HIP R. Moskowitz Internet-Draft HTT Consulting Updates: 7401 (if approved) S. Card Intended status: Standards Track A. Wiethuechter Expires: 26 July 2020 AX Enterprize 23 January 2020 New Cryptographic Algorithms for HIP draft-moskowitz-hip-new-crypto-04 Abstract This document provides new cryptographic algorithms to be used with HIP. The Edwards Elliptic Curve and the Keccak sponge functions are the main focus. The HIP parameters and processing instructions impacted by these algorithms are defined. Status of This Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." This Internet-Draft will expire on 26 July 2020. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/ license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License. Moskowitz, et al. Expires 26 July 2020 [Page 1]

Internet-Draft HIP New Crypto January 2020 Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2. Terms and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2.1. Requirements Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2.2. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. HIP Parameter values for new Crytpo . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.1. Elliptic Curves for Diffie-Hellman . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.1.1. DIFFIE_HELLMAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.2. Edward Digital Signature Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.2.1. HOST_ID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.2.2. HIT_SUITE_LIST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.3. Hashing with the Keccak Function . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.3.1. The Keccak Permutation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.3.2. RHASH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.3.3. HIP_MAC and HIP_MAC2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.4. HIP Cipher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.4.1. HIP_CIPHER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4. Generating a HIT from an HI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 5. HIP KEYMAT Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 6. Using Keccak for a Pseudorandom Function . . . . . . . . . . 8 7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 8.1. Keymat vulnerabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 8.2. KMAC Security as a KDF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 9. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 1. Introduction This document adds new cryptographic algorithms for HIPv2 [RFC7401]. This includes: * New elliptic curves for ECDH. * The Edwards Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA) used in Host Identities (HI) and for Base Exchange (BEX) signatures. * Hashes used in Host Identity Tag (HIT) generation, and wherever else hashes are needed. * Keyed hashes used for KEYMAT generation and packet MACing operations. Moskowitz, et al. Expires 26 July 2020 [Page 2]

Internet-Draft HIP New Crypto January 2020 * AEAD and stream ciphers to use in HIP and HIP enabled secure communication protocols. The hashes and encryption are all built on the [Keccak] sponge function. These additions reflect selection of advances in the field of cryptography that would best benefit HIP, particularly in constrained devices and communications. 2. Terms and Definitions 2.1. Requirements Terminology The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. 2.2. Definitions Keccak (KECCAK Message Authentication Code): The family of all sponge functions with a KECCAK-f permutation as the underlying function and multi-rate padding as the padding rule. KMAC (KECCAK Message Authentication Code): A PRF and keyed hash function based on KECCAK. cSHAKE (The customizable SHAKE function): Extends the SHAKE scheme to allow users to customize their use of the function. SHAKE (Secure Hash Algorithm KECCAK): A secure hash that allows for an arbitrary output length. PRF (Pseudorandom Function): A function that can be used to generate output from a random seed such that the output is computationally indistinguishable from truly random output. capacity: In the sponge construction, the width of the underlying function minus the rate. rate: Moskowitz, et al. Expires 26 July 2020 [Page 3]

Internet-Draft HIP New Crypto January 2020 In the sponge construction, the number of input bits processed per invocation of the underlying function. XOF (eXtendable-Output Function): A function on bit strings (also called messages) in which the output can be extended to any desired length. 3. HIP Parameter values for new Crytpo HIP parameters carry information that is necessary for establishing and maintaining a HIP association. For example, the device's public keys as well as the signaling for negotiating ciphers and payload handling are encapsulated in HIP parameters. Additional information, meaningful for end hosts or middleboxes, may also be included in HIP parameters. The specification of the HIP parameters and their mapping to HIP packets and packet types is flexible to allow HIP extensions to define new parameters and new protocol behavior. 3.1. Elliptic Curves for Diffie-Hellman Elliptic curves Curve25519 and Curve448 [RFC7748] are specified here for use in the HIP Diffie-Hellman exchange. Curve25519 and Curve448 are already defined in Section 5.2.1 of [I-D.ietf-hip-dex], using the HIP-DEX CKDF. Here they are defined for using the new KMAC [NIST.SP.800-185] derived KDF in Section 5. 3.1.1. DIFFIE_HELLMAN The DIFFIE_HELLMAN parameter may be included in selected HIP packets based on the DH Group ID selected. The DIFFIE_HELLMAN parameter is defined in Section 5.2.7 of [RFC7401]. The following Elliptic Curves are defined here: Group KDF Value Curve25519 [RFC7748] KKDF 13 Curve448 [RFC7748] KKDF 14 A new KDF for KEYMAT, Section 6.5 of [RFC7401] and Section 6.3 of [I-D.ietf-hip-dex] using Keccak is defined in Section 5. 3.2. Edward Digital Signature Algorithm Edwards-Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA) [RFC8032] are specified here for use as Host Identities (HIs). Moskowitz, et al. Expires 26 July 2020 [Page 4]

Internet-Draft HIP New Crypto January 2020 3.2.1. HOST_ID The HOST_ID parameter specifies the public key algorithm, and for elliptic curves, a name. The HOST_ID parameter is defined in Section 5.2.19 of [RFC7401]. Algorithm profiles Values EdDSA 13 [RFC8032] (RECOMMENDED) For hosts that implement EdDSA as the algorithm, the following ECC curves are available: Algorithm Curve Values EdDSA RESERVED 0 EdDSA EdDSA25519 1 [RFC8032] EdDSA EdDSA25519ph 2 [RFC8032] EdDSA EdDSA448 3 [RFC8032] EdDSA EdDSA448ph 4 [RFC8032] 3.2.2. HIT_SUITE_LIST The HIT_SUITE_LIST parameter contains a list of the supported HIT suite IDs of the Responder. Based on the HIT_SUITE_LIST, the Initiator can determine which source HIT Suite IDs are supported by the Responder. The HIT_SUITE_LIST parameter is defined in Section 5.2.10 of [RFC7401]. The following HIT Suite ID is defined, and the relationship between the four-bit ID value used in the OGA ID field and the eight-bit encoding within the HIT_SUITE_LIST ID field is clarified: HIT Suite Four-bit ID Eight-bit encoding RESERVED 0 0x00 EdDSA/SHAKE128 5 0x50 (RECOMMENDED) The following table provides more detail on the above HIT Suite combinations. The input for each generation algorithm is the encoding of the HI as defined in Section 4. The output is 96 bits long and is directly used in the ORCHID. Moskowitz, et al. Expires 26 July 2020 [Page 5]

Internet-Draft HIP New Crypto January 2020 +-------+----------+---------+------------------+-------------------+ | Index | Hash | HMAC | Signature | Description | | | function | | algorithm | | | | | | family | | +=======+==========+=========+==================+===================+ | 5 | SHAKE128 | KMAC128 | EdDSA | EdDSA HI hashed | | | | | | with cSHAKE128, | | | | | | output is 96 bits | +-------+----------+---------+------------------+-------------------+ Table 1: HIT Suites 3.3. Hashing with the Keccak Function The [Keccak] sponge function is the basis for the new SHA-3, standard [NIST.FIPS.202], and the customized XOF functions in [NIST.SP.800-185]. These are used here as an alternative to all the hashing functions in HIP. Hardware implementation of Keccak in VHDL is available from [Keccak]. 3.3.1. The Keccak Permutation Keccak is described as a sponge function. The analogy to a sponge is that an arbitrary number of input bits are "absorbed" into the state of the function, after which an arbitrary number of output bits are "squeezed" out of its state. The Keccak function is defined to have a width of b bits. Where b is the capacity (c) + rate (r). The rate is the number of bits "fed" into the sponge at a time. The capacity is twice the desired hash "strength" and part of the sponge width. b is one of the set {25, 50, 100, 200, 400, 800, 1600}. In FIPS 202, b=1600. Thus a hash strength of 128 bits can be delivered with c=256 and r=1344, or 168 byte segment input to the sponge. Keccak can also provide a hash strength of 128 bit with b=800 (r=544 or 68 bytes) and b=400 (r=144 or 18 bytes). 256 bit strength can only be provided with b=1600 or 800. FIPS 202 does not specify use of these smaller values for b which may be preferred in memory constrained devices, processing relatively short input strings. Future work will determine if the smaller Moskowitz, et al. Expires 26 July 2020 [Page 6]

Internet-Draft HIP New Crypto January 2020 values for b result in a significant performance/memory improvement to warrant their use. 3.3.2. RHASH The RHASH is the general term used throughout [RFC7401] to refer to the hash used for a specific HIT suite. For this addendum SHAKE128 is used, even for HIs of EdDSA448. Unless otherwise specified, L of SHAKE128 is 256, resulting in a similar output to SHA256. Any truncation used for, older, fixed output hashes is still used. This is to simplify code integration. One exception to this is in Section 4. 3.3.3. HIP_MAC and HIP_MAC2 The HIP_MAC and HIP_MAC2 parameters in [RFC7401] use HMAC [RFC2104]. This performs two hashes on a string with a key for a keyed hash the length of the underlying hash. Here, KMAC from NIST SP 800-185 [NIST.SP.800-185] is used. This is a single pass using the underlying cSHAKE function. The function call is: KMAC128(Key, Input String, 256, "") 3.4. HIP Cipher HIP encrypted parameters use the HIP_CIPHER, Section 5.2.8 of [RFC7401]. The Keccak Keyak cipher, [Keyak_Cipher], is recommended. Keyak is a candidate in the NIST Lightweight Cryptography competition and is consistent with the overall approach in this addendum to use Keccak functions for simplicity in design and implementation. 3.4.1. HIP_CIPHER The HIP_CIPHER parameter values for Keyak are: hip_cipher Suite ID Value RIVER KEYAK 6 (Keyak) LAKE KEYAK 7 (Keyak) For use as the HIP Cipher, the TAG generated in Keyak is length 0. The Keyak SUV is the key plus IV specified for the encrypted parameter. River Keyak MAY be used for [Keyak_Cipher], in place of AES-CTR. Moskowitz, et al. Expires 26 July 2020 [Page 7]

Internet-Draft HIP New Crypto January 2020 Lake Keyak can provide 256 bits of security by following the recommendations for the Keyak cipher. 4. Generating a HIT from an HI The EdDSA/cSHAKE based HITs vary slightly the ORCHID generation method described in section 3.2 of [RFC7401]. The XOF functionality of cSHAKE produces an output of L bits. This replaces the Encode_96 function in the ORCHID generation. For identities that are EdDSA public keys, ORCHIDs will be generated per the process defined in Using cSHAKE in ORCHIDs [I-D.moskowitz-orchid-cshake] 5. HIP KEYMAT Generation The KMAC function provides a new, more efficient, key derivation function over HKDF [RFC5869]. This will be referred to as KKDF. The choice of KMAC128 or KMAC256 is based on the strength of the output key material. For 256 bits of strength equivalent to HMAC- SHA256, use KMAC256. Per [NIST.SP.800-56Cr1], Section 4.1, Option 3: OKM = KMAC[128|256](salt | info, IKM, L, S) L is the derived key bit length. Since 4 HIP keys are "drawn" from this output, the length is 4 * HIP_key_size. Per ASIACRYPT 2017, pp. 606-637 [ASIACRYPT-2017] each of these derived keys will have the same strength as the Diffie-Hellman shared secret. S is the byte string 01001011 || 01000100 || 01000110, which represents the sequence of characters "K", "D", and "F" in 8-bit ASCII. Salt and info are derived as defined in [RFC7401] or [I-D.ietf-hip-dex]. There are special security considerations for IKM per [RFC7748]. The two HIs MUST be used in constructing IKM as follows: IKM = Diffie-Hellman secret | HI-R | HI-I These are separately DER encoded. 6. Using Keccak for a Pseudorandom Function Appendix B of NIST SP 800-185 [NIST.SP.800-185] defines how to use SHAKE, cSHAKE, or KMAC as a PRF. Moskowitz, et al. Expires 26 July 2020 [Page 8]

Internet-Draft HIP New Crypto January 2020 7. IANA Considerations IANA will need to make the following changes to the "Host Identity Protocol (HIP) Parameters" registries: Diffie Hellman: This document defines the new Curve25519 and Curve448 for the Diffie-Hellman exchange (see Section 3.1.1). Host ID: This document defines the new EdDSA Host ID (see Section 3.2.1). HIT Suite ID: This document defines the new HIT Suite of EdDSA/cSHAKE (see Section 3.2.2). HIP Cipher: This document defines the new Keyak ciphers for HIP encrypted parameters (see Section 3.4.1). 8. Security Considerations 8.1. Keymat vulnerabilities [RFC7748] warns about using Curve25519 and Curve448 in Diffie-Hellman for key derivation: Designers using these curves should be aware that for each public key, there are several publicly computable public keys that are equivalent to it, i.e., they produce the same shared secrets. Thus using a public key as an identifier and knowledge of a shared secret as proof of ownership (without including the public keys in the key derivation) might lead to subtle vulnerabilities. This applies to [I-D.ietf-hip-dex], but may have broader consequences. Thus the two Host IDs are included with the Diffie- Hellman secret. 8.2. KMAC Security as a KDF Section 4.1 of NIST SP 800-185 [NIST.SP.800-185] states: "The KECCAK Message Authentication Code (KMAC) algorithm is a PRF and keyed hash function based on KECCAK . It provides variable-length output" That is, the output of KMAC is indistinguishable from a random string, regardless of the length of the output. As such, the output Moskowitz, et al. Expires 26 July 2020 [Page 9]

Internet-Draft HIP New Crypto January 2020 of KMAC can be divided into multiple substrings, each with the strength of the function (KMAC128 or KMAC256) and provided that a long enough key is used, as discussed in Sec. 8.4.1 of SP 800-185. For example KMAC128(K, X, 512, S), where K is at least 128 bits, can produce 4 128 bit keys each with a strength of 128 bits. That is a single sponge operation is replacing perhaps 5 HMAC-SHA256 operations (each 2 SHA256 operations) in HKDF. 9. Acknowledgments Quynh Dang of NIST gave considerable guidance on using Keccak and the NIST supporting documents. Joan Deamen of the Keccak team was especially helpful in many aspects of using Keccak, particularly with the KEYMAT section and the strength of the derived keys. 10. References 10.1. Normative References [NIST.FIPS.202] Dworkin, M., "SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output Functions", National Institute of Standards and Technology report, DOI 10.6028/nist.fips.202, July 2015, <https://doi.org/10.6028/nist.fips.202>. [NIST.SP.800-185] Kelsey, J., Change, S., and R. Perlner, "SHA-3 derived functions: cSHAKE, KMAC, TupleHash and ParallelHash", National Institute of Standards and Technology report, DOI 10.6028/nist.sp.800-185, December 2016, <https://doi.org/10.6028/nist.sp.800-185>. [NIST.SP.800-56Cr1] Barker, E., Chen, L., and R. Davis, "Recommendation for key-derivation methods in key-establishment schemes", National Institute of Standards and Technology report, DOI 10.6028/nist.sp.800-56cr1, April 2018, <https://doi.org/10.6028/nist.sp.800-56cr1>. [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC Moskowitz, et al. Expires 26 July 2020 [Page 10]

Internet-Draft HIP New Crypto January 2020 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>. 10.2. Informative References [ASIACRYPT-2017] Daemen, J., Mennink, B., and G. Van Assche, "Full-State Keyed Duplex with Built-In Multi-user Support", DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-70697-9_21, Advances in Cryptology - ASIACRYPT 2017 pp. 606-637, 2017, <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-70697-9_21>. [I-D.ietf-hip-dex] Moskowitz, R., Hummen, R., and M. Komu, "HIP Diet EXchange (DEX)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-hip- dex-11, 31 October 2019, <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-hip-dex-11>. [I-D.moskowitz-orchid-cshake] Moskowitz, R., Card, S., and A. Wiethuechter, "Using cSHAKE in ORCHIDs", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-moskowitz-orchid-cshake-00, 11 December 2019, <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-moskowitz-orchid- cshake-00>. [Keccak] Bertoni, G., Daemen, J., Peeters, M., Van Assche, G., and R. Van Keer, "The Keccak Function", <https://keccak.team/index.html>. [Keyak_Cipher] Bertoni, G., Daemen, J., Peeters, M., Van Assche, G., and R. Van Keer, "The Keyak Cipher", <https://keccak.team/keyak.html>. [RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed- Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104, DOI 10.17487/RFC2104, February 1997, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2104>. [RFC5869] Krawczyk, H. and P. Eronen, "HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation Function (HKDF)", RFC 5869, DOI 10.17487/RFC5869, May 2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5869>. [RFC7401] Moskowitz, R., Ed., Heer, T., Jokela, P., and T. Henderson, "Host Identity Protocol Version 2 (HIPv2)", RFC 7401, DOI 10.17487/RFC7401, April 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7401>. Moskowitz, et al. Expires 26 July 2020 [Page 11]

Internet-Draft HIP New Crypto January 2020 [RFC7748] Langley, A., Hamburg, M., and S. Turner, "Elliptic Curves for Security", RFC 7748, DOI 10.17487/RFC7748, January 2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7748>. [RFC8032] Josefsson, S. and I. Liusvaara, "Edwards-Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)", RFC 8032, DOI 10.17487/RFC8032, January 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8032>. Authors' Addresses Robert Moskowitz HTT Consulting Oak Park, MI 48237 United States of America Email: rgm@labs.htt-consult.com Stuart W. Card AX Enterprize 4947 Commercial Drive Yorkville, NY 13495 United States of America Email: stu.card@axenterprize.com Adam Wiethuechter AX Enterprize 4947 Commercial Drive Yorkville, NY 13495 United States of America Email: adam.wiethuechter@axenterprize.com Moskowitz, et al. Expires 26 July 2020 [Page 12]