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Versions: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 RFC 7791

IPSECME                                                  D. Migault (Ed)
Internet-Draft                                                    Orange
Intended status: Standards Track                              V. Smyslov
Expires: January 22, 2015                                     ELVIS-PLUS
                                                           July 21, 2014


                         Clone IKE SA Extension
                 draft-mglt-ipsecme-clone-ike-sa-02.txt

Abstract

   This document considers a VPN End User setting a VPN with a security
   gateway where at least one of the peers has multiple interfaces.

   With the current IKEv2 protocol, the outer IP addresses of the VPN
   are determined by those used by IKEv2 SA.  As a result using multiple
   interfaces requires to set up an IKEv2 SA on each interface, or on
   each path if both the VPN Client and the security gateway have
   multiple interfaces.  Setting each IKEv2 SA involves authentications
   which might require multiple round trips as well as activity from the
   VPN User and thus would delay the VPN establishment.  In addition
   multiple authentications unnecessarily increase the load on the VPN
   client and the authentication infrastructure.

   This document presents the Clone IKE SA extension, where an
   additional IKEv2 SA is derived from an existing IKEv2 SA.  The newly
   created IKEv2 SA is set without the IKEv2 authentication exchange.
   The newly created IKEv2 SA can later be assigned to another interface
   using MOBIKE protocol.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 22, 2015.




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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Requirements notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  Protocol Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   5.  Protocol Details  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     5.1.  Support Negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     5.2.  Cloning the IKE SA  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     5.3.  Error Handling  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   6.  Payload Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   7.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   8.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   9.  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   10. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     10.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     10.2.  Informational References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   Appendix A.  Document Change Log  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   Appendix B.  Setting a VPN on Multiple Interfaces . . . . . . . .  10
     B.1.  Setting VPN_0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     B.2.  Creating an additional IKEv2 Channel  . . . . . . . . . .  12
     B.3.  Creation of the Child SA for VPN_1  . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     B.4.  Moving VPN_1 on Interface_1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14

1.  Requirements notation

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].






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2.  Introduction

   The main scenario that motivated this document is a VPN End User
   establishing VPN with a Security Gateway when at least one of the
   peers has multiple interfaces.  Figure 1 represents the case when the
   VPN End User has multiple interfaces, Figure 2 represents the case
   when the Security Gateway has multiple interfaces, and Figure 3
   represents the case when both the VPN End User and the Security
   Gateway have multiple interfaces.  With Figure 1 and Figure 2, one of
   the peers has n = 2 interfaces and the other has a single interface.
   This results in creating of up to n = 2 VPNs.  With Figure 3, the VPN
   End User has n = 2 interfaces and the Security Gateway has m = 2
   interfaces.  This may lead to up to m x n VPNs.

   +------------+                                +------------+
   |            | Interface_0 : VPN_0            |            |
   |            ===================              |  Security  |
   |    VPN     |                  v             |  Gateway   |
   |  End User  |                   ==============            |
   |            ========================^        |            |
   |            | Interface_1 : VPN_1            |            |
   +------------+                                +------------+


              Figure 1: VPN End User with Multiple Interfaces

   +------------+                                +------------+
   |            |            Interface_0 : VPN_0 |            |
   |            |                    =============  Security  |
   |    VPN     |                   v            |  Gateway   |
   |  End User  ===================              |            |
   |            |                   ^ ============            |
   |            |            Interface_1 : VPN_1 |            |
   +------------+                                +------------+


            Figure 2: Security Gateway with Multiple Interfaces














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   +------------+                                +------------+
   |            | Interface_0       Interface_0' |            |
   |            =================================   Security  |
   |    VPN     |                \\ //           |  Gateway   |
   |  End User  |                // \\           |            |
   |            =================================             |
   |            | Interface_1       Interface_1' |            |
   +------------+                                +------------+


   Figure 3: VPN End User and Security Gateway with Multiple Interfaces

   With the current IKEv2 protocol
   [I-D.kivinen-ipsecme-ikev2-rfc5996bis], each VPN requires an IKEv2
   SA, and setting an IKEv2 SA requires an authentication.
   Authentication might require multiple round trips and an activity
   from the End User (like EAP-SIM [RFC4186] or EAP-TLS [RFC5216]) as
   well as crypto operations that would introduce an additional delay.

   This document presents the Clone IKE SA extension.  The main idea is
   that the peer with multiple interfaces sets the first IKEv2 SA as
   usual.  Then it takes advantage of the fact that this IKE SA is
   completed and derives as many new parallel IKEv2 SAs from it as the
   desired number of VPNs.  On each IKEv2 SA a VPN is negotiated.  This
   results in coexisting parallel VPNs.  Then the VPN End User moves
   each VPN to its proper location using MOBIKE [RFC4555].
   Alternatively, the VPN End User may first move the IKEv2 SAs and then
   negotiate the VPNs.

   Combining the Clone IKE SA extension with MOBIKE [RFC4555] for IPsec
   communications with multiple interfaces provides the following
   advantages.  First, the Clone IKE SA extension requires very few
   modifications to already existing IKEv2 implementations.  Then, it
   takes advantage of already existing and widely deployed MOBIKE
   protocol.  Finally, it keeps a dedicated IKEv2 SA for each VPN which
   simplifies reachability tests and VPN maintenance.

   Note also that the Clone IKE SA extension is independent from MOBIKE
   and MAY also address other future scenarios.

3.  Terminology

   This section defines terms and acronyms used in this document.

   - VPN End User:   designates the end user that initiates the VPN with
         a Security Gateway.  This end user may be mobile and moves its
         VPN from one Security Gateway to another.




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   - Security Gateway:   designates a point of attachment for the VPN
         service.  In this document, the VPN service is provided by
         multiple Security Gateways.  Each Security Gateway may be
         considered as a specific hardware.

   - IKE SA:   The IKEv2 SA (IKEv2 Security Association) is defined in
         [I-D.kivinen-ipsecme-ikev2-rfc5996bis].

4.  Protocol Overview

   The goal of the document is to specify how to create a new IKEv2 SA
   without performing an authentication.  In order to achieve this goal,
   the document proposes that the two peers agree they support the Clone
   IKE SA extension.  This is done during the IKE_AUTH exchange by
   exchanging the CLONE_IKE_SA_SUPPORTED Notifications.  To create a new
   parallel IKE SA, one of the peers initiates a CREATE_CHILD_SA
   exchange as if it would rekey the IKE SA.  In order to indicate the
   current IKE SA must not be deleted, the initiator includes the
   CLONE_IKE_SA Notification in the CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange.  This
   results in two parallel IKE SAs.

   Note, that without the CLONE_IKE_SA Notification the old IKE SA would
   be deleted after the rekey is successfully completed (as specified in
   Section 2.8 of [I-D.kivinen-ipsecme-ikev2-rfc5996bis].

5.  Protocol Details

5.1.  Support Negotiation

   The initiator and the responder indicate their support for the Clone
   IKE SA extension by exchanging the CLONE_IKE SA_SUPPORTED
   Notifications.  This notification MUST be sent in the IKE_AUTH
   exchange (in case of multiple IKE_AUTH exchanges, in the message
   containing the SA payload).  If both initiator and responder send
   this notification during the IKE_AUTH exchange, peers MAY use the
   Clone IKE SA extension.  In the other case the Clone IKE SA extension
   MUST NOT be used.














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   Initiator                         Responder
   -------------------------------------------------------------------
   HDR, SAi1, KEi, Ni -->
                                <-- HDR, SAr1, KEr, Nr
   HDR, SK { IDi, CERT, AUTH,
                   CP(CFG_REQUEST),
                   SAi2, TSi, TSr,
                   N(CLONE_IKE_SA_SUPPORTED) }
                                <-- HDR, SK { IDr, CERT, AUTH,
                                    CP(CFG_REPLY), SAr2, TSi, TSr,
                                     N(CLONE_IKE_SA_SUPPORTED) }

5.2.  Cloning the IKE SA

   The initiator of the rekey exchange includes the CLONE_IKE_SA
   Notification in a CREATE_CHILD_SA request for rekeying the IKE SA.
   The CLONE_IKE_SA Notification indicates that the current IKE SA MUST
   NOT be deleted.  Instead two parallel IKEv2 SAs are expected to
   coexist.  The current IKE SA becomes the old IKE SA and the newly
   negotiated IKE SA becomes the new IKE SA.  The CLONE_IKE_SA
   Notification MUST appear only in request message of the
   CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange concerning the IKE SA rekey.  If the
   CLONE_IKE_SA Notification appears in any other message, it MUST be
   ignored.

   Initiator                         Responder
   -------------------------------------------------------------------
   HDR, SK { N(CLONE_IKE_SA), SA, Ni, KEi } -->

   If the CREATE_CHILD_SA request concerns an IKE SA rekey and contains
   the CLONE_IKE_SA Notification, the Responder proceeds to the IKE SA
   rekey, creates the new IKE SA, and keeps the old IKE SA.  No
   additional Notify Payload is included in the CREATE_CHILD_SA response
   as represented below:

                                <--  HDR, SK { SA, Nr, KEr }

   When using Clone IKE SA Extension peers MUST NOT transfer existing
   Child SAs, that were created by the old IKE SA, to the newly created
   IKE SA.  So, all signalling messages, concerning those Child SAs MUST
   continue to be send over the old IKE SA.  This is different from the
   regular IKE SA rekey.

5.3.  Error Handling

   There may be conditions when responder for some reason is unable or
   unwilling to perform IKE SA cloning.  This inability may be temporary
   or permanent.



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   Temporary inability occurs when responder doesn't have enough
   resources at the moment to clone IKE SA or when IKE SA is being
   deleted by responder.  In this case the responder SHOULD reject
   request to clone IKE SA with the TEMPORARY_FAILURE notification.

                               <--  HDR, SK { N(TEMPORARY_FAILURE) }

   After receiving this notification the initiator MAY retry its request
   after waiting some period of time.  See Section 2.25 of
   [I-D.kivinen-ipsecme-ikev2-rfc5996bis] for details.

   In some cases responder may have restrictions on the number of co-
   existing IKE SAs with one peer.  These restrictions may be either
   implicit (some devices may have enough resources to handle only a few
   IKE SAs) or explicit (provided by some configuration parameter).  If
   the initiator wants to clone more IKE SAs, than responder is able or
   is configured to handle, the responder SHOULD reject the request with
   the NO_ADDITIONAL_SAS notification.

                               <--  HDR, SK { N(NO_ADDITIONAL_SAS) }

   This condition is considered permanent and the initiator SHOULD NOT
   retry to clone IKE SA until some of existing IKE SAs with the
   responder are deleted.

6.  Payload Description

   Figure 4 illustrates the Notify Payload packet format as described in
   section 3. 10 of [I-D.kivinen-ipsecme-ikev2-rfc5996bis].  This format
   is used for both the CLONE_IKE_SA and the CLONE_IKE_SA_SUPPORTED
   notifications.

   The CLONE_IKE_SA_SUPPORTED Notification is used in an IKEv2 exchange
   of type IKE_AUTH and the CLONE_IKE_SA is used in an IKEv2 exchange of
   type CREATE_CHILD_SA.

                           1                   2                   3
       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      | Next Payload  |C|  RESERVED   |         Payload Length        |
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |  Protocol ID  |   SPI Size    |      Notify Message Type      |
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+


                         Figure 4: Notify Payload





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   The fields Next Payload, Critical Bit, RESERVED and Payload Length
   are defined in [I-D.kivinen-ipsecme-ikev2-rfc5996bis].  Specific
   fields defined in this document are:

   - Protocol ID (1 octet):  set to zero.

   - SPI Size (1 octet):  set to zero.

   - Notify Message Type (2 octets):  Specifies the type of notification
         message.  It is set to <TBA by IANA> for the CLONE_IKE_SA
         notification or to <TBA by IANA> for the CLONE_IKE_SA_SUPPORTED
         Notification.

7.  IANA Considerations

   IANA is requested to allocate two values in the IKEv2 Notify Message
   Types - Status Types registry:

   IKEv2 Notify Message Types - Status Types
   -----------------------------------------
   CLONE_IKE_SA_SUPPORTED  - TBA
   CLONE_IKE_SA            - TBA

8.  Security Considerations

   The protocol defined in this document does not modify IKEv2.
   Security considerations for Clone IKE SA extension are mostly the
   same as those for base IKEv2 protocol described in
   [I-D.kivinen-ipsecme-ikev2-rfc5996bis].

   This extension provides the ability for an initiator to clone
   existing IKE SAs.  As a result it may influence any accounting or
   control mechanisms based on a single IKE SA per authentication.

   Suppose a system has a limit on the number of IKE SAs it can handle.
   In this case, the Clone IKE SA extension may provide a way for
   resource exhaustion, as a single end user may populate multiple IKE
   SAs.

   Suppose a system shares the IPsec resources by limiting the number of
   Child SAs per IKE SA.  With a single IKE SA per end user, this
   provides an equal resource sharing.  The Clone IKE SA provides means
   for an end user to overpass this limit.  Such system should evaluate
   the number of Child SAs over the number of all IKE SAs associated to
   an end user.

   Note, that these issues are not unique for Clone IKE SA extensions,
   as multiple IKE SAs between two peers may be created without this



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   extension.  Note also, that implementation can always limit the
   number of cloned IKE SAs.

   Suppose VPN or any other IPsec based service monitoring is based on
   the liveliness of the first IKE SA.  Such system considers a service
   is accessed or used from the time IKE performs an authentication to
   the time the IKE SA is deleted.  Such accounting methods were fine as
   any IKE SA required an authentication exchange.  As the Clone IKE SA
   skips the authentication phase, Clone IKE SA may make possible to
   delete the initial IKE SA while the service is being used on the
   cloned IKE SA.  Such accountings method should considers the service
   is being used from the first IKE SA establishment to until the last
   IKE SA is being removed.

9.  Acknowledgments

   The ideas of this draft came from various inputs from the ipsecme WG
   and from discussions with Tero Kivinen and Michael Richardson.  Yaron
   Sheffer, Tero Kivinen provided significant inputs to set the current
   design of the protocol as well as its designation.

10.  References

10.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC4555]  Eronen, P., "IKEv2 Mobility and Multihoming Protocol
              (MOBIKE)", RFC 4555, June 2006.

10.2.  Informational References

   [I-D.kivinen-ipsecme-ikev2-rfc5996bis]
              Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., Eronen, P., and T.
              Kivinen, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
              (IKEv2)", draft-kivinen-ipsecme-ikev2-rfc5996bis-04 (work
              in progress), June 2014.

   [RFC4186]  Haverinen, H. and J. Salowey, "Extensible Authentication
              Protocol Method for Global System for Mobile
              Communications (GSM) Subscriber Identity Modules (EAP-
              SIM)", RFC 4186, January 2006.

   [RFC5216]  Simon, D., Aboba, B., and R. Hurst, "The EAP-TLS
              Authentication Protocol", RFC 5216, March 2008.





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Appendix A.  Document Change Log

   [RFC Editor: This section is to be removed before publication]

   -02: Clarification, editing.

   -01: Valery Smyslov is now a co-author.

   1.  Exchange of CLONE_IKE_SA_SUPPORTED notifications made limited to
   IKE_AUTH exchange only.

   2.  Some clarifications about processing CLONE_IKE_SA notification
   are added.

   3.  Some words that with Clone IKE SA existing Child SAs must not be
   transferred to newly created IKE SA (unlike regular rekey) are added.

   4.  Reduced exchanges (combined IKE_AUTH with cloning IKE SA and
   CREATE_CHILD_SA with transferring to different IPs) are removed.

   5.  Error handling while clonoing IKE SA is described.

   -00: Comments from Valery Smyslov, Tero Kivinen and Yaron Sheffer.
   SUPPORTED Notify Payload can be placed in a INFORMATIONAL or IKE_AUTH
   exchange.  CLONE_IKE_SA is sent in a CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange and is
   provided both in the query and in the response.

   -00: First version published. draft-mglt-ipsecme-keep-old-ike-sa-00

Appendix B.  Setting a VPN on Multiple Interfaces

   This section is informational and exposes how a VPN End User as
   illustrated in Figure 1 can build two VPNs on its two interfaces
   without multiple authentications.  Other cases represented in
   Figure 2 and Figure 3 are similar and can be easily derived from this
   case.  The mechanism is based on the Clone IKE SA extension and the
   MOBIKE extension [RFC4555].

B.1.  Setting VPN_0

   First, the VPN End User negotiates a VPN using one interface.  This
   involves regular IKEv2 exchanges.  In addition, the VPN End User and
   the Security Gateway advertise their support for MOBIKE.  At the end
   of the IKE_AUTH exchange, VPN_0 is set as represented in Figure 5.







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   +------------+                                +------------+
   |            | Interface_0 : VPN_0            |            |
   |            ===================              |  Security  |
   |    VPN     |                  v             |  Gateway   |
   |  End User  |                   ==============            |
   |            =                                |            |
   |            | Interface_1                    |            |
   +------------+                                +------------+


                 Figure 5: VPN End User Establishing VPN_0

   The exchanges are completely described in
   [I-D.kivinen-ipsecme-ikev2-rfc5996bis] and [RFC4555].  First, peers
   negotiate IKE SA parameters and exchange nonces and public keys in
   IKE_SA_INIT exchange.  In the figure below they also proceed to NAT
   detection because of the use of MOBIKE.

   Initiator                         Responder
   -------------------------------------------------------------------
   (IP_I0:500 -> IP_R:500)
   HDR, SAi1, KEi, Ni,
        N(NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP),
        N(NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP)  -->

                         <--  (IP_R:500 -> IP_I0:500)
                              HDR, SAr1, KEr, Nr,
                                   N(NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP),
                                   N(NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP)

   Then the initiator and the responder proceed to the IKE_AUTH
   exchange, advertise their support for MOBIKE and for the Clone IKE SA
   extension - with the MOBIKE_SUPPORTED and the CLONE_IKE_SA_SUPPORTED
   Notifications - and negotiate the Child SA for VPN_0.  Optionally,
   the initiator and the Security Gateway MAY advertise their multiple
   interfaces using the ADDITIONAL_IP4_ADDRESS and/or
   ADDITIONAL_IP6_ADDRESS Notify Payload.














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   (IP_I0:4500 -> IP_R:4500)
   HDR, SK { IDi, CERT, AUTH,
             CP(CFG_REQUEST),
             SAi2, TSi, TSr,
             N(CLONE_IKE_SA_SUPPORTED)
             N(MOBIKE_SUPPORTED),
             N(ADDITIONAL_IP*_ADDRESS)+ }  -->

                         <--  (IP_R:4500 -> IP_I0:4500)
                              HDR, SK { IDr, CERT, AUTH,
                                        CP(CFG_REPLY),
                                        SAr2, TSi, TSr,
                                        N(CLONE_IKE_SA_SUPPORTED)
                                        N(MOBIKE_SUPPORTED),
                                        N(ADDITIONAL_IP*_ADDRESS)+}

B.2.  Creating an additional IKEv2 Channel

   In our case the the initiator wants to establish a VPN with its
   Interface_1 between the VPN End User and the Security Gateway.  The
   VPN End User will first establish a parallel IKE SA using a
   CREATE_CHILD_SA that concerns an IKE SA rekey associated to a
   CLONE_IKE_SA Notify Payload.  This results in two different IKE SAs
   between the VPN End User and the Security Gateway.  Currently both
   IKE SAs are set using Interface 0 of the VPN End User.

   Initiator                         Responder
   -------------------------------------------------------------------
   (IP_I0:4500 -> IP_R:4500)
   HDR, SK { N(CLONE_IKE_SA),
             SA, Ni, KEi} -->
                         <--  (IP_R:4500 -> IP_I0:4500)
                              HDR, SK { N(CLONE_IKE_SA),
                                        SA, Nr, KEr}

B.3.  Creation of the Child SA for VPN_1

   Once the new IKEv2 SA has been created, the VPN End User MAY initiate
   a CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange that concerns the creation of a Child SA
   for VPN_1.  The newly created VPN_1 will use Interface_0 of the VPN
   End User.

   It is out of scope of the document to define how the VPN End User
   handles traffic with multiple interfaces.  The VPN End User MAY use
   the same IP inner address on its multiple interfaces.  In this case,
   the same Traffic Selectors (that is the IP address used for VPN_0 and
   VPN_1) MAY match for both VPNs VPN_0 and VPN_1.  The end user VPN
   SHOULD be aware of such match and be able to manage it.  It MAY for



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   example use distinct Traffic Selectors on both VPNs using different
   ports, manage the order of its SPD or have SPD defined per
   interfaces.  Defining these mechanisms are out of scope of this
   document.  Alternatively, the VPN End User MAY use a different IP
   address for each interface.

   The creation of VPN_1 is performed via the newly created IKE SA as
   follows:

   Initiator                         Responder
   -------------------------------------------------------------------
   (IP_I0:4500 -> IP_R:4500)
   HDR(new), SK(new) { [CP(CFG_REQUEST)],
             SAi2, TSi, TSr }  -->

                         <--  (IP_R:4500 -> IP_I0:4500)
                              HDR(new), SK(new) { [CP(CFG_REPLY)],
                                        SAr2, TSi, TSr}

   The resulting configuration is depicted in Figure 6.  VPN_0 and VPN_1
   have been created, but both are using the same Interface:
   Interface_0.

   +------------+                                +------------+
   |            | Interface_0 : VPN_0, VPN_1     |            |
   |            ===================              |  Security  |
   |    VPN     =================  v             |  Gateway   |
   |  End User  |               v   ==============            |
   |            =               ==================            |
   |            | Interface_1                    |            |
   +------------+                                +------------+


            Figure 6: VPN End User Establishing VPN_0 and VPN_1

B.4.  Moving VPN_1 on Interface_1

   In this section, MOBIKE is used to move VPN_1 on interface_1.  The
   exchange is described in [RFC4555].  All exchanges use the new IKE
   SA.  Eventually, the VPN End User MAY check if the Security Gateway
   is reachable via Interface_1.  The exchanges are described below:










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   Initiator                         Responder
   -------------------------------------------------------------------
   (IP_I1:4500 -> IP_R:4500)
   HDR(new), SK(new) { N(NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP),
             N(NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP) }

                         <--  (IP_R:4500 -> IP_I1:4500)
                              HDR(new), SK(new) {
                                   N(NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP),
                                   N(NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP) }

   After that initiator requests the peer to switch to new addresses.

   (IP_I1:4500 -> IP_R:4500)
   HDR(new), SK(new) { N(UPDATE_SA_ADDRESSES),
             N(NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP),
             N(NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP),
             N(COOKIE2) }  -->

                         <--  (IP_R:4500 -> IP_I1:4500)
                              HDR(new), SK(new) {
                                   N(NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP),
                                   N(NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP),
                                   N(COOKIE2) }

   This results in the situation as described in Figure 7.

   +------------+                                +------------+
   |            | Interface_0 : VPN_0            |            |
   |            ===================              |  Security  |
   |    VPN     |                  v             |  Gateway   |
   |  End User  |                   ==============            |
   |            ========================^        |            |
   |            | Interface_1 : VPN_1            |            |
   +------------+                                +------------+


              Figure 7: VPN End User with Multiple Interfaces

Authors' Addresses











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   Daniel Migault
   Orange
   38 rue du General Leclerc
   92794 Issy-les-Moulineaux Cedex 9
   France

   Phone: +33 1 45 29 60 52
   Email: daniel.migault@orange.com


   Valery Smyslov
   ELVIS-PLUS
   PO Box 81
   Moscow (Zelenograd)  124460
   Russian Federation

   Phone: +7 495 276 0211
   Email: svan@elvis.ru

































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