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MPTCP                                                     C. Paasch, Ed.
Internet-Draft                                            O. Bonaventure
Intended status: Informational                                 UCLouvain
Expires: April 18, 2013                                 October 15, 2012


        Securing the MultiPath TCP handshake with external keys
                       draft-paasch-mptcp-ssl-00

Abstract

   Multipath TCP currently relies on the exchange of keys in clear
   during the initial handshake to authenticate the establishment of
   additional subflows.  This document proposes a variant of the
   Multipath TCP handshake that allows Multipath TCP to reuse keys
   negotiated by the Application layer protocol above it such as SSL/TLS
   to authenticate the establishment of additional subflows.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 18, 2013.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as



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   described in the Simplified BSD License.


Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
   2.  Connection initiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
   3.  Multipath TCP API . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
   4.  Starting a new subflow  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
   5.  Deployment  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
   7.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7






































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1.  Introduction

   Multipath TCP is an extension to TCP that enables hosts to use
   multiple paths to exchange data for a single connection.
   [I-D.ietf-mptcp-multiaddressed] describes the current design of the
   Multipath TCP protocol.  The design of Multipath TCP has been
   influenced by various factors including the backward compatibility
   with regular TCP, the fallback to TCP when middleboxes interfere with
   the Multipath TCP options, ...  The design of Multipath TCP has also
   been affected by security requirements.  The security threats against
   Multipath TCP are documented in [RFC6181].  Multipath TCP aims at
   being no worse than TCP from a security viewpoint.  Other approaches
   such as [I-D.bittau-tcp-crypt] or [RFC5925] have been proposed to
   reduce the vulnerability of TCP to attacks.  Multipath TCP currently
   addresses the security threats identified in [RFC6181] by exchanging
   keys during the handshake for the initial subflow.  These keys are
   then used to generate HMACs to authenticate the establishment of
   subsequent TCP subflows.  Exchanging keys in clear during the initial
   handshake has obvious shortcomings from a security viewpoint.
   However, some application-layer protocols like SSL/TLS or ssh already
   negotiate a shared key between the end-points.  In this document we
   propose a modification to the handshake used by Multipath TCP for the
   initial and subsequent subflows that enables Multipath TCP to rely on
   an application-supplied key to authenticate the establishment of the
   subflows.


2.  Connection initiation

   The handshake of the initial subflow is a small variation to the
   handshake of [I-D.ietf-mptcp-multiaddressed] or
   draft-paasch-mptcp-lowoverhead-00.  The header of the MP_CAPABLE
   option of these two MPTCP-versions has the format as shown in the
   below figure.

                         1                   2                   3
     0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
     +---------------+---------------+-------+-------+---------------+
     |     Kind      |    Length     |Subtype|Version|A|B|C|D|E|F|G|H|
     +---------------+---------------+-------+-------+---------------+

                      Header of the MP_CAPABLE option

                                 Figure 1

   We propose to use the B bit in this option to indicate whether the
   host that sent the MP_CAPABLE option will use an application supplied
   key to authenticate the additional subflows or not.  When the B bit



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   is set, it indicates that the authentication key is supplied by the
   application.  If the B bit has not been set in both directions, the
   authentication mechanism is used as defined by the MPTCP version
   ([I-D.ietf-mptcp-multiaddressed] or
   draft-paasch-mptcp-lowoverhead-00).

   In MPTCP version 0, even if the B bit is set the end-hosts still have
   to generate a key that fulfills the requirements as defined in MPTCP
   version 0.  This is necessary to handle the case where the client
   supports the B bit, but the server not yet.  For a more in-depth
   analysis of this kind of deployment scenario, have a look at
   Section 5.

   By using the same handshake as draft-paasch-mptcp-lowoverhead-00, the
   proposed handshake can also benefit from the lower overhead for
   generating the token and thus the faster establishment of the initial
   subflow.


3.  Multipath TCP API

   The proposed mechanism requires an interaction between the
   application and the MPTCP layer.  This can be achieved by the means
   of socket options.  Two socket options are necessary:

   o  MPTCP_ENABLE_APP_KEY : This socket option tells the socket layer
      that an application supplied key will be used to secure the
      establishement of additional subflows.  This socket option MUST be
      used before establishing the initial subflow, or before starting
      to listen on a socket to accept new connections.  When this socket
      option is used, the MP_CAPABLE option is sent with the "B"-bit set
      to 1.

   o  MPTCP_KEY : This socket option allows the application to provide a
      key to the MPTCP layer.  Both end-points MUST use this socket
      option in order to allow the MPTCP-layer to create new subflows.
      It is up to the application to negotiate the key between the end-
      points.  E.g., in the case of SSL/TLS, the key can be a hash of
      the shared secret that has been negotiated with the SSL exchange.
      Separate documents will describe in details how applications such
      as TLS or SSH can pass a shared secret to Multipath TCP by using
      this option.


4.  Starting a new subflow

   The handshake for the establishment of a new subflow is similar to
   the one specified in [I-D.ietf-mptcp-multiaddressed].  There are two



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   important differences.  First, the HMAC is computed by using the keys
   provided by the application.  Second, the token and the client's
   random number are included inside the third ack to allow stateless
   operation of the passive opener of an additional subflow.

              Host A                                  Host B
             ----------                             ----------
             Address A2                             Address B2
             ----------                             ----------
                 |                                      |
                 |   SYN + MP_JOIN(Token-B, R-A)        |
                 |------------------------------------->|
                 |                                      |
                 |   SYN/ACK + MP_JOIN(HMAC-B, R-B)     |
                 |<-------------------------------------|
                 |                                      |
                 |  ACK + MP_JOIN(Token-B, R-A, HMAC-A) |
                 |------------------------------------->|

             HMAC-A = HMAC(Key, Msg=(R-A+R-B))
             HMAC-B = HMAC(Key, Msg=(R-B+R-A))

                        Handshake of a new subflow.

                                 Figure 2

   In order to allow the Token-B and R-A inside the third ack, the
   HMAC-A must also be a truncated version of the 160-bit HMAC-SHA1.
   Thus, HMAC-A is the truncated (leftmost 128 bits) of the HMAC as
   shown in Figure 2.

   The message-format of the MP_JOIN-option in the SYN and the SYN/ACK
   is the same as in [I-D.ietf-mptcp-multiaddressed].  As the third ACK
   includes the Token and the random nonce, the MP_JOIN message format
   of the third ack is as show in Figure 3.  The length of the MP_JOIN-
   option in the third ACK is 28 bytes.  There remains thus enough space
   to insert the timestamp option in the third ACK.














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                         1                   2                   3
     0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
     +---------------+---------------+-------+-------+---------------+
     |     Kind      |     Length    |Subtype|     |B|   Address ID  |
     +---------------+---------------+-------+-------+---------------+
     |                                                               |
     |                Sender's Truncated HMAC (128 bits)             |
     |                                                               |
     +---------------------------------------------------------------+
     |                Sender's Random Number (32 bits)               |
     +---------------------------------------------------------------+
     |                     Receiver's Token (32 bits)                |
     +---------------------------------------------------------------+

                       Format of the MP_JOIN-option

                                 Figure 3

   The semantics of the backup-bit "B" and the Address ID are the same
   as in [I-D.ietf-mptcp-multiaddressed].


5.  Deployment

   This proposed mechanism assumes that the application uses new socket-
   options to provide the key to the MPTCP-layer.  Thus, the first
   requirement for deploying this MPTCP handshake is that the TLS/
   SSL-layer has been modified.  There may of course be scenarios, where
   the client is supporting the proposed solution, but the server not.
   Thus, the client sends out the MP_CAPABLE with the B bit set, but the
   server replies without enabling the B bit.  Upon reception of the
   SYN/ACK, it is up to the client's policy how to react.  It can either
   continue with the negotiated version of MPTCP but without using the
   key from the application or fallback to regular TCP.

   The applications will have to pass the shared key to the MPTCP-layer
   by the means of a socket-option.  It may be that the client's
   application has already done the call to the socket-option but the
   server's application not yet.  The server will receive a SYN with the
   MP_JOIN-option, without knowing the key.  In that case the server
   should silently drop the SYN.  The TCP retransmission mechanism on
   the client-side will retransmit the SYN after the initial RTO expired
   (after 1 second).  And the server's application potentially will have
   finally set the key via the socket-option.







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6.  Security Considerations

   It is recommended that the applications do not pass the plain shared
   key to the MPTCP layer.  They should rather pass a hash of their
   shared secret to the MPTCP layer.  These security considerations will
   be discussed in documents that describe how applications such as TLS/
   SSL or SSH can interact efficiently with Multipath TCP.


7.  Informative References

   [I-D.bittau-tcp-crypt]
              Bittau, A., Boneh, D., Hamburg, M., Handley, M., Mazieres,
              D., and Q. Slack, "Cryptographic protection of TCP Streams
              (tcpcrypt)", draft-bittau-tcp-crypt-03 (work in progress),
              September 2012.

   [I-D.ietf-mptcp-api]
              Scharf, M. and A. Ford, "MPTCP Application Interface
              Considerations", draft-ietf-mptcp-api-05 (work in
              progress), April 2012.

   [I-D.ietf-mptcp-multiaddressed]
              Ford, A., Raiciu, C., Handley, M., and O. Bonaventure,
              "TCP Extensions for Multipath Operation with Multiple
              Addresses", draft-ietf-mptcp-multiaddressed-10 (work in
              progress), October 2012.

   [RFC5925]  Touch, J., Mankin, A., and R. Bonica, "The TCP
              Authentication Option", RFC 5925, June 2010.

   [RFC6181]  Bagnulo, M., "Threat Analysis for TCP Extensions for
              Multipath Operation with Multiple Addresses", RFC 6181,
              March 2011.


Authors' Addresses

   Christoph Paasch (editor)
   UCLouvain
   Place Sainte Barbe, 2
   Louvain-la-Neuve,   1348
   BE

   Email: christoph.paasch@uclouvain.be






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   Olivier Bonaventure
   UCLouvain
   Place Sainte Barbe, 2
   Louvain-la-Neuve,   1348
   BE

   Email: olivier.bonaventure@uclouvain.be












































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