNs VPN_0 and VPN_1.  The end user VPN
   SHOULD be aware of such match and be able to manage it.  It MAY for



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   example use distinct Traffic Selectors on both VPNs using different
   ports, manage the order of its SPD or have SPD defined per
   interfaces.  Defining these mechanisms are out of scope of this
   document.  Alternatively, the VPN End User MAY uses a different IP
   address for each interface.  In the latter case, if the inner IP
   address is assigned by the Security Gateway, the Configuration
   Payload (CP) MUST be placed before the SA Payload as specified in
   [RFC5996] Section 2.19.

   The creation of VPN_1 is performed via the newly created IKE_SA as
   follows:

   Initiator                         Responder
   -------------------------------------------------------------------
   (IP_I1:4500 -> IP_R1:4500)
   HDR(new), SK(new) { [CP(CFG_REQUEST)],
             SAi2, TSi, TSr }  -->

                         <--  (IP_R1:4500 -> IP_I1:4500)
                              HDR(new), SK(new) { [CP(CFG_REPLY)],
                                        SAr2, TSi, TSr}

   The resulting configuration is depicted in figure 5.  VPN_0 and VPN_1
   have been created, but both are using the same Interface:
   Interface_0.

   +------------+                                +------------+
   |            | Interface_0 : VPN_0, VPN_1     |            |
   |            ===================              |  Security  |
   |    VPN     =================  v             |  Gateway   |
   |  End User  |               v   ==============            |
   |            =               ==================            |
   |            | Interface_1                    |            |
   +------------+                                +------------+

               Figure 5:  VPN End User Establishing VPN_0 and VPN_1

B.4.  Moving VPN_1 on Interface_1

   In this section, MOBIKE is used to move VPN_1 on interface_1.  The
   exchange is described in [RFC4555].  All exchanges are using the new
   IKE_SA.  Eventually, the VPN End User MAY check if the Security
   Gateway is reachable via Interface_1.  The exchanges are described
   below:







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   Initiator                         Responder
   -------------------------------------------------------------------
   (IP_I2:4500 -> IP_R1:4500)
   HDR(new), SK(new) { N(NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP),
             N(NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP) }

                         <--  (IP_R2:4500 -> IP_I1:4500)
                              HDR(new), SK(new) {
                                   N(NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP),
                                   N(NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP) }

   (This worked, and the initiator requests the peer to switch to new
      addresses.)

   (IP_I2:4500 -> IP_R1:4500)
   HDR(new), SK(new) { N(UPDATE_SA_ADDRESSES),
             N(NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP),
             N(NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP),
             N(COOKIE2) }  -->

                         <--  (IP_R1:4500 -> IP_I2:4500)
                              HDR(new), SK(new) {
                                   N(NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP),
                                   N(NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP),
                                   N(COOKIE2) }

   This results in the situation as described in figure 6.

   +------------+                                +------------+
   |            | Interface_0 : VPN_0            |            |
   |            ===================              |  Security  |
   |    VPN     |                  v             |  Gateway   |
   |  End User  |                   ==============            |
   |            ========================^        |            |
   |            | Interface_1 : VPN_1            |            |
   +------------+                                +------------+

               Figure 6:  VPN End User with Multiple Interfaces

B.5.  Reduced Exchange

   The previous sections detail the various exchanges between the VPN
   End User and the Security Gateway.  This section shows an example
   where the number of exchanges are limited, thus limiting the delay to
   set up a multiple interface VPN communication.






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   Initiator                         Responder
   -------------------------------------------------------------------

   (IP_I1:500 -> IP_R1:500)
   HDR, SAi1, KEi, Ni,
        N(NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP),
        N(NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP)  -->

                         <--  (IP_R1:500 -> IP_I1:500)
                              HDR, SAr1, KEr, Nr,
                                   N(NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP),
                                   N(NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP)
   (IP_I1:4500 -> IP_R1:4500)
   HDR, SK { IDi, CERT, AUTH,
             CP(CFG_REQUEST),
             SAi2, TSi, TSr,
             N(CLONE_IKE_SA_SUPPORTED),
             N(MOBIKE_SUPPORTED),
             N(ADDITIONAL_IP*_ADDRESS)+,
             N(CLONE_IKE_SA),
             SA, Ni, KEi}                  -->

                         <--  (IP_R1:4500 -> IP_I1:4500)
                              HDR, SK { IDr, CERT, AUTH,
                                        CP(CFG_REPLY),
                                        SAr2, TSi, TSr,
                                        N(CLONE_IKE_SA_SUPPORTED),
                                        N(MOBIKE_SUPPORTED),
                                        N(ADDITIONAL_IP*_ADDRESS)+},
                                        N(CLONE_IKE_SA),
                                        SA, Nr, KEr}
                         <--  (IP_R1:4500 -> IP_I2:4500)
                              HDR(new), SK(new)
                                      { [CP(REQUEST)],
                                        SAi2, TSi, TSr,
                                        N(UPDATE_SA_ADDRESSES)}
   (IP_I2:4500 -> IP_R1:4500)              -->
   HDR(new), SK(new) { [CP(CFG_REPLY)],
             SAr2, TSi, TSr}


Author's Address









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   Daniel Migault
   Orange
   38 rue du General Leclerc
   92794 Issy-les-Moulineaux Cedex 9
   France

   Phone: +33 1 45 29 60 52
   Email: daniel.migault@orange.com











































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