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Versions: 00 01

Internet Area WG                                          L. Muscariello
Internet-Draft                                             G. Carofiglio
Intended status: Informational                                   J. Auge
Expires: June 7, 2019                                        M. Papalini
                                                      Cisco Systems Inc.
                                                       December 04, 2018


                 Hybrid Information-Centric Networking
                   draft-muscariello-intarea-hicn-01

Abstract

   This documents describes the hybrid information-centric networking
   (hICN) architecture for IPv6.  The specifications describe a way to
   implement information-networking functionalities into IPv6.  The
   objective is to use IPv6 without creating overlays with a new packet
   format as an additional encapsulation.  The intent of the present
   design is to introduce some IPv6 routers in the network with
   additional packet processing operations to implement ICN functions.
   Moreover, the current design is tightly integrated into IPv6 to allow
   easy interconnection to IPv6 networks with the additional design
   objective to exploit existing IPv6 protocols as much as possible as
   they are, or extend them where needed.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on June 7, 2019.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.





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   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Architecture  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.1.  End-points  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     2.2.  Naming  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       2.2.1.  Name prefix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       2.2.2.  Name Suffix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     2.3.  Packet Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       2.3.1.  Interest Packet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       2.3.2.  Data Packet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     2.4.  Packet cache  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     2.5.  Forwarding  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
       2.5.1.  Interest Path . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
       2.5.2.  Data Path . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   3.  Security  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   4.  The End-host model and End-to-End considerations  . . . . . .  18
   5.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
   6.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
   7.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     7.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     7.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22

1.  Introduction

   The objective of this document is to describe hybrid ICN, a network
   protocol that integrates ICN in IPv6, at a minimum cost in terms of
   required modifications in end-points and routers and in a way to
   guarantee transparent interconnection with IP without using overlays.

   The ICN reference design used in this document is CCNx as described
   in [I-D.irtf-icnrg-ccnxsemantics] and [I-D.irtf-icnrg-ccnxmessages].
   IPv6 is used as described in [RFC8200].

   There are some basic design principles behind the hICN architecture
   that are implemented by the design reported below that can be
   summarized as follows:



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   o  (i) the network can transport many different kinds of applications
      as IPv6, i.e. hICN can serve content-distribution or real-time
      applications, to cite examples with very different requirements.
      hICN is not a content-distribution network;

   o  (ii) it provides connection-less and location independent
      communications by identifying data with unique global names,
      instead of naming network interfaces (locator) or end-hosts (end-
      host identifiers) as in LISP [RFC6830].

   o  (iii) data is retrieved by an end-point by issuing requests and a
      node accepts a data packet from an ingress interface if and only
      if at least one matching request packet is stored in the local
      cache of the node, otherwise the data packet is dropped;

   o  (iv) basic security services are provided by the architecture:
      authenticity of the data producer and data integrity.  A
      cryptographic signature over a security envelop is computed by the
      producer (using its own private key) and must be verified by the
      consumer (using the producer's public key).  The security envelop
      can be as small as a single data packet or cover groups of packets
      using the technique of the transport manifest [MAN].

2.  Architecture



























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+---------------------+
|                     | Data packets
| End-host            |           +-----------+          +-----------+
|                     +------->   |           |          |           |
| +------------+      |           |   IPv6    |          |   hICN    |
| | Producer   |      +-----------+   router  +----------+   router  |
| | end-point  |      |           |           |          |           |
| +------------+      | <------+  +----+------+          +------+----+
|                     |                |                        |
+---------------------+  Interest      |                        |
                         packets       |                        |
                                       |                        |
                                       |                        |
                                       |                        |
                                  +----+------+            +----+------+
                                  |           |            |           |
                                  |   hICN    |            |   IPv6    |
                 +----------------+   router  +------------+   network |
         +   ^   |                |           |            |           |
         |   |   |                +-----------+            +--------+--+
         |   |   |                                                  |
         v   |   |                                                  |
             |   |                                                  |
    +---------------------+    Interest packets                     |
    | +------------+      | +-------->            +-----------+     |
    | | Consumer   |      |                       |           |     |
    | | end-point  |      +-----------------------+   hICN    +-----+
    | +------------+      |                       |   router  |
    |                     |    <-------+          |           |
    | End-host            |                       +-----------+
    |                     |     Data packets
    +---------------------+

      Figure 1: General overview of an hICN end-to-end communication.

   The communication model described in this document covers the
   transport and the network layer.

   The network layer includes the forwarding plane only and does not
   consider the routing plane. hICN network layer is about using the
   IPv6 FIB to determine a next hop router to forward requests or using
   a local packet cache to determine if an incoming request can be
   satisfied locally.  The hICN forwarding plane takes care of
   forwarding replies by using information stored in cached requests.
   The packet pipeline of an hICN node always includes a lookup in a
   packet cache for both requests and replies.  The packet cache is a
   mandatory component that is added to the usual IPv6 packet processing
   pipeline.  Requests and replies carry an immutable data name end-to-



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   end, in packet header fields as described in the following sections.
   Moreover, requests and replies carry locators as mutable packet
   header fields.  A locator, i.e. an interface identifier, is changed
   every time a packet is sent to another hICN node.  A detailed
   description of how locators are modified along the path between end-
   points is reported in the following sections.

   It is assumed that existing routing protocols, working for IPv6,
   should be reused as much as possible as they are.  Improvements to
   existing routing protocols are out of scope and might be developed in
   other documents to better exploit features made available by the hICN
   forwarding plane.  For instance, hICN forwarding plane can take
   advantage of the ability of a routing protocol to provide multiple
   routes for a given destination or more generally compute routes for
   destinations that are multi-instantiated [MIR].  This topic is
   important but out of scope for this document.

   The hICN network architecture can run on top of any link-layer that
   supports IPv6.  hICN data names are globally routable names which are
   visible to the transport layer end-points.  Conversely, the transport
   layer has no visibility of addresses of network interfaces.  The
   network layer forwards two kind of protocol data units: the request
   and the reply, called interest and data packets.

   The hICN network layer offers a communication service to the
   transport layer in the end-points by means of a local unidirectional
   channel that we call local or application face.  This channel is used
   by the transport layer to send requests and receive replies or to
   send replies upon receptions of requests.

   A transport end-point is always bound to a unidirectional channel
   that is used to either send data or receive data.  The former end-
   point is called data producer while the latter data consumer.  The
   producer end-point produces data under a location independent name,
   which is an IPv6 prefix.  A consumer end-point fetches data by using
   the non ambiguous name as provided by the producer.  The producer
   end-point is responsible for managing the usage of the prefix in
   terms of provisioning, association to applications and its
   revocation.

   The transport end-point offers two kinds of services to applications:
   a producer and a consumer service.  The service is instantiated in
   the application by opening communication sockets with an API to
   perform basic transport service operations: allocation,
   initialization, configuration, data transmission and reception.

   The producer and consumer sockets can implement different types of
   services such as stream or datagram, reliable or unreliable.  In all



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   cases all transport services are connection-less, meaning that a
   producer transport service produces named data in a socket memory
   that is accessible by any valid request coming from one or multiple
   consumers.  The consumer, on the other hand, retrieve named data
   using location independent names which are not tied to any interface
   identifier (also called locator).  This transport model allows to
   implement reliable consumer mobility without any special mobility
   management protocol. hICN supports communication of multi-homed end-
   hosts without any special treatment in the transport layer.  The hICN
   network layer can also implement robust usage of multi-path
   forwarding in IPv6 networks as balanced request/reply flows self-
   stabilize network congestion see [CCN],[NDN], [RAQ] .

   A data packet is an IPv6 packet with a transport layer header
   carrying data from an application that produces data.  An interest
   packet is an IPv6 packet with a transport layer header and is used to
   unambiguously fetch a data packet from a producer end point.

2.1.  End-points

   In hICN we introduce two new kinds of endpoints: the producer and the
   consumer.  We identify two kind of communication sockets each with a
   specific API: the producer and consumer sockets.  These socket types
   are designed to exchange data in a multi-point to multi-point manner.
   In (h)ICN we have the same concept that is applied to a network where
   memories are distributed across the communication path.  The first
   memory in the path is the production buffer of the producer end-point
   that forges Data Packets and copies them into a shared memory
   isolated into a namespace.  Consumer sockets can retrieve data from
   such memory by using the (h)ICN network layer.  The model just
   described is an inter-process communication example (IPC) that
   requires data to cross a communication network by using a transport
   protocol.

   The way consumers and producers synchronize depends on application
   requirements and the transport layer exposes a variety of services:
   stream/datagram, reliable/unreliable, with or without latency budgets
   etc.  Independently of the specific requirements of the applications,
   producer sockets always perform data segmentation from the upper
   layer into Data Packets, as well as compute digital signatures on the
   packet security envelop.  This envelop can also be computed across a
   group of packets, by including a cryptographic hash of each packet
   into the transport manifest, and eventually signing only such
   manifest.

   The consumer socket, on the other end, always performs reassembly of
   Data Packets, hash integrity verification and signature verification.
   This is common to all architectures in (h)ICN.  The usual assumption



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   is that the producer socket uses an authentic-able identity while
   using namespaces that it has been assigned.  The end-point must be
   able to manage the mapping of her identity and the allocated
   namespace by issuing digital certificates about the mapping.  The
   consumer end-point must retrieve the associated certificate to
   perform the basic operations.  It is out of scope for this document
   how to design and implement a scalable system to perform such
   certificate operations.

   A detailed description of transport end-points is out of scope for
   this document.  A detailed description of transport end-points is out
   of scope for this document but more details can be found in [TRA].

2.2.  Naming

   In hICN, two name components are defined: the name prefix and the
   name suffix.  The name prefix is used to identify an application
   object, a service or in general an application level source of data
   in the network.  This is incarnated by a listening socket that binds
   to the name prefix.  The name suffix is used to index segmented data
   within the scope of the name prefix used by the application.

   For instance an RTP [RFC3550] source with a given SSRC can be mapped
   into a name prefix.  Single RTP sequence numbers can be mapped into
   name suffixes.  For example an HTTP server can listen to a name
   prefix to serve HTTP requests.  An HTTP reply with large payload with
   require the transport layer to segment the application data unit
   according to an MTU.  Name suffixes are used to index each segment in
   the socket stream.

   More details about how to use hICN to transport HTTP or RTP will be
   given in a different document.

2.2.1.  Name prefix

   The format of an hICN name prefix is the following:

   |            64 bits             |        64 bits                |
   +--------------------------------+-------------------------------+
   |           routable prefix      |       data identifier         |
   +----------------------------------------------------------------+


                     Figure 2: hICN IPv6 name prefix.

   It is composed of a routable IPv6 /64 prefix as per [RFC3587] which
   SHOULD be globally routable.  The data identifier is encoded in 64
   bits.  An application can use several identifiers if needed.



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   From the description given above, the name prefix is a location
   independent name encoded in an IPv6 address.

2.2.2.  Name Suffix

   The name suffix is used by the transport layer protocol to index
   segments.  The segment MUST be indexed in the end-points and in the
   network with the same suffix.  This implies that there is one
   transport segment per IP packet and that IP fragmentation is not
   allowed.  Extension to allow secure fragmentation are possible, such
   as [FRA] but they are out of scope for this document.  It is up to
   the producer end-point to determine how to perform segmentation
   depending on the use case.  An MTU path discovery protocol for hICN
   is out of scope of this document and additional work is required to
   extend existing protocols or design new ones.

               |            32 bits         |
               +-----------------------------
               |           name suffix      |
               +-----------------------------


                        Figure 3: hICN name suffix.

2.3.  Packet Format

   Two protocol data units are defined below: the interest (request) and
   the data (reply).

   They are composed of a network and transport header.  The transport
   header is the same for both packet types while the network header is
   slightly different.

2.3.1.  Interest Packet

















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   0                   1                   2                   3
   0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |Version| Traffic Class |             Flow Label                |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |         Payload Length        |  Next Header  |   Hop Limit   |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                                                               |
   +                                                               +
   |                                                               |
   +                         Source Address                        +
   |                                                               |
   +                                                               +
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                                                               |
   +                                                               +
   |                                                               |
   +                          Name Prefix                          +
   |                                                               |
   +                                                               +
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
                     Interest Packet Header Format

                 Figure 4: IPv6 interest packet L3 header.

Source Address:       128-bit address of the originator of the packet
                      (possibly not the end-host but a previous hICN node).

Name Prefix:          128-bit name prefix of the intended service.

2.3.2.  Data Packet


















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   0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |Version| Traffic Class |             Flow Label                |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |         Payload Length        |  Next Header  |   Hop Limit   |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                                                               |
   +                                                               +
   |                                                               |
   +                         Name Prefix                           +
   |                                                               |
   +                                                               +
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                                                               |
   +                                                               +
   |                                                               |
   +                          Source Address                       +
   |                                                               |
   +                                                               +
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
                     Interest Packet Header Format

                   Figure 5: IPv6 data packet L3 header.

Name Prefix:          128-bit name prefix of the intended service.

Source Address:       128-bit address of the destination of the packet
                      (possibly not the end-host but the next hICN node).




















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   0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |          Source Port          |       Destination Port        |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                          Name Suffix                          |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                           Path Label                          |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |  Data |   Time    |M|A|S|R|S|F|        Loss Detection         |
   | Offset|   Scale   |A|C|I|S|Y|I|         and Recovery          |
   |       |           |N|K|G|T|N|N|                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |           Checksum            |             Lifetime          |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

         Figure 6: Transport header for data and interest packets.

Name Suffix:       32-bit name-suffix of the packet
                   (possibly not the end-host but a previous hICN node).

Path Label:        32-bit label used to carry an encoding of the path
                   between the consumer and data responder, be it an
                   intermediate  node or the producer end-point.

Time Scale:        6-bit natural number in the range 1-64 used as a scaling
                   factor for time calculations. If not null it is used
                   to scale lifetime.

Manifest:          flag to indicate the packet carries a transport manifest
                   in the payload.

Signature:         flag to indicate the packet carries an authentication
                   header with a signature. Interest packet do not carry
                   signatures.

Loss Detection:    16-bit natural number used to implement data
and Recovery       sequencing on per adjacency basis to detect an
                   recover losses using the mechanism WLDR described
                   in {{WLD}}.

Lifetime:          16-bit unsigned integer to carry the packet lifetime in
                   milliseconds.

Checksum:          Updated using RFC 1624.

   The following sections describe the components of an hICN node and
   the packet processing operations.



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2.4.  Packet cache

   The packet cache is a router local memory used to temporarily store
   requests and reply.  The simplest incarnation of the packet cache
   MUST index packets by full name, i.e.  the concatenation of the name
   prefix and suffix.  Insertion and deletion of packets in the cache is
   described below.

2.5.  Forwarding

   The forwarding path in hICN is composed of two components: the
   interest and data path.  Requests and replies are processed at the
   hICN node in a different way.  Both forwarding paths require a packet
   cache to be incorporated into the router.  The cache is used to
   temporarily store requests and replies for a relatively short amount
   of time.

   By caching a request in an hICN node, the reply can be transmitted
   back to the right nodes as the source address field in the interest
   contains the interface identifier of the hICN node having transmitted
   the request.  Replies are optionally cached if needed.

   This means that the interest forwarding path is based on lookups in
   the IP FIB just like any other IP packet, with the additional
   processing due to a cache lookup to check if the actual reply is
   already present in the local cache for expedited reply.

   On the other hand, data packet forwarding is similar to label
   swapping [RFC3031], being the packet name identifier (prefix plus
   suffix) the forwarding label.  The next hop for the reply in transit
   is indeed selected by using information in a cached matching request.

   The name prefix in the packet header is never modified along the path
   for both requests and replies, while the locator, i.e. the interface
   identifier written in the source or destination address field, for
   interest or data packets respectively, is modified at the egress of
   the router as reported below.

2.5.1.  Interest Path

   At the router ingress the incoming interest packet I is parsed to
   obtain the name prefix and the name suffix.  An exact match look up
   is made in the packet cache using the full packet name as key.  Based
   on the outcome of the lookup the following options are possible:

   1.  at least one match is found.





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       1.1.  If one match is a data packet D, other matches are ignored,
       and D is prepared for transmission by setting D's
       destination address with I's source address.  D is passed to the
       egress to further processing before transmission.  For instance
       the next-hop MAY be selected by using the router IPv6 FIB
       (longest prefix match).  The IPv6 FIB lookup MIGHT be saved in
       case the next-hop can be derived directly from information
       previously derived by processing the incoming interest packet I.
       I is eventually dropped.

       1.2.  There is one or multiple matches and all are interest
       packets.

       *  One matching interest has the same source address and I is
          classified as duplicate and further processed as duplicate.

       *  Matching interest packets have different source addresses and
          I is classified as filtered and stored in the cache.

   2.  a match is not found and I passed to the egress for further
       processing to determine the next-hop by using the router IP FIB.

   Notice that the destination address field in the interest packet is
   polymorphic as it has two different types based on the data
   structured it is looked-up against.  It has the type of a location
   independent name while used to find a match in the packet cache and
   it has an address prefix type to find the next-hop in the IPv6 FIB.
   Polymorphism is transparent for the forwarding plane while it has
   several implications in the control plane.

           Packet Cache
 RX       +------------+
 Interest |            | Translation Operation
+---------> Data Hit   | IPv6Hdr(Data).DstAddr:= IPv6Hdr(Interest).SrcAddr
 TX       |      +     |
 Data     |      |     |
<---------+ <----+     |
          +------------+

     Figure 7: The interest packet hits a matching data packet in the
                               packet cache.










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          +----------------+    +--------+
 Interest |                |    |        | Egress NIC
  +-------> Data Miss      +--->+ IP FIB |+----->
          |                |    |        | Translation Operation
          | Interest Miss  |    |        | IPv6Hdr(Interest).SrcAddr:= NIC.Addr
          |                |    |        |
          +----------------+    +--------+


   Figure 8: The interest packet finds no match in the packet cache and
                     is processed to find a next-hop.

                                    Same src addr
            Packet Cache            +-----------+
            +--------------+        | Duplicate |
   Interest |              |        +-----^-----+
    +-------> Data Miss    |              |
            | Interet Hit+-------------->-+
            |              |              |
            +--------------+              |
                                    +-----v-----+
                                    |Filtered   |
                                    +-----------+
                                    Different src addr


    Figure 9: The interest packet hits an interest packet in the packet
                                  cache.

2.5.2.  Data Path

   At the router ingress the incoming data packet D is parsed to obtain
   the name prefix and the name suffix.  An exact match look up is made
   in the packet cache using the full packet name as key.  Based on the
   outcome of the lookup the following options are possible:

   1.  one or multiple matching interest packets are found 1.1.  The
       data packet D is cloned to have as many copies as the number of
       matching interests including D.  The destination address field of
       each copy of D is set with the source address field of each
       interest packet.  All copies are passed to the egress to further
       processing before transmission in order to find each data
       packet's next-hop.

   2.  No matching is an interest packet and the D is dropped.






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    RX
    Data   +-----------+
+--------> | Interest  |
           | Hit       |
           |  +        |
           +-----------+
              |
              |
              |
              |       Translation Operation
              |       +------>
              |       | IPv6Hdr(Data[1]).DstAddr:=IPv6Hdr(Interest[1]).SrcAddr
              |       | TX Data[1]
              +-----> |
                      |  ...
                      |
                      |
                      |  IPv6Hdr(Data[N]).DstAddr:=IPv6Hdr(Interest[N]).SrcAddr
                      |  TX Data[N]
                      +------>




     Figure 10: The data packet hits an interest packet in the packet
                                  cache.

     RX             Packet Cache
     Data      +------------------+ Drop Data
   +---------->+   Interest Miss  +------>
               |   OR Data hit    |
               +------------------+

   Figure 11: The data packet is drop in case no interest match is found
                           in the packet cache.

3.  Security

   hICN inherits ICN data-centric security model: integrity, data-origin
   authenticity and confidentiality are tied to the content rather than
   to the channel.
   Integrity and data-origin authenticity are provided through a digital
   signature computed by the producer and included in each data packet.
   Integrity and data-origin authenticity are provided in two ways using
   two approaches: the first one based on IP Authenticated Header
   [RFC4302] and the second one based on transport manifests.  Notice
   that the IP AH is not used as an IPv6 extension header as it is
   appended after the transport header.  However the choice of the IP AH



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   has been made in order to exploit existing protocol implementations
   in the end-points.

   When using IP AH, the signature is computed over

   o  (i)IP or extension header fields either immutable in transit or
      that are predictable in value upon arrival at the consumer,

   o  (ii) the AH header with the signature field set to zero.  We
      recall that in hICN the destination header field is not immutable
      nor predictable and must be set to zero for the signature
      computation.  We also point out the AH in placed after the TCP
      header in order to prevent any kind of filtering from network
      devices such as middleboxes.

   0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |  Next Header  |  Payload Len  |    ValidAlg   |               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                          Timestamp                            |
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   /                                                               /
   /                            KeyID                              /
   /                                                               /
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   /                                                               /
   /                           Signature                           /
   /                                                               /
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   Figure 12: The IP authentication header appended after the transport
                    header to carry packet signatures.

ValidAlg:          8-bit index to indicate which validation algorithm
                   must be used to verify the signature.

Timestamp:         64-bit time stamp that indicates the validity of the
                   signature.

KeyID:             256-bit key identifier.

Signature:         Variable length field that carries the cryptographic
                   signature of the security envelope.
                   It is 128 bytes for RSA-1024, 256 bytes for RSA-2048,
                   56 bytes for EDCSA 192, 72 bytes for ECDSA 256.




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   The transport manifest is a L4 entity computed at the producer which
   contains the list of names of a group of data packets to convey to
   the consumer. hICN cryptographic hashes of data packets are then
   computed instead of signatures.  The hashes are computed on immutable
   fields as explained above when using the IP AH.  Moreover, the
   manifest must be signed to guarantee a level of security equivalent
   to packet-wise signatures.

   hICN is oblivious of the trust model adopted by consumers and works
   with any of the existing proposals.

   0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |Version| MType |HashAlg|NextStr|     Flags     |NumberOfEntries|
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                                                               |
   +                                                               +
   |                                                               |
   +                             Prefix                            +
   |                                                               |
   +                                                               +
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                           Name-suffix[1]                      |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                           Hash Value[1]                       |
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
                                  . . .
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                           Name-suffixv[NumberOfEntries]       |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                           Hash Value [NumberOfEntries]        |
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+


     Figure 13: The transport manifest, generated by the producer end-
    point for the consumer end-point, contains names, integrity hashes
           and is signed with the producer end-point private key










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Version:          8-bit index to indicate which validation algorithm
                  must be used to verify the signature.

MType:            64-bit time stamp that indicates the validity of the
                  signature.

HashAlg:          256-bit key identifier.

NextStr:          Encode an operator use to predict the name-suffix
                  sequence

Flags:            Flags.

NumberOfEntries:  8-bit field that encodes the number of packets indexed
                  in the manifest.

Name-prefix:      128-bit field carrying the name-prefix common to all
                  packets indexed in the manifest.

Name-suffix:      32-bit field carrying the name-suffix.

Hash-value:       256-bit field carrying the SHA-256 hash of the packet
                  security envelop.

4.  The End-host model and End-to-End considerations

   In hICN the end-host model is very similar to a regular IPv6 end-host
   with some extensions.  An end-host is capable of opening consumer and
   producer transport end-points, one to receive data and one to send
   data under a given name prefix.  The end-host continues to identify
   interfaces using IPv6 addresses (locators or routing locators, RLOCs,
   using LISP terminology), just like any IPv6 router.  In addition to
   that, transport end-points bind to location-independent names,
   similar to LISP end-point identifiers (EIDs).  However, instead of
   using name prefixes to identify end-hosts only, in hICN a name prefix
   is used to identifity a data source.

   There is an analogy between IPv6 multicast and the hICN data
   forwarding path for one-to-many communications, as the IPv6 multicast
   group address identifies data that group members receive from a
   single sender.  Notice that in hICN a data packet transmission stores
   the identifiers in the source address field while in IPv6 multicast
   it is stored in the destination address field.

   Theres is also an analogy between IPv6 anycast and the hICN interest
   forwarding path, where multiple interfaces make use of the same IPv6
   (anycast) address.  Multiple instances of the same applications can




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   then run at different end-points to eventually reply to the same
   request.

   An hICN network node behaves as an end-host consumer end-point for
   the upstream producer end-point as all replies are forced to flow
   back to the same hICN that transmitted the requests.  An hICN network
   node may be able to reply to a request on behalf of a end-point
   producer, in that case that hICN node behaves as an end-host for the
   consumer end-point.

5.  IANA Considerations

   There are no IANA considerations in this specification.

6.  Acknowledgements

   The authors would like to thank David Ward, David Oran, Paul Polakos,
   Mark Townsley, Mauro Sardara and Alberto Compagno for suggestions on
   how to improve the architecture and the current document.

7.  References

7.1.  Normative References

   [RFC0793]  Postel, J., "Transmission Control Protocol", STD 7,
              RFC 793, DOI 10.17487/RFC0793, September 1981,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc793>.

   [RFC1081]  Rose, M., "Post Office Protocol: Version 3", RFC 1081,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC1081, November 1988,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1081>.

   [RFC1624]  Rijsinghani, A., Ed., "Computation of the Internet
              Checksum via Incremental Update", RFC 1624,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC1624, May 1994,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1624>.

   [RFC3031]  Rosen, E., Viswanathan, A., and R. Callon, "Multiprotocol
              Label Switching Architecture", RFC 3031,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3031, January 2001,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3031>.

   [RFC3550]  Schulzrinne, H., Casner, S., Frederick, R., and V.
              Jacobson, "RTP: A Transport Protocol for Real-Time
              Applications", STD 64, RFC 3550, DOI 10.17487/RFC3550,
              July 2003, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3550>.





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   [RFC3587]  Hinden, R., Deering, S., and E. Nordmark, "IPv6 Global
              Unicast Address Format", RFC 3587, DOI 10.17487/RFC3587,
              August 2003, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3587>.

   [RFC4291]  Hinden, R. and S. Deering, "IP Version 6 Addressing
              Architecture", RFC 4291, DOI 10.17487/RFC4291, February
              2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4291>.

   [RFC4302]  Kent, S., "IP Authentication Header", RFC 4302,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4302, December 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4302>.

   [RFC6830]  Farinacci, D., Fuller, V., Meyer, D., and D. Lewis, "The
              Locator/ID Separation Protocol (LISP)", RFC 6830,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6830, January 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6830>.

   [RFC8200]  Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6
              (IPv6) Specification", STD 86, RFC 8200,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8200, July 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8200>.

7.2.  Informative References

   [CCN]      Jacobson, V., Smetters, D., Thornton, J., Plass, M.,
              Briggs, N., and R. Braynard, "Networking named content",
              Proceedings of the 5th international conference on
              Emerging networking experiments and technologies -
              CoNEXT '09, DOI 10.1145/1658939.1658941, 2009.

   [FRA]      Mosko, M. and C. Wood, "Secure Fragmentation for Content
              Centric Networking", 2015 IEEE 12th International
              Conference on Mobile Ad Hoc and Sensor Systems,
              DOI 10.1109/mass.2015.51, October 2015.

   [I-D.irtf-icnrg-ccnxmessages]
              Mosko, M., Solis, I., and C. Wood, "CCNx Messages in TLV
              Format", draft-irtf-icnrg-ccnxmessages-08 (work in
              progress), July 2018.

   [I-D.irtf-icnrg-ccnxsemantics]
              Mosko, M., Solis, I., and C. Wood, "CCNx Semantics",
              draft-irtf-icnrg-ccnxsemantics-09 (work in progress), June
              2018.







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   [I-D.irtf-icnrg-mapme]
              Auge, J., Carofiglio, G., Muscariello, L., and M.
              Papalini, "MAP-Me : Managing Anchorless Mobility in
              Content Centric Networking", draft-irtf-icnrg-mapme-02
              (work in progress), October 2018.

   [I-D.irtf-icnrg-terminology]
              Wissingh, B., Wood, C., Afanasyev, A., Zhang, L., Oran,
              D., and C. Tschudin, "Information-Centric Networking
              (ICN): CCN and NDN Terminology", draft-irtf-icnrg-
              terminology-01 (work in progress), October 2018.

   [MAN]      Baugher, M., Davie, B., Narayanan, A., and D. Oran, "Self-
              verifying names for read-only named data", 2012
              Proceedings IEEE INFOCOM Workshops,
              DOI 10.1109/infcomw.2012.6193505, March 2012.

   [MIR]      Garcia-Luna-Aceves, J., Martinez-Castillo, J., and R.
              Menchaca-Mendez, "Routing to Multi-Instantiated
              Destinations: Principles, Practice, and Applications",
              IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing Vol. 17, pp.
              1696-1709, DOI 10.1109/tmc.2017.2734658, July 2018.

   [NDN]      Zhang, L., Afanasyev, A., Burke, J., Jacobson, V., claffy,
              k., Crowley, P., Papadopoulos, C., Wang, L., and B. Zhang,
              "Named data networking", ACM SIGCOMM Computer
              Communication Review Vol. 44, pp. 66-73,
              DOI 10.1145/2656877.2656887, July 2014.

   [RAQ]      Carofiglio, G., Gallo, M., Muscariello, L., Papalini, M.,
              and , "Optimal multipath congestion control and request
              forwarding in Information-Centric Networks", 2013 21st
              IEEE International Conference on Network Protocols (ICNP),
              DOI 10.1109/icnp.2013.6733576, October 2013.

   [TRA]      "M. Sardara, L. Muscariello and A. Compagno, A Transport
              Layer and Socket API for (h)ICN: Design, Implementation
              and Performance Analysis, In Proc. of ACM SIGCOMM ICN",
              2018.

   [WLD]      Carofiglio, G., Muscariello, L., Papalini, M., Rozhnova,
              N., and X. Zeng, "Leveraging ICN In-network Control for
              Loss Detection and Recovery in Wireless Mobile networks",
              Proceedings of the 2016 conference on 3rd ACM Conference
              on Information-Centric Networking - ACM-ICN '16,
              DOI 10.1145/2984356.2984361, 2016.





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Authors' Addresses

   Luca Muscariello
   Cisco Systems Inc.

   Email: lumuscar@cisco.com


   Giovanna Carofiglio
   Cisco Systems Inc.

   Email: gcarofig@cisco.com


   Jordan Auge
   Cisco Systems Inc.

   Email: augjorda@cisco.com


   Michele Papalini
   Cisco Systems Inc.

   Email: mpapal@cisco.com



























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