[Docs] [txt|pdf|xml] [Tracker] [Email] [Nits]

Versions: 00 draft-mglt-lurk-tls12

Network Working Group                                         D. Migault
Internet-Draft                                                  Ericsson
Intended status: Standards Track                       February 19, 2016
Expires: August 22, 2016


           TLS/DTLS Content Provider Edge Server Abstract API
                  draft-mglt-lurk-tls-abstract-api-00

Abstract

   This document describes the interactions between the Edge Server and
   the Content Provider in a split authentication scenario.

   This document provides an abstract description of the information
   exchanged between an Edge Server and a Content Provider.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on August 22, 2016.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.



Migault                  Expires August 22, 2016                [Page 1]


Internet-Draft              TLS abstract API               February 2016


Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Protocol Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     3.1.  Premaster Computation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.2.  Master Computation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.3.  Signature Computation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   4.  Input Parameters Description  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     4.1.  Static parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       4.1.1.  API Version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       4.1.2.  TLSVersion  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       4.1.3.  ObjectRequest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       4.1.4.  AuthenticationMethod  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       4.1.5.  MasterMethod  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       4.1.6.  SignatureMethod . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       4.1.7.  PRF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     4.2.  TLS Hanshake parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
       4.2.1.  ClientHello.random, ClientServer.random . . . . . . .  11
       4.2.2.  session_hash, DataHash  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
       4.2.3.  handshake_messages  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
       4.2.4.  PSK_ID  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     4.3.  Cryptographic Parameters  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
       4.3.1.  RSAEncryptedPreMaster . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
       4.3.2.  DHECDHTLSClientPublicDHECDHKey  . . . . . . . . . . .  13
       4.3.3.  TLSClientEdgeServerDHSecret . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
       4.3.4.  TLSClientEdgeServerDHECDHSecret . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   5.  Output Parameters Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     5.1.  Premaster . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     5.2.  Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     5.3.  Error . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   7.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   8.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14

1.  Introduction

   This document assumes a TLS session is established between a TLS
   Client authenticates a Content Provider while being connected with an
   TLS Edge Server.

   The architecture is defined more in details in [draft-cairns-tls-
   session-key-interface], and the split authentication models are
   described in [draft-mglt-tls-lurk-requirements].

   Motivation for providing an abstract API is to to provide a reference
   that may be implemented in various ways.  As a result, this document



Migault                  Expires August 22, 2016                [Page 2]


Internet-Draft              TLS abstract API               February 2016


   does not consider the names of the procedures, their implementations,
   nor how the informations are exchanged between the Edge Server and
   the Content Provider.  This document only describes the information
   exchanged between the Edge Server and the Content Provider and the
   associated treatment or verifications that may apply.

2.  Terminology



3.  Protocol Overview

   In a split authentication scenario, the Edge Server and the Content
   Provider needs to interact in order to set up the TLS/DTLS session
   between the TLS Client and the Edge Server while the TLS Client
   authenticates the Content Provider.

   The current document considers the following authentication methods:
   dhe_dss, dhe_rsa, dh_anon, rsa, dh_dss and dh_rsa described in
   [RFC6347], ecdh_ecdsa, ecdhe_ecdsa, ecdh_rsa, ecdhe_rsa and ecdh_anon
   described in [RFC4492] as well as psk, dhe_psk and rsa_psk that are
   described in [RFC4279].  These authentication methods are designated
   in this document by the AuthenticationMethod variable.

       AuthenticationMethod = [rsa, dh_dss, dh_rsa, dh_dss, dh_rsa,
                              ecdh_rsa, dh_anon, ecdh_anon, dhe_dss,
                              dhe_rsa, ecdhe_ecdsa, ecdhe_rsa, psk,
                              dhe_psk, rsa_psk]

                           AuthenticationMethod

   The interactions between the Edge Server and the Content Provider
   depend on the authentication method.  First of all, the object
   request, designated in this document as ObjectRequest, depends on the
   authentication method.  When the authentication methods is one of
   rsa, dh_dss, dh_rsa rsa, dh_dss, dh_rsa, ecdh_rsa, the Content
   Provider is likely to be requested by the Edge Server a premaster
   secret or a master secret.  When the authentication method is an
   ephemeral Diffie Hellman or ephemeral Elliptic Diffie Hellman
   authentication methods like dhe_dss, dhe_rsa, ecdhe_ecdsa, ecdhe_rsa,
   the Content Provider is likely to be requested a signature.  When the
   authentication method is an anonymous authentication method like
   dh_anon, ecdh_anon no interactions are expected from the Content
   Provider and the Edge Server.  Finally, when the authentication
   method is PSK based, the Content provider is likely to be requested a
   master secret but not the premaster secret as the premaster contains
   the PSK in clear text.




Migault                  Expires August 22, 2016                [Page 3]


Internet-Draft              TLS abstract API               February 2016


   Second, the object of the request like a master secret or the
   signature may be generated with different inputs.  For example, a
   signature or a master secret may use the hash of some clear text.
   The different inputs provided by the Edge Server are designated as
   InputParameters.

   Finally, the Content provider may have its own policies regarding the
   TLS version, the authentication methods, the object request as well
   as the associated inputs.  This means that the Content Provider may
   refuse some request defined in this document based on its own
   policies.  This should be indicated in an error message by the
   Content provider in its response.

   As a result, the basic scheme considered for this API adopts a Query
   / Response pattern.  The Query message provides all necessary
   information for the Content Provider, to proceed to the Query, and
   send the output result in the Response.

              Query:
              APIVersion = 1.0
              TLSVersion = [1.2, 1.3]
              ObjectRequest = [premaster, master, signature]
              InputParameters

              Response:
              Output [PreMaster, Master, Signature, Error]

                           API Query / Response

   The Query is associated with the following parameters:

   (a)  APIVersion: which designates the version of the API used.  The
        version is expected to be useful when the authentication methods
        or TLS version will be added.
   (b)  TLSVersion: the associated version of the TLS.
   (c)  ObjectRequest: the requested output.  Currently the requested
        output can be one of the following: pre_master, master,
        signature.
   (d)  InputParameters: the parameters provided by the Edge Server in
        order to compute the ObjectRequest.  These InputParameters will
        be defined in the remaining of the document, and are very
        specific to each Query.

   The Response returns the ObjectRequest or an Error.  When an Error is
   returned it SHOULD provide some indication why the request have not
   been proceeded.  Note that the types of errors are:





Migault                  Expires August 22, 2016                [Page 4]


Internet-Draft              TLS abstract API               February 2016


   (a)  Input Format Parameter Errors: that is errors associated to the
        format of a given parameter.  For example a TLS version that is
        out of bound, or a Client,random that does not have the expected
        size would trigger such an error.
   (b)  Input Parameters Incompatibility Error: that is a combination of
        input parameters that is not acceptable on a standard point of
        view.  This could be for example requesting a signature with an
        authentication method that is expected to provide a master
        secret.
   (c)  Not Permitted Input Parameters Error: that is a combination of
        parameters that is either not accepted by the Content Provider,
        or not implemented by the API.  For example, the Content
        Provider may only generate signature from the complete clear
        text and refuse to generate it simply based on the hash of the
        content.

   InpuParameters depends on the ObjectRequest value, so the
   InputParameters can be:

   (a)  PremasterInputParams: when the query requests a premaster, that
        is ObjectRequest is set to premaster.
   (b)  MasterInputParams: when the query requests a master secret, that
        is ObjectRequest is set to master.
   (c)  SignatureInputParams: when the query requests a signature, that
        is the ObjectRequest is set to signature.

                       InputParameters:
                           select(ObjectRequest)
                           case pre_master:
                               PremasterInputParams
                           case master:
                               MasterInputParams
                           case signature:
                               SignatureInputParams

                              InpuParameters

3.1.  Premaster Computation

   A premaster may be requested only for a subset of authentication
   methods, that is RSA and non anonymous Diffie Helmman based methods.
   In the case of RSA, the encrypted premaster is provided whereas
   Diffie Hellman based authentication provides the TLS Client public
   key.

   When another authentication method is associated to the premaster
   request an Input Parameters Incompatibility Error must be sent




Migault                  Expires August 22, 2016                [Page 5]


Internet-Draft              TLS abstract API               February 2016


   indicating that the authentication method is not compatible with the
   premaster request.

   (a)  INCOMPATIBLE_INPUT_PARAMETERS_ERROR

   In order to indicate the error is associated to the authentication
   method the two following error message are added.  Note that an
   unacceptable error may occur when there is a incompatibility between
   the parameters.  This can occur due to local policies or due to an
   incompatibility with the specification.  It is the responsibility of
   the Edge Server to implement the specification properly, and thus to
   receive the error only when it results from a local policy.

      AUTHENTICATION_METHOD_UNACCEPTABLE_ERROR

   The description of the input parameters are provide by the figure
   below:

            PreMasterInputParams
                - AuthenticationMethod
                - PreMasterInputData

            PreMasterInputData:
                select(AuthenticationMethod)
                case rsa:
                    RSAEncryptedPreMaster
                case dh_dss, dh_rsa, dh_dss, dh_rsa, ecdh_rsa:
                    DHECDHTLSClientPublicDHECDHKey
                case dhe_dss, dhe_rsa, ecdhe_ecdsa,
                     ecdhe_rsa, psk, dhe_psk and rsa_psk:
                    /* Input Parameters Incompatibility Error
                       INCOMPATIBLE_INPUT_PARAMETERS_ERROR
                       AUTHENTICATION_METHOD_UNACCEPTABLE_ERROR
                       is generated
                    */

                           PreMasterInputParams

3.2.  Master Computation

   The computation of a master secret needs more information than the
   computation of the premaster.  Similarly to the premaster generation,
   generation of a master secret is reserved to a subset of
   authentication methods.  Note that the PSK based authentication
   methods are able to generate master secret but not to generate
   premaster.  The reason is that the premaster embeds the PSK in clear
   text.




Migault                  Expires August 22, 2016                [Page 6]


Internet-Draft              TLS abstract API               February 2016


   Similarly to the premaster generation, when an authentication method
   is not permitted an Input Parameters Incompatibility Error
   INCOMPATIBLE_INPUT_PARAMETERS_ERROR with and
   AUTHENTICATION_METHOD_UNACCEPTABLE_ERROR are returned.

   As premaster are used to compute the master, when a authentication
   method enable the generation of the premaster the same input
   parameters must be also provided to the Content Provider.

   Master secret may be generated using different methods and using
   different inputs.  More specifically, the extended master secret may
   be generated from the hash of the exchange messages, or the exchange
   message themselves.  The figure below represent a method by the type
   of the master secret (that is the standard master secret or the
   extended master secret) as well as the expected inputs.  Such
   representation is not normative and provided for illustration.  As a
   result, alternative representation may be used.

    MasterInputParams
        AuthenticationMethod
        MasterMethod = [standard_master,
                        extended_master_from_session_hash,
                        extended_master_method_from_handshake_messages]
        MasterInputData

    MasterInputData
        select(AuthenticationMethod)
        case rsa:
            MasterMethodParams
            RSAEncryptedPreMaster
        case dh-scdh:
            MasterMethodParams
            DHECDHTLSClientPublicDHECDHKey
        case dhe_dss, dhe_rsa, ecdhe_ecdsa, dh_anon, ecdh_anon
             ecdhe_rsa, psk
            /* Input Parameters Incompatibility Error
               INCOMPATIBLE_INPUT_PARAMETERS_ERROR
               AUTHENTICATION_METHOD_UNACCEPTABLE_ERROR
               is generated
            */
        case psk, dhe_psk, rsa_psk:
            PSKInputData


    MasterMethodParams
        select(MasterMethod)
        case standard_master:
            - ClientHello.random



Migault                  Expires August 22, 2016                [Page 7]


Internet-Draft              TLS abstract API               February 2016


            - ClientServer.random
            - PRF
        case extended_master_from_session_hash
            - session_hash
            - PRF
        case extended_master_method_from_handshake_messages
            - handshake_messages
            - PRF

    PSKInputData
       select(PSKSubAuthenticationMethod)
        case psk:
            - PSK_ID
        case PSK_rsa:
            - RSAEncryptedPreMaster
        case psk_dhe:
            - TLSClientEdgeServerDHSecret
            - PSK_ID

                             MasterInputParams

3.3.  Signature Computation

   Similarly to the generation of the premaster and the generation of
   the master, the signature is associated to restricted subset of
   authentication methods, i.e. dhe_dss, dhe_rsa, ecdhe_ecdsa ecdhe_rsa.
   When another authentication method is chosen an Input Parameters
   Incompatibility Error INCOMPATIBLE_INPUT_PARAMETERS_ERROR with an
   AUTHENTICATION_METHOD_UNACCEPTABLE_ERROR are returned.

   Similarly to the generation of the master, different method may be
   used to generate the signature and different parameters may be needed
   to generate the signature.  In some case, the hash is provided
   whereas in some other case, the whole content to sign is provided.

   The figure below provides a representation of the possible parameters
   provided by the Edge Server.














Migault                  Expires August 22, 2016                [Page 8]


Internet-Draft              TLS abstract API               February 2016


   SignatureInputParams
        AuthenticationMethod
        SignatureMethod = (CryptoAlgo = [dss, rsa, ecdsa],
                           DataType = [hash, content])
        SignatureInputData

   SignatureInputData
       select(AuthenticationMethod)
           case dhe_dss, dhe_rsa, ecdhe_ecdsa ecdhe_rsa:
               SignatureInputData
           case rsa, dh_dss, dh_rsa, dh_dss, dh_rsa, ecdh_rsa, dh_anon,
                ecdh_anon, psk, dhe_psk, rsa_psk:
           /* Input Parameters Incompatibility Error
              INCOMPATIBLE_INPUT_PARAMETERS_ERROR
              AUTHENTICATION_METHOD_UNACCEPTABLE_ERROR
              is generated
           */

   SignatureInput
       select(SignatureMethod.DataType)
       case hash:
           - DataHash
       case content:
           - ClientHello.random
           - ClientServer.random
           - TLSClientEdgeServerDHECDHSecret

                             MasterInputParams

4.  Input Parameters Description

   This section lists the possible parameters exchanged between the Edge
   Server and the Content Provider.  For each parameters, this section
   determine what checks and error may be associated to them and
   communicated to the Edge Server.

   In order to address the different errors, for each input, there is an
   associated Input Format Parameter Errors that indicates the input
   does not follow the format expected in this document.  In addition,
   there is an Not Permitted Input Parameters Error that indicates the
   API does not support the provided input.  This is mostly due to local
   policies.  In addition, the local policies may also prevent a given
   input value in combination with other input values.  In this case,
   the error returned by the Content Provider is an Input Parameters
   Incompatibility Error INCOMPATIBLE_INPUT_PARAMETERS_ERROR with the
   Not Permitted Input Parameters Error associated to the conflicting
   parameters.




Migault                  Expires August 22, 2016                [Page 9]


Internet-Draft              TLS abstract API               February 2016


4.1.  Static parameters

4.1.1.  API Version

   The Input Format Parameter Errors associated to the API version
   output are:

      API_VERSION_FORMAT_ERROR

4.1.2.  TLSVersion

   The Input Format Parameter Errors and Not Permitted Input Parameters
   Error associated to the TLS version output are:

      TLS_VERSION_FORMAT_ERROR
      TLS_VERSION_UNACCEPTABLE_ERROR

4.1.3.  ObjectRequest

   The Input Format Parameter Errors and Not Permitted Input Parameters
   Error associated to the requested output are:

      REQUEST_OUTPUT_FORMAT_ERROR
      REQUEST_OUTPUT_UNACCEPTABLE_ERROR

4.1.4.  AuthenticationMethod

   The Input Format Parameter Errors and Not Permitted Input Parameters
   Error associated to the authentication method are:

      AUTHENTICATION_METHOD_FORMAT_ERROR
      AUTHENTICATION_METHOD_UNACCEPTABLE_ERROR

4.1.5.  MasterMethod

   The Input Format Parameter Errors and Not Permitted Input Parameters
   Error associated to the master methods are:

      MASTER_METHOD_FORMAT_ERROR
      MASTER_METHOD_UNACCEPTABLE_ERROR

4.1.6.  SignatureMethod

   The Input Format Parameter Errors and Not Permitted Input Parameters
   Error associated to the signature method are:

      SIGNATURE_METHOD_FORMAT_ERROR
      SIGNATURE_METHOD_UNACCEPTABLE_ERROR



Migault                  Expires August 22, 2016               [Page 10]


Internet-Draft              TLS abstract API               February 2016


4.1.7.  PRF

   The Input Format Parameter Errors and Not Permitted Input Parameters
   Error associated to the pseudo random function are:

      PRF_FUNCTION_FORMAT_ERROR
      PRF_FUNCTION_UNACCEPTABLE_ERROR

4.2.  TLS Hanshake parameters

4.2.1.  ClientHello.random, ClientServer.random

   The Input Format Parameter Error associated to the ClientHello
   randoms is:

      CLIENT_RANDOM_FORMAT_ERROR (most likely a length different from 32
      bytes)

4.2.2.  session_hash, DataHash

   The Input Format Parameter Error associated to the hash is:

      HASH_FORMAT_ERROR (most likely an unexpected length)

4.2.3.  handshake_messages

   The Input Format Parameter Error associated to the hash is:

      HANDSHAKE_MESAGE_FORMAT_ERROR

4.2.4.  PSK_ID

   The Not Input Parameter Error associated to the hash is:

      PSK_ID_UNACCEPTABLE_ERROR (unkown PSK id)

4.3.  Cryptographic Parameters

4.3.1.  RSAEncryptedPreMaster

   Encrypted RSA values are expected to follow the PKCS#1 format.  Upon
   receipt of the parameter, the Content Provider checks the format of
   encrypted parameters.  If an error is detected, the Content Provider
   can either respond with a randomly generated pre_master or master or
   return a Input Format Parameter Error.  The random value will result
   in an aborted session, and so motivation for providing a random value
   is to prevent notifying the Edge Server a format error has been
   detected.  This behavior is recommended when the Content provider



Migault                  Expires August 22, 2016               [Page 11]


Internet-Draft              TLS abstract API               February 2016


   does not trust the Edge Server or suspect it is under attack.  On the
   other hand, sending a error may also notify the Edge Server an attack
   is being suspected, so mitigating mechanisms may be activated by the
   Edge Server.  In any case, if an format error is detected the error
   returned by the Content Provider may be:

      RSA_ENCRYPTED_FORMAT_ERROR

   If the parameters ar enot expected, the Content Provider may provide
   in addition to an INCOMPATIBLE_INPUT_PARAMETERS_ERROR the following
   message:

      RSA_ENCRYPTED_UNACCEPTABLE_ERROR

4.3.1.1.  Checking RSA Encrypted Premaster Format

   The first two bytes must be 00 02 followed by non zero padding until
   a 00 byte is found, followed by the two byte for the TLS version and
   finally the 46 bytes of the pre master secret.  If the format is
   appropriated the premaster is returned, otherwise an
   ERROR_UNVALID_ENCRYPTED_MASTER is returned, or a randomly generated
   Premaster Secret which will silently discard the TLS session - see
   Section 7.4.7.1 of [RFC5246].

   As defined in section 8.1.1 [RFC2546], the pre_master is 48-byte
   generated by the TLS Client.  The two first bytes indicates the TLS
   version and MUST be the same value as the one provided by the
   ClientHello.client_version, and the remaining 46 bytes are expected
   to be random.

   The pre_master is encrypted with the public key of the TLS Server as
   a EncryptedPreMasterSecret structure sent in the Client Key Exchange
   Message as described in section 7.4.7.1 [RFC5246].  The encryption
   follows for compatibility with previous TLS version RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5
   scheme described in [RFC3447], which results in a 256 byte encrypted
   message for a 2048-bit RSA key or 128 byte encrypted message for a
   1024 bit RSA key.

          <---------- 256 bytes ------------------------------>
                   <-- 205 bytes -->       <-    48 bytes    ->
                                           <-  TLS  ->
                                             version
         +----+----+------------------+----+-----+-----+--------+
         | 00 | 02 | non-zero padding | 00 | maj | min | random |
         +----+----+------------------+----+-----+-----+--------+

   PKCS#1 padding for pre_master secret encrypted with 2048-bit RSA key




Migault                  Expires August 22, 2016               [Page 12]


Internet-Draft              TLS abstract API               February 2016


4.3.2.  DHECDHTLSClientPublicDHECDHKey

   TBD

4.3.3.  TLSClientEdgeServerDHSecret

   TBD

4.3.4.  TLSClientEdgeServerDHECDHSecret

   TBD

5.  Output Parameters Description

5.1.  Premaster

   The premaster and master are an opaque number bytes. premaster are 46
   byte length and master are 48 byte length.

   Note that the PreMasterSecret structure of [RFC5246] includes the
   protocol version.

                       struct {
                           ProtocolVersion client_version;
                           opaque random[46];
                       } PreMasterSecret;

                         PreMasterSecret Structure

5.2.  Signature

   In order to identify the signature, the signature structure should
   have the signature algorithm, the hash algorithm and the value of the
   signature.

5.3.  Error

   In this document, the Error message can carry various messages.  More
   specifically, when a query is not accepted because of incompatibility
   of parameters provided, the Content provider returns
   INCOMPATIBLE_INPUT_PARAMETERS_ERROR.  In order to provide more
   indication to the Edge Server additional message as the convicting
   parameters may be added.








Migault                  Expires August 22, 2016               [Page 13]


Internet-Draft              TLS abstract API               February 2016


6.  Security Considerations

7.  Acknowledgements

8.  References

   [RFC2546]  Durand, A. and B. Buclin, "6Bone Routing Practice", RFC
              2546, DOI 10.17487/RFC2546, March 1999,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2546>.

   [RFC3447]  Jonsson, J. and B. Kaliski, "Public-Key Cryptography
              Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications
              Version 2.1", RFC 3447, DOI 10.17487/RFC3447, February
              2003, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3447>.

   [RFC4279]  Eronen, P., Ed. and H. Tschofenig, Ed., "Pre-Shared Key
              Ciphersuites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC
              4279, DOI 10.17487/RFC4279, December 2005,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4279>.

   [RFC4492]  Blake-Wilson, S., Bolyard, N., Gupta, V., Hawk, C., and B.
              Moeller, "Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites
              for Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 4492, DOI
              10.17487/RFC4492, May 2006,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4492>.

   [RFC5246]  Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
              (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, DOI 10.17487/
              RFC5246, August 2008,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>.

   [RFC6347]  Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer
              Security Version 1.2", RFC 6347, DOI 10.17487/RFC6347,
              January 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6347>.

Author's Address

   Daniel Migault
   Ericsson
   8400 boulevard Decarie
   Montreal, QC   H4P 2N2
   Canada

   Phone: +1 514-452-2160
   Email: daniel.migault@ericsson.com






Migault                  Expires August 22, 2016               [Page 14]


Html markup produced by rfcmarkup 1.129c, available from https://tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcmarkup/