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Versions: 00 01

Network Working Group                                           K. Moore
Internet-Draft                                          Network Heretics
Intended status: Best Current Practice                         R. Barnes
Expires: January 4, 2018                                         Mozilla
                                                           H. Tschofenig
                                                             ARM Limited
                                                            July 3, 2017


  Best Current Practices for Securing Internet of Things (IoT) Devices
                    draft-moore-iot-security-bcp-01

Abstract

   In recent years, embedded computing devices have increasingly been
   provided with Internet interfaces, and the typically-weak network
   security of such devices has become a challenge for the Internet
   infrastructure.  This document lists a number of minimum requirements
   that vendors of Internet of Things (IoT) devices need to take into
   account during development and when producing firmware updates, in
   order to reduce the frequency and severity of security incidents in
   which such devices are implicated.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 4, 2018.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of



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   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.1.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     1.2.  Note about version -01 of this document . . . . . . . . .   5
   2.  Design Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.1.  General security design considerations  . . . . . . . . .   5
       2.1.1.  Threat analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       2.1.2.  Use of Standard Cryptographic Algorithms  . . . . . .   6
       2.1.3.  Use of Standard Security Protocols  . . . . . . . . .   7
       2.1.4.  Security protocols should support algorithm agility .   7
     2.2.  Authentication requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       2.2.1.  Resistance to keyspace-searching attacks  . . . . . .   7
       2.2.2.  Protection of authentication credentials  . . . . . .   8
       2.2.3.  Resistance to authentication DoS attacks  . . . . . .   8
       2.2.4.  Unauthenticated device use disabled by default  . . .   8
       2.2.5.  Per-device unique authentication credentials  . . . .   8
     2.3.  Encryption Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       2.3.1.  Encryption should be supported  . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       2.3.2.  Encryption of traffic should be the default . . . . .   9
       2.3.3.  Encryption algorithm strength . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       2.3.4.  Man in the middle attack  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     2.4.  Firmware Updates  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       2.4.1.  Automatic update capability . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       2.4.2.  Enable automatic firmware update by default . . . . .  10
       2.4.3.  Backward compatibility of firmware updates  . . . . .  10
       2.4.4.  Automatic updates should be phased in . . . . . . . .  10
       2.4.5.  Authentication of firmware updates  . . . . . . . . .  10
     2.5.  Private key management  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     2.6.  Operating system features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
       2.6.1.  Use of memory compartmentalization  . . . . . . . . .  11
       2.6.2.  Privilege minimization  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     2.7.  Miscellaneous . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   3.  Implementation Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     3.1.  Randomness  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   4.  Firmware Development Practices  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   5.  Documentation and Support Practices . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     5.1.  Support Commitment  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     5.2.  Bug Reporting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     5.3.  Labeling  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     5.4.  Documentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13



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   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   7.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   8.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   9.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     9.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     9.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15

1.  Introduction

   The weak security of Internet of Things devices has resulted in many
   well-publicized security incidents over the last few years.
   Unfortunately, it appears that very few lessons have been learned
   from those incidents.  The rate at which IoT devices are compromised
   via network-based attacks appears to be increasing.  The effect of
   such security breaches goes far beyond the immediate effect on the
   compromised devices and their users.  A compromised device may, for
   example, expose to an attacker secrets (such as passwords) stored in
   the device.  A compromised device also may be used to attack other
   computers on the same local network as the device, or elsewhere on
   the Internet.  Attackers have constructed application networks of
   compromised devices which have then been used for the purpose of
   attacking other network hosts and services, for example distributed
   password guessing attacks and distributed denial of service (DDoS)
   attacks.  [SNMP-DDOS][DDOS-KREBS] This document recommends a small
   number of minimum security requirements to reduce some of the more
   easily prevented security problems.

   The scope of these recommendations is as follows:

   -  These measures described in this document are intended to impede
      network-based attacks.  These measures are not intended to impede
      other kinds of attacks, e.g. those requiring physical access to
      the device, though following these requirements may help reduce
      the effectiveness of some such attacks.  This document does not
      address physical attacks because thwarting such attacks is
      generally outside of IETF's expertise, and because it is
      understood that the physical security requirements of Internet-
      connected devices vary widely from one application to another.
      However, because a device compromised by physical means may be
      used to attack other devices or to obtain information that useful
      in attacking other devices, it is strongly recommended that
      vendors of Internet-connected devices carefully consider physical
      security requirements when designing their products.

   -  In principle these requirements apply to all hosts that connect to
      the Internet, but this list of requirements is specifically
      targeted at devices that are constrained in their capabilities,



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      more than general-purpose programmable hosts (PCs, servers,
      laptops, tablets, etc.), routers, middleboxes, etc.  While this is
      a fuzzy boundary, it reflects the current understanding of IoT.  A
      more detailed treatment of some of the constraints of IoT devices
      can be found in [RFC7228].

   -  These are MINIMUM requirements that apply to all devices.  They
      are unlikely to be sufficient by themselves, to ensure security of
      hosts from attack.  Because IoT devices are used in a large number
      of different domains with different needs, each device will have
      its own unique security considerations.  It is not feasible to
      completely list all security requirements in a document such as
      this.  Vendors should conduct threat assessments of each device
      they produce, to determine which additional security
      considerations are applicable for use in a given application
      domain.

   -  It is expected that this list of requirements will be revised from
      time to time, as new threats are identified, and/or new security
      techniques become feasible.

   -  This document makes broad recommendations, but avoids recommending
      specific technological solutions to security issues.  This is
      because there is a wide variety of IoT devices with a wide variety
      of use cases and threat scenarios, so there are few one-size-fits-
      all technological solutions.  A companion document may be produced
      with suggestions for design choices and implementations that may
      aid in meeting these requirements.

   We expect that many of the requirements can easily be met by most
   vendors, but may require additional documentation and transparency of
   a vendor's development practices to improve credibility of their
   security practices in the marketplace.

1.1.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC
   2119 [RFC2119].  These key words describe normative requirements of
   this specification.  This specification also contains non-normative
   recommendations that do not use these key words.

   This document uses the term "firmware" to refer to the executable
   code and associated data that, in combination with device hardware,
   implements the functionality of an Internet- connected device.
   Traditionally the term "firmware" refers to code and data stored in
   non-volatile memory as distinguished from "software" which presumably



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   refers to code stored in read/write or erasable memory, or code that
   can be loaded from other devices.  For the purpose of this document,
   "firmware" applies to any kind of code or data that implements the
   functions that the device provides.  Both software and firmware
   present similar issues regarding device security, and it is easier to
   use "firmware" consistently than to write "software and firmware".

1.2.  Note about version -01 of this document

   The goal for the initial versions of this document is to invite
   discussion about what minimum security standards for Internet-
   connected devices are appropriate.  Consequently, this draft suggests
   a wide range of potential measures.  The authors, however, understand
   that imposing too many barriers to adoption might discourage device
   manufacturers from attempting to comply with this standard.  We seek
   to find the right balance that helps improve the security of the
   Internet.  We understand that some of the requirements in this draft
   may need to be removed or relaxed, at least in an initial version of
   a BCP document, and that other requirements may require additional
   refinement and justification.

2.  Design Considerations

   This section lists requirements and considerations that should affect
   the design of an Internet-connected device.  Broadly speaking, such
   considerations include device architecture, hardware and firmware
   component choices, partitioning of function, design and/or choice of
   protocols used to communicate with the device.

2.1.  General security design considerations

   In general an Internet connected device should:

   -  Protect itself from attacks that impair its function or allow it
      to be used for unintended purposes, without authorization;

   -  Protect its private authentication credentials and key material
      from being compromised resulting in disclosure to unauthorized
      parties;

   -  Protect the information received from the device, transmitted from
      the device, or stored on the device, from inappropriate disclosure
      to unauthorized parties; and

   -  Protect itself from being used as a vector to attack other devices
      or hosts on the Internet.





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   -  When appropriate, protect itself from communications with
      unauthorized/unauthenticated parties or devices.

   Each device is responsible for its own security and for ensuring that
   it is not used as a vector for attack on other Internet hosts.  The
   design of a device MUST NOT assume that a firewall or other perimeter
   security measure will protect the device from attack.  While useful
   as part of a layered defense strategy, perimeter security has
   consistently been demonstrated to be insufficient to thwart attacks
   by itself.  There are nearly always mechanisms by which one or more
   hosts on the local network can be compromised, and which in turn can
   serve as a means to attack other hosts.  Perimeter security
   mechanisms also cannot distinguish hostile traffic from safe traffic
   with 100% reliability.  And even devices on "air gapped" networks
   have been compromised by portable storage devices or software
   updates.

   For some kinds of attack, there is a limited amount that a device can
   do to prevent the attack.  For instance, any device can fall victim
   to certain kinds of denial-of-service attack caused by receiving more
   traffic in a given amount of time than the device can process.  A
   device SHOULD be designed to gracefully tolerate some amount of
   excessive traffic without failing entirely, but at some point the
   device receives so much traffic that it cannot distinguish valid
   requests from invalid ones.

2.1.1.  Threat analysis

   The design for a device MUST enumerate specific security threats
   considered in its design, and the specific measures taken (if any) to
   remedy or limit the effect of each threat.  This requirement
   encourages making deliberate, explicit choices about security
   measures at design time rather than leaving security as an
   afterthought.  This document is also useful later in the life cycle
   of a device if it becomes necessary to improve security; for instance
   it can help identify whether the original design choices fulfilled
   their intended function or failed to do so, or whether a newly
   discovered threat was not anticipated in the original design.

2.1.2.  Use of Standard Cryptographic Algorithms

   Standard or well-established, mature algorithms for cryptographic
   functions (such as symmetric encryption, public-key encryption,
   digital signatures, cryptographic hash / message integrity check)
   MUST be used.

   Explanation: A tremendous amount of subtlety must be understood in
   order to construct cryptographic algorithms that are resistant to



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   attack.  A very few people in the world have the knowledge required
   to construct or analyze robust new cryptographic algorithms, and even
   then, many knowledgeable people have constructed algorithms that were
   found to be flawed within a short time.

2.1.3.  Use of Standard Security Protocols

   Standard protocols for authentication, encryption, and other means of
   assuring security SHOULD be used whenever apparently-robust,
   applicable protocols exist.

   Explanation: The amount of expertise required to design robust
   security protocols is comparable to that required to design robust
   cryptographic algorithms.  However, there are sometimes use cases for
   which no existing standard protocol may be suitable.  In these cases
   it may be necessary to adapt an existing protocol for a new use case,
   or even to design a new security protocol.

2.1.4.  Security protocols should support algorithm agility

   The security protocols chosen for a device design, and the
   implementations of those protocols, SHOULD support the ability to
   choose between multiple cryptographic algorithms and/or to negotiate
   minimum key sizes.

   Explanation: This way, if a flaw in one algorithm is discovered that
   weakens its security, updated devices or their application peers with
   which they communicate, may refuse to use that algorithm, or permit
   its use only with a longer key than originally required.  This allows
   devices and protocol implementations to continue providing adequate
   security even after weaknesses in algorithms are discovered.

   The concept of crypto agility is further described in [RFC7696].

2.2.  Authentication requirements

   The vast majority of Internet-connected devices will require
   authentication for some purposes, whether to protect the device from
   unauthorized use or reconfiguration, and to protect information
   stored within the device from disclosure or modification.  This
   section details authentication requirements for devices that require
   authentication.

2.2.1.  Resistance to keyspace-searching attacks

   A device that requires authentication MUST be designed to make brute-
   force authentication attacks, dictionary attacks, or other attacks




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   that involve exhaustive searching of the device's key or password
   space, infeasible.

2.2.2.  Protection of authentication credentials

   A device MUST be designed to protect any secrets used to authenticate
   to the device (such as passwords or private keys) from disclosure via
   monitoring of network traffic to or from the device.  For example, if
   a password is used to authenticate a client to the device, that
   password must not appear "in the clear", or in any form via which
   extraction of the password from network traffic is computationally
   feasible.

2.2.3.  Resistance to authentication DoS attacks

   A device SHOULD be designed to gracefully tolerate excessive numbers
   of authentication attempts, for instance by giving CPU priority to
   existing protocol sessions that have already successfully
   authenticated, limiting the number of concurrent new sessions in the
   process of authenticating, and randomly discarding attempts to
   establish new sessions beyond that limit.  The specific mechanism is
   a design choice to be made in light of the specific function of the
   device and the protocols used by the device.  What's important for
   this requirement is that this be an explicit choice.

2.2.4.  Unauthenticated device use disabled by default

   A device that supports authentication SHOULD NOT be shipped in a
   condition that allows an unauthenticated client to use any function
   of the device that requires authentication, or to change that
   device's authentication credentials.

   Explanation: Most devices that can be used in an unauthenticated
   state will never be configured to require authentication.  These
   devices are attractive targets for attack and compromise, especially
   by botnets.  This is very similar to the problems caused by shipping
   devices with default passwords.

2.2.5.  Per-device unique authentication credentials

   Many devices that require authentication will be shipped with default
   authentication credentials, so that the customer can authenticate to
   the device using those credentials until they are changed.  Each
   device that requires authentication SHOULD be instantiated either
   prior to shipping, or on initial configuration by the user, with
   credentials unique to that device.  If a device is not instantiated
   with device-unique credentials, that device MUST NOT permit normal




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   operation until those credentials have been changed to something
   other than the default credentials.

   Explanation: devices that were shipped with default passwords have
   been implicated in several serious denial-of-service attacks on
   widely-used Internet services.

2.3.  Encryption Requirements

2.3.1.  Encryption should be supported

   Internet-connected devices SHOULD support the capability to encrypt
   traffic sent to or from the device.  Any information transmitted over
   a network is potentially sensitive to some customers.  For example,
   even a home temperature monitoring sensor may reveal information
   about when occupants are away from home, when they wake up and when
   they go to bed, when and how often they cook meals - all of which are
   useful to, say, a thief.

   Note: This requirement is separate from the requirement to protect
   authentication secrets from disclosure.  Authentication secrets MUST
   be protected from disclosure even if a general encryption capability
   is not supported, or if the capability is optional and a particular
   client or user doesn't use it.

2.3.2.  Encryption of traffic should be the default

   If a device supports encryption and use of encryption is optional,
   the device SHOULD be configurable to require encryption, and this
   SHOULD be the default.

2.3.3.  Encryption algorithm strength

   Encryption algorithms and minimum key lengths SHOULD be chosen to
   make brute-force attack infeasible.

2.3.4.  Man in the middle attack

   Encryption protocols SHOULD be resistant to man-in-the-middle attack.

2.4.  Firmware Updates

2.4.1.  Automatic update capability

   Vendors MUST offer an automatic firmware update mechanism.  A
   discussion about the firmware update mechanisms can be found in
   [I-D.iab-iotsu-workshop].




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   Devices SHOULD be configured to check for the existence of firmware
   updates at frequent but irregular intervals.

2.4.2.  Enable automatic firmware update by default

   Automatic firmware updates SHOULD be enabled by default.  A device
   MAY offer an option to disable automatic firmware updates.

   Especially for any device for which a firmware update would disrupt
   operation, the device SHOULD be configurable to allow the operator to
   control the timing of firmware updates.

   If enabling or disabling or changing the timing of the automatic
   update feature is controlled by a network protocol, the device MUST
   require authentication of any request to control those features.

2.4.3.  Backward compatibility of firmware updates

   Automatic firmware updates SHOULD NOT change network protocol
   interfaces in any way that is incompatible with previous versions.  A
   vendor MAY offer firmware updates which add new features as long as
   those updates are not automatically initiated.

2.4.4.  Automatic updates should be phased in

   To prevent widespread simultaneous failure of all instances of a
   particular kind of device due to a bug in a new firmware release,
   automatic firmware updates SHOULD be phased-in over a short time
   interval rather than updating all devices at once.

2.4.5.  Authentication of firmware updates

   Firmware updates MUST be authenticated and the integrity of such
   updates assured before the update is installed.  Unauthenticated
   updates or updates where the authentication or integrity checking
   fails MUST be rejected.

   Firmware updates SHOULD be authenticated using digital signature
   items that use public key cryptography to verify the authenticity of
   the signer.  Ordinary checksums or hash algorithms are insufficient
   by themselves, and keyed hashes that use shared secrets are generally
   discoverable by a determined attacker.

2.5.  Private key management

   If public key cryptography is used by the device to authenticate
   itself to other devices or parties, each device MUST be instantiated
   with its own unique private key or keys.  In many cases it will be



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   necessary for the vendor to sign such keys or arrange for them to be
   signed by a trusted party, prior to shipping the device.

   Per-device private keys SHOULD be generated on the device and never
   exposed outside the device.

2.6.  Operating system features

2.6.1.  Use of memory compartmentalization

   Device firmware SHOULD be designed to use hardware and operating
   systems that implement memory compartmentalization techniques, in
   order to prevent read, write, and/or execute access to areas of
   memory by processes not authorized to use those areas for those
   purposes.

   Vendors that do not make use of such features MUST document their
   design rationale.

   Explanation: Such mechanisms, when properly used, reduce the impact
   of a firmware bug, such as a buffer overflow vulnerability.
   Operating systems, or even firmware running on "bare metal", that do
   not provide such a separation allow an attacker to gain access to the
   complete address space.  While these concepts have been available in
   hardware for a long time already, they often are not utilized by
   real-time operating systems.

2.6.2.  Privilege minimization

   Device firmware SHOULD be designed to isolate privileged code and
   data from portions of the firmware that do not need to access them,
   in order to minimize the potential for compromised code to access
   those code and/or data.

2.7.  Miscellaneous

3.  Implementation Considerations

   This section lists requirements for implementation that broadly
   affect security of a device.

3.1.  Randomness

   Vendors MUST include a solution for generating cryptographic quality
   random numbers in their products.  Randomness is an important
   component in security protocols and without such randomness many of
   today's security protocols offer weak or no security protection.




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   Hardware random-number generators, when feasible, SHOULD be utilized,
   but MAY be combined with other sources of randomness.

   A discussion about randomness can be found in [RFC4086].

4.  Firmware Development Practices

   This section outlines requirements for development of firmware that
   is employed on Internet-connected devices.

   Vendors SHOULD use modern firmware development practices, including:

   -  Source code change control systems, which record all changes made
      to source code along with the identity of the person who committed
      the change.  Such systems help to identify which versions of code
      contain a particular bug, as well as protect against insertion of
      malicious code.

   -  Bug tracking systems.

   -  Automated testing of a set of pre-defined test conditions,
      including tests for all security vulnerabilities identified to
      date via either analysis or experience.

   -  Periodic checking of bug databases for reported security issues
      associated with the product itself, and with all components (for
      example: kernel, libraries, and protocol servers) used in the
      product.

   -  Whenever feasible, checking externally-provided source code and
      object code for authenticity.

   -  Periodic checking of externally-provided source code and object
      code for known security bugs, or updates intended to thwart
      security bugs.

   All known security bugs for which fixes or workarounds are known MUST
   be addressed prior to shipping a new product or or a code update.

5.  Documentation and Support Practices

5.1.  Support Commitment

   Vendors MUST be transparent about their commitment to supply devices
   with updates before selling products to their customers and what
   happens with those devices after the support period finishes.





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   Within the support period, vendors SHOULD provide firmware updates
   whenever new security risks associated with their products are
   identified.  Such firmware updates SHOULD NOT change the protocol
   interfaces to those products, except as necessary to address security
   issues, so that they can be deployed without disruption to customers'
   networks.  Firmware updates MAY introduce new features which change
   protocol interfaces if those features are optional and disabled by
   default.

5.2.  Bug Reporting

   Vendors MUST provide an easy to find way for reporting of security
   bugs, which is free of charge.

5.3.  Labeling

   Vendors MUST have a manufacturer, model number and hardware revision
   number legibly printed on the device.  This attempts to help
   customers with bug reporting.

   There SHOULD be a documented means of querying a device for its model
   number, hardware revision number, and firmware revision number via
   its network interface and/or via any manual input and display.  This
   interface MAY require authentication.

5.4.  Documentation

   Vendors MUST offer documentation about their products so that
   security experts are able to assess the design choices.  While such a
   document will not directly help end customers since they will almost
   always lack the expertise to judge these design decisions but they
   help security experts to assess liability and independent third
   parties to compare products without spending an disproportional
   amount of time.

   This form of public documentation will help transparency similar to
   other documentation requirements found in other industries.  It will
   also help to evolve the best practices described in this document.

6.  Security Considerations

   This entire document is about security.

7.  IANA Considerations

   This document does not contain any requests to IANA.





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8.  Acknowledgements

   Add acknowledgments here.

9.  References

9.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC4086]  Eastlake 3rd, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker,
              "Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4086, June 2005,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4086>.

9.2.  Informative References

   [DDOS-KREBS]
              Goodin, D., "Record-breaking DDoS reportedly delivered by
              >145k hacked cameras", September 2016,
              <http://arstechnica.com/security/2016/09/botnet-of-145k-
              cameras-reportedly-deliver-internets-biggest-ddos-ever/>.

   [I-D.iab-iotsu-workshop]
              Tschofenig, H. and S. Farrell, "Report from the Internet
              of Things (IoT) Software Update (IoTSU) Workshop 2016",
              draft-iab-iotsu-workshop-00 (work in progress), October
              2016.

   [RFC7228]  Bormann, C., Ersue, M., and A. Keranen, "Terminology for
              Constrained-Node Networks", RFC 7228,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7228, May 2014,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7228>.

   [RFC7696]  Housley, R., "Guidelines for Cryptographic Algorithm
              Agility and Selecting Mandatory-to-Implement Algorithms",
              BCP 201, RFC 7696, DOI 10.17487/RFC7696, November 2015,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7696>.

   [SNMP-DDOS]
              BITAG, "SNMP Reflected Amplification DDoS Attack
              Mitigation", August 2012,
              <https://www.bitag.org/documents/SNMP-Reflected-
              Amplification-DDoS-Attack-Mitigation.pdf>.




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Authors' Addresses

   Keith Moore
   Network Heretics
   PO Box 1934
   Knoxville, TN  37901
   United States

   EMail: moore@network-heretics.com


   Richard Barnes
   Mozilla

   EMail: rbarnes@mozilla.com


   Hannes Tschofenig
   ARM Limited

   EMail: hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net






























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