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NVO3  Working Group                                            G. Mirsky
Internet-Draft                                                 ZTE Corp.
Intended status: Standards Track                              S. Boutros
Expires: March 29, 2021                                            Ciena
                                                                D. Black
                                                                Dell EMC
                                                           S. Pallagatti
                                                                  VMware
                                                      September 25, 2020


                         OAM for use in GENEVE
                     draft-mmbb-nvo3-geneve-oam-04

Abstract

   This document lists a set of general requirements for active OAM
   protocols in the Geneve overlay network.  Based on the requirements,
   IP encapsulation for active Operations, Administration, and
   Maintenance protocols in Geneve protocol is defined.  Considerations
   for using ICMP and UDP-based protocols are discussed.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on March 29, 2021.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents



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   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Conventions used in this document . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
       1.1.1.  Acronyms  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
       1.1.2.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Active OAM Protocols in Geneve Networks . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.1.  Defect Detection and Troubleshooting in Geneve Network
           with Active OAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.2.  OAM Encapsulation in Geneve . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   3.  Echo Request and Echo Reply in Geneve Tunnel  . . . . . . . .   7
   4.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   6.  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   7.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     7.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     7.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   Appendix A.  Additional Considerations for OAM Encapsulation
                Method in Geneve . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10

1.  Introduction

   Geneve [I-D.ietf-nvo3-geneve] is intended to support various
   scenarios of network virtualization.  In addition to carrying multi-
   protocol payload, e.g., Ethernet, IPv4/IPv6, the Geneve message
   includes metadata.  Operations, Administration, and Maintenance (OAM)
   protocols support fault management and performance monitoring
   functions necessary for comprehensive network operation.  Active OAM
   protocols, as defined in [RFC7799], use specially constructed packets
   that are injected into the network.  To ensure that the measured
   performance metric or the detected failure of the transport layer are
   related to a particular Geneve flow, it is critical that these test
   packets share fate with overlay data packets for that flow when
   traversing the underlay network.

   A set of general requirements for active OAM protocols in the Geneve
   overlay network is listed in Section 2.  IP encapsulation conforms to
   these requirements and is defined as a suitable encapsulation of
   active OAM protocols in a Geneve overlay network.  Note that the IP
   encapsulation of OAM is applicable to those VNIs that support the use
   of the necessary values of the Protocol Type field in the Geneve



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   header, i.e., Ethertypes of IPv4 or IPv6.  It does not apply to VNIs
   that lack that support, e.g., VNIs that only support Ethernet
   Ethertypes.  Analysis and definition of other types of OAM
   encapsulation in Geneve are outside the scope of this document.

1.1.  Conventions used in this document

1.1.1.  Acronyms

   CC Continuity Check

   CV Connectivity Verification

   FM Fault Management

   Geneve Generic Network Virtualization Encapsulation

   NVO3 Network Virtualization Overlays

   OAM Operations, Administration, and Maintenance

   VNI Virtual Network Identifier

1.1.2.  Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

2.  Active OAM Protocols in Geneve Networks

   OAM protocols, whether part of fault management or performance
   monitoring, are intended to provide reliable information that can be
   used to detect a failure, identify the defect and localize it, thus
   helping to identify and apply corrective actions to minimize the
   negative impact on service.  Several OAM protocols are used to
   perform these functions; these protocols require demultiplexing at
   the receiving instance of Geneve.  To improve the accuracy of the
   correlation between the condition experienced by the monitored Geneve
   tunnel and the state of the OAM protocol the OAM encapsulation is
   required to comply with the following requirements:

      REQ#1: Geneve OAM test packets MUST share the fate with data
      traffic of the monitored Geneve tunnel, i.e., be in-band with the
      monitored traffic, follow the same overlay and transport path as




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      packets with data payload, in the forward direction, i.e. from
      ingress toward egress endpoint(s) of the OAM test.

   An OAM protocol MAY be used to monitor the particular Geneve tunnel
   as a whole.  In that case, test packets could be fate-sharing with a
   sub-set of tenant flows transported over the Geneve tunnel.  If the
   goal is to monitor the condition experienced by the flow of a
   particular tenant, the test packets MUST be fate-sharing with that
   specific flow in the Geneve tunnel.  In the latter case, the test
   packet MUST use the same Geneve encapsulation as the data packet
   (except for the value in the Protocol Type field
   [I-D.ietf-nvo3-geneve]), including the value in the Virtual Network
   Identifier (VNI) field.  Both scenarios are discussed in detail in
   Section 2.1.

      REQ#2: Encapsulation of OAM control message and data packets in
      underlay network MUST be indistinguishable from the underlay
      network IP forwarding point of view.

      REQ#3: Presence of OAM control message in Geneve packet MUST be
      unambiguously identifiable to Geneve functionality, e.g., at
      endpoints of Geneve tunnels.

      REQ#4: OAM test packets MUST NOT be forwaded to a tenant system.

   A test packet generated by an active OAM protocol, either for a
   defect detection or performance measurement, according to REQ#1, MUST
   be fate-sharing with the tunnel or data flow being monitored.  In an
   environment where multiple paths through the domain are available,
   underlay transport nodes can be programmed to use characteristic
   information to balance the load across known paths.  It is essential
   that test packets follow the same route, i.e., traverses the same set
   of nodes and links, as a data packet of the monitored flow.  Thus,
   the following requirement to support OAM packet fate-sharing with the
   data flow:

      REQ#5: It MUST be possible to express entropy for underlay Equal
      Cost Multipath in the Geneve encapsulation of OAM packets.

2.1.  Defect Detection and Troubleshooting in Geneve Network with Active
      OAM

   Figure 1 presents an example of a Geneve domain.  In this section, we
   consider two scenarios of active OAM being used to detect and
   localize defects in the Geneve network.






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       +--------+                                             +--------+
       | Tenant +--+                                     +----| Tenant |
       | VNI 28 |  |                                     |    | VNI 35 |
       +--------+  |          ................           |    +--------+
                   |  +----+  .              .  +----+   |
                   |  | NVE|--.              .--| NVE|   |
                   +--| A  |  .              .  | B  |---+
                      +----+  .              .  +----+
                      /       .              .
                     /        .     Geneve   .
       +--------+   /         .    Network   .
       | Tenant +--+          .              .
       | VNI 35 |             .              .
       +--------+             ................
                                     |
                                   +----+
                                   | NVE|
                                   | C  |
                                   +----+
                                     |
                                     |
                           =====================
                             |               |
                         +--------+      +--------+
                         | Tenant |      | Tenant |
                         | VNI 28 |      | VNI 35 |
                         +--------+      +--------+


                  Figure 1: An example of a Geneve domain

   In the first case, a communication problem between Network
   Virtualization Edge (NVE) device A and NVE C was observed.  The
   underlay, e.g., IP network, forwarding is working well but the Geneve
   connection is unstable for all tenants of NVE A and NVE C.
   Troubleshooting and localization of the problem can be done
   irrespective of the VNI value.

   In the second case, traffic on VNI 35 between NVE A and NVE B has no
   problems, as on VNI 28 between NVE A and NVE C.  But traffic on VNI
   35 between NVE A and NVE C experiences problems, for example,
   excessive packet loss.

   The first case can be detected and investigated using any VNI value,
   whether it connects tenant systems or not.  To conform to REQ#4
   (Section 2) OAM test packets could be transmitted on VNI that doesn't
   have any tenant.  That VNI in a Geneve tunnel is dedicated to
   carrying only control and management data between the tunnel



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   endpoints, hence communication that uses that VNI is also and
   referred to as a Geneve control channel.  Thus, the control channel
   of a Geneve tunnel MUST NOT carry tenant data.  As no tenants are
   connected using the control channel, a system that supports this
   specification, MUST NOT forward a packet received over the control
   channel to any tenant.  A packet received over the control channel
   MAY be forwarded if and only if it is sent onto the control channel
   of the concatenated Geneve tunnel.  A specific VNI MAY be used to
   identify the control channel.  The value that is associated with this
   function is referred to as Management VNI.  It is RECOMMENDED that
   the value 1 be used as the default value of Management VNI.
   Encapsulation of test packets, in this case, is discussed in
   Section 2.2.  The Management VNI SHOULD be terminated on the tenant-
   facing side of the Geneve encap/decap functionality, not the DC-
   network-facing side (per definitions in Section 4 [RFC8014]) so that
   Geneve encap/decap functionality is included in its scope.  This
   approach causes an active OAM packet, e.g., an ICMP echo request, to
   be decapsulated in the same fashion as any other received Geneve
   packet.  In this example, the resulting ICMP packet is handed to
   NVE's local management functionality for the processing which
   generates an ICMP echo reply.  The ICMP echo reply is encapsulated in
   Geneve for forwarding back to the NVE that sent the echo request.
   One advantage of this approach is that a repeated ping test could
   detect an intermittent problem in Geneve encap/decap hardware, which
   would not be tested if the Management VNI were handled as a "special
   case" at the DC-network-facing interface.

   The second case requires that a test packet be transmitted using the
   VNI value for the traffic that is encountering problems.  The
   encapsulation of the test packet, i.e., inner encapsulation, MUST be
   the same as the tenant packet's encapsulation in the Geneve tunnel
   and use the same VNI number.  Encapsulation of test packets in this
   case, is discussed in Section 2.2.

2.2.  OAM Encapsulation in Geneve

   Active OAM in Geneve network uses an IP encapsulation.  Protocols
   such as BFD [RFC5880] or STAMP [RFC8762] use UDP transport.
   Destination UDP port number in the inner UDP header (Figure 2)
   identifies the OAM protocol.  This approach is well-known and has
   been used, for example, in MPLS networks [RFC8029].  The UDP source
   port can be used to provide entropy, e.g., for Equal Cost Multipath.
   To use IP encapsulation for an active OAM protocol the Protocol Type
   field of the Geneve header MUST be set to the IPv4 (0x0800) or IPv6
   (0x86DD) value.






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     0                   1                   2                   3
     0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |                                                               |
    ~                        Outer IPvX Header                      ~
    |                                                               |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |                                                               |
    ~                        Outer UDP Header                       ~
    |                                                               |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |                                                               |
    ~                          Geneve Header                        ~
    |                                                               |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |                                                               |
    ~                        Inner IPvX Header                      ~
    |                                                               |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |                                                               |
    ~                        Inner UDP Header                       ~
    |                                                               |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |                                                               |
    ~                        Active OAM Packet                      ~
    |                                                               |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

       Figure 2: Geneve IP/UDP Encapsulation of an Active OAM Packet

   Inner IP header:

      Destination IP: IP address MUST NOT be of one of tenant's IP
      addresses.  The IP address SHOULD be set to the loopback address
      127.0.0.1/32 for IPv4, or the loopback address ::1/128 for IPv6
      [RFC4291].  Alternatively, the destination IP address MAY be set
      to VAP's IP address.

      Source IP: IP address of the originating VAP.

      TTL or Hop Limit: MUST be set to 255 per [RFC5082].

3.  Echo Request and Echo Reply in Geneve Tunnel

   ICMP and ICMPv6 ([RFC0792] and [RFC4443] respectively) provide
   required on-demand defect detection and failure localization.  ICMP
   control messages immediately follow the inner IP header encapsulated




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   in Geneve.  ICMP extensions for Geneve networks use mechanisms
   defined in [RFC4884].

4.  IANA Considerations

   This document has no requirements for IANA.  This section can be
   removed before the publication.

5.  Security Considerations

   As part of a Geneve network, active OAM inherits the security
   considerations discussed in [I-D.ietf-nvo3-geneve].  Additionally, a
   system MUST provide control to limit the rate of Geneve OAM packets
   punted to the Geneve control plane for processing in order to avoid
   overloading that control plane.

6.  Acknowledgments

   TBD

7.  References

7.1.  Normative References

   [I-D.ietf-nvo3-geneve]
              Gross, J., Ganga, I., and T. Sridhar, "Geneve: Generic
              Network Virtualization Encapsulation", draft-ietf-
              nvo3-geneve-16 (work in progress), March 2020.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC4385]  Bryant, S., Swallow, G., Martini, L., and D. McPherson,
              "Pseudowire Emulation Edge-to-Edge (PWE3) Control Word for
              Use over an MPLS PSN", RFC 4385, DOI 10.17487/RFC4385,
              February 2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4385>.

   [RFC5586]  Bocci, M., Ed., Vigoureux, M., Ed., and S. Bryant, Ed.,
              "MPLS Generic Associated Channel", RFC 5586,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5586, June 2009,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5586>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.




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7.2.  Informative References

   [RFC0792]  Postel, J., "Internet Control Message Protocol", STD 5,
              RFC 792, DOI 10.17487/RFC0792, September 1981,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc792>.

   [RFC4291]  Hinden, R. and S. Deering, "IP Version 6 Addressing
              Architecture", RFC 4291, DOI 10.17487/RFC4291, February
              2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4291>.

   [RFC4443]  Conta, A., Deering, S., and M. Gupta, Ed., "Internet
              Control Message Protocol (ICMPv6) for the Internet
              Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Specification", STD 89,
              RFC 4443, DOI 10.17487/RFC4443, March 2006,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4443>.

   [RFC4884]  Bonica, R., Gan, D., Tappan, D., and C. Pignataro,
              "Extended ICMP to Support Multi-Part Messages", RFC 4884,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4884, April 2007,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4884>.

   [RFC5082]  Gill, V., Heasley, J., Meyer, D., Savola, P., Ed., and C.
              Pignataro, "The Generalized TTL Security Mechanism
              (GTSM)", RFC 5082, DOI 10.17487/RFC5082, October 2007,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5082>.

   [RFC5880]  Katz, D. and D. Ward, "Bidirectional Forwarding Detection
              (BFD)", RFC 5880, DOI 10.17487/RFC5880, June 2010,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5880>.

   [RFC7799]  Morton, A., "Active and Passive Metrics and Methods (with
              Hybrid Types In-Between)", RFC 7799, DOI 10.17487/RFC7799,
              May 2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7799>.

   [RFC8014]  Black, D., Hudson, J., Kreeger, L., Lasserre, M., and T.
              Narten, "An Architecture for Data-Center Network
              Virtualization over Layer 3 (NVO3)", RFC 8014,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8014, December 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8014>.

   [RFC8029]  Kompella, K., Swallow, G., Pignataro, C., Ed., Kumar, N.,
              Aldrin, S., and M. Chen, "Detecting Multiprotocol Label
              Switched (MPLS) Data-Plane Failures", RFC 8029,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8029, March 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8029>.






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   [RFC8762]  Mirsky, G., Jun, G., Nydell, H., and R. Foote, "Simple
              Two-Way Active Measurement Protocol", RFC 8762,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8762, March 2020,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8762>.

Appendix A.  Additional Considerations for OAM Encapsulation Method in
             Geneve

   Several other options of OAM encapsulation were considered.  Those
   are listed in the Appendix solely for the informational purpose.

   A Protocol Type field might be used to demultiplex active OAM
   protocols directly.  Such method avoids the use of additional
   intermediate header but requires that each active OAM protocol be
   assigned unique identifier from the Ether Types registry maintained
   by IANA.

   The alternative to using the Protocol Type directly is to use a shim
   that, in turn, identifies the OAM Protocol and, optionally, includes
   additional information.  [RFC5586] defines how the Generic Associated
   Channel Label (GAL) can be used to identify that the Associated
   Channel Header (ACH), defined in [RFC4385], immediately follows the
   Bottom-of-the-Stack label.  Thus, the MPLS Generic Associated Channel
   can be identified, and protocols are demultiplexed based on the
   Channel Type field's value.  Number of channel types, e.g., for
   continuity check and performance monitoring, already have been
   defined and are listed in IANA MPLS Generalized Associated Channel
   Types (including Pseudowire Associated Channel Types) registry.  The
   value of the Protocol Type field in the Geneve header MUST be set to
   MPLS to use this approach.  The Geneve header MUST be immediately
   followed by the GAL label with the S flag set to indicate that GAL is
   the Bottom-of-the-stack label.  Then ACH MUST follow the GAL label
   and the value of the Channel Type identifies which of active OAM
   protocols being encapsulated in the packet.

Authors' Addresses

   Greg Mirsky
   ZTE Corp.

   Email: gregimirsky@gmail.com


   Sami Boutros
   Ciena

   Email: sboutros@ciena.com




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   David Black
   Dell EMC
   176 South Street
   Hopkinton, MA  01748
   United States of America

   Email: david.black@dell.com


   Santosh Pallagatti
   VMware

   Email: santosh.pallagatti@gmail.com






































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