[Docs] [txt|pdf] [Tracker] [Email] [Diff1] [Diff2] [Nits]

Versions: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 draft-ietf-sasl-scram

Network Working Group                                  Abhijit Menon-Sen
Internet-Draft                                    Oryx Mail Systems GmbH
Intended Status: Proposed Standard                          Chris Newman
Expires: September 6, 2007                              Sun Microsystems
                                                              March 2007


       Salted Challenge Response Authentication Mechanism (SCRAM)
                     draft-newman-auth-scram-04.txt


Status of this Memo

    By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any
    applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware
    have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes
    aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79.

    Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
    Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups.  Note that
    other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
    Drafts.

    Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six
    months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents
    at any time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as
    reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

    The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
    http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt. The list of Internet-
    Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
    http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.

    This Internet-Draft expires in September 2007.


Copyright Notice

    Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007).


Abstract

    The secure authentication mechanism most widely deployed and used by
    Internet application protocols, is the transmission of clear-text
    passwords over a channel protected by Transport Layer Security
    (TLS).  There are some significant security concerns with that
    mechanism which could be addressed by the use of a challenge



Menon-Sen and Newman     Expires September 2007                 [Page 1]


Internet-draft                                                March 2007


    response authentication mechanism protected by TLS. Unfortunately,
    the challenge response mechanisms presently on the standards track
    all fail to meet requirements necessary for widespread deployment
    and have had success only in limited use.

    This specification describes the Salted Challenge Response
    Authentication Mechanism (SCRAM) which addresses the deployability
    requirements.  When used in combination with Transport Layer
    Security or an equivalent security layer, this mechanism could
    improve the status-quo for application protocol authentication and
    provide a suitable choice for a mandatory-to-implement mechanism for
    future application protocol standards.


1.  Conventions Used in This Document

    The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
    "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
    document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

    Formal syntax is defined by [RFC4234] including the core rules
    defined in Appendix B of [RFC4234].

    Example lines prefaced by "C:" are sent by the client and ones
    prefaced by "S:" by the server. If a single "C:" or "S:" label
    applies to multiple lines, then the line breaks between those lines
    are for editorial clarity only and are not part of the actual
    protocol exchange.


1.1.  Terminology

    This document uses several terms defined in [RFC2828] ("Internet
    Security Glossary") including the following: authentication,
    authentication exchange, authentication information, brute force,
    challenge-response, cryptographic hash function, dictionary attack,
    eavesdropping, hash result, keyed hash, man-in-the-middle, nonce,
    one-way encryption function, password, replay attack and salt.
    Readers not familiar with these terms should use that glossary as a
    reference.

    Some clarifications and additional definitions follow:

    - Authentication information: Information used to verify an identity
      claimed by a SCRAM client.  The authentication information for a
      SCRAM identity consists of salt, and for each cryptographic hash
      function supported, it includes the "StoredKey" and the
      "ServerKey" (the latter two are defined in the algorithm



Menon-Sen and Newman     Expires September 2007                 [Page 2]


Internet-draft                                                March 2007


      overview).

    - Authentication database: The database used to look up the
      authentication information associated with a particular identity.
      For application protocols, LDAPv3 (see [RFC4510]) is frequently
      used as the authentication database.  For network-level protocols
      such as PPP or 802.11x, the use of RADIUS is more common.

    - Base64: An encoding mechanism defined in [RFC2045] which converts
      an octet string input to a textual output string which can be
      easily displayed to a human. Although MIME permits arbitrary
      insertion of whitespace and other characters, use of base64 in
      SCRAM is restricted to the canonical form with no whitespace.

    - Octet: An 8-bit byte.

    - Octet string: A sequence of 8-bit bytes.

    - Salt: A random octet string that is combined with a password
      before applying a one-way encryption function.  This value is used
      to protect passwords that are stored in an authentication
      database.


1.2.  Notation

    The pseudocode description of the algorithm uses the following
    notations:

    - ":=": The variable on the left hand side represents the octet
      string resulting from the expression on the right hand side.

    - "+": Octet string concatenation.

    - "[ ]": A portion of an expression enclosed in "[" and "]" may not
      be included in the result under some circumstances.  See the
      associated text for a description of those circumstances.

    - HMAC(key, str): Apply the HMAC keyed hash algorithm (defined in
      [RFC2104]) using the octet string represented by "key" as the key
      and the octet string "str" as the input string.  The size of the
      result is the hash result size for the hash function in use. For
      example, it is 20 octets for SHA-1 (see [RFC3174]).

    - H(str): Apply the cryptographic hash function to the octet string
      "str", producing an octet string as a result.  The size of the
      result depends on the hash result size for the hash function in
      use.



Menon-Sen and Newman     Expires September 2007                 [Page 3]


Internet-draft                                                March 2007


    - Hi(str): Apply the cryptographic hash function to the octet string
      "str", then repeat the application on the output string for a
      number of iterations equal to the integer i minus 1.

    - XOR: Apply the exclusive-or operation to combine the octet string
      on the left of this operator with the octet string on the right of
      this operator.  The length of the output and each of the two
      inputs will be the same for this use.


2.  Introduction

    This specification describes the Salted Challenge Response
    Authentication Mechanism (SCRAM) which addresses the requirements
    necessary to deploy a challenge-response mechanism more widely than
    past attempts.  When used in combination with Transport Layer
    Security (TLS, see [RFC4346]) or an equivalent security layer, this
    mechanism could improve the status-quo for application protocol
    authentication and provide a suitable choice for a mandatory-to-
    implement mechanism for future application protocol standards.

    For simplicity, this mechanism does not presently include
    negotiation of a security layer.  It is intended to be used with an
    external security layer such as that provided by TLS or SSH.

    SCRAM provides the following protocol features:

    - The authentication information stored in the authentication
      database is not sufficient by itself to impersonate the client.
      The information is salted to prevent a pre-stored dictionary
      attack if the database is stolen.

    - The server does not gain the ability to impersonate the client to
      other servers (with an exception for server-authorized proxies).

    - The mechanism permits the use of a server-authorized proxy without
      requiring that proxy to have super-user rights with the back-end
      server.

    - A standard attribute is defined to enable storage of the
      authentication information in LDAPv3 (see [RFC4510]).

    - Bindings to several authentication frameworks are provided so the
      mechanism is not limited to a small subset of protocols.

    - Both the client and server can be authenticated by the protocol.

    - The cryptographic hash function used to authenticate can be



Menon-Sen and Newman     Expires September 2007                 [Page 4]


Internet-draft                                                March 2007


      upgraded gracefully without breaking backwards compatibility or
      risking downgrade attacks.

    For an in-depth discussion of why other challenge response
    mechanisms are not considered sufficient, see appendix A.  For more
    information about the motivations behind the design of this
    mechanism, see appendix B.

    Comments regarding this draft may be sent either to the ietf-
    sasl@imc.org mailing list or to the authors.


3.  SCRAM Algorithm Overview

    Here is a psuedocode overview of the complete SCRAM algorithm:

        SaltedPassword  := Hi(HMAC(password, salt))
        ClientKey       := H(SaltedPassword)
        StoredKey       := H(ClientKey)
        Message         := [FirstClientMessage + "," +
                            FirstServerMessage + "," +]
                            FinalClientMessageExcludingP
        ClientSignature := HMAC(StoredKey, Message)
        ClientProof     := ClientKey XOR ClientSignature
        ServerKey       := HMAC(SaltedPassword, salt)
        ServerSignature := HMAC(ServerKey, Message)

    The client has access to the user's password and once it gets the
    value of the salt and the value of i from the server, it can
    determine all of the above values.  The authentication information
    which the server stores consists of the "salt", the "StoredKey" and
    the "ServerKey".  The server authenticates the client by computing
    the ClientSignature, exclusive-oring that with the ClientProof to
    recover the ClientKey and verifying the correctness of the ClientKey
    by applying the hash function and comparing the result to the
    StoredKey.


4.  SCRAM Authentication Exchange

    The SCRAM protocol is a textual protocol with a comma-separated list
    of attribute value pairs.  Each attribute has a name with one
    letter.  An example of a simple protocol exchange follows:

        C: r=ClientNonce,n=Chris Newman
        S: r=ClientNonceServerNonce,i=128,s=PxR/wv+epq
        C: r=ClientNonceServerNonce,
           c=QWBv+XbwcaI/wp,p=WxPv/siO5l+qxN4



Menon-Sen and Newman     Expires September 2007                 [Page 5]


Internet-draft                                                March 2007


        S: v=WxPv/siO5l+qxN4

    The client sends the first message to provide the user name whose
    password will be used, a random and unique nonce and a list of the
    cryptographic hash functions the client supports.  The server
    responds by appending additional randomness on the end of the nonce,
    providing the list of hash functions it supports, and providing the
    base64-encoded salt from that user's authentication information.
    The client then authenticates by repeating the nonce, stating the
    resource to which it is authenticating, an optional base64-encoded
    channel binding (discussed later) and a proof that it has the user's
    password.  Unless the client has choosen to skip the server
    authentication step (discussed later), the server responds with a
    verification proof that the server has the appropriate password
    verifier.

    A more detailed description of the protocol elements follows:

    - a: This attribute can be provided in the client's first message.
      It specifies the authorization identity. When this is omitted or
      empty, it is presumed to be the same as the "n" attribute.  When
      this is different from the "n" attribute, then the "n" attribute
      specifies the user name whose password will be used for
      authentication, while the "a" attribute specifies the user whose
      identity will be associated with the connection subsequent to
      successful authentication and authorization.  This is typically
      used when an administrative user wishes to impersonate another
      user to perform some management role for that user.  It can also
      be used by proxies in some situations (see appendix A for more
      information).  The syntax of this field is the same as that of the
      "n" field with respect to quoting of '=' and ','.

    - c: This base64-encoded string is the channel binding.  Whether
      this is included and the meaning of the contents of this string
      depends on the external security layer used with this mechanism.
      See section XXX for more details.  If this is present, the
      authentication MUST fail unless this value is successfully
      verified.  In other words, if it appears when not expected then an
      automatic authentication failure results.  This is necessary to
      detect a man-in-the-middle attack on the security layer (see
      security considerations for details).

    - n: This is the name of the user whose password is used for
      authentication.  In most cases, the "a" attribute is omitted and
      this also specifies the identity which will be associated with the
      connection subsequent to authentication and authorization.  If the
      actual name contains the characters ',' or '=', then a quoting
      mechanism is applied which converts these characters to '=2C' and



Menon-Sen and Newman     Expires September 2007                 [Page 6]


Internet-draft                                                March 2007


      '=3D' respectively.  If the server receives a name string which
      contains '=' not followed by either '2C' or '3D', then the server
      MUST fail the authentication.

    - p: This base64-encoded string provides the client's proof of
      authentication.  This is the last attribute in the message.  See
      the algorithm overview for the computation.

    - r: This is a sequence of random printable characters excluding ','
      which forms the nonce used as input to the hash function. No
      quoting is applied to this string (unless the binding of SCRAM to
      a particular protocol states otherwise).  The client provides the
      first part of the string and the server provides the second part.
      It is important that this be different for each authentication and
      it is important that the client verifies the first part of this
      string used in all messages was provided by the client.

    - s: This is a base64-encoded string which represents the salt used
      by the server for this user.

    - v: This is used to verify the server has access to the user's
      authentication information.  If the client supplies the "v"
      attribute with an empty value in the message with a "p", that
      indicates the client does not want the server to provide
      verification.  When the server includes this in the final message,
      it is always the last attribute in the message.  See the next
      section for the computation.


5.  Security Considerations

    If the authentication exchange is performed without a strong
    security layer, then a passive eavesdropper can gain sufficient
    information to mount an offline dictionary or brute-force attack
    which can be used to recover the user's password.  The amount of
    time necessary for this attack depends on the cryptographic hash
    function selected, the strength of the password and the iteration
    count supplied by the server.  An external security layer with
    strong encryption will prevent this attack.

    If the external security layer used to protect the SCRAM exchange
    uses an anonymous key exchange, then the SCRAM channel binding
    mechanism can be used to detect a man-in-the-middle attack on the
    security layer and cause the authentication to fail as a result.
    However, the man-in-the-middle attacker will have gained sufficient
    information to mount an offline dictionary or brute-force attack.
    For this reason, SCRAM includes the ability to increase the
    iteration count over time.



Menon-Sen and Newman     Expires September 2007                 [Page 7]


Internet-draft                                                March 2007


    If the authentication information is stolen from the authentication
    database, then an offline dictionary or brute-force attack can be
    used to recover the user's password.  The use of salt mitigates this
    attack somewhat by requiring a separate attack on each password.
    Authentication mechanisms which protect against this attack are
    available (e.g., the EKE class of mechanisms), but the patent
    situation is presently unclear.

    If an attacker obtains the authentication information from the
    authentication repository and eavesdrops on one authentication
    exchange, the attacker gains the ability to impersonate that user to
    all servers providing SCRAM access using the same password and salt.


6.  IANA considerations

    (Hash function names registry, SASL mechanism registration.)



7. Acknowedgements

    (Frank Ellermann already?)


8. Normative References

    [RFC2045]  Freed, Borenstein, "Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions
               (MIME) Part One: Format of Internet Message Bodies", RFC
               2045, Innosoft, November 1996.

    [RFC2104]  Krawczyk, Bellare, Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for
               Message Authentication", IBM, February 1997.

    [RFC2119]  Bradner, "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
               pRequirement Levels", RFC 2119, Harvard University, March
               1997.

    [RFC3174]  Eastlake, Jones, "US Secure Hash Algorithm 1 (SHA1)", RFC
               3174, Motorola, September 2001

    [RFC3986]  Berners-Lee, Fielding, Masinter, "Uniform Resource
               Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", RFC 3986, W3C/MIT,
               January 2005.

    [RFC4234]  Crocker, Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax
               Specifications: ABNF", RFC 4234, Brandenburg
               Internetworking, Demon Internet Ltd, October 2005.



Menon-Sen and Newman     Expires September 2007                 [Page 8]


Internet-draft                                                March 2007


    [RFC4346]  Dierks, Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security (TLS)
               Protocol, Version 1.1", RFC 4346, Brandenburg
               Internetworking, April 2006.

    [RFC4422]  Melnikov, Zeilenga, "Simple Authentication and Security
               Layer (SASL)", RFC 4422, Isode Limited, June 2006.


9. Informative References

    [RFC1939]  Myers, Rose, "Post Office Protocol - Version 3", RFC
               1939, Carnegie Mellon, May 1996.

    [RFC2195]  Klensin, Catoe, Krumviede, "IMAP/POP AUTHorize Extension
               for Simple Challenge/Response", RFC 2195, MCI, September
               1997.

    [RFC2202]  Cheng, Glenn, "Test Cases for HMAC-MD5 and HMAC-SHA-1",
               RFC 2202, IBM, September 1997

    [RFC2289]  Haller, Metz, Nesser, Straw, "A One-Time Password
               System", RFC 2289, STD0061, February 1998.

    [RFC2828]  Shirey, "Internet Security Glossary", RFC 2828, FYI 0036,
               May 2000.

    [RFC4086]  Eastlake, Schiller, Crocker, "Randomness Requirements for
               Security", RFC 4086, BCP 0106, Motorola Laboratories,
               June 2005.

    [RFC4120]  Neuman, Yo, Hartman, Raebun, "The Kerberos Network
               Authentication Service (V5)", RFC 4120, USC-ISI, July
               2005.

    [RFC4510]  Zeilenga, "Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP):
               Technical Specification Road Map", RFC 4510, June 2006.

    [DIGEST-MD5] Melnikov, "Using Digest Authentication as a SASL
               Mechanism", draft-ietf-sasl-rfc2831bis-11.txt, Isode
               Ltd., November 2006


10. Authors' Addresses

    Abhijit Menon-Sen
    Oryx Mail Systems GmbH

    Email: ams@oryx.com



Menon-Sen and Newman     Expires September 2007                 [Page 9]


Internet-draft                                                March 2007


    Chris Newman
    Sun Microsystems
    1050 Lakes Drive
    West Covina, CA  91790
    USA

    Email: chris.newman@sun.com


Appendix A: Other Authentication Mechanisms

    (To be written.)



Appendix B: Design Motivations

    (To be written.)


Appendix C: SCRAM Examples

    (To be written.)


Appendix D: SCRAM Interoperability Testing

    (To be written.)


Intellectual Property Statement

    The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
    Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed
    to pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described
    in this document or the extent to which any license under such
    rights might or might not be available; nor does it represent that
    it has made any independent effort to identify any such rights.
    Information on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC
    documents can be found in BCP 78 and BCP 79.

    Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any
    assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an
    attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use
    of such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this
    specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository
    at http://www.ietf.org/ipr.




Menon-Sen and Newman     Expires September 2007                [Page 10]


Internet-draft                                                March 2007


    The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
    copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary
    rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement
    this standard.  Please address the information to the IETF at ietf-
    ipr@ietf.org.


Full Copyright Statement

    Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007).  This document is subject to
    the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in BCP 78, and
    except as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights.

    This document and the information contained herein are provided on
    an "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE
    REPRESENTS OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY, THE
    IETF TRUST AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL
    WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY
    WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE
    ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS
    FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.


Acknowledgment

    Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
    Internet Society.
























Menon-Sen and Newman     Expires September 2007                [Page 11]


Internet-draft                                                March 2007


          (RFC Editor: Please delete everything after this point)


Open Issues

    Appendixes A, B and C need to be written.

    D too, and the framework implemented.

    Should the title include the acronym SASL to help the greppers?


Changes since -03

    - Seven years have passed, in which it became clear that DIGEST-MD5
      suffered from unacceptably bad interoperability, so SCRAM-MD5 is
      now bad from the dead.

    - Be hash agnostic, so MD5 can be replaced more easily

    - General simplification.






























Menon-Sen and Newman     Expires September 2007                [Page 12]


Html markup produced by rfcmarkup 1.129b, available from https://tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcmarkup/