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Versions: 00 01

Network Working Group                                      M. Nottingham
Internet-Draft                                           August 11, 2016
Intended status: Informational
Expires: February 12, 2017


                         Retrying HTTP Requests
                   draft-nottingham-httpbis-retry-00

Abstract

   HTTP allows requests to be automatically retried under certain
   circumstances.  This draft explores how this is implemented,
   requirements for similar functionality from other parts of the stack,
   and potential future improvements.

Note to Readers

   This draft is not intended to be published as an RFC.

   The issues list for this draft can be found at
   https://github.com/mnot/I-D/labels/httpbis-retry .

   The most recent (often, unpublished) draft is at
   https://mnot.github.io/I-D/httpbis-retry/ .

   Recent changes are listed at https://github.com/mnot/I-D/commits/gh-
   pages/httpbis-retry .

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on February 12, 2017.






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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.1.  Notational Conventions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Background  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.1.  Retries and Replays: A Taxonomy of Repetition . . . . . .   3
     2.2.  What the Spec Says: Automatic Retries . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.3.  What the Specs Say: Replay  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       2.3.1.  TCP Fast Open . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       2.3.2.  TLS 1.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       2.3.3.  QUIC  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   3.  Discussion  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.1.  Automatic Retries In Practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.2.  Replays Are Different . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   4.  Possible Areas of Work  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     4.1.  Updating HTTP's Requirements for Retries  . . . . . . . .   8
     4.2.  Protocol Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     4.3.  Feedback to Transport 0RT Efforts . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   6.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   7.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     7.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     7.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     7.3.  URIs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   Appendix A.  When Clients Retry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     A.1.  Squid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     A.2.  Traffic Server  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     A.3.  Firefox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     A.4.  Chromium  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16






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1.  Introduction

   One of the benefits of HTTP's well-defined method semantics is that
   they allow failed requests to be retried, under certain
   circumstances.

   However, interest in extending, redefining or just clarifying HTTP's
   retry semantics is increasing, for a number of reasons:

   o  Since HTTP/1.1's requirements were written, there has been a
      substantial amount of experience deploying and using HTTP, leading
      implementations to refine their behaviour, arguably diverging from
      the specification.

   o  Likewise, changes such as HTTP/2 [RFC7540] might change the
      underlying assumptions that these requirements were based upon.

   o  Emerging lower-layer developments such as TCP Fast Open [RFC7413],
      TLS/1.3 [I-D.ietf-tls-tls13] and QUIC
      [I-D.hamilton-early-deployment-quic] introduce the possibility of
      replayed requests in the beginning of a connection, thanks to Zero
      Round Trip (0RT) modes.  In some ways, these are similar to
      retries - but not completely.

   o  Applications sometimes want requests to be retried by
      infrastructure, but can't easily express them in a non-idempotent
      request (such as GET).

   This draft gives some background in Section 2, discusses aspects of
   these issues in Section 3, suggesting possible areas of work in
   Section 4, and cataloguing current implementation behaviours in
   Appendix A.

1.1.  Notational Conventions

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

2.  Background

2.1.  Retries and Replays: A Taxonomy of Repetition

   In HTTP, there are three similar but separate phenomena that deserve
   consideration for the purposes of this document:

   1.  *User Retries* happen when a user initiates an action that
       results in a duplicate request being emitted.  For example, a



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       user retry might occur when a "reload" button is pressed, a URL
       is typed in again, "return" is pressed in the URL bar again, or a
       navigation link or form button is pressed twice while still on
       screen.

   2.  *Automatic Retries* happen when an HTTP client implementation
       resends a previous request without user intervention or
       initiation.  This might happen when a GET request fails to return
       a complete response, or when a connection drops before the
       request is sent.  Note that automatic retries can (and are)
       performed both by user agents and intermediary clients.

   3.  *Replays* happen when the packet(s) containing a request are re-
       sent on the network, either automatically as part of transport
       protocol operation, or by an attacker.  The closest upstream HTTP
       client might not have any indication that a replay has occurred.

   Note that retries initiated by code shipped to the client by the
   server (e.g., in JavaScript) occupy a grey area here; however,
   because they are not initiated by the generic HTTP client
   implementation itself, we will consider them user retries for the
   time being.

   Also, this document doesn't include TCP-layer loss recovery (i.e.,
   retransmission).

2.2.  What the Spec Says: Automatic Retries

   [RFC7230], Section 6.3.1 allows HTTP requests to be retried in
   certain circumstances:

      When an inbound connection is closed prematurely, a client MAY
      open a new connection and automatically retransmit an aborted
      sequence of requests if all of those requests have idempotent
      methods (Section 4.2.2 of [RFC7231]).  A proxy MUST NOT
      automatically retry non-idempotent requests.

      A user agent MUST NOT automatically retry a request with a non-
      idempotent method unless it has some means to know that the
      request semantics are actually idempotent, regardless of the
      method, or some means to detect that the original request was
      never applied.  For example, a user agent that knows (through
      design or configuration) that a POST request to a given resource
      is safe can repeat that request automatically.  Likewise, a user
      agent designed specifically to operate on a version control
      repository might be able to recover from partial failure
      conditions by checking the target resource revision(s) after a
      failed connection, reverting or fixing any changes that were



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      partially applied, and then automatically retrying the requests
      that failed.

      A client SHOULD NOT automatically retry a failed automatic retry.

   Note that the complete list of idempotent methods is maintained in
   the IANA HTTP Method Registry [4].

2.3.  What the Specs Say: Replay

2.3.1.  TCP Fast Open

   [RFC7413], Section 6.3.1 addresses HTTP Request Replay with TCP Fast
   Open:

      While TFO is motivated by Web applications, the browser should not
      use TFO to send requests in SYNs if those requests cannot tolerate
      replays.  One example is POST requests without application-layer
      transaction protection (e.g., a unique identifier in the request
      header).

      On the other hand, TFO is particularly useful for GET requests.
      GET request replay could happen across striped TCP connections:
      after a server receives an HTTP request but before the ACKs of the
      requests reach the browser, the browser may time out and retry the
      same request on another (possibly new) TCP connection.  This
      differs from a TFO replay only in that the replay is initiated by
      the browser, not by the TCP stack.

   The same specification addresses HTTP over TLS in Section 6.3.2:

      For Transport Layer Security (TLS) over TCP, it is safe and useful
      to include a TLS client_hello in the SYN packet to save one RTT in
      the TLS handshake.  There is no concern about violating
      idempotency.  In particular, it can be used alone with the
      speculative connection above.

2.3.2.  TLS 1.3

   [I-D.ietf-tls-tls13], Section 2.3 explains the properties of Zero-RTT
   Data in TLS 1.3:

      IMPORTANT NOTE: The security properties for 0-RTT data (regardless
      of the cipher suite) are weaker than those for other kinds of TLS
      data.  Specifically:






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      1.  This data is not forward secret, because it is encrypted
          solely with the PSK.

      2.  There are no guarantees of non-replay between connections.
          Unless the server takes special measures outside those
          provided by TLS, the server has no guarantee that the same
          0-RTT data was not transmitted on multiple 0-RTT connections
          (See Section 4.2.6.2 for more details).  This is especially
          relevant if the data is authenticated either with TLS client
          authentication or inside the application layer protocol.
          However, 0-RTT data cannot be duplicated within a connection
          (i.e., the server will not process the same data twice for the
          same connection) and an attacker will not be able to make
          0-RTT data appear to be 1-RTT data (because it is protected
          with different keys.)

   Section 4.2.6 defines a mechanism to limit the exposure to replay.

2.3.3.  QUIC

   The QUIC specifications don't say anything about the replay risk of
   0RTT.

3.  Discussion

3.1.  Automatic Retries In Practice

   In practice, it has been observed (see Appendix A) that some client
   (both user agent and intermediary) implementations do automatically
   retry requests.  However, they do not do so consistently, and
   arguably not in the spirit of the specification, unless this vague
   catch-all:

      some means to detect that the original request was never applied

   is interpreted very broadly.

   On the server side, it has been widely observed that content on the
   Web doesn't always honour HTTP idemotency semantics, with many GET
   requests incurring side effects, and with some sites even requiring
   browsers to retry POST requests in order to properly interoperate.
   (TODO: refs / details from Patrick and Artur).

   Despite this situation, the Web seems to work reasonably well to date
   (with notable exceptions [5]).

   The status quo, therefore, is that no Web application can read HTTP's
   retry requirements as a guarantee that any given request won't be



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   retried, even for methods that are not idempotent.  As a result,
   applications that care about avoiding duplicate requests need to
   build a way to detect not only user retries but also automatic
   retries into the application "above" HTTP itself.

3.2.  Replays Are Different

   TCP Fast Open [RFC7413], TLS/1.3 [I-D.ietf-tls-tls13] and QUIC
   [I-D.hamilton-early-deployment-quic] all have mechanisms to carry
   application data on the first packet sent by a client, to avoid the
   latency of connection setup.

   The request(s) in this first packet might be _replayed_, either
   because the first packet is lost and retransmitted by the transport
   protocol in use, or because an attacker observes the packet and sends
   a duplicate at some point in the future.

   At first glance, it seems as if the idempotency semantics of HTTP
   request methods could be used to determine what requests are suitable
   for inclusion in the first packet of various 0RT mechanisms being
   discussed (as suggested by TCP Fast Open).  For example, we could
   disallow POST (and other non-idempotent methods) in 0RT data.

   Upon reflection, though, the observations above lead us to believe
   that since any request might be retried (automatically or by users),
   applications will need to have a means of detecting duplicate
   requests, thereby preventing side effects from replays as well as
   retries.  Thus, any HTTP request can be included in the first packet
   of a 0RT, despite the risk of replay.

   Two types of attack specific to replayed HTTP requests need to be
   taken into account, however:

   1.  A replay is a potential Denial of Service vector.  An attacker
       that can replay a request many times can probe for weaknesses in
       retry protections, and can bring a server that needs to do any
       substantial processing down.

   2.  An attacker might use a replayed request to leak information
       about the response over time.  If they can observe the encrypted
       payload on the wire, they can infer the size of the response
       (e.g., it might get bigger if the user's bank account has more in
       it).

   The first attack cannot be mitigated by HTTP; the 0RT mechanism
   itself needs some transport-layer means of scoping the usability of
   the first packet on a connection so that it cannot be reused broadly.
   For example, this might be by time, network location.



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   The second attack is more difficult to mitigate; scoping the
   usability of the first packet helps, but does not completely prevent
   the attack.  If the replayed request is state-changing, the
   application's retry detection should kick in and prevent information
   leakage (since the response will likely contain an error, instead of
   the desired information).

   If it is not (e.g., a GET), the information being targeted is
   vulnerable as long as both the first packet and the credentials in
   the request (if any) are valid.

4.  Possible Areas of Work

4.1.  Updating HTTP's Requirements for Retries

   The currently language in [RFC7230] about retries is vague about the
   conditions under which a request can be retried, leading to
   significant variance in implementation behaviour.  For example, it's
   been observed that many automated clients fail under circumstances
   when browsers succeed, because they do not retry in the same way.

   As a result, more carefully specifying the conditions under which a
   request can be retried would be helpful.  Such work would need to
   take into account varying conditions, such as:

   o  Connection closes

   o  TCP RST

   o  Connection timeouts

   o  Whether or not any part of the response has been received

   o  Whether or not it is the first request on the connection

   o  Variance due to use of HTTP/2, TLS/1.3 and TCP Fast Open.

   Furthermore, readers might mistake the language in RFC7230 as
   guaranteeing that some requests (e.g., POST) are never automatically
   retried; this should be clarified.

4.2.  Protocol Extensions

   A number of mechanisms have been mooted at various times, e.g.:

   o  Adding a header to automatically retried requests, to aid de-
      duplication by servers




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   o  Defining a request header to by added by intermediaries when they
      have received a request in a way that could have been replayed

   o  Defining a status code to allow servers to indicate that the
      request needs to be sent in a way that can't be replayed

4.3.  Feedback to Transport 0RT Efforts

   If the observations above hold, we should disabuse any notion that
   HTTP method idempotency is a useful way to avoid problems with replay
   attacks.  Instead, we should encourage development of mechanisms to
   mitigate the aspects of replay that are different than retries (e.g.,
   potential for DOS attacks).

5.  Security Considerations

   Yep.

6.  Acknowledgements

   Thanks to Brad Fitzpatrick, Leif Hedstrom, Subodh Iyengar, Amos
   Jeffries, Patrick McManus, Matt Menke, Miroslav Ponec and Martin
   Thomson for their input and feedback.

   Thanks also to the participants in the 2016 HTTP Workshop for their
   lively discussion of this topic.

7.  References

7.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC7230]  Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
              Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Message Syntax and Routing",
              RFC 7230, DOI 10.17487/RFC7230, June 2014,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7230>.

   [RFC7231]  Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
              Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Semantics and Content", RFC 7231,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7231, June 2014,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7231>.






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   [RFC7413]  Cheng, Y., Chu, J., Radhakrishnan, S., and A. Jain, "TCP
              Fast Open", RFC 7413, DOI 10.17487/RFC7413, December 2014,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7413>.

7.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.hamilton-early-deployment-quic]
              Hamilton, R., Iyengar, J., Swett, I., and A. Wilk, "QUIC:
              A UDP-Based Secure and Reliable Transport for HTTP/2",
              draft-hamilton-early-deployment-quic-00 (work in
              progress), July 2016.

   [I-D.ietf-tls-tls13]
              Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
              Version 1.3", draft-ietf-tls-tls13-14 (work in progress),
              July 2016.

   [RFC7540]  Belshe, M., Peon, R., and M. Thomson, Ed., "Hypertext
              Transfer Protocol Version 2 (HTTP/2)", RFC 7540,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7540, May 2015,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7540>.

7.3.  URIs

   [1] https://www.iana.org/assignments/http-methods/http-methods.xhtml

   [2] https://signalvnoise.com/archives2/google_web_accelerator_hey_not
       _so_fast_an_alert_for_web_app_designers.php

   [3] http://bazaar.launchpad.net/~squid/squid/trunk/view/head:/src/
       FwdState.cc#L594

   [4] https://git-wip-
       us.apache.org/repos/asf?p=trafficserver.git;a=blob;f=proxy/http/H
       ttpTransact.cc;h=8a1f5364d47654b118296a07a2a95284f119d84b;hb=HEAD
       #l6408

   [5] https://git-wip-
       us.apache.org/repos/asf?p=trafficserver.git;a=blob;f=proxy/http/
       HttpTransact.cc;hb=48d7b25ba8a8229b0471d37cdaa6ef24cc634bb0#l3634

   [6] http://mxr.mozilla.org/mozilla-
       release/source/netwerk/protocol/http/nsHttpTransaction.cpp#938

   [7] http://mxr.mozilla.org/mozilla-
       release/source/netwerk/protocol/http/nsHttpRequestHead.cpp#67





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   [8] https://www.fxsitecompat.com/en-CA/docs/2016/post-request-fails-
       on-certain-sites-showing-connection-reset-page/

   [9] https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src.git/+/master/net/
       http/http_network_transaction.cc#1657

Appendix A.  When Clients Retry

   In implementations, clients have been observed to retry requests in a
   number of circumstances.

   _Note: This section is intended to inform the discussion, not to be
   published as a standard.  If you have relevant information about
   these or other implementations (open or closed), please get in
   touch._

A.1.  Squid

   Squid is a caching proxy server that retries requests that it
   considers safe *or* idempotent, as long as there is not a request
   body:

/// Whether we may try sending this request again after a failure.
bool
FwdState::checkRetriable()
{
    // Optimize: A compliant proxy may retry PUTs, but Squid lacks the [rather
    // complicated] code required to protect the PUT request body from being
    // nibbled during the first try. Thus, Squid cannot retry some PUTs today.
    if (request->body_pipe != NULL)
        return false;

    // RFC2616 9.1 Safe and Idempotent Methods
    return (request->method.isHttpSafe() || request->method.isIdempotent());
}

   (source [6])

   Currently, it considers GET, HEAD, OPTIONS, REPORT, PROPFIND, SEARCH
   and PRI to be safe, and GET, HEAD, PUT, DELETE, OPTIONS, TRACE,
   PROPFIND, PROPPATCH, MKCOL, COPY, MOVE, UNLOCK, and PRI to be
   idempotent.

A.2.  Traffic Server

   Apache Traffic Server, a caching proxy server, ties retry-ability to
   whether the request required a "tunnel" - i.e., forward to the next




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   server.  This is indicated by "request_body_start", which is set when
   a POST tunnel is used.

// bool HttpTransact::is_request_retryable
//
//   If we started a POST/PUT tunnel then we can
//    not retry failed requests
//
bool
HttpTransact::is_request_retryable(State *s)
{
  if (s->hdr_info.request_body_start == true) {
    return false;
  }

  if (s->state_machine->plugin_tunnel_type != HTTP_NO_PLUGIN_TUNNEL) {
    // API can override
    if (s->state_machine->plugin_tunnel_type == HTTP_PLUGIN_AS_SERVER &&
        s->api_info.retry_intercept_failures == true) {
      // This used to be an == comparison, which made no sense. Changed
      // to be an assignment, hoping the state is correct.
      s->state_machine->plugin_tunnel_type = HTTP_NO_PLUGIN_TUNNEL;
    } else {
      return false;
    }
  }

  return true;
}

   (source [7])

   When connected to an origin server, Traffic Server attempts to retry
   under a number of failure conditions:

/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
// Name       : handle_response_from_server
// Description: response is from the origin server
//
// Details    :
//
//   response from the origin server. one of three things can happen now.
//   if the response is bad, then we can either retry (by first downgrading
//   the request, maybe making it non-keepalive, etc.), or we can give up.
//   the latter case is handled by handle_server_connection_not_open and
//   sends an error response back to the client. if the response is good
//   handle_forward_server_connection_open is called.
//



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//
// Possible Next States From Here:
//
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
void
HttpTransact::handle_response_from_server(State *s)
{

[...]

  switch (s->current.state) {
  case CONNECTION_ALIVE:
    DebugTxn("http_trans", "[hrfs] connection alive");
    SET_VIA_STRING(VIA_DETAIL_SERVER_CONNECT, VIA_DETAIL_SERVER_SUCCESS);
    s->current.server->clear_connect_fail();
    handle_forward_server_connection_open(s);
    break;

[...]

  case OPEN_RAW_ERROR:
  /* fall through */
  case CONNECTION_ERROR:
  /* fall through */
  case STATE_UNDEFINED:
  /* fall through */
  case INACTIVE_TIMEOUT:
    // Set to generic I/O error if not already set specifically.
    if (!s->current.server->had_connect_fail())
      s->current.server->set_connect_fail(EIO);

    if (is_server_negative_cached(s)) {
      max_connect_retries = s->txn_conf->connect_attempts_max_retries_dead_server;
    } else {
      // server not yet negative cached - use default number of retries
      max_connect_retries = s->txn_conf->connect_attempts_max_retries;
    }
    if (s->pCongestionEntry != NULL)
      max_connect_retries = s->pCongestionEntry->connect_retries();

    if (is_request_retryable(s) && s->current.attempts < max_connect_retries) {

   (source [8])








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A.3.  Firefox

   Firefox is a Web browser that retries under the following conditions:

// if the connection was reset or closed before we wrote any part of the
// request or if we wrote the request but didn't receive any part of the
// response and the connection was being reused, then we can (and really
// should) assume that we wrote to a stale connection and we must therefore
// repeat the request over a new connection.
//
// We have decided to retry not only in case of the reused connections, but
// all safe methods(bug 1236277).
//
// NOTE: the conditions under which we will automatically retry the HTTP
// request have to be carefully selected to avoid duplication of the
// request from the point-of-view of the server.  such duplication could
// have dire consequences including repeated purchases, etc.
//
// NOTE: because of the way SSL proxy CONNECT is implemented, it is
// possible that the transaction may have received data without having
// sent any data.  for this reason, mSendData == FALSE does not imply
// mReceivedData == FALSE.  (see bug 203057 for more info.)
//

[...]

   if (!mReceivedData &&
       ((mRequestHead && mRequestHead->IsSafeMethod()) ||
        !reallySentData || connReused)) {
       // if restarting fails, then we must proceed to close the pipe,
       // which will notify the channel that the transaction failed.

   (source [9])

   ... and it considers GET, HEAD, OPTIONS, TRACE, PROPFIND, REPORT, and
   SEARCH to be safe:















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 bool
 nsHttpRequestHead::IsSafeMethod() const
 {
   // This code will need to be extended for new safe methods, otherwise
   // they'll default to "not safe".
     if (IsGet() || IsHead() || IsOptions() || IsTrace()) {
         return true;
     }

     if (mParsedMethod != kMethod_Custom) {
         return false;
     }

     return (!strcmp(mMethod.get(), "PROPFIND") ||
             !strcmp(mMethod.get(), "REPORT") ||
             !strcmp(mMethod.get(), "SEARCH"));
 }

   (source [10])

   Note that "connReused" is tested; if a connection has been used
   before, Firefox will retry _any_ request, safe or not.  A recent
   change attempted to remove this behaviour, but it caused
   compatibility problems [11], and is being backed out.

A.4.  Chromium

   Chromium is a Web browser that appears to retry any request when a
   connection is broken, as long as it's successfully used the
   connection before, and hasn't received any response headers yet:

bool HttpNetworkTransaction::ShouldResendRequest() const {
  bool connection_is_proven = stream_->IsConnectionReused();
  bool has_received_headers = GetResponseHeaders() != NULL;

  // NOTE: we resend a request only if we reused a keep-alive connection.
  // This automatically prevents an infinite resend loop because we'll run
  // out of the cached keep-alive connections eventually.
  if (connection_is_proven && !has_received_headers)
    return true;
  return false;
}

   (source [12])







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Author's Address

   Mark Nottingham

   Email: mnot@mnot.net
   URI:   https://www.mnot.net/













































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