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Versions: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 RFC 7791

Network Working Group                                    D. Migault (Ed)
Internet-Draft                                                  Ericsson
Intended status: Standards Track                              V. Smyslov
Expires: September 5, 2015                                    ELVIS-PLUS
                                                           March 4, 2015


 Cloning IKE SA in the Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)
                 draft-mglt-ipsecme-clone-ike-sa-04.txt

Abstract

   This document considers a VPN End User establishing an IPsec SA with
   a Security Gateway using the Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
   (IKEv2), where at least one of the peers has multiple interfaces or
   where Security Gateway is a cluster with each node having its own IP
   address.

   With the current IKEv2 protocol, the outer IP addresses of the IPsec
   SA are determined by those used by IKE SA.  As a result using
   multiple interfaces requires to set up an IKE SA on each interface,
   or on each path if both the VPN Client and the Security Gateway have
   multiple interfaces.  Setting each IKE SA involves authentications
   which might require multiple round trips as well as activity from the
   VPN End User and thus would delay the VPN establishment.  In addition
   multiple authentications unnecessarily increase the load on the VPN
   client and the authentication infrastructure.

   This document presents the solution that allows to clone IKEv2 SA,
   where an additional SA is derived from an existing one.  The newly
   created IKE SA is set without the IKEv2 authentication exchange.
   This IKE SA can later be assigned to another interface or moved to
   another cluster mode using MOBIKE protocol.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."



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   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 5, 2015.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Requirements notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   4.  Protocol Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   5.  Protocol Details  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     5.1.  Support Negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     5.2.  Cloning the IKE SA  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     5.3.  Error Handling  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   6.  Payload Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   7.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   8.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   9.  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   10. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     10.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     10.2.  Informational References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   Appendix A.  Setting a VPN on Multiple Interfaces . . . . . . . .  10
     A.1.  Setting VPN_0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     A.2.  Creating an additional IKE SA . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     A.3.  Creating the Child SA for VPN_1 . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     A.4.  Moving VPN_1 on Interface_1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13

1.  Requirements notation

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].





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2.  Introduction

   The main scenario that motivated this document is a VPN End User
   establishing VPN with a Security Gateway when at least one of the
   peers has multiple interfaces.  Figure 1 represents the case when the
   VPN End User has multiple interfaces, Figure 2 represents the case
   when the Security Gateway has multiple interfaces, and Figure 3
   represents the case when both the VPN End User and the Security
   Gateway have multiple interfaces.  With Figure 1 and Figure 2, one of
   the peers has n = 2 interfaces and the other has a single interface.
   This results in creating of up to n = 2 VPNs.  With Figure 3, the VPN
   End User has n = 2 interfaces and the Security Gateway has m = 2
   interfaces.  This may lead to up to m x n VPNs.

   +------------+                                +------------+
   |            | Interface_0 : VPN_0            |            |
   |            =================                |            |
   |    VPN     |               v                |  Security  |
   |  End User  |               ==================  Gateway   |
   |            ================^                |            |
   |            | Interface_1 : VPN_1            |            |
   +------------+                                +------------+


              Figure 1: VPN End User with Multiple Interfaces

   +------------+                                +------------+
   |            |            Interface_0 : VPN_0 |            |
   |            |               ==================            |
   |    VPN     |               v                |  Security  |
   |  End User  =================                |  Gateway   |
   |            |               ^=================            |
   |            |            Interface_1 : VPN_1 |            |
   +------------+                                +------------+


            Figure 2: Security Gateway with Multiple Interfaces














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   +------------+                                +------------+
   |            | Interface_0       Interface_0' |            |
   |            ==================================            |
   |    VPN     |             \\ //              |  Security  |
   |  End User  |             // \\              |  Gateway   |
   |            ==================================            |
   |            | Interface_1       Interface_1' |            |
   +------------+                                +------------+


   Figure 3: VPN End User and Security Gateway with Multiple Interfaces

   With the current IKEv2 protocol [RFC7296], each VPN requires an IKE
   SA, and setting an IKE SA requires an authentication.  Authentication
   might require multiple round trips and an activity from the End User
   (like EAP-SIM [RFC4186] or EAP-TLS [RFC5216]) as well as crypto
   operations that would introduce an additional delay.

   Another scenario is a load-balancing solution, when there are two or
   more Security Gateways sharing the same ID, but each having its own
   IP address.  In this case the VPN End User first establishes IKE SA
   with one of these gateways.  Then, at some point of time the gateway
   takes a decision to move client to a different cluster node.  This
   can be done using Redirect Mechanism for IKEv2 [RFC5685].  The
   drawback of such approach is that it requires new IKE SA to be
   established from scratch, including full authentication.  In some
   cases this could be avoided by using IKEv2 Session Resumption
   [RFC5723] with a new gatevay.  However this requires VPN End User to
   know beforehand which new gateway to connect.  It is desirable to be
   able to clone existing IKE SA and moves it to a different Security
   Gateway, and then indicate to VPN End User to use this new SA.  This
   would allows participating Security Gateways to share the load
   between them.

   This document introduces the possibility to clone the IKE SA in the
   Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2).  The main idea is
   that the peer with multiple interfaces sets the first IKE SA as
   usual.  Then it takes advantage of the fact that this SA is completed
   and derives as many new parallel IKE SAs from it as the desired
   number of VPNs.  On each IKE SA a VPN is negotiated by creating one
   or more IPsec SAs.  This results in coexisting parallel VPNs.  Then
   the VPN End User moves each IPsec SA to its proper location using
   MOBIKE protocol [RFC4555].  Alternatively, the VPN End User may first
   move the IKE SAs and then create the IPsec SAs.

   The combination of the IKE SA cloning with with MOBIKE protocol
   provides IPsec communications with multiple interfaces the following
   advantages.  First, cloning the IKE SA requires very few



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   modifications to already existing IKEv2 implementations.  Then, it
   takes advantage of already existing and widely deployed MOBIKE
   protocol.  Finally, it keeps a dedicated IKE SA for each VPN which
   simplifies reachability tests and VPN maintenance.

   Note also that the cloning of the IKE SA is independent from MOBIKE
   and can also address other future scenarios.

3.  Terminology

   This section defines terms and acronyms used in this document.

   - VPN:   Virtual Private Network - one or more Child (IPsec) SAs
         created in tunnel mode between two peers.

   - VPN End User:   designates the end user that initiates the VPN with
         a Security Gateway.  This end user may be mobile and moves its
         VPN from one Security Gateway to another.

   - Security Gateway:   designates a point of attachment for the VPN
         service.  In this document, the VPN service is provided by
         multiple Security Gateways.  Each Security Gateway may be
         considered as a specific hardware.

   - IKE SA:   The IKE SA (IKE Security Association) is defined in
         [RFC7296].

4.  Protocol Overview

   The goal of the document is to specify how to create a new IKE SA
   without performing an authentication.  In order to achieve this goal,
   the document proposes that the two peers agree upon their ability of
   cloning the IKE SA.  This is done during the IKE_AUTH exchange by
   exchanging the CLONE_IKE_SA_SUPPORTED notifications.  To create a new
   parallel IKE SA, one of the peers initiates a CREATE_CHILD_SA
   exchange as if it would rekey the existing IKE SA.  In order to
   indicate the current IKE SA must not be deleted, the initiator
   includes the CLONE_IKE_SA notification in the CREATE_CHILD_SA
   exchange.  This results in two parallel IKE SAs.

   Note, that without the CLONE_IKE_SA notification the old IKE SA would
   be deleted after the rekey is successfully completed (as specified in
   Section 2.8 of [RFC7296].








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5.  Protocol Details

5.1.  Support Negotiation

   The initiator and the responder indicate their support for cloning
   IKE SA by exchanging the CLONE_IKE SA_SUPPORTED notifications.  This
   notification MUST be sent in the IKE_AUTH exchange (in case of
   multiple IKE_AUTH exchanges, in the message containing the SA
   payload).  If both initiator and responder send this notification
   during the IKE_AUTH exchange, peers may clone this IKE SA.  In the
   other case the IKE SA MUST NOT be cloned.

   Initiator                         Responder
   -------------------------------------------------------------------
   HDR, SA, KEi, Ni -->
                                <-- HDR, SA, KEr, Nr
   HDR, SK {IDi, AUTH,
        SA, TSi, TSr,
        N(CLONE_IKE_SA_SUPPORTED)} -->
                                <-- HDR, SK {IDr, AUTH,
                                         SA, TSi, TSr,
                                         N(CLONE_IKE_SA_SUPPORTED)}

5.2.  Cloning the IKE SA

   The initiator of the rekey exchange includes the CLONE_IKE_SA
   notification in a CREATE_CHILD_SA request for rekeying the IKE SA.
   The CLONE_IKE_SA notification indicates that the current IKE SA will
   not be immediately deleted once the new IKE SA is created.  Instead
   two parallel IKE SAs are expected to coexist.  The current IKE SA
   becomes the old IKE SA and the newly negotiated IKE SA becomes the
   new IKE SA.  The CLONE_IKE_SA notification MUST appear only in
   request message of the CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange concerning the IKE SA
   rekey.  If the CLONE_IKE_SA notification appears in any other
   message, it MUST be ignored.

   Initiator                         Responder
   -------------------------------------------------------------------
   HDR, SK {N(CLONE_IKE_SA), SA, Ni, KEi} -->

   If the CREATE_CHILD_SA request concerns an IKE SA rekey and contains
   the CLONE_IKE_SA notification, the responder proceeds to the IKE SA
   rekey, creates the new IKE SA, and keeps the old IKE SA.  No
   additional Notify Payload is included in the CREATE_CHILD_SA response
   as represented below:

                                <--  HDR, SK {SA, Nr, KEr}




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   When the IKE SA is cloned, peers MUST NOT transfer existing Child
   SAs, that were created by the old IKE SA, to the newly created IKE
   SA.  So, all signalling messages, concerning those Child SAs would
   continue to be sent over the old IKE SA.  This is different from the
   regular IKE SA rekey in IKEv2.

5.3.  Error Handling

   There may be conditions when responder for some reason is unable or
   unwilling to clone IKE SA.  This inability may be temporary or
   permanent.

   Temporary inability occurs when responder doesn't have enough
   resources at the moment to clone IKE SA or when IKE SA is being
   deleted by responder.  In this case the responder SHOULD reject the
   request to clone IKE SA with the TEMPORARY_FAILURE notification.

                               <--  HDR, SK {N(TEMPORARY_FAILURE)}

   After receiving this notification the initiator MAY retry its request
   after waiting some period of time.  See Section 2.25 of [RFC7296] for
   details.

   In some cases responder may have restrictions on the number of co-
   existing IKE SAs with one peer.  These restrictions may be either
   implicit (some devices may have enough resources to handle only a few
   IKE SAs) or explicit (provided by some configuration parameter).  If
   the initiator wants to clone more IKE SAs, than responder is able or
   is configured to handle, the responder SHOULD reject the request with
   the NO_ADDITIONAL_SAS notification.

                               <--  HDR, SK {N(NO_ADDITIONAL_SAS)}

   This condition is considered permanent and the initiator SHOULD NOT
   retry to clone IKE SA until some of existing SAs with the responder
   are deleted.

6.  Payload Description

   Figure 4 illustrates the Notify Payload packet format as described in
   section 3. 10 of [RFC7296].  This format is used for both the
   CLONE_IKE_SA and the CLONE_IKE_SA_SUPPORTED notifications.

   The CLONE_IKE_SA_SUPPORTED notification is used in an IKEv2 exchange
   of type IKE_AUTH and the CLONE_IKE_SA is used in an IKEv2 exchange of
   type CREATE_CHILD_SA.





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                           1                   2                   3
       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      | Next Payload  |C|  RESERVED   |         Payload Length        |
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |  Protocol ID  |   SPI Size    |      Notify Message Type      |
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+


                         Figure 4: Notify Payload

   The fields Next Payload, Critical Bit, RESERVED and Payload Length
   are defined in [RFC7296].  Specific fields defined in this document
   are:

   - Protocol ID (1 octet):  set to zero.

   - SPI Size (1 octet):  set to zero.

   - Notify Message Type (2 octets):  Specifies the type of notification
         message.  It is set to <TBA by IANA> for the CLONE_IKE_SA
         notification or to <TBA by IANA> for the CLONE_IKE_SA_SUPPORTED
         Notification.

7.  IANA Considerations

   IANA is requested to allocate two values in the "IKEv2 Notify Message
   Types - Status Types registry":

   IKEv2 Notify Message Types - Status Types
   -----------------------------------------
     <TBA>         CLONE_IKE_SA_SUPPORTED
     <TBA>         CLONE_IKE_SA

8.  Security Considerations

   The protocol defined in this document does not modify IKEv2.
   Security considerations for cloning an IKE SA are mostly the same as
   those for base IKEv2 protocol described in [RFC7296].

   Cloning an IKE SA provides the ability for an initiator to duplicate
   existing SAs.  As a result it may influence any accounting or control
   mechanisms based on a single IKE SA per authentication.

   Suppose a system has a limit on the number of IKE SAs it can handle.
   In this case, the cloning an IKE SA may provide a way for resource
   exhaustion, as a single end user may populate multiple IKE SAs.




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   Suppose a system shares the IPsec resources by limiting the number of
   Child SAs per IKE SA.  With a single IKE SA per end user, this
   provides an equal resource sharing.  In this case, cloning the IKE SA
   provides means for an end user to overpass this limit.  Such system
   should evaluate the number of Child SAs over the number of all IKE
   SAs associated to an end user.

   Note, that these issues are not unique to the ability of cloning the
   IKE SA, as multiple IKE SAs between two peers may be created without
   involving a cloning method.  Note also, that implementation can
   always limit the number of cloned IKE SAs.

   Suppose VPN or any other IPsec based service monitoring is based on
   the liveliness of the first IKE SA.  Such system considers a service
   is accessed or used from the time IKE performs an authentication to
   the time the IKE SA is deleted.  Such accounting methods were fine as
   any IKE SA required an authentication exchange.  As cloning the IKE
   SA skips the authentication phase, it may make possible to delete the
   initial IKE SA while the service is being used on the cloned IKE SA.
   Such accountings method should considers the service is being used
   from the first IKE SA establishment to until the last IKE SA is being
   removed.

9.  Acknowledgments

   The ideas of this draft came from various inputs from the ipsecme WG
   and from discussions with Tero Kivinen and Michael Richardson.  Yaron
   Sheffer, Tero Kivinen provided significant inputs to set the current
   design of the protocol as well as its designation.

10.  References

10.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC4555]  Eronen, P., "IKEv2 Mobility and Multihoming Protocol
              (MOBIKE)", RFC 4555, June 2006.

   [RFC7296]  Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., Eronen, P., and T.
              Kivinen, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
              (IKEv2)", STD 79, RFC 7296, October 2014.








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10.2.  Informational References

   [RFC4186]  Haverinen, H. and J. Salowey, "Extensible Authentication
              Protocol Method for Global System for Mobile
              Communications (GSM) Subscriber Identity Modules (EAP-
              SIM)", RFC 4186, January 2006.

   [RFC5216]  Simon, D., Aboba, B., and R. Hurst, "The EAP-TLS
              Authentication Protocol", RFC 5216, March 2008.

   [RFC5685]  Devarapalli, V. and K. Weniger, "Redirect Mechanism for
              the Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)", RFC
              5685, November 2009.

   [RFC5723]  Sheffer, Y. and H. Tschofenig, "Internet Key Exchange
              Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2) Session Resumption", RFC 5723,
              January 2010.

Appendix A.  Setting a VPN on Multiple Interfaces

   This section is informational and exposes how a VPN End User as
   illustrated in Figure 1 can build two VPNs on its two interfaces
   without multiple authentications.  Other cases represented in
   Figure 2 and Figure 3 are similar and can be easily derived from this
   case.  The mechanism is based on cloning the IKE SA and the MOBIKE
   extension [RFC4555].

A.1.  Setting VPN_0

   First, the VPN End User negotiates a VPN using one interface.  This
   involves regular IKEv2 exchanges.  In addition, the VPN End User and
   the Security Gateway advertise their support for MOBIKE.  At the end
   of the IKE_AUTH exchange, VPN_0 is set as represented in Figure 5.

   +------------+                                +------------+
   |            | Interface_0 : VPN_0            |            |
   |            =================                |            |
   |    VPN     |               v                |  Security  |
   |  End User  |               ==================  Gateway   |
   |            =                                |            |
   |            | Interface_1                    |            |
   +------------+                                +------------+


                 Figure 5: VPN End User Establishing VPN_0

   The exchanges are completely described in [RFC7296] and [RFC4555].
   First, peers negotiate IKE SA parameters and exchange nonces and



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   public keys in IKE_SA_INIT exchange.  In the figure below they also
   proceed to NAT detection because of the use of MOBIKE.

   Initiator                         Responder
   -------------------------------------------------------------------
   (IP_I0:500 -> IP_R:500)
   HDR, SA, KEi, Ni,
        N(NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP),
        N(NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP)  -->

                         <--  (IP_R:500 -> IP_I0:500)
                              HDR, SA, KEr, Nr,
                                   N(NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP),
                                   N(NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP)

   Then the initiator and the responder proceed to the IKE_AUTH
   exchange, advertise their support for MOBIKE and their ability to
   clone the IKE SA - with the MOBIKE_SUPPORTED and the
   CLONE_IKE_SA_SUPPORTED notifications - and negotiate the Child SA for
   VPN_0.  Optionally, the initiator and the responder can advertise
   their multiple interfaces using the ADDITIONAL_IP4_ADDRESS and/or
   ADDITIONAL_IP6_ADDRESS notifications.

   (IP_I0:4500 -> IP_R:4500)
   HDR, SK {IDi, AUTH,
        SA, TSi, TSr,
        N(MOBIKE_SUPPORTED),
        [N(ADDITIONAL_IP*_ADDRESS)+,]
        N(CLONE_IKE_SA_SUPPORTED)}  -->

                         <--  (IP_R:4500 -> IP_I0:4500)
                              HDR, SK {IDr, AUTH,
                                   SA, TSi, TSr,
                                   N(MOBIKE_SUPPORTED),
                                   [N(ADDITIONAL_IP*_ADDRESS)+,]
                                   N(CLONE_IKE_SA_SUPPORTED)}

A.2.  Creating an additional IKE SA

   In our case the VPN End User wants to establish an additional VPN
   with its Interface_1.  The VPN End User will first establish a
   parallel IKE SA using a CREATE_CHILD_SA that concerns an IKE SA rekey
   associated with a CLONE_IKE_SA notification.  This results in two
   separate IKE SAs between the VPN End User and the Security Gateway.
   Currently both IKE SAs are set using Interface_0 of the VPN End User.






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   Initiator                         Responder
   -------------------------------------------------------------------
   (IP_I0:4500 -> IP_R:4500)
   HDR, SK {N(CLONE_IKE_SA),
        SA, Ni, KEi} -->
                         <--  (IP_R:4500 -> IP_I0:4500)
                              HDR, SK {SA, Nr, KEr}

A.3.  Creating the Child SA for VPN_1

   Once the new IKE SA has been created, the VPN End User can initiate a
   CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange that concerns the creation of a Child SA for
   VPN_1.  The newly created VPN_1 will use Interface_0 of the VPN End
   User.

   It is out of scope of the document to define how the VPN End User
   handles traffic with multiple interfaces.  The VPN End User can use
   the same inner IP address on its multiple interfaces.  In this case,
   the same Traffic Selectors (that is the IP address used for VPN_0 and
   VPN_1) can match for both VPNs VPN_0 and VPN_1.  The VPN End User
   must be aware of such match and be able to manage it.  It can for
   example use distinct Traffic Selectors on both VPNs using different
   ports, manage the order of its SPD or have SPD defined per
   interfaces.  Defining these mechanisms are out of scope of this
   document.  Alternatively, the VPN End User can use a different inner
   IP address for each interface.

   The creation of VPN_1 is performed via the newly created IKE SA as
   follows:

   Initiator                         Responder
   -------------------------------------------------------------------
   (IP_I0:4500 -> IP_R:4500)
   HDR(new), SK(new) {SA, TSi, TSr}  -->

                         <--  (IP_R:4500 -> IP_I0:4500)
                              HDR(new), SK(new) {SA, TSi, TSr}

   The resulting configuration is depicted in Figure 6.  VPN_0 and VPN_1
   have been created, but both are using the same Interface:
   Interface_0.










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   +------------+                                +------------+
   |            | Interface_0 : VPN_0, VPN_1     |            |
   |            ====================             |            |
   |    VPN     =================  v             |  Security  |
   |  End User  |               v  ===============  Gateway   |
   |            |               ==================            |
   |            | Interface_1                    |            |
   +------------+                                +------------+


            Figure 6: VPN End User Establishing VPN_0 and VPN_1

A.4.  Moving VPN_1 on Interface_1

   In this section, MOBIKE is used to move VPN_1 on interface_1.  The
   exchange is described in [RFC4555].

   (IP_I1:4500 -> IP_R:4500)
   HDR(new), SK(new) {N(UPDATE_SA_ADDRESSES),
             N(NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP),
             N(NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP),
             N(COOKIE2)}  -->

                         <--  (IP_R:4500 -> IP_I1:4500)
                              HDR(new), SK(new) {
                                   N(NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP),
                                   N(NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP),
                                   N(COOKIE2)}

   This results in the situation as described in Figure 7.

   +------------+                                +------------+
   |            | Interface_0 : VPN_0            |            |
   |            ==================               |            |
   |    VPN     |                v               |  Security  |
   |  End User  |                =================  Gateway   |
   |            =================^               |            |
   |            | Interface_1 : VPN_1            |            |
   +------------+                                +------------+


              Figure 7: VPN End User with Multiple Interfaces

Authors' Addresses







Migault (Ed) & Smyslov  Expires September 5, 2015              [Page 13]


Internet-Draft                Clone IKE SA                    March 2015


   Daniel Migault
   Ericsson
   8400 boulevard Decarie
   Montreal, QC H4P 2N2
   Canada

   Email: mglt.ietf@gmail.com


   Valery Smyslov
   ELVIS-PLUS
   PO Box 81
   Moscow (Zelenograd)  124460
   Russian Federation

   Phone: +7 495 276 0211
   Email: svan@elvis.ru


































Migault (Ed) & Smyslov  Expires September 5, 2015              [Page 14]


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