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Internet Engineering Task Force                            G. Montenegro
INTERNET DRAFT                                           C. Castelluccia
                                                           November 2001
                     SUCV Identifiers and Addresses

Status of This Memo

   This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance
   with all provisions of Section 10 of RFC 2026.

   Comments should be submitted to the Mobile IP mailing list
   at mobile-ip@sunroof.eng.sun.com.

   Distribution of this memo is unlimited.

   This document is an Internet-Draft.  Internet-Drafts are working
   documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas,
   and its working groups.  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six
   months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents
   at any time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as
   reference material or to cite them other than as ``work in

   The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at

   The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at


   This document addresses the identifier ownership problem.  It
   does so by using characteristics of Statistic Uniqueness and
   Cryptographic Verifiability (SUCV) of certain entities which
   this document calls SUCV Identifiers (SUCV ID's).  This note
   also proposes using these SUCV characteristics in related
   entities called SUCV Addresses in order to severely limit
   certain classes of denial of service attacks and hijacking
   attacks. SUCV addresses are particularly applicable to solve the
   'address ownership' problem that hinders confidence in
   mechanisms like Binding Updates in Mobile IP for IPv6.

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Table of Contents

1.0 Introduction ..................................................    3
2.0 Terminology ...................................................    3
3.0 Overview of the Proposal ......................................    5
4.0 Statistical Uniqueness and Cryptographic Verifiability
(SUCV) ............................................................    5
   4.1 SUCV ID's ..................................................    5
   4.3 SUCV Addresses .............................................    6
   4.4 SUCV Derivation and Formats ................................    7
5.0 SUCV Protocol (sucvP) Overview ................................    8
   5.1 Goals and Constraints ......................................    9
   5.2 Packet Exchanges ...........................................    9
   5.3 Deriving the Session Keys ..................................   12
      5.3.1 SUCV Session Key ......................................   12
      5.3.2 Keys for ESP-protected Binding Updates ................   12
   5.4 Default Algorithms .........................................   12
6.0 Extension for Constrained Devices .............................   13
7.0 Privacy Considerations ........................................   14
   7.1 Support for Random Addresses [RFC3041] .....................   14
   7.2 Support for Confidentiality ................................   15
      7.2.1 Confidentiality .......................................   15
      7.2.2 Location Privacy ......................................   15
8.0 Security Analysis .............................................   16
   8.1 Hash ID Size Considerations ................................   16
   8.2 Key size considerations ....................................   18
   8.3 Intruder-in-the-middle attacks .............................   19
      8.3.1 Summary of the Attack .................................   20
      8.3.2 Risks .................................................   21
      8.3.3 Why not Route sucvP2 Through the Home Agent?  .........   22
   8.4 Denial-of-Service Attacks ..................................   23
9.0 Security Considerations .......................................   24
10.0 Conclusions ..................................................   24
11.0 Acknowledgements .............................................   25
References ........................................................   25
Authors' addresses ................................................   26
Changes ...........................................................   27

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1.0 Introduction

   This document addresses the identifier ownership problem
   [ADDROWN] by using characteristics of Statistic Uniqueness and
   Cryptographic Verifiability (SUCV) of certain entities which
   this document calls SUCV Identifiers (SUCV ID's).  This note
   also proposes using these SUCV characteristics in related
   entities called SUCV Addresses in order to severely limit
   certain classes of denial of service attacks and hijacking
   attacks. SUCV addresses can solve the 'address ownership'
   problem that hinders confidence in mechanisms like Binding
   Updates in Mobile IP for IPv6.

   [ADDROWN] argues that there is a fundamental problem in handling
   operations like Binding Updates (BU's) in Mobile IP for IPv6
   [MIPv6], source routing, etc) that allows hosts to modify how
   other hosts route packets to a certain destination.  The problem
   is that these operations can be misused by rogue nodes to
   redirect traffic away from its legitimate destination.
   Authentication does not solve this problem. Even if a node
   unequivocally identifies itself, this has no bearing on its
   rights to modify how packets to any given address are routed.
   This is true even if its packets currently seem to emanate from
   the address in question. This last point is obvious if one
   considers DHCP leased addresses. It is imperative not to allow
   any node to redirect traffic for a DHCP address for which it
   held a valid lease previously. This would allow it to hijack
   traffic meant for the current valid user of the address in
   question. Hence, protection against hijacking of valid addresses
   requires cryptographic authorization for operations that modify
   routing (BU's, source routing, etc). One way to show
   authorization is by showing that the requesting node owns the
   address for which routing information is being altered. Quoting

      Currently there exists no specified mechanism for proving
      address ownership in Internet-wide scale.

   This document proposes a solution to the address ownership

2.0 Terminology

   This Section presents the notation used throughout this paper.

      Pseudo-random function. SUCV mandates the use of the keyed

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      hash function HMAC [HMAC] which produces 160 bits of output.
      Input key is assumed to also be 160 bits.

      Pseudo-random function whose output is truncated by taking
      the T leftmost bits of the output. In SUCV, HMAC-SHA1 is
      used, so prf96, for example, would be the keyed hash function
      HMAC-SHA1-96 [RFC2404].

      Cryptographic hash function, SHA-1 [SHA1] for SUCV.

      Cryptographic hash function whose output is truncated by
      taking the T leftmost bits of the output.

      Statistical uniqueness and cryptographic verifiability, the
      property exhibited by the identifiers and addresses which are
      the subject of this study. We also use SUCV to refer to the
      resultant mechanism as a whole.

      The protocol developed here, whose objectives are proof of
      address ownership and session key generation.

      128 bit identifier obtained as the keyed hash output of the
      hash of the public key,  using an imprint value as the input

      64 bit SUCV identifier used instead of the interface
      identifier, and combined with the routing prefix to form an
      autoconfigured IPv6 address [IPV6ADDR]. Obtained as the keyed
      hash output of the hash of the public key, using an imprint
      value as the input key.

      Mobile IPv6 [MIPv6].

   MN, HA, CN, BU, BA and CoA:
      Abbreviations of mobile node, home agent, correspondent node,
      binding update, binding acknowledgement and care-of address,
      respectively, as defined by MIPv6 [MIPv6]

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3.0 Overview of the Proposal

   We assume that we have a network in which the nodes inherently
   distrust each other, and in which a global or centralized PKI
   (Public Key Infrastructure) or KDC (Key Distribution Center) is
   not available.

   The goal is to arrive at some fundamental assumptions about
   trust on top of which one can build some useful peer-to-peer
   communication using opportunistic security.

   But in such a network, is there a default rule we can follow
   safely?  We posit this is it:

      Default Trust Rule:

         Redirect operations are allowed only with addresses which
         are securely bound to the requesting entity.

   The above rule (to be refined later) constitutes the only rule
   that operates by default, allowing any other more dangerous
   operation only if authorized by strong cryptographic

4.0 Statistical Uniqueness and Cryptographic Verifiability (SUCV)

   In the absence of a third party, how does a principal prove
   ownership of its identity to a peer?

   Notice that usual owner verification relies on a third party to
   provide this function.

   In this proposal, the principal self-generates a private/public
   key pair. It uses material obtained via a prf based on the
   public key as its identity (or as part of its address) and
   proves its ownership by signing it with its private key. The
   recipient verifies the signature, and, consequently, the
   ownership of the identity.

4.1 SUCV ID's

   It is much more practical for protocols to use fixed length
   identifiers (representations of identities). Because of this, we
   do not use the public key itself as the identifier, but material
   obtained via a prf of the public key.

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   These identifiers have a strong cryptographic binding with their
   public components (of their private-public keys). This is
   exactly the purpose that certificates have.  Let's call them
   Statistically Unique Cryptographically Verifiable ID's, or SUCV

   Because of this, once a CN obtains information about one of
   these identifiers, it has a strong cryptographic assurance about
   which entity created it. Not only that, it knows that this
   identifier is owned and used exclusively by only one node in the
   universe: its peer in the current exchange. Thus, it is safe to
   allow that peer to effect changes (via BU's, for example) on how
   this address or identifier is routed to. Notice that with
   publically routable addresses, this assurance is much harder to
   arrive at, given that the address may be 'loaned' to (not owned
   by) the peer in question, perhaps thanks to the good service of
   a DHCP server.

   Despite the fact that currently there is no way to prove address
   ownership in the Internet, these considerations lead to the
   following fundamental assumption:

      Default Trust Rule

         Redirect operations are only allowed to affect routing for
         entities which have the SUCV property.

   The above constitutes perhaps the only rule that operates by
   default, allowing any other more dangerous operation only if
   authorized by strong cryptographic mechanisms

   What should one use: pure identifiers with no routing
   significance or addresses? With pure identifiers, routing
   information must be included somewhere in the packet. This
   takes up extra space in the packet via home address options,
   routing headers or tunneling headers.

   A major advantage to using an address is that the data traffic
   need not carry extra information in the packet to guarantee
   proper delivery by routing. Because of this it is useful
   to create addresses that are routable and satisfy the SUCV
   property: SUCV addresses.

4.3 SUCV Addresses

   In IPv6, addresses that satisfy the SUCV property may be
   obtained as follows (as it turns out, this is very similar to

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   and was predated by [CAM]):

   - use the top 64 bits from your routing prefix (as in rfc3041)

   - define the bottom 64 bits as an SUCV ID (called the sucvHID).
     Use these 64 bits instead of the 'interface
     identifier' in IPv6 [IPV6ADDR].

   The resultant 128 bit field is an identifier that is also
   routable, avoiding the need for taking extra space in the packet
   (for example, by sending routing options or tunneling headers).
   Notice that even after moving, it is possible to reuse the
   'HID' portion of the address with the new network prefix at
   the new location. Thus it is possible to reuse the HID with
   different CoA's.

   Nevertheless, by snooping on binding updates, it is possible for
   an attacker to learn the original network prefix used by the
   home address. This tells an eavesdropper where this home address
   began to be used, and to which network it belongs, potentially
   important information.

   On the other hand, if you use a 'pure' SUCV ID (without any
   routing significance), then your packets will always need extra
   information somewhere to assure they are routed properly.
   Eavesdroppers may still know where that identity is at any
   particular point in time. Nevertheless, this is a tangible
   improvement over always including a valid 64 bit prefix, as this
   divulges information about an identity's topological
   connectivity or under what prefix a given identity began to be

4.4 SUCV Derivation and Formats

   This section describes how to generate an SUCV ID (128 bits), an
   SUCV HID (64 bits) and an SUCV address (128 bits).

   First of all, the node generates a public/private key pair.
   Then we define the required quantities as:

      sucvID = hmac-sha-1-128(sha1(imprint), sha1(PK))
      sucvHID = hmac-sha-1-64(sha1(imprint), sha1(PK))

   Where, imprint is a 64 bit field:

      It could be a quantity that depends on the MN's location or
      something created by the MN itself (a random value, for

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      example). The objective is to use the imprint to limit
      certain types of brute-force attacks by limiting their
      applicability, or by forcing interaction with the MN.

   PK: The public key is the DSA public key.

   Note that according to [IPV6ADDR], the leftmost 3 bits of
   the sucvID can be used to unequivocally distinguish them from
   IPv6 addresses. Accordingly, we assume only 125 bits may be
   used.  Additionally, bit 6 of the sucvHID (the universal/local)
   has to be set to zero to indicate that the sucvHID is not
   guaranteed to be globally unique.

5.0 SUCV Protocol (sucvP) Overview

   The following protocol, sucvP, is run between a MN  and an
   arbitrary CN to:

      - prove the Mobile host home address and possibly CoA

      - to establish an IPSec ESP SA (Skey, Lifetime, SPI) between
        the MN and its CN that will be used to secure MIPv6 BUs.

   As for the choice of using AH or ESP to protect the binding
   updates, we chose the latter, because we believe there is
   no added value in protecting the IP headers of BU's once a
   security association has been established. This and the heated
   debate on the future of AH convinced us to use ESP.

   sucvP is functionally independent of MIPv6, and is, in fact,
   a separate protocol. sucvP provides the authorization for
   the MIPv6 BU's, but the authentication is provided by IPsec
   ESP. These are two separate steps which could run serially. For
   example, the sucvP step could be carried out over UDP (as our
   initial experimental implementation does), after which the
   ESP-authenticated BU could be sent.

   However for efficiency reasons, sucvP messages might contain
   MIPv6 BUs (along with sucvP3).

   In order for sucvP to set up an IPsec security association
   (including an SPI) just in time to process an ESP header and
   its encapsulated BU, the sucvP payload is carried as an IP
   protocol number (currently unassigned).  Furthermore, it must
   precede the ESP payload used to authenticate the binding update.

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5.1 Goals and Constraints

   This design allows sucvP to satisfy these two objectives:

      - not affect existing IPsec implementations more than
        absolutely necessary

      - support efficient BU processing by reducing as much as
        possible the number of round trips.

   Furthermore, we assume there is no piggybacking with the BU,
   so no further payload follows.

   sucvP has been designed based on the following considerations:

      - the protocol should not rely on a third party (i.e. a
        global PKI, central key distribution center, etc), although
        it could use one if available

      - not all nodes need to use SUCV addresses, only those that
        wish their binding updates to be heeded (mobile nodes)

      - not all nodes need to verify the validity of SUCV
        addresses, only those CN's that accept and handle binding
        updates from MN's (these CN's must use SUCV as explained
        below to safely populate their binding caches)

   sucvP packets are exchanged directly between the mobile node and
   its correspondent nodes. They are not routed through the Home
   agent because the mobile node might be homeless or the home
   agent might be out of order for a certain period of time. The
   implications for this decision are explored below.

5.2 Packet Exchanges

   The proposed protocol that a mobile host uses to send a BU to
   its CN is the following:

      The MN sends a sucvP1 message (just to initiate the exchange)
      to its correspondent node.  This message contains a Nonce,
      N1.  This packet may contain a MIP HomeAddress Option
      containing the MN's home address. The CN might sometimes need
      the home address to decide whether it wants to pursue the
      protocol exchange or not. The source address of the packet is
      the MN's current CoA.  Additionally, SUCV supports a very
      simple negotiation mechanism that works as follows:

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      Optionally, the MN can express its desire to use certain
      Diffie-Hellman groups (for the ephemeral DH exchange), as
      well as algorithms for ESP authentication and for ESP

      The CN replies with a sucvP2 message that contains the
      following: N1, Client puzzle request, Diffie-Hellman value
      (g^y mod p), Session_Key_lifetime. The CN may respond to any
      optional parameter negotiation included by the MN in sucvP1,
      by choosing those algorithms it wishes to support.

      In order to defend against sucvP1 storms, a host might use
      the same Diffie-Hellman (DH) value for a period of time.  The
      sucvP2 contains a client puzzle to prevent DoS attacks
      PUZZLES. Along these line, the CN may wish to ignore the
      optional negotiation of parameters initiated by the MN in
      sucvP1. In this case, the default algorithms (see below) must
      be used by both parties.

      When the MN receives sucvP2, it verifies that the nonce N1 is
      the same as what was sent in sucvP1.  It then solves the
      puzzle. At this stage of the protocol, the MN:

      1. generates a DH value (g^x mod p) and derives from it and
         the DH received from the CN the session keys.

      2. computes skey_espauth (the ESP session key used to
         authenticate the MIPv6 binding update lifetime as the
         minimum of the lifetime value suggested by the CN and its
         lifetime value.

      3. builds an IPSec SA. If ESP is used subsequently in the
         packet to secure a Binding Update, the MN must use a fixed
         SPI assigned from the range 1 to 255 (currently

      4. sends a sucvP3 packet.  Note that this message is sent
         directly from the MN's CoA to the CN.

      A sucvP3 message contains the following fields: Puzzle reply,
      Public key and imprint it has used to generate its HID, a
      Diffie-Hellman value, the skey_espauth lifetime and an SPI
      for the CN to use when sending BA's (secured via ESP) to the
      MN.  This message must be signed by the MN with its private
      key (the public key is used to generate the HID).

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      Note that this sucvP3 might be followed by an ESP header
      authenticating an encapsulated BU. The authentication is
      performed using the SA available inline within this sucvP3

      When the CN receives the sucvP3, it first checks for a valid
      Puzzle reply. It verifies the signature using the included
      Public key, and then verifies that this Public key and
      imprint produce the sucvHID used as part of the sender's
      address. The CN can then conclude that the MN owns its the
      Home and CoA addresses.

      At this point, the CN makes a note of this Public key and

      The CN can then compute the session keys (using the ephemeral
      DH value.  From the fixed SPI, the CN learns that the
      security association material is all inline in sucvP3. It
      proceeds to build an IPSec SA and processes this ESP header.
      In preparation for subsequent ESP processing of BU's, it
      computes an SPI and sends it in sucvP4. After this point, and
      thanks to this SPI, IPsec usage reverts to normal, i.e.,
      future BU's can be secured via ESP, unaccompanied by any
      inline sucvP material.

      In sucvP4, the CN sends an SPI.  The MN will use this SPI in
      association with ESP in order to authenticate subsequent
      BU's.  The CN authenticates sucvP4 with HMAC-SHA1 using the
      Session key Skey_sucv derived previously.  Additionally, a CN
      that uses an SUCV address could sign sucvP4 instead.  This
      possibility is explored below.

      A CN may include a BA (binding acknowledgement) along with
      sucvP4, and if so, it must use ESP for authentication. The
      SPI used is that communicated by the MN in sucvP3.  When the
      MN receives a sucvP4, it must make note of the SPI
      corresponding to the CN. }

   As long as the MN uses the same HID interface identifier for
   its CoA, it does not have to prove the CoA ownership and BU
   authentication is enough.

   Proving the CoA ownership can be very useful to prevent a
   malicious host from bombing a victim with packets by using
   the victim's address as CoA. For example, with ``regular''
   Mobile IPv6, a host can start a big file transfer from a server
   and then send a BU with the victim's address as CoA to the

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   server. As a result, the file will be send to the victim. If
   an host can prove that it owns its CoA, and that therefore it
   is not using someone's else address as CoA, this attack can
   be avoided.

   If for any reason the MN configures its CoA with a new interface
   identifier, it must restart the whole protocol sequence.

5.3 Deriving the Session Keys

   We need to generate keying material and keys for the SUCV
   protocol itself and for use with ESP.

      skeymat = prf(hash (g^{xy} mod p), N1 | imprint)

   Where N1 is the nonce used in sucvP1 and sucvP2.

5.3.1 SUCV Session Key

      skey_sucv = prf(skeymat, g^{xy} mod p | N1 | imprint | 0)

   Used with sucvP4 for: authentication, and optionally with sucvP5
   (see Section on Privacy Considerations) for both authentication
   and encryption.

5.3.2 Keys for ESP-protected Binding Updates

      skeymat_espauth = prf(skeymat, skey_sucv | g^{xy} | N1 |
                                        imprint | 1)

   Used to authenticate BU's unaccompanied by SUCV packets (once
   sucvP is completed).

   Note that whereas skey_sucv is the actual key used by the
   SUCV protocol, skeymat_espauth is keying material used to
   derive the real key for use with ESP, i.e. skey_espauth in an
   algorithm-specific manner.

5.4 Default Algorithms

   The following algorithms must be supported by any SUCV

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   DSA [DSA] for signing sucvP3.

   Diffie-Hellman Oakley Group 1 [RFC2412] for the ephemeral
   Diffie-Hellman exchange.

   HMAC-SHA-1-96 [RFC2404] for ESP authentication.

   3DES-CBC [RFC2451] for sucvP5 and ESP encryption.

6.0 Extension for Constrained Devices

   In our sucvP protocol, a MN must:

   - generate a DSA public/private key pair.

   - sign the sucvP3 message.

   - perform a DH exponentiation to derive the Skey.

   All these operations are computativally expensive especially
   if the MN is a constrained device (i.e. a PDA or a sensor
   with limited memory, battery or CPU).  Elliptic curve
   cryptographic algorithms might be more efficient but still
   too expensive to execute for a constrained device.

   In this section, we propose an extension to our scheme for
   this type of contrained devices. Our goal is to off-load most
   of the expensive cryptographic operations of a MN to its HA.
   We assume that the MN and HA share a secret key, and that the
   MN trusts its HA.

   The proposed extension operates as follows:

   1. The HA generates the DSA keys (public and private keys)
      and sends the public Key to the MN via the secured channel.

   2. The SUCV id and HID is generated by the MN itself by choosing
      a k and computing sucvHID = prf64(hash(publicKey), k).

   3. When a MN wants to initiate a sucvP exchange with CN, it
      sends a SUCV_request messages, that contains the CN address
      and the k value, to its HA (authenticated with the shared
      key). The HA then initiates a sucvP exchange with the CN. The
      HA then proves that it knows the private key corresponding
      to the public by signing the exchanged messages (sucvP has
      to be slightly modified here) and generates a session key,
      SKey using the DH algorithm.

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   4. The HA then sends the Skey to the MN via the secure channel.

   5. The MN can then send authentication BUs to the CN using
      the SKey.

   With this extension all the expensive cryptographic operations
   are offloaded to the home agent but the session key that is
   used to authenticated the MIPv6 BU (Skey) is only known to
   the MN, its HA and the CN.  A malicious host that wants to
   redirect a MN's traffic needs either to discover the HA-MN
   secret key or to find a public key/private key pair and  a k'
   such that

      sucvHID = prf64(hash(public), k')

   Both are very difficult to achieve.

7.0 Privacy Considerations

   A normal sucvP exchange consists of sucvP1 through sucvP3,
   and a subsequent sucvP4 authenticated using the session key.
   This basic protocol does not allow any hijacking attacks, so
   it already fulfills the security requirements for protecting
   BU's in MIPv6 as defined by the Mobile IP working group

7.1 Support for Random Addresses [RFC3041]

   A first concern regarding privacy is how to use random
   addresses as defined in RFC3041 in a mobile environment.
   The issue here is that, whereas these addresses hide a node's
   permanent identifier (perhaps derived from IEEE addresses),
   the node cannot prove address ownership of them so it cannot
   safely send binding updates. This means that an MN cannot use
   RFC3041 addresses with route optimization.  SUCV addresses
   are indistinguishable from those defined in RFC3041, with the
   added benefit that an MN can use them in a route optimized
   fashion. The basic sucvP outlined above already handles this
   case. The only consideration is that nodes interested in being
   anonymous may want to use ephemeral SUCV identifiers (as opposed
   to more permanent or longer-lived SUCV ID's) for this purpose.

   Furthermore, if nodes wish to have higher protection against
   attackers than what is afforded by 63 bits in the sucvAddr,
   they can use an sucvID. The protocol exchange is the same,
   but since an sucvID is a pure identifier without any routing

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   information, the MN is restricted to being a client. Of course,
   as shown below, routing information must be included somewhere
   in the packet, via home address options and routing headers
   (alternatively, tunneling headers could be used as well).

7.2 Support for Confidentiality

7.2.1 Confidentiality

   If confidentiality is a concern, there is the possibility of
   an intruder in the middle gaining knowledge of the session keys,
   as explained in the section on Security Analysis. In fact,
   sucvP prevents an intruder from impersonating a Mobile node
   but not from impersonating a correspondent node. As a result,
   a MN might think that it is talking with its CN whereas it
   is actually talking with an intruder. The MN may wish to
   make sure it is indeed talking to a given CN whose address
   it has previously obtained (via, for example, a DNS search,
   or a preconfigured list).  If in addition to the MN, the CN
   also uses an SUCV address this problem can be prevented. We
   suggest that a CN uses a SUCV address when confidentiality
   is an issue and that the CN signs sucvP4 to prove its address
   ownership. By doing so, both MN and CN have the assurance that
   they are talking to each other and not to an intruder.

7.2.2 Location Privacy

   In Mobile IPv6:

      Each packet (BU and data) sent by a MN contains a
      HomeAddress option that reveals the MN's home address.

      Each packet sent to a MN contains a routing header with
      the MN's home address.

   As a result it is very easy for any host in the network
   to track the location of a MN by snooping its packets.
   If location privacy is an issue, a MN can use an ephemeral
   home address sucvADDR_ephem instead of its actual one and
   only reveal its actual home address sucvADDR to its CN (see
   [MIPPRIV] for more details).  Packets (BU and data) sent over
   the network then use the ephemeral home address sucvADDR_ephem.

   This privacy extension can actually be applied to our proposal.

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   The MN will need an ephemeral SUCV identity sucvID_ephem, and
   defer revealing its more permanent SUCV identity sucvID after
   the CN has proven ownership of its address. This is accomplished
   roughly via the following extended protocol sequence:

   sucvP1: as usual

   sucvP2: the CN adds a bit to advertise its SUCV capabilities

   sucvP3: the MN proves ownership of its sucvADDR_ephem (derived
           from an ephemeral public-private key.  At this point,
           the MN derives session keys but is not yet sure it
           sharing them with the CN itself.

   sucvP4: the CN proves ownership of its SUCV address by signing
           sucvP4 with its private key, at which point the MN
           knows the session keys have not been compromised by
           an intermediary.

   sucvP5: the MN uses the session key obtained above to send an
           encrypted payload revealing its actual SUCV Home Address
           sucvADDR. sucvP5 must be signed with the key used to
           generate the sucvADDR in order to prove its ownership.

   Notice that if the MN wishes to use the stronger mode, it can do
   so by using an sucvID_ephem and sucvID instead of sucvADDR_ephem
   and sucvAddr, respectively. As in the discussion above,
   this provides for more protection against attackers, with the
   proviso that the MN is now limited to being a client. That is,
   it must initiate communication with the CN, because it is now
   using non-routable entities (SUCV ID's versus SUCV Addresses).

8.0 Security Analysis

   This section includes a non-exhaustive security analysis of the
   SUCV protocol. For an assessment with regards to the security
   requirements in [MIPv6SecReq] please see [MIPv6SecEval].

8.1 Hash ID Size Considerations

   In SUCV addresses, one of the lower 64 bits is reserved as the
   local/universal bit (the u bit), so only 63 bits are actually
   usable as a hash.

   Suppose the hash function produces an n-bit long output. If we
   are trying to find some input which will produce some target

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   output value y, then since each output is equally likely we
   expect to have to try 2^{(n-1) possible input values on average.

   On the other hand, if we are worried about naturally ocurring
   SUCV address duplications, then by the birthday paradox we
   would expect that after trying 1.2*2^n/2 possible input values
   we would have a 50% probability of collision [HandBook].

   So if n=63, you need a population of 1.2*2^{31.5} i.e. 3.64*10^9
   nodes on average before any two produce duplicate addresses.
   This is acceptable especially if you consider that this
   collision is actually harmfull only if the 2 hosts (that
   collide) are in the same site (i.e.  they have the same 64
   bit prefix), and have the same correspondent nodes.  This is
   very unlikely.  Additionally, assuming the collision is not
   deliberate the duplicate address detection (DAD) will detect it.

   If an attacker wishes to impersonate a given SUCV address,
   it must attempt 2^{62} (i.e. approximately 4.8*10^{18})
   tries to find a public key that hashes to this SUCV address.
   If the attacker can do 1 million hashes per second it will need
   142,235 years.  If the attacker can hash 1 billion hashes per
   second it will still need 142 years.

   If we use SUCV Addresses as suggested in RFC3041 (perhaps
   renewing them as often as once every 24 hours), an attacker
   would then have to to hash 5.3*10^{13} hashes/second in order
   to be able to find a public key that hashes to the sucvHID of
   a given host.

   Note that the previous analysis only considers the cost of
   computing the hash of the public key. Additionally, an attacker
   must also generate a valid (public, private) key pair.  This is
   a significantly more expensive operation.

   This would still leave open the possibility of brute-force
   attacks.  In this scenario, a bad guy BG could generate a huge
   table of PK's and their corresponding HID's, assuming any fixed
   imprint. It could then look for matching real IP addresses.
   By doing so it would identify a victim for a hijacking attack.
   BG can send a BU to any CN without a binding entry for the
   victim's address (for example, by targetting non-mobile fixed
   hosts as victims).

   In general, such attacks are possible with hash functions, but
   not with keyed hash functions because they require interacting
   with the legitimate user [HMAC].  Notice that normal usage of
   keyed hash functions requires an authenticated secret, which

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   we do not have. Nevertheless, we can still limit exposure by
   creating the HID (or ID) using (in addition to the Public key)
   some key or known state that is established in advance of the
   sucvP interaction itself, and which will force interaction
   with the MN.

   This is the role of the imprint, sent by the MN to the CN in
   sucvP. Since the imprint is not authenticated, the CN could
   verify it independently of sucvP, perhaps by checking directly
   with the MN by routing it via the HA.  True, the imprint
   is not a secret as expected for HMAC use, but it serves to
   severely limit which entities can launch the attack to only
   those entities with this priviledged location, and within this
   time period.

   As another possibility, the imprint may instead be a quantity
   which the CN knows about the MN, and which the CN can verify
   independently using a separate subsystem (DNS, routing fabric,
   etc). In this case, the attack is limited to only those nodes
   for which the imprint is also a valid quantity. Tying the
   HID in this manner may have undesirable consequences with
   regards to privacy and location independence (for example
   homeless operation).

   Alternatively, one could always use sucvID's (in which case
   the brute-force attacks would be nearly impossible).

   Even for HID's, actually carrying out such brute-force
   attacks remain highly unlikely in practice, and we claim our
   scheme remains secure even without requiring any of the above

8.2 Key size considerations

   There are three ways that an attacker could break the MIPv6
   security protocol presented in the paper:

   1. If an attacker find a DSA public/private key pair that hashes
      to the MN's sucvID, it can run a sucvP exchange with a CN
      and impersonate the MN.  This can be achieved by a brute
      force attack. The attacker tries several public keys as
      input to the hash function used to generate the sucvID.
      The difficulty of this attack depends on the size of the
      sucvID and is at least as hard as breaking a symmetric key
      algorithm that uses the same key size as the sucvID size
      (actually this is more difficult because the attacker
      must also generate valid public/private key pairs before

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      performing the hash function).

   2. If an attacker can find the public/private key pair that
      is used to generate the sucvId and sign sucvP3, an attacker
      can impersonate a MN in sucvP. Breaking a DSA system depends
      on the DSA modulus and subgroup.

   3. If an attacker can retrieve the generated session key it can
      send fake BU's on behalf of the MN and redirect its traffic.
      An attacker has two ways of retrieving the session key:
      (1) generate it from the DH values exchanged between the
      MN and the CN, or (2) perform a brute-force attack on the
      session key itself. The difficulty of these attacks depend
      respectively on the DH modulus size and the session Key size.

   A security system is consistent if all the components of the
   security chain provide the same security levels and none of
   them is a weak link.  Most of the security parameters used in
   our proposal (DH modulus size, Session key size, DSA subgroup)
   can be adjusted. The only fixed parameter is the SUCV identifier
   itself. It is either 63 bits long (i.e. we use an sucvHID)
   or 125 bits long (if using an sucvID itself).

   If we use sucvHID's, the security of our proposal depends on
   these 63 bits. Accordingly, the symmetric key strength should
   not be less, not would we gain much by it being significantly
   stronger.  In light of [DetStrengths], Oakley group 1 is about
   enough for this application (although there are other more
   conservative views [lenstra00selecting]).

   However, if we use suvcID's, we will need a symmetric key
   strength of almost 128 bits (125 bits) of output from our
   prf. Notice that 96 bits symmetric keys are generally considered
   safe for another 20 years or so. However, if we want to keep up
   with the strength afforded by the sucvID itself, we would need
   to use other MODP groups [MODPGrp]. For example, MODP group 5
   with exponents of 1563 bits should be enough to derive 90 bit
   symmetric keys. MODP group 6 with 2048 bits should be used to
   produce 100 bit symmetric keys.

8.3 Intruder-in-the-middle attacks

   As described above, a mobile node and its correspondent node
   derive a shared (symetric) key to authenticate the MIPv6
   Binding updates sent by the MN.

   The MN and its CN derive the shared key using the Diffie-Hellman

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      The CN chooses a random secret y and sends g^y mod p to
      the MN (in the DH value field of sucvP2)

      The MN chooses a random secret x and sends g^x mod p to
      its CN (in the DH value field sucvP3)

   The session key shared by the MN and its CN is then a hash
   digest of g^{xy} mod p (g and p are known by the MN and CN).

8.3.1 Summary of the Attack

   Diffie Hellman is know to be vulnerable to the
   intruder-in-the-middle attack on un-authenticated DH key

      CN -->g^y-->Intruder-->g^y_i-->MN

   The intruder intercepts g^y sent by the CN and sends g^{y_i}
   to the MN.  The intruder also intercepts g^x sent by the MN
   and sends g^x_i to the CN.  As a result, MN shares the key
   g^{xy_i} with the intruder (it actually thinks that it is
   sharing this key with its CN). The CN shares the key g^{x_iy}
   with the intruder (it actually thinks that it is sharing this
   key with the MN). The Intruder can then impersonate the MN
   and the CN.

   In our protocol, the MN signs sucvP3 (which contains g^x).
   As a result, the intruder can not modify nor replace this
   message.  This only thing that the intruder could do is the
   following attack:

      sucvP1: CN<--HID'-->Intruder<--HID<--MN
      sucvP2: CN-->g^y-->Intruder-->g^yi-->MN
      sucvP3: CN<--g^xi-->Intruder<--g^x<--MN

   In sucvP1, MN sends its HID by virtue of sending from its
   address (the HID is just the bottom 64 bits in the address). The
   intruder could replace this HID by another value, say HID_i,
   without affecting return routability, as long as the prefix
   remains the same.  In sucvP2, the CN sends its DH value g^y,
   which is replaced by the intruder for g^{y_i}. In sucvP3, the
   MN sends its g^x. Notice that the intruder can replace it by
   another g^{x_i} as long as this {g^x_i} is used to create HID_i.

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8.3.2 Risks

   The keys created are derived from:

      g^{xy_i} (between the MN and the intruder) and

      g^{yx_i} (between the intruder and the CN).

   So the intruder cannot pass itself off as MN (assuming it is
   computationally unfeasible to find another private-public pair
   that generates the same HID). It can, however, pass itself off
   as MN_i, where this is the address formed from HID_i. This means
   that it is not possible for an intruder to hijack an existing
   communication between MN and CN. But if the intruder is present
   at the very beginning of the communication, and if it sits
   on the path it could supplant MN. In so doing it could obtain
   knowledge of any session keys derived for this communication.

   If the session supported encryption, the endpoints might be led
   to believe in the privacy of their conversation, oblivious to
   the fact that the intruder could snoop. For example, suppose
   an MN established an sucvP session with an CN. Subsequently,
   and using this optimized path, an application (for example
   telnet) started. If a security policy database required all
   such application traffic to be encrypted, a misconfigured
   system might leverage the existing sucvP session and use ESP
   for confidentiality. This would result in the intermediary
   being privy to all the application traffic.

   Because of this, sucvP session keys must not be used for
   anything more than securing BU's. In other words, IPsec
   traffic selectors in the SPD must limit use of SA's obtained
   via sucvP for the sole purpose of securing BU's. In order to
   avoid any potential misapplication of these SA's BU's must
   not be piggybacked.

   Not heeding the above guidelines may result in the
   aforementioned snooping attack. Nevertheless, the attacker
   would have to remain on the path forever. This interception
   is possible because of the non-authenticated nature of
   the example.  Of course, if the exchange is authenticated,
   perhaps as contemplated by default by HIP [HIPARCH, HIPIMPL,
   HIPPROT], this would not be possible. Even if this interception
   is possible, once the intruder ceases to be on the path between
   MN and CN there is nothing further it can do. In other words,
   the use of unauthenticated SUCV entities does not add any
   risk to those that currently exist.  Even unauthenticated
   SUCV, eliminates the possibility of on the path redirection

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   of traffic. Notice that with current MIPv6, ``off the path''
   (as well as ``on the path'') redirection of traffic is possible.

   In some case, a MN might request to its CN to acknowledge the
   reception of the BU.  The intruder could actually fool the MN
   by sending an acknowledgement with the CN address as source
   address (note that the intruder could also authenticate this
   acknowlegement since it knows the key used by the MN, g^{xy}).
   This might confuse the MN that has received an acknowledgement
   but keeps receiving the packets from the CN via its home agent
   (note that the same problem exists also will current Mobile
   IPv6 specification)!

   One solution to these problems is for the the CN to use an
   SUCV address and to sign sucvP2 (the message that contains the
   DH value).  Then, the intruder will not be able to substitute
   g^y by g^{y_i}.

   Of course, the intruder can hinder successful completion
   of the SUCV protocol, thus preventing the CN from heeding
   the MN's BU using route optimization to the MN.  In effect,
   this is a denial-of-service attack against route optimization,
   and it leads to service degradation not disruption.

   The previous security analysis shows that sucvP prevents any
   intruders from redirecting the traffic addressed to a mobile
   host's home address and consequently provides the minimal
   Mobile IP security requirement [MIPv6SecReq].

8.3.3 Why not Route sucvP2 Through the Home Agent?

   What, if we assume sucvP1 was carried with a home address
   option, and then sucvP2 travelled via the home agent. At
   this point, the home agent can check that the validity of
   this MN_i (corresponding to HID_i), its current care-of
   address, etc. In this case, none of the above snooping would be
   possible. In order to further mitigate the sucvP2 packet from
   being redirected, the MN must check upon its reception that it
   was sent tunneled by its home agent. Home address options can
   be misused to set up distributed denial of service attacks
   whereby these options are sent to numerous hosts prompting
   them all to respond to the same address. Even if CN's exercise
   caution when sending their sucvP2 packets as instructed via a
   home address option, the nature of DDoS attacks is such that
   any given CN may not send more than a few sucvP2's to the same
   home address region (same prefix), the collection of thousands
   of such responses may be sufficient to clog a target network.

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   The above analysis shows the pro's and cons of using the home
   address option. Notice that for our purpose of authenticating
   BU's we do not need to resort to the heavy requirement of
   routing sucvP2 via the HA. SUCV packets are exchanged directly
   between the MN and the CN.

8.4 Denial-of-Service Attacks

   Denial-of-service (DOS) attacks that exhaust a host resource
   (memory and computional resources) is a major security threat
   on the Internet.  In this section we study the behavior of
   the sucvP against DoS attacks.

   sucvP1 storm:

      Malicious hosts, could try to attack a host, by sending a
      storm of sucvP1 messages. We prevent this potential attack
      as follows:

      1. When receiving a sucvP1, a host does not create any
         state and replies with a constant message (sucvP2)
         that contains a client puzzle [PUZZLES].

      2. An host only creates state if it receives a valid puzzle
         reply to its puzzle request (in sucvP3).

   sucvP2 storm:

      Malicious host could try to attack a host by sending a storm
      of sucvP2 messages. We prevent this attack by inserting
      a nonce, N1, in the sucvP1.  If a host receives a sucvP2
      with a nonce N1 that is not equal to the nonce N1 that it
      has set in the initial sucvP1, this sucvP2 must be rejected.

      Note that an intruder (between the MN and its CN) could
      intercept the sucvP1 and reply to the MN with a fake sucvP2
      containing a valid N1 and an intentionally difficult puzzle
      request. The MN would then spend a lot of CPU and power
      computing the puzzle reply. This attack can be avoided
      if the MN had a mean to authenticate the address used by
      its CN.  One solution is that the CN uses a SUCV address
      and signs sucvP2.

      Instead of this heavy alternative, we suggest that a MN
      simply reject any sucvP2 messages that contain an overly
      complex client puzzle request Of course, the MN itself
      defines the complexity threshold of the puzzle request as

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      a function of its processing power.

      As a result, the attack that consists of sending complex
      puzzles (in sucvP2) to a MN, in order to exhaust its
      computing resources, will not be sucessful, because the
      MN will drop the sucvP2.  The MN service will be degraded
      (because its incoming packets will then be routed through
      its home agent) but not disrupted.}

   sucvP3 storm:

      Malicious hosts could try to attack a host by sending a storm
      of sucvP3 messages.  We prevent this attack by using a client
      puzzle. A host accepts a sucvP3 message only after verifying
      that the puzzle reply (contained in the sucvP3) is valid.}

9.0 Security Considerations

   The technique introduced in this document is meant to increase
   the level of security in the Internet.

   This document explains the concept of statistical uniqueness
   and cryptographic verifiability (SUCV), specially as it
   applies to IPv6 addresses in the form of SUCV addresses. The
   SUCV characteristics are used to prove address ownership, thus
   preventing a class of attacks which exploit this fault in many
   types of commands.  In particular, commands which alter how an
   address is treated by peers or by the routing infrastructure
   can be used to launch denial of service attacks or hijacking
   attacks. Proving address ownership eliminates these attacks.
   However, given that this technique is meant to be used primarily
   in the absence of global infrastructures, the possibility of
   man in the middle attacks does remain. Nevertheless, these
   attacks are limited by the use of cookies and client puzzles.

10.0 Conclusions

   The present document focuses on the use of the SUCV property to
   enhance the security of exchanges between an arbitrary pair of
   peers in the absence of any third party.  In particular, we
   propose that SUCV addresses be used to solve the issue of
   securing binding updates in Mobile IPv6.

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11.0 Acknowledgements

   The authors appreciate the helpful comments received from the
   following individuals: Erik Nordmark, Alberto Escudero, Lars
   Henrik Petander, Imad Aad, Pars Mutaf and the anonymous


[ADDROWN] Pekka Nikander, "An Address Ownership Problem in IPv6",
   draft-nikander-ipng-address-ownership-00.txt, February 2001.

[BIRTH] http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/faq/2-4-6.html

[CAM] Greg O'Shea and Michael Roe, "Child-proof Authentication for
   MIPv6 (CAM)", ACM Computer Communications Review, April 2001.

[DetStrengths] Hilarie Orman and Paul Hoffman, "Determining
   Strengths For Public Keys Used For Exchanging Symmetric Keys",

[HandBook] A.J. Menezes, P.C. van Oorschot and S.A. Vanstone.
   Handbook of applied cryptography. CRC Press, 1997.

[HIPARCH] Bob Moskowitz, "HIP Architecture",

[HIPIMPL] Bob Moskowitz, "HIP Implementation",

[HIPPROT] Bob Moskowitz, "Host Identity Payload and Protocol",

[HMAC] Krawczyk, Bellare and Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-Hashing
   for Message Authentication," RFC 2104, February 1997.

[IPV6ADDR] Hinden, Deering, "IPv6 Addressing Architecture,"
   RFC 2373, July 1998.

[lenstra00selecting] A.K. Lenstra and E.R. Verheul, "Selecting
   Cryptographic Key Sizes," manuscript, (Oct.1999).

[MIPPRIV] Castelluccia, Dupont, "A Simple Privacy Extension for
   Mobile IPv6," draft-castelluccia-mobileip-privacy-00.txt,
   February 2001.

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[MIPv6] C. Perkins, "Mobile IP for IPv6",

[MIPv6SecReq] Mankin, Patil, Harkins, Nordmark, Nikander,
   Roberts, Narten, "Threat Models Introduced by Mobile
   IPv6 and Requirements for Security in Mobile IPv6",

[MIPv6SecEval] Montenegro and Petrescu, "MIPv6 Security: Assessment
   of Proposals," draft-montenegro-mobileip-mipv6-seceval-00.txt.

[MODPGrp] T. Kivinen and M. Kojo, "More MODP Diffie-Hellman Groups
   for IKE", draft-ietf-ipsec-ike-modp-groups-03.txt

[PUZZLES] Tuomas Aura, Pekka Nikander and J. Leiwo. DOS-resistant
   Authentication with Client Puzzles.

[RFC2404] Madson and Glenn, "The Use of HMAC-SHA-1-96 within ESP
   and AH," RFC 2404, November 1998.

[RFC3041] T. Narten, R. Draves "Privacy Extensions for Stateless
   Address Autoconfiguration in IPv6," RFC 3041.

[SHA1] Eastlake, Jones, "US Secure Hash Algorithm 1 (SHA-1),"
   RFC 3174, September 2001.

[WeakMD5] H. Dobbertin, "Cryptanalysis of MD5 Compress",

Authors' addresses

   Questions about this document may be directed to:

          Gabriel Montenegro
          Sun Microsystems Laboratories, Europe
          29, chemin du Vieux Chene
          38240 Meylan, FRANCE

          Voice:  +33 476 18 80 45
          E-Mail: gab@sun.com

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          Claude Castelluccia
          INRIA Rhone-Alpes
          655 avenue de l'Europe
          38330 Montbonnot Saint-Martin
          email: claude.castelluccia@inria.fr
          phone: +33 4 76 61 52 15
          fax:   +33 4 76 61 52 52

Copyright (c) The Internet Society (2000). All Rights Reserved.

   This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to
   others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it
   or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published
   and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any
   kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are
   included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this
   document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing
   the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other
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   The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be
   revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns.

   This document and the information contained herein is provided on an


   Changes between version 01 and 02:

   o Cosmetic editorial changes, reorganization, etc.

   o Added more details on SKey derivation to the protocol overview

   o Added a terminology section.

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   o Specified more fully the sucvP protocol, which means SUCV is
     now independent of HIP.

   o Added a section on extensions for constrained devices.

   o Added a section on Privacy considerations.

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