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SPEERMINT Working Group                                     S. Niccolini
Internet-Draft                                                       NEC
Intended status: Informational                                   E. Chen
Expires: March 2, 2008                                               NTT
                                                         August 30, 2007


              VoIP Security Threats relevant to SPEERMINT
                draft-niccolini-speermint-voipthreats-02

Status of this Memo

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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007).













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Abstract

   This memo presents the different security threats related to
   SPEERMINT classifying them into threats to the Location Function, to
   the Signaling Function and to the Media Function.  The different
   instances of the threats are briefly introduced inside the
   classification.  Finally the existing security solutions in SIP and
   RTP/RTCP are presented to describe the countermeasures currently
   available for such threats.  The objective of this document is to
   identify and enumerate the SPEERMINT-specific threat vectors in order
   to specify security-related requirements.  Once the requirements are
   identified, methods and solutions how to achieve such requirements
   can be selected.






































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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4

   2.  Security Threats relevant to SPEERMINT . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     2.1.  Threats Relevant to the Location Function (LF) . . . . . .  5
       2.1.1.  Threats to LF Confidentiality  . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
       2.1.2.  Threats to LF Integrity  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
       2.1.3.  Threats to LF Availability . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     2.2.  Threats to the Signaling Function (SF) . . . . . . . . . .  6
       2.2.1.  Threats to SF Confidentiality  . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
       2.2.2.  Threats to SF Integrity  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
       2.2.3.  Threats to SF Availability . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     2.3.  Threats to the Media Function (MF) . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
       2.3.1.  Threats to MF Confidentiality  . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
       2.3.2.  Threats to MF Integrity  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
       2.3.3.  Threats to MF Availability . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9

   3.  Security Best Practices  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     3.1.  General Security Best Practices  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     3.2.  Security Best Practices for the LF . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
       3.2.1.  Ensure LF Confidentiality  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
       3.2.2.  Ensure LF Integrity  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
       3.2.3.  Ensure LF Availability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     3.3.  Security Best Practices for the SF . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
       3.3.1.  Ensure SF Confidentiality  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
       3.3.2.  Ensure SF Integrity  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
       3.3.3.  Ensure SF Availability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
     3.4.  Security Best Practices for the MF . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
       3.4.1.  Ensure MF Confidentiality and Integrity  . . . . . . . 12
       3.4.2.  Ensure MF Availability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

   4.  Conclusions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

   5.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

   6.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

   7.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
   Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 19









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1.  Introduction

   With VoIP, the need for security is compounded because there is the
   need to protect both the control plane and the data plane.  In a
   legacy telephone system, security is a more valid assumption.
   Intercepting conversations requires either physical access to
   telephone lines or to compromise the Public Switched Telephone
   Network (PSTN) nodes or the office Private Branch eXchanges (PBXs).
   Only particularly security-sensitive organizations bother to encrypt
   voice traffic over traditional telephone lines.  In contrast, the
   risk of sending unencrypted data across the Internet is more
   significant (e.g.  DTMF tones corresponding to the credit card
   number).  An additional security threat to Internet Telephony comes
   from the fact that the signaling is sent using the same network as
   the multimedia data; traditional telephone systems have the signaling
   network separated from the data network.  This is an increased
   security threat since a hacker could attack the signaling network and
   its servers with increased damage potential (call hijacking, call
   drop, DoS attacks, etc.).  Therefore there is the need of
   investigating the different security threats, to extract security-
   related requirements and to highlight the solutions how to protect
   from such threats.





























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2.  Security Threats relevant to SPEERMINT

   This section enumerates potential security threats relevant to
   SPEERMINT.  A taxonomy of VoIP security threats is defined in [1].
   Such a taxonomy is really comprehensive and takes into account also
   non-VoIP-specific threats (e.g. loss of power, etc.).  Threats
   relevant to the boundaries of layer-5 SIP networks are extracted from
   such a taxonomy and mapped to the classification relevant for the
   SPEERMINT architecture as defined in [2], moreover additional threats
   for the SPEERMINT architecture are listed and detailed under the same
   classification:

   o  Location Function (LF);

   o  Signaling Function (SF);

   o  Media Function (MF).

   An additional category is also included for completeness to address
   social threats relevant to SPEERMINT even if they are currently out
   of the scope of the SPEERMINT charter.

2.1.  Threats Relevant to the Location Function (LF)

2.1.1.  Threats to LF Confidentiality

   o  numbers/identities harvesting - the attacker harvests numbers
      and/or user identities by issuing a multitude of location requests
      with the purpose of discovering the existent ones and their
      identifiers/addresses for calling them, for using them as spoofed
      identities or just for retrieving their location in the physical
      topology;

   o  signaling entities harvesting - the attacker harvests signaling
      entities (SIP Proxy Servers, etc.) addresses by issuing a specific
      number of requests with the purpose of discovering their location
      in the physical topology or for targeting them with subsequent
      attacks.

2.1.2.  Threats to LF Integrity

   o  routing directories modification - the attacker modifies routing
      directories (e.g.  DNS, ENUM tree, etc.) in an unauthorized way in
      order to modify the call routing.  The scope could be to reroute
      the call inserting unauthorized nodes in the path, to exclude
      authorized nodes from the path, to route the call towards a wrong
      destination causing a Denial of Service (DoS), to route the call
      towards a wrong destination causing annoyance for the callee;



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   o  call routing modification by Man in the Middle (MitM) - the
      attacker has already or inserts an unauthorized node in the
      signaling path in order to modify the call routing.  The scope
      could be to reroute the call inserting other unauthorized nodes in
      the path, to exclude authorized nodes from the path, to route the
      call towards a wrong destination causing a Denial of Service
      (DoS), to route the call towards a wrong destination causing
      annoyance for the callee;

   o  DNS and ENUM hijacking - the attacker uses a technique called
      cache poisoning that exploits a flaw in the DNS software and
      tricks the server into receiving incorrect information.  The
      compromised server would cache and serve the incorrect information
      locally.  This technique can be used to replace arbitrary NAPTR
      records for a set of ENUM queries with NAPTR records of an
      attacker's choosing.  This allows the attacker to redirect all
      calls to a malicious destination.

   o  proxy impersonation - the attacker tricks a SIP UA or proxy into
      communicating with a rogue proxy.  VoIP calls established among
      different peering providers may introduce a number of new
      opportunities for such attack as intermediate proxies are
      discovered dynamically during call routing.  A successful proxy
      impersonation allows full access and control to all routed SIP
      messages.

2.1.3.  Threats to LF Availability

   o  Denial of Service Attacks to LF - A DoS attack to the location
      function is possible by sending a large number of queries to the
      associated ENUM gateways or DNS servers.  This prevents a User
      Agent to look up the NAPTR record of the intended recipient of the
      call.

2.2.  Threats to the Signaling Function (SF)

   Signaling function involves a great number of sensitive information.
   Through signaling function, user agents (UA) assert identities and
   VSP operators authorize billable resources.  Correct and trusted
   operations of signaling function is essential for service providers.
   This section discusses potential security threats to the signaling
   function to detail the possible attack vectors.

2.2.1.  Threats to SF Confidentiality

   o  call pattern tracking - the attacker tracks the call patterns of
      the users violating his/her privacy;




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2.2.2.  Threats to SF Integrity

   o  session black holing - the attacker intentionally drops essential
      packets (e.g.  INVITE) of the VoIP protocol resulting the call
      initiation to fail, it is needed that the attacker controls (or
      is) a node in the middle of the signaling path;

   o  session tear down - the attacker uses CANCEL/BYE messages in order
      to tear down an existing call at SIP layer, it is needed that the
      attacker replicates the proper SIP header for the hijacking to be
      successful (To, From, Call-ID, CSeq);

   o  seesion hijacking - the attacker uses SIP messages (e.g. 301 Moved
      Temporarily) in order to hijack an existing call towards
      unexisting proxy/endpoint to make the session initiation fail, it
      is needed that the attacker replicates the proper SIP header for
      the hijacking to be successful (To, From, Call-ID, CSeq);

   o  SIP message spoofing - There are a number of ways to perform a DoS
      attack by spoofing SIP messages.  An attacker may directly send
      initial INVITE messages to a User Agent that has no capability to
      authenticate them.  Such messages may cause the UA to ring non-
      stop and effectively make it unusable.  Moreover, if the INVITE
      appears to come from a SIP server, the UA may keep responding to
      the server with multiple messages.  This may cause a DrDoS
      (Distributed Reflection DoS) attack to the SIP server if enough
      UAs are comprimised.  Another technique involves injecting faked
      BYE/CANCEL or error reponses to an ongoing dialogue in order to
      tear down a session or interrupt a session establishment.

   o  accounting fraud by media oversize - the attacker injects in the
      network more traffic than declared in the session request in order
      to avoid paying for the used resources;

   o  session replay - the attacker replays a past session of another
      user in order to have access to the same resources (e.g. a bank
      account, etc.).  This attack can results in using resources
      without paying for them, having access to sensitive inforation,
      loss of money, etc.;

   o  call hijacking - the attacker uses SIP messages (e.g. 301 Moved
      Temporarily) in order to hijack an existing call towards other
      proxy/endpoint, it is needed that the attacker replicates the
      proper SIP header for the hijacking to be successful (To, From,
      Call-ID, CSeq);

   o  caller ID spoofing - the attacker spoofs the caller identifier in
      order to make calls avoiding paying for them.



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   o  bypassing SF - the attacker sends the session intiation directly
      to the endpoint (Ua, media gateway, etc.) bypassing signaling
      entities in order to avoid paying for the used resources.

   o  weak caller ID assertion by peers - a carrier member fails to
      achieve the level of identity assertion expected by the federation
      may introduce an entry point for attackers to conduct CID (caller
      ID) spoofing fraud.  This would affect all members in the
      federation, despite their efforts to strengthen the assertion
      within their own domains.

   o  illegitimate transit peers - multimedia traffic may be
      unknowningly delivered through an illegitimate transit peer.  This
      introduces opportunities for a variety of attacks by rough peers.

   o  codec negotiation interruption/modification - signaling function
      is used to perform handshake regarding the codec(s) to be used
      during multimedia session.  An attacker may intentionally drop or
      modify only packets involved in the handshake.  This attack could
      interrupt the multimedia communication or degrade the quality
      achievable in the case o lower quality codec is used.

   o  SIP protocol spefication interruption/modification - signaling
      function may use specific details of the signaling protocol.
      Extensions and the signaling associated may vary.  An attacker may
      intentionally drop or modify only packets meant to give evidence
      or declare such extensions tricking the peering party into wrong
      assumptions.  This attack could make the peering party wrongly
      allocating protocol mediation function resulting in failure to
      establish communications or parts of them.  Moreover the peering
      party would unnecessarly use resources in allocating such protocol
      mediation function resulting in a DoS attack.

   o  bid-down attack to SF - a number of encryption key exchange
      protocols performs handshake through the Signaling Function.  An
      attacker may intentionally drop or modify only packets involved in
      the handshake.  While this attack does not interrupt the voice
      communication, calling parties are prenvented from establishing an
      SRTP session to secure privacy.

2.2.3.  Threats to SF Availability

   o  SIP malformed requests and messages - the attacker tries to cause
      a crash or a reboot of the proxy/endpoint by sending SIP malformed
      requests and messages;

   o  SIP requests and messages flooding - the attacker tries to exhaust
      the resources of the proxy/endpoint by sending many SIP requests



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      and messages;

2.3.  Threats to the Media Function (MF)

   Media function is responsible for the actual delivery of multimedia
   comunication between the users and carries sensitive information.
   Through media function, user agents (UA) can establish secure
   communications and monitor quality of conversations.  Correct and
   trusted operations of media function is essential for privacy and
   service assurance issues.  This section discusses potential security
   threats to the media function to detail the possible attack vectors.

2.3.1.  Threats to MF Confidentiality

   o  eavesdropping - the attacker reconstruct the conversation and/or
      additional data delivered with it (e.g.numbers transmitted with
      DTMF tones);

2.3.2.  Threats to MF Integrity

   o  media alteration - the attacker alters some RTP packets in order
      to modify the conversation between two users;

   o  bid-down attack to MF - a number of encryption key exchange
      protocols performs handshake through the Media Function.  ZRTP [3]
      is an example of such protocol that exchanges key information
      using RTP at the beginning before establishing an SRTP session.
      An attacker may intentionally drop only RTP packets involved in
      the handshake.  While this attack does not interrupt the voice
      communication, calling parties are prenvented from establishing an
      SRTP session to secure privacy.

2.3.3.  Threats to MF Availability

   o  RTP/RTCP malformed messages - the attacker tries to cause a crash
      or a reboot of the proxy/endpoint by sending RTP/RTCP malformed
      messages;

   o  RTP/RTCP messages flooding - the attacker tries to exhaust the
      resources of the proxy/endpoint by sending many RTP/RTCP messages;

   o  RTP/RTCP session tear down - the attacker uses RTCP messages (e.g.
      BYE) in order to tear down an existing call at RTP layer, the SIP
      layer will not notice that the RTP flow has been torn down and the
      call will not result as released;

   o  RTP/RTCP QoS degradation - the attacker sends wrong RTCP reports
      advertising more packet loss or more jitter than actually



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      experimented resulting in the usage of a poor quality codec
      degrading the overall quality of the call experience.

















































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3.  Security Best Practices

   This section will be completed in the next version

3.1.  General Security Best Practices

   In the next version, this section will describe general security best
   practices such as the following.

   o  source address assurance by ingress filtering

   o  audit trail, trapping and logging

   o  trusted time stamping

   o  critical resource allocation

   o  exception handling

   o  system monitoring

   o  mechanism to timely apply patches and supplementary code

   o  separate network for management

3.2.  Security Best Practices for the LF

   In the next version, this section will describe LF security best
   practices such as the following.

3.2.1.  Ensure LF Confidentiality

   o  Encryption

   o  stripping proper headers at the border by SM/SBE

3.2.2.  Ensure LF Integrity

   o  authenticate DNS records with digital certificates [RFC 4033-4035]

   o  strong authentication against intermediate nodes

3.2.3.  Ensure LF Availability

   o  server redundancy

   o  filter illegitimate traffic




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3.3.  Security Best Practices for the SF

   In the next version, this section will describe SF security best
   practices such as the following.

3.3.1.  Ensure SF Confidentiality

   o  encryption

3.3.2.  Ensure SF Integrity

   o  encryption

   o  Strong identity assertion

   o  strong authentication against intermediate nodes

   o  shared secret contact info between UA and server to prevent
      illegitimate INVITE packets

3.3.3.  Ensure SF Availability

   o  Fuzzing test against all devices before release

   o  Mechanism to timely apply patches

   o  Server redundancy

   o  Rate limitation

3.4.  Security Best Practices for the MF

   In the next version, this section will describe MF security best
   practices such as the following.

3.4.1.  Ensure MF Confidentiality and Integrity

   o  SRTP [requires consensus outside SPEERMINT on key exchange
      protocol]

3.4.2.  Ensure MF Availability

   o  Fuzzing test against all UA devices before release

   o  DBEs provides policing based on active sessions (also cross-layer
      issue)





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   o  verify whether packet rate is consistent with negotiated
      parameters

















































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4.  Conclusions

   This memo presented a the different SPEERMINT security threats
   classified in groups related to the Location Function, Signaling
   Function and Media Function respectively.  The multiple instances of
   the threats are presented with a brief explanation.  Finally the
   existing security solutions in VoIP were presented to describe the
   countermeasures currently available for such threats.  The objective
   of this document is to identify and enumerate the VoIP threat vectors
   in order to specify security-related requirements specific to
   SPEERMINT (that will be included in section Section 3).  Once the
   requirements are identified, methods and solutions how to achieve
   such requirements can be selected.






































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5.  Security Considerations

   This memo is entirely focused on the security threats for SPEERMINT.
















































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6.  Acknowledgements

   This memo takes inspiration from VOIPSA VoIP Security and Privacy
   Threat Taxonomy.  The author would like to thank VOIPSA for having
   produced such a comprehensive taxonomy which is the starting point of
   this draft.  The author would also like to thank Cullen Jennings for
   the useful slides presented at the VoIP Management and Security
   workshop in Vancouver.











































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7.  Informative References

   [1]  "VOIPSA VoIP Security and Privacy Threat Taxonomy",
        October 2005.

   [2]  Penno, R., Hammer, M., Khan, S., Malas, D., and A. Uzelac,
        "SPEERMINT Peering Architecture",
        draft-ietf-speermint-architecture-02.txt (work in progress),
        October 2006.

   [3]  Zimmermann, P., Johnston, A., and J. Callas, "ZRTP: Extensions
        to RTP for Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement for SRTP",
        draft-zimmermann-avt-zrtp-02.txt (work in progress),
        October 2006.

   [4]  Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston, A.,
        Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E. Schooler, "SIP:
        Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261, June 2002.

   [5]  Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The TLS Protocol Version 1.2",
        draft-ietf-tls-rfc4346-bis-02.txt (work in progress),
        October 2006.

   [6]  Ramsdell, B., "Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions
        (S/MIME) Version 3.1 Message Specification", RFC 3851,
        July 2004.

   [7]  Baugher, M., McGrew, D., Naslund, M., Carrara, E., and K.
        Norrman, "The Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP)",
        RFC 3711, March 2004.

   [8]  Peterson, J. and C. Jennings, "Enhancements for Authenticated
        Identity Management in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)",
        RFC 4474, August 2006.

















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Authors' Addresses

   Saverio Niccolini
   Network Laboratories, NEC Europe Ltd.
   Kurfuersten-Anlage 36
   Heidelberg  69115
   Germany

   Phone: +49 (0) 6221 4342 118
   Email: saverio.niccolini@netlab.nec.de
   URI:   http://www.netlab.nec.de


   Eric Chen
   Information Sharing Platform Laboratories, NTT
   3-9-11 Midori-cho
   Musashino, Tokyo  180-8585
   Japan

   Email: eric.chen@lab.ntt.co.jp
   URI:   http://www.ntt.co.jp/index_e.html






























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Full Copyright Statement

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