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In: IS-auth-wait
Network Working Group                                          L. Morand
Internet-Draft                                               Orange Labs
Intended status: Informational                            April 14, 2014
Expires: October 16, 2014


 Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Digest Authentication Using GSM 2G
                 Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA)
                   draft-morand-http-digest-2g-aka-05

Abstract

   This document specifies a one-time password generation mechanism for
   Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Digest access authentication based
   on Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) authentication and
   key generation functions A3 and A8, also known as GSM AKA or 2G AKA.
   The HTTP Authentication Framework includes two authentication
   schemes: Basic and Digest.  Both schemes employ a shared secret based
   mechanism for access authentication.  The GSM AKA mechanism performs
   user authentication and session key distribution in GSM and Universal
   Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) networks.  GSM AKA is a
   challenge-response based mechanism that uses symmetric cryptography.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on October 16, 2014.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of



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   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction and Motivations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Motivation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.2.  Relationship with 3GPP authentication mechanism over HTTP   3
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Acronyms  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  GSM 2G AKA Mechanism Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   5.  Example of Digest 2G AKA operations . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   6.  Specification of Digest 2G AKA  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     6.1.  Algorithm Directive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     6.2.  Creating a Challenge  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     6.3.  Client Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     6.4.  Server Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   7.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   8.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     8.1.  Authentication of Clients using Digest 2G AKA . . . . . .  10
     8.2.  Limited Use of Nonce Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     8.3.  Multiple Authentication Schemes and Algorithms  . . . . .  11
     8.4.  Online Dictionary Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     8.5.  Session Protection  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     8.6.  Replay Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     8.7.  Mutual Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     8.8.  Flooding the Authentication Centre  . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     8.9.  AKA Security  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     8.10. TLS Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   9.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   10. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     10.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     10.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16

1.  Introduction and Motivations

1.1.  Motivation

   The Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Authentication Framework,
   described in [RFC2617], includes two authentication schemes: Basic
   and Digest.  Both schemes employ a shared secret based mechanism for
   access authentication.  The Basic scheme is inherently insecure in
   that it transmits user credentials in plain text.  The Digest scheme



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   improves security by hiding user credentials with cryptographic
   hashes, and additionally by providing limited message integrity.


   The 2G AKA functions [TS55.205] perform authentication and session
   key distribution in Global System for Mobile Communication (GSM) and
   Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) networks. 2G AKA is
   a challenge-response based mechanism that uses symmetric
   cryptography. 2G AKA is typically run in a GSM Subscriber Identity
   Module (SIM), which resides in a smart card like device that also
   provides tamper resistant storage of shared secrets.  The 3G
   Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) mechanism, also known as UMTS
   AKA, relying on the use of the UMTS Subscriber Identity Module (USIM)
   instead of the GSM SIM, is most closely associated with UMTS;
   however, mobile operators commonly distribute GSM SIMs with UMTS
   mobile phones, resulting in the use of 2G (GSM) AKA in place of UMTS
   AKA.

   This document specifies a mapping of GSM AKA parameters onto HTTP
   Digest authentication.  In essence, this mapping enables the usage of
   GSM 2G AKA as a one-time password generation mechanism for Digest
   authentication.

   This document is based heavily on [RFC3310] which specified a mapping
   of Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) onto HTTP Digest
   authentication.  While Digest AKA can be generally used when the
   mobile phones are equipped with a UMTS SIM card, it may be useful for
   mobile operators who have not yet fully deployed USIMs and have still
   millions of SIMs deployed in the network.  Digest 2G AKA allows
   access to applications in a more secure way than would be possible
   with the use of passwords or with GSM without enhancements.

   Moreover, as the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) [RFC3261]
   Authentication Framework closely follows the HTTP Authentication
   Framework, Digest 2G AKA is directly applicable to SIP as well as to
   any other embodiment of HTTP Digest.

1.2.  Relationship with 3GPP authentication mechanism over HTTP

   3GPP has defined the Generic Bootstrapping Architecture (GBA) that
   enables the authentication of mobile subscriber based on AKA protocol
   [TS33.220].  This architecture is originally designed to allow 3G AKA
   authentication over HTTP [RFC3310], involving the user's mobile
   smartcard, a bootstrapping server function (BSF) and the
   authentication center (AuC) colocated with the mobile subscriber
   profile repository in the mobile operator network (HLR/HSS).  GBA
   also provides the optional support of authentication of 2G mobile
   users with the procedure called 2G GBA.  This document does not



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   intend to define a new standard mechanism for 3GPP.  The aim of this
   document is to provide mobile operators with an 2G-AKA authentication
   mechanism over HTTP in networks when no GBA is deployed in the mobile
   operator network.  When the GBA architecture is deployed in the
   mobile operator network, it is recomment to rely on the 3GPP TS
   33.220 [TS33.220] to perform 2G-AKA autentication over HTTP instead
   of the mechanism described in this document.

2.  Terminology

3.  Acronyms

   AuC  Authentication Center.

   AKA  Authentication and Key Agreement.

   GSM  Global System for Mobile Communication.

   IMS  IP Multimedia Subsystem.

   IMSI  International Mobile Subscriber Identity

   ISIM  IMS Subscriber Identity Module.

   Kc Cipher Key.

   Ki Subscriber Key.

   RAND  Random Challenge.

   SIM  Subscriber Identity Module.

   SRES  Signed Authentication Response.

   UMTS  Universal Mobile Telecommunications System.

   USIM  UMTS Subscriber Identity Module.

4.  GSM 2G AKA Mechanism Overview

   This following figure (Fig. 1) provides an overview of the GSM 2G AKA
   mechanism, which is based on a shared secret key (Ki) and the use of
   A3/A8 algorithms.

   The GSM 2G AKA mechanism is a challenge-response mechanism that
   allows the authentication of the mobile subscriber/device in the
   network.  This mechanism involves the Subscriber Identity Module
   (SIM) hosted by the mobile subscriber's device, a server in the



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   serving network and the Authentication Centre (AuC) in the mobile
   subscriber's home network.  When required, the authentication of the
   mobile subscriber is performed by the serving network using
   authentication material provided by the AuC.

   A shared secret (Ki) is established beforehand between the SIM and
   the AuC.  The secret is stored in the SIM, which resides on a smart
   card like, tamper resistant device.  The SIM is identified by the
   IMSI (International Mobile Subscriber Identity), which is also used
   to identify the mobile subscriber/device in the network and the
   shared secret (Ki) in the AuC (Authentication Center).


     SIM                         Server                           AuC
     (Ki)                                                         (Ki)

      |                            |                               |
      |---- 1.Request (IMSI) ----->|                               |
      |                            | 2.Authen. Data Request (IMSI) |
      |                            |------------------------------>|
      |                            |                               |
      |                            |             +-----------------+----+
      |                            |             | (3)                  |
      |                            |             | IMSI --> Ki          |
      |                            |             | A3(RAND,Ki) = SRES   |
      |                            |             | A8(RAND,Ki) = Kc     |
      |                            |             +----------------+-----+
      |                            |                              |
      |                            |<--- 4.AV (RAND, SRES, Kc) ---|
      |<-- 5.Auth. Request (RAND) -|                              |
      |                            |                              |
+-----+---------------+            |                              |
| (6)                 |            |                              |
| A3(RAND,Ki) = SRES* |            |                              |
| A8(RAND,Ki) = Kc    |            |                              |
+-----+---------------+            |                              |
      |                            |                              |
      |- 7.Auth. Response (SRES*)->|                              |
      |                            |                              |
      |                    +-------+------+                       |
      |                    | (8)          |                       |
      |                    | SRES*= SRES? |                       |
      |                    +-------+------+                       |
      |                            |                              |

                              Figure 1. GSM 2G AKA overview





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   1.  The mobile subscriber initiates a access/service request towards a
       server in the serving network. The request contains the IMSI.

   2.  When the request needs to be authenticated, the server queries
       the AuC of the mobile subscriber's home network to retrieve the
       necessary material for authenticating the mobile subscriber
       identified by the IMSI.

   3.  The IMSI received from the server is used as key entry by the AuC
       to select the corresponding shared secret Ki. The AuC uses the
       shared secret Ki and a generated random value (RAND) for calculating
       the expected response (SRES) using the A3 algorithm and the cipher
       key Kc using the A8 algorithm. the triple RAND, SRES and Kc form an
       Authentication Vector (AV).

   4.  The authentication vector (RAND, SRES, Kc) is downloaded to a
       server.  Optionally, if request by the server, the AuC can
       also download more than one authentication vector, each AV generated
       with a different RAND value.

   5.  The server creates an authentication request, which contains the
       random challenge RAND and the authentication request is delivered
       to the client.

   6.  The client produces a authentication response RES, using
       the shared secret Ki and the random challenge RAND provided in
       the authentication request received from the server.

   7.  The authentication response RES is delivered to the server.

   8.  The server compares the authentication response RES with the
       expected response SRES.  If the two match, the user has been
       successfully authenticated, and the session key Kc can be used
       for protecting further communication between the client and the
       server

5.  Example of Digest 2G AKA operations

   Figure 2 below describes a message flow describing a Digest 2G AKA
   process of authenticating a SIP request, namely the SIP REGISTER
   request.










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      SIM                        HTTP Server                       AuC
      (Ki)                                                         (Ki)

       | 1) GET (IMSI)              |                               |
       |--------------------------->|                               |
       |                            | 2) Authen. Data Request (IMSI)|
       |                            |------------------------------>|
       |                            |                               |
       |                            |             +-----------------+--+
       |                            |             | IMSI --> Ki        |
       |                            |             | A3(RAND,Ki) = SRES |
       |                            |             | A8(RAND,Ki) = Kc   |
       |                            |             +-----------------+--+
       |                            |                               |
       |                            |       3) AV (RAND, SRES, Kc)  |
       |                            |<------------------------------|
       | 4) 401 Unauthorized (RAND) |                               |
       |<---------------------------|                               |
       |                            |                               |
 +-----+---------------+            |                               |
 | A3(RAND,Ki) = SRES* |            |                               |
 | A8(RAND,Ki) = Kc    |            |                               |
 +-----+---------------+            |                               |
       |                            |                               |
       | 5) GET (IMSI, RAND, SRES)  |                               |
       |--------------------------->|                               |
       |                            |                               |
       |                    +-------+------+                        |
       |                    | SRES*= SRES? |                        |
       |                    +-------+------+                        |
       |                            |                               |
       |                  6) 200 OK |                               |
       |<---------------------------|                               |
       |                            |                               |


       Figure 2: Message flow representing a successful authentication


     1) Initial request

         GET / HTTP/1.1
         Authorization: Digest
            username="user1_private@home1.net",
            realm="service1.home1.net",
            nonce="",
            uri="/",
            response=""



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     2) Request to the AuC for 2G AKA authentication vector (AV) for the
        given IMSI

     3) Response from the AuC providing 2G AKA AV (RAND, SRES, Kc)
        associated with the IMSI

     4) Response containing a challenge

         HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized
         WWW-Authenticate: Digest
             realm="service1.home1.net",
             nonce="base64(RAND)",
             qop="auth,auth-int",
             opaque="6dae728da9089dab9112373c9f0a9731",
             algorithm=2GAKA-MD5

     5) Request containing credentials

         GET / HTTP/1.1
         Authorization: Digest
            username="user1_private@home1.net",
            realm="service1.home1.net",
            nonce="base64(RAND)",
            uri="/",
            nc=00000001,
            cnonce="0b8f29d6",
            response="6629fae49393a05397450978507c4ef1",
            opaque="6dae728da9089dab9112373c9f0a9731",
            algorithm=2GAKA-MD5

     6) Successful response

         HTTP/1.1 200 OK
         Authentication-Info:
            qop=auth-int,
            rspauth="6629fae49394a05397450978507c4ef1",
            cnonce="6629fae49393a05397450978507c4ef1",
            nc=00000001,
            opaque="6dae728da9089dab9112373c9f0a9731",
            nonce="base64(RAND)"

6.  Specification of Digest 2G AKA

   In general, the Digest 2G AKA operation is identical to the Digest
   operation in [RFC2617].  This chapter specifies the parts in which
   Digest 2G AKA extends the Digest operation.  The notation used in the
   Augmented BNF definitions for the new and modified syntax elements in
   this section is as used in SIP [RFC3261], and any elements not



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   defined in this section are as defined in SIP and the documents to
   which it refers.

6.1.  Algorithm Directive

   In order to direct the client into using 2G AKA for authentication
   instead of the standard password system, the RFC 2617 defined
   algorithm directive is overloaded in Digest 2G AKA:

      algorithm = "algorithm" EQUAL ( 2GAKA-namespace / algorithm-value
      )

      2GAKA-namespace = "2GAKA" "-" algorithm-value

      algorithm-value = ( "MD5" / "MD5-sess" / token )

   algorithm

      A string indicating the algorithm used in producing the digest and
      the checksum.  If the directive is not understood, the nonce
      SHOULD be ignored, and another challenge (if one is present)
      should be used instead.  Reuse of the same SRES value in
      authenticating subsequent requests and responses is NOT
      RECOMMENDED.  An SRES value SHOULD only be used as a one-time
      password, and algorithms such as "MD5-sess", which limit the
      amount of material hashed with a single key, by producing a
      session key for authentication, SHOULD NOT be used.

6.2.  Creating a Challenge

   In order to deliver the GSM 2G AKA authentication challenge to the
   client in Digest 2G AKA, the nonce directive defined in [RFC2617] is
   extended:

      nonce = "nonce" EQUAL ( 2GAKA-nonce / nonce-value )

      2GAKA-nonce = LDQUOT 2GAKA-nonce-value RDQUOT

      2GAKA-nonce-value = <base64 encoding of RAND>

   nonce

      A parameter which is populated with the Base64 [RFC2045] encoding
      of the 2G AKA authentication random challenge RAND.







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6.3.  Client Authentication

   When a client receives a Digest 2G AKA authentication challenge, it
   extracts the RAND from the "nonce" parameter and runs the A3-A8
   algorithms with the RAND challenge and shared secret Ki.

   The resulting A3-A8 SRES parameter is treated as a "password" when
   calculating the response directive of [RFC2617].  Due to the fact
   that the SRES parameter is 32 bits and the response directive of
   [RFC2617] is defined as 32 hex digits, SRES is encoded in the low
   order (i.e. rightmost) 32 bits of "response", padded with leading
   zeroes.

   Example:

      SRES="0000000000000000000000007018d8a1"

6.4.  Server Authentication

   With Digest 2G AKA, the server MUST use the expected response SRES
   received in the authentication vector as "password" when calculating
   the "response-auth" of the "Authentication-Info" header defined in
   [RFC2617].

7.  IANA Considerations

   IANA is kinly requested to register the following fields in the HTTP
   Authentication Scheme Registry:

   o  Authentication Scheme Name: Digest-2G-AKA

   o  Pointer to specification text: draft-morand-http-digest-2g-aka-05

   o  Notes: This document specifies a mapping of GSM AKA parameters
      onto HTTP Digest authentication independent of the GBA
      architecture defined by 3GPP.

8.  Security Considerations

   In general, Digest 2G AKA is vulnerable to the same security threats
   as HTTP authentication [RFC2617].  This chapter discusses the
   relevant exceptions.

8.1.  Authentication of Clients using Digest 2G AKA

   2G AKA is typically -- though this isn't a theoretical limitation --
   run on a SIM application that usually resides in a tamper resistant
   smart card.  Interfaces to the SIM exist, which enable the host



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   device to request authentication to be performed on the card.
   However, these interfaces do not allow access to the long-term secret
   outside the SIM, and the authentication can only be performed if the
   device accessing the SIM has knowledge of a PIN code, shared between
   the user and the SIM.  Such PIN codes are typically obtained from
   user input, and are usually required when the device is powered on.

   The use of tamper resistant cards with secure interfaces implies that
   Digest 2G AKA is typically more secure than regular Digest
   implementations, as neither possession of the host device nor Trojan
   Horses in the software give access to the long-term secret.  Where a
   PIN scheme is used, the user is also authenticated when the device is
   powered on.  However, there may be a difference in the resulting
   security of Digest 2G AKA, compared to traditional Digest
   implementations, depending on whether those implementations cache/
   store passwords that are received from the user.

8.2.  Limited Use of Nonce Values

   The Digest scheme uses server-specified nonce values to seed the
   generation of the request-digest value.  The server is free to
   construct the nonce in such a way that it may only be used from a
   particular client, for a particular resource, for a limited period of
   time or number or uses, or any other restrictions.  Doing so
   strengthens the protection provided against, for example, replay
   attacks.

   Digest 2G AKA limits the applicability of a nonce value to a
   particular SIM.  Typically, the SIM is accessible only to one client
   device at a time.  However, the nonce values are strong and secure
   even though limited to a particular SIM.  Additionally, this requires
   that the server is provided with the client identity before an
   authentication challenge can be generated.  If a client identity is
   not available, an additional round trip is needed to acquire it.

8.3.  Multiple Authentication Schemes and Algorithms

   In HTTP authentication, a user agent MUST choose the strongest
   authentication scheme it understands and request credentials from the
   user, based upon that challenge.

   In general, using passwords generated by Digest 2G AKA with other
   HTTP authentication schemes is not recommended even though the realm
   values or protection domains would coincide.  In these cases, a
   password should be requested from the end-user instead.  Digest 2G
   AKA passwords MUST NOT be re-used with such HTTP authentication
   schemes, which send the password in the clear.  In particular, 2G AKA
   passwords must not be re-used with HTTP Basic.



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   The same principle must be applied within a scheme if several
   algorithms are supported.  A client receiving an HTTP Digest
   challenge with several available algorithms MUST choose the strongest
   algorithm it understands.  For example, Digest with "2GAKA-MD5" would
   be stronger than Digest with "MD5".

8.4.  Online Dictionary Attacks

   Since user-selected passwords are typically quite simple, it has been
   proposed that servers should not accept passwords for HTTP Digest
   which are in the dictionary [RFC2617].  This potential threat does
   not exist in HTTP Digest 2G AKA because the algorithm will use SIM
   originated passwords.  However, the end-user must still be careful
   with PIN codes.  Even though HTTP Digest 2G AKA password requests are
   never displayed to the end-user, the end-user will be authenticated
   to the SIM via a PIN code.  Commonly known initial PIN codes are
   typically installed to the SIM during manufacturing and if the end-
   users do not change them, there is a danger than an unauthorized user
   may be able to use the device.  Naturally this requires that the
   unauthorized user has access to the physical device, and that the
   end-user has not changed the initial PIN code.  For this reason, end-
   users are strongly encouraged to change their PIN codes when they
   receive a SIM.

8.5.  Session Protection

   Digest 2G AKA is able to generate an additional session key for
   integrity (Kc) protection.  Even though this document does not
   specify the use of these additional keys, they may be used for
   creating additional security within HTTP authentication or some other
   security mechanisms.

8.6.  Replay Protection

   The generation of RAND used as one-time or very limited-use nonces
   and the use of the integrity protection of qop=auth-int will limit
   the possibility of replay attacks.

   In GSM, the network is allowed to re-use the RAND challenge in
   consecutive authentication exchanges.  This is not allowed in Digest
   2G AKA.  The server is mandated to use fresh triplets (RAND
   challenges) in consecutive authentication exchanges.  Digest 2G AKA
   does not mandate any means for the client to check if the RANDs are
   fresh, so the security of the scheme leans on the secrecy of the
   triplets.  However, the peer MAY employ implementation-specific
   mechanisms to remember some of the previously used RANDs, and the
   client MAY check the freshness of the server's RANDs.




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8.7.  Mutual Authentication

   With Digest 2G AKA, network authentication is performed only after
   client authentication, in contrary to Digest AKA [RFC3310] in which
   the UE authenticates the network before responding to the challenge.
   To prevent an impersonation attack of the server to the client, the
   authentication of the server to the UE SHOULD be improved by
   protecting the communication with Transport Layer Security (TLS).  An
   attacker succeeds only if he can break both, the certificate-based
   TLS authentication to the client and mutual authentication provided
   by HTTP Digest using a password derived from GSM procedures.  One way
   to break TLS is to compromise the certificate.  However, the risk of
   clients using the root certificates associated with a compromised
   Certification Authority (CA) is minimized if the clients use a
   preconfigured list of trusted root certificates restricted to a low
   number of CAs trusted by the operator, as opposed to the list of all
   root certificates in a browser's key store, as described in section
   8.10.

   When TLS is used for server authentication, the recommendations given
   in section 8.10 apply.

8.8.  Flooding the Authentication Centre

   The server typically obtains authentication vectors from the
   Authentication Centre (AuC).  Digest 2G AKA introduces a new usage
   for the AuC.  The protocols between the server and the AuC are out of
   the scope of this document.  However, it should be noted that a
   malicious client may generate a lot of protocol requests to mount a
   denial of service attack.  The server implementation SHOULD take this
   into account and SHOULD take steps to limit the traffic that it
   generates towards the AuC, preventing the attacker from flooding the
   AuC and from extending the denial of service attack from Digest 2G
   AKA to other users of the AuC.

8.9.  AKA Security

   Evolutions of GSM networks, specifically Universal Mobile
   Telecommunications System (UMTS) and IP Multimedia System (IMS)
   networks, use an enhanced shared secret based mechanism for
   authentication known as Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA).  In
   these networks, AKA is typically run in a UMTS Services Identity
   Module (USIM) or IP Multimedia Services Identity Module (ISIM).  GSM
   phones can also be equipped with a USIM or ISIM.  In that case,
   Digest AKA as described in [RFC3310] is used for authentication as
   opposed to Digest 2G AKA.





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8.10.  TLS Profile

   When TLS is used for server authentication prior to the Digest 2G AKA
   authentication procedures, the following recommendations apply.

   o  The TLS endpoints MUST support TLS version 1.1 as specified in RFC
      4346 [RFC4346] and SHOULD support TLS version 1.2 as specified in
      RFC 5246 [RFC5246] should be supported. -

   o  The highest TLS version supported on both TLS endpoints MUST be
      used.

   o  The TLS endpoints MUST comply with the 3GPP TLS profile given in
      3GPP TS 33.310, Annex E [TS33.310] is . The only difference is
      that TLS cipher suites without encryption MUST not be used.

   o  The certificates used for TLS MUST comply with the 3GPP
      certificate profile defined in the section 6.1 of 3GPP TS 33.310
      [TS33.310] is .

   o  Support of certificate revocation and of the related fields in
      certificates is recommended.

   o  Server name matching MUST be performed by the client using the
      matching rules specified by RFC 2818 [RFC2818] is .

   o  The client MUST use a preconfigured list of trusted root
      certificates for server certificate validation.

   o  Server certificate validation MUST not require manual user
      interaction.

   o  The server MUST not request a certificate in a Server Hello
      Message from the client (as the client is authenticated using
      Digest 2G AKA as described in section 5).

   o  The TLS endpoints MUST allow for resuming a session.  The lifetime
      of a Session ID is subject to local policies set on the TLS
      endpoints.

9.  Acknowledgements

   This memo is based on an initial draft written by Brett Wallis
   (draft-ietf-http-digest-auth-a3a8-01).

   The authors would like to thank Yoav Nir, Yaron Sheffer, Mark
   Nottingham, Sean Turner, Jari Arkko, Barry Leiba, Adrian Farrel,
   Stephen Farrell, Nevil Brownlee, Loic Habermacher, Bengt Sahlin and



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   Stefan Schroeder for their valuable comments before, during and after
   IESG review.

10.  References

10.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2045]  Freed, N. and N. Borenstein, "Multipurpose Internet Mail
              Extensions (MIME) Part One: Format of Internet Message
              Bodies", RFC 2045, November 1996.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC2617]  Franks, J., Hallam-Baker, P., Hostetler, J., Lawrence, S.,
              Leach, P., Luotonen, A., and L. Stewart, "HTTP
              Authentication: Basic and Digest Access Authentication",
              RFC 2617, June 1999.

10.2.  Informative References

   [RFC2818]  Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818, May 2000.

   [RFC3261]  Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston,
              A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E.
              Schooler, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261,
              June 2002.

   [RFC3310]  Niemi, A., Arkko, J., and V. Torvinen, "Hypertext Transfer
              Protocol (HTTP) Digest Authentication Using Authentication
              and Key Agreement (AKA)", RFC 3310, September 2002.

   [RFC4346]  Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
              (TLS) Protocol Version 1.1", RFC 4346, April 2006.

   [RFC5246]  Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
              (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.

   [TS33.220]
              "Generic Bootstrapping Architecture (GBA)", December 2013.

   [TS33.310]
              "Network Domain Security (NDS); Authentication Framework
              (AF) (Release 12)", June 2013.

   [TS55.205]
              "Specification of the GSM- MILENAGE algorithms (Release
              11)", September 2012.



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Author's Address

   Lionel Morand
   Orange Labs
   38/40 rue du General Leclerc
   Issy-Les-Moulineaux Cedex 9  92794
   France

   Phone: +33145296257
   Email: lionel.morand@orange.com









































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