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Versions: 00 01 02

MPTCP Working Group                                            C. Paasch
Internet-Draft                                                 A. Biswas
Intended status: Experimental                                    D. Haas
Expires: April 16, 2016                                      Apple, Inc.
                                                        October 14, 2015


          Making Multipath TCP robust for stateless webservers
                    draft-paasch-mptcp-syncookies-02

Abstract

   This document proposes a modification of the MPTCP handshake that
   allows it to work efficiently with stateless servers.  We first
   identify the issues around stateless connection establishment using
   SYN-cookies.  Further, we suggest an extension to Multipath TCP to
   overcome these issues and discuss alternatives.

   As a side-effect, the proposed modification to the handshake opens
   the door to reduce the size of the MP_CAPABLE option in the SYN.
   This reduces the growing pressure on the TCP-option space in the SYN-
   segment, giving space for future extensions to TCP.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 16, 2016.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of



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   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Problem statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Proposal  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.1.  Loss of the third ACK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
       3.1.1.  MP_CAPABLE_ACK specification  . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       3.1.2.  TCP Fast Open . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       3.1.3.  Negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       3.1.4.  DATA_FIN  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       3.1.5.  Server sending data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       3.1.6.  Middlebox considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     3.2.  Loss of the first data segment  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   4.  Alternative solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   5.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   7.  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   8.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     8.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     8.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13

1.  Introduction

   During the establishment of a TCP connection, a server must create
   state upon the reception of the SYN [RFC0793].  Specifically, it
   needs to generate an initial sequence number, and reply to the
   options indicated in the SYN.  The server typically maintains in-
   memory state for the embryonic connection, including state about what
   options were negotiated, such as window scale factor [RFC7323] and
   the maximum segment size.  It also maintains state about whether SACK
   [RFC2018] and TCP Timestamps were negotiated during the 3-way
   handshake.

   Attackers exploit this state creation on the server through the SYN-
   flooding attack.  Indeed, an attacker only needs to emit SYN segments
   with different 4-tuples (source and destination IP addresses and port
   numbers) in order to make the server create the state and thus
   consume its memory, while the attacker itself does not need to
   maintain any state for such an attack [RFC4987].




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   A common mitigation of this attack is to use a mechanism called SYN-
   cookies.  SYN-cookies rely on the fact that a TCP-connection echoes
   back certain information that the server puts in the SYN/ACK during
   the three-way handshake.  Notably, the sequence-number is echoed back
   in the acknowledgment field as well as the TCP timestamp value inside
   the timestamp option.  When generating the SYN/ACK, the server
   generates these fields in a verifiable fashion.  Typically, servers
   use the 4-tuple, the client's sequence number plus a local secret
   (which changes over time) to generate the initial sequence number by
   applying a hashing function to the aforementioned fields.  Further,
   setting certain bits either in the sequence number or the TCP
   timestamp value allows to encode for example whether SACK has been
   negotiated and what window-scaling has been received [M08].  Upon the
   reception of the third ACK, the server can thus verify whether the
   acknowledgment number is indeed the reply to a SYN/ACK it has
   generated (using the 4-tuple and the local secret).  Further, it can
   decode from the timestamp echo reply the required information
   concerning SACK, window scaling and MSS-size.

   In case the third ACK is lost during the 3-way handshake of TCP,
   stateless servers only work if it's the client who initiates the
   communication by sending data to the server - which is commonly the
   case in today's application-layer protocols.  As the data segment
   includes the acknowledgement number for the original SYN/ACK as well
   as the TCP timestamp value, the server is able to reconstruct the
   connection state even if the third ACK is lost in the network.  If
   the very first data segment is also lost, then the server is unable
   to reconstruct the connection state and will respond to subsequent
   data sent by the client with a TCP Reset.

   Multipath TCP (MPTCP [RFC6824]) is unable to reconstruct the MPTCP
   level connection state if the third ack is lost in the network (as
   explained in the following section).  If the first data segment from
   the client reaches the server, the server can reconstruct the TCP
   state but not the MPTCP state.  Such a server can fallback to regular
   TCP upon the loss of the third ACK.  MPTCP is also prone to the same
   problem as regular TCP if the first data segment is also lost.

   In the following section a more detailed assessment of the issues
   with MPTCP and TCP SYN-cookies is presented.  Section 3 then shows
   how these issues might get solved.

2.  Problem statement

   Multipath TCP adds additional state to the 3-way handshake.  Notably,
   the keys must be stored in the state so that later on new subflows
   can be established as well as the initial data sequence number is
   known to both hosts.  In order to support stateless servers,



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   Multipath TCP echoes the keys in the third ACK.  A stateless server
   thus can generate its own key in a verifiable fashion (similar to the
   initial sequence number), and is able to learn the client's key
   through the echo in the third ACK.  The generation of the key is
   implementation-specific.  An example of such a key-generation would
   be: Key_Server = Hash(5-tuple, server's subflow sequence number,
   local_secret).  The reliance on the third ACK however implies that if
   this segment gets lost, then the server cannot reconstruct the state
   associated to the MPTCP connection.  Indeed, a Multipath TCP
   connection is forced to fallback to regular TCP in case the third ACK
   gets lost or has been reordered with the first data segment of the
   client, because it cannot infer the client's key from the connection
   and thus won't be able to generate a valid HMAC to establish new
   subflows nor does it know the initial data sequence number.  In the
   remainder of this document we refer to the aforementioned issue as
   "Loss of the third ACK".

   Stateless servers also are unable to recover connection state when
   the third ack and the first data segment are lost.  This issue,
   outlined hereafter, happens even when regular TCP is being used.  In
   case the client is sending multiple segments when initiating the
   connection, it might be that the third ack as well as the first data
   segment get lost.  Thus, the server only receives the second data
   segment and will try to reconstruct the state based on this segment's
   4-tuple, sequence number and timestamp value.  However, as this
   segment's sequence number has already gone beyond the client's
   initial sequence number, it will not be able to regenerate the
   appropriate SYN-cookie and thus the verification will fail.  The
   server effectively cannot infer that the sequence number in the
   segment has gone beyond TCP's initial sequence number.  This will
   make the server send a TCP reset as it appears to the server that it
   received a segment for which no SYN cookie was ever generated.

3.  Proposal

   This section shows how the above problems might be solved in
   Multipath TCP.

3.1.  Loss of the third ACK

   In order to make Multipath TCP robust against the loss of the third
   ACK when SYN-cookies are being deployed on servers, we must make sure
   that the state-information relevant to Multipath TCP reaches the
   server in a reliable way.  If the client is initiating the data
   transfer to the server (this data is being delivered reliably through
   TCP) the state-information could be delivered together with this data
   and thus is implicitly reliably sent to the server - when the data
   reaches the server, the state-information reaches the server as well.



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   We achieve this by adding another variant to the MP_CAPABLE option,
   differentiated by the length of it (we call this option
   MP_CAPABLE_ACK in the remainder of this document).  It is solely sent
   on the very first data segment from the client to the server.  This
   option serves the dual purpose of conveying the client's and server's
   key as well as the DSS mapping which would otherwise have been sent
   in a DSS option on the first data segment.

   Making the MP_CAPABLE in the third ACK reliable opens the door for
   another improvement in MPTCP.  In fact, the client doesn't need to
   send its own key in the SYN anymore (it will send it reliably in the
   MP_CAPABLE_ACK).  Thus, the MP_CAPABLE option in the SYN segment can
   avoid adding the key, reducing the option-space requirement of the
   MP_CAPABLE down to 4 bytes.  This is a major improvement as the
   option-space in the SYN segment is very limited, and allows a TCP
   connection to negotiate future extensions in the SYN.

   As this change is a major extension to Multipath TCP, we require that
   the version number of the MP_CAPABLE is increased.  Further details
   on the negotiation are presented in Section 3.1.3.  The following is
   a detailled description of the option format and the suggested
   handshake.

3.1.1.  MP_CAPABLE_ACK specification

   We suggest to remove the key from the MP_CAPABLE in the SYN-segment.
   The format of the MP_CAPABLE remains the same (with the bits A to H
   as well as the version number), with the difference that the key is
   no more present.  Hosts are able to differentiate between the
   different MP_CAPABLE options through the length-field of the TCP-
   option.

   The MP_CAPABLE option in the SYN/ACK as well as the third ACK (which
   does not contain any data) remain unmodified from RFC6824.

   The MP_CAPABLE_ACK option (shown in Figure 1) contains the same set
   of bits A to H as well as the version number, like the MP_CAPABLE
   option.  Further, the option includes the data-level length as well
   as the checksum (in case it has been negotiated during the 3-way
   handshake).  This allows the server to reconstruct the mapping and
   deliver the data to the application.  It must be noted that the
   information inside the MP_CAPABLE_ACK is less explicit than a DSS
   option.  Notably, the data-sequence number, data acknowledgment as
   well as the relative subflow-sequence number are not part of the
   MP_CAPABLE_ACK.  Nevertheless, the server is able to reconstruct the
   mapping because the MP_CAPABLE_ACK is guaranteed to only be sent on
   the very first data segment.  Thus, implicitly the relative subflow-




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   sequence number equals 1 as well as the data-sequence number, which
   is equal to the initial data-sequence number.

                          1                   2                   3
      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
     +---------------+---------------+-------+-----------------------+
     |     Kind      |    Length=24  |Subtype|Version|A|B|C|D|E|F|G|H|
     +---------------+---------------+-------+-----------------------+
     |                  Sender's Key (64 bits)                       |
     |                                                               |
     +---------------+---------------+-------+-----------------------+
     |                 Receiver's Key (64 bits)                      |
     |                                                               |
     +---------------------------------------------------------------+
     | Data-Level Length (2 octets)  | Checksum (2 octets, optional) |
     +---------------------------------------------------------------+

                   Format of the MP_CAPABLE_ACK option.

                                 Figure 1

   The handshake (depicted in Figure 2) starts with the client sending
   the MP_CAPABLE option to the server inside the SYN.  The client is
   not required to having generated its key already at this point.

   Upon reception of this SYN-segment, a stateful server generates a
   random key and replies with a SYN/ACK.  If the server behaves in a
   stateless manner it has to generate it's own key in a verifiable
   fashion.  This verifiable way of generating the key can be done by
   using a hash of the 4-tuple, sequence number and a local secret
   (similar to what is done for the TCP-sequence number [RFC4987]).  It
   will thus be able to verify whether it is indeed the originator of
   the key echoed back in the MP_CAPABLE_ACK option.  When generating
   this verifiable key, the server has to ensure that the token derived
   from this key is locally unique (Section 3.1 of RFC6824).  If there
   is already an MPTCP-session with such a token, the server must
   fallback to regular TCP by not sending an MP_CAPABLE in the third
   ACK.













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      Host A                                         Host B
      ------                                         ------
                     SYN + MP_CAPABLE (4 bytes)
         -------------------------------------------->
                   SYN/ACK + MP_CAPABLE (Key_B, 12 bytes)
         <--------------------------------------------
               ACK + MP_CAPABLE (Key_A, Key_B, 20 bytes)
         -------------------------------------------->

         DATA + MP_CAPABLE_ACK (Key_A, Key_B, Length, Csum, 24 bytes)
         -------------------------------------------->

      The modified MPTCP-handshake only consumes 4 bytes in the SYN.

                                 Figure 2

   To complete the three-way handshake, the client has to reply with a
   third ACK and the MP_CAPABLE option (with both keys as defined in
   RFC6824).  If the client has already data to send, it can even avoid
   sending the third ACK, and immediately send the data together with
   the MP_CAPABLE_ACK.  Otherwise, the client sends the MP_CAPABLE_ACK
   as soon as the application writes data on the socket.

   The goal of the third ACK (with the MP_CAPABLE) as well as the
   MP_CAPABLE_ACK is to convey the client's key to the server.  An
   indication for the client that the server received the key is when
   the server issues a DATA_ACK inside the DSS-option (even if this
   DATA_ACK does not acknowledge any data).  Thus, as long as the client
   has not sent an MP_CAPABLE_ACK with data, it must add the MP_CAPABLE
   option in each (non-data) segment sent to the server.  It must do
   this until it either did send an MP_CAPABLE_ACK or until it received
   a DATA_ACK from the server.  The reason for this is explained in
   Section 3.1.2 and Section 3.1.5.  Combining the MP_CAPABLE with the
   DATA_ACK will require 20 + 8 bytes, which still leaves 12 bytes for
   the TCP timestamp option.

   Finally, the server must send a duplicate acknowledgment to the
   client upon reception of the client's key.  This, to convey to the
   client that it successfully received the MP_CAPABLE(_ACK) option.  It
   must be noted that this 4-way handshake does not prevent the client
   to send data before the reception of this fourth acknowledgment.

   This mechanism of sending the MP_CAPABLE with a DATA_ACK until the
   server acknowledges it, introduces additional complexity to the
   handshake.  However, we consider the gain of reducing the MP_CAPABLE
   option in the SYN-segment as significant enough, that it is worth to
   accept this added complexity.




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3.1.2.  TCP Fast Open

   If TCP Fast Open [RFC7413] is being used in combination with
   Multipath TCP [I-D.barre-mptcp-tfo], the server is allowed to send
   data right after the SYN/ACK, without the need to wait for the third
   ACK.  The server sending this data cannot include a DATA_ACK option
   inside the DSS option as it does not yet know the client's key.  This
   is not an issue as the DATA_ACK is optional in the DSS option.

   However, the client receiving this data sent by the server will have
   to acknowledge it with a DATA_ACK.  As specified above, the client
   must also send an MP_CAPABLE option on this acknowledgment as it
   didn't yet receive a DATA_ACK from the server.

3.1.3.  Negotiation

   We require a way for the hosts to negotiate support for the suggested
   handshake.  As we modify the size of the MP_CAPABLE, our proposal
   relies on a new version of MPTCP.  The client requests this new
   version of MPTCP during the MP_CAPABLE exchange (it remains to be
   defined by the IETF which version of MPTCP includes the
   MP_CAPABLE_ACK option).  If the server supports this version, it
   replies with a SYN/ACK including the MP_CAPABLE and indicating this
   same version.

3.1.4.  DATA_FIN

   As the MP_CAPABLE_ACK option includes the same bitfields as the
   regular MP_CAPABLE, there is no space to indicate a DATA_FIN as is
   done in the DSS option.  This implies that a client cannot send a
   DATA_FIN together with the first segment of data.  Thus, if the
   server requests the usage of MP_CAPABLE_ACK through the C-bit, the
   client must send a separate segment with the DSS-option, setting the
   DATA_FIN-flag to 1, after it has sent the data-segment that includes
   the MP_CAPABLE_ACK option.

3.1.5.  Server sending data

   The MP_CAPABLE_ACK version can only be sent by the client if it
   actually has data to send.  One question that this raises is how the
   proposal will work when the server is the first one to send data to
   the client.  In the following we describe how the handshake will
   still work when servers behave in a stateless and stateful manner.

   For stateless servers the same issue arises as well for regular TCP.
   Upon loss of the third ACK, the server cannot complete the three-way
   handshake.  Thus, stateless servers that begin the application level
   protocol by emitting data rely on the fact that the third ACK is



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   received (irregardless of whether MPTCP is used or not).  Thus, this
   implies that the server also will receive the MP_CAPABLE with this
   third ACK.

   Stateful servers will retransmit the SYN/ACK until the third ACK
   (including the MP_CAPABLE) has been received.  This will thus provide
   to the server the client's key.  When the client eventually sends its
   own first data segment to the server, it actually does not has to use
   the MP_CAPABLE_ACK option because the server already did send a
   DATA_ACK to the client.

3.1.6.  Middlebox considerations

   Multipath TCP has been designed with middleboxes in mind and so the
   MP_CAPABLE_ACK option must also be able to go through middleboxes.
   The following middlebox behaviors have been considered and
   MP_CAPABLE_ACK acts accordingly across these middleboxes:

   o  Removing MP_CAPABLE_ACK-option: If a middlebox strips the
      MP_CAPABLE_ACK option out of the data segment, the server receives
      data without a corresponding mapping.  As defined in Section 3.6
      of [RFC6824], the server must then do a seamless fallback to
      regular TCP.

   o  Coalescing segments: A middlebox might coalesce the first and
      second data segment into one single segment.  While doing so, it
      might remove one of the options (either MP_CAPABLE_ACK or the DSS-
      option of the second segment because of the limited 40 bytes TCP
      option space).  There are two cases to consider:

      *  If the DSS-option is not included in the segment, the second
         half of the payload is not covered by a mapping.  Thus, the
         server will do a seamless fallback to regular TCP as defined by
         [RFC6824] in Section 3.6.  This fallback will trigger because
         RFC6824 specifies that during the beginning of a connection (as
         long as the path has not been proven to let the MPTCP-options
         unmodified in both directions) a seamless fallback to regular
         TCP must be done by stopping to send DATA_ACKs to the client.

      *  If the MP_CAPABLE_ACK option is not present, then the DSS-
         option provides an offset of the TCP sequence number.  As the
         server behaves statelessly it can only assume that the present
         mapping belongs to the first byte of the payload (similar to
         what is explained in detail in Section 3.2).  As this however
         is not true, it will calculate an incorrect initial TCP
         sequence number and thus reply with a TCP-reset as the SYN-
         cookie is invalid.  As such kind of middleboxes are very rare
         we consider this behavior as acceptable.



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   o  Splitting segments: A TCP segmentation offload engine (TSO) might
      split the first segment in smaller segments and copy the
      MP_CAPABLE_ACK option on each of these segments.  Thanks to the
      data-length value included in the MP_CAPABLE_ACK option, the
      server is able to detect this and correctly reconstructs the
      mapping.  In case the first of these splitted segments gets lost,
      the server finds itself in a situation similar to the one
      described in Section 2.  The TCP sequence number doesn't allow
      anymore to verify the SYN-cookie and thus a TCP reset is sent.
      This behavior is the same as for regular TCP.

   o  Payload modifying middlebox: In case the middlebox modifies the
      payload, the DSS-checksum included in the MP_CAPABLE_ACK option
      allows to detect this and will trigger a fallback to regular TCP
      as defined in [RFC6824].

3.2.  Loss of the first data segment

   Section 2 described the issue of losing the first data segment of a
   connection while TCP SYN-cookies are in use.  The following outlines
   how Multipath TCP actually allows to fix this particular issue.

   Consider the packet-flow of Figure 3.  Upon reception of the second
   data segment, the included data sequence mapping allows the server to
   actually detect that this is not the first segment of a TCP
   connection.  Indeed, the relative subflow sequence number inside the
   DSS-mapping is actually 100, indicating that this segment is already
   further ahead in the TCP stream.  This allows the server to actually
   reconstruct the initial sequence number based on the sequence number
   in the TCP-header ((X+100) - 100) that has been provided by the
   client and verify whether its SYN-cookie is correct.  Thus, no TCP-
   reset is being sent - in contrast to regular TCP, where the server
   cannot verify the SYN-cookie.  The server knows that the received
   segment is not the first one of the data stream and thus it can store
   it temporarily in the out-of-order queue of the connection.  It must
   be noted that the server is not yet able to fully reconstruct the
   MPTCP state.  In order to do this it still must await the
   MP_CAPABLE_ACK option that is provided in the first data segment.

   The server responds to the out-of-order data with a duplicate ACK.
   The duplicate ACK may also have SACK data if SACK was negotiated.
   However, if this duplicate ACK does not have an MPTCP level Data ACK,
   the client may interpret this as a fallback to TCP.  This is because
   the client cannot determine if an option stripping middlebox removed
   the MPTCP option on TCP segments after connection establishment.  So
   even though the server has not fully recreated the MPTCP state at
   this point, it should respond with a Data ACK set to the Data
   Sequence Number Y-100.  The client's TCP implementation may



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   retransmit the first data segment after a TCP retransmit timeout or
   it may do so as part of an Early Retransmit that can be triggered by
   an ACK arriving from the server.

          Host A                                         Host B
          ------                                         ------
                         SYN + MP_CAPABLE
             -------------------------------------------->
                       SYN/ACK + MP_CAPABLE
             <--------------------------------------------
                   ACK + MP_CAPABLE
             -----------------------------------X

             DATA (TCP-seq = X) + MP_CAPABLE_ACK
             -----------------------------------X
             DATA (TCP-seq = X+100) + DSS (DSN = Y, subseq = 100)
             --------------------------------------------->

                   DATA_ACK (Y - 100)
             <---------------------------------------------

     Multipath TCP's DSS option allows to handle the loss of the first
      data segment as the host can infer the initial sequence number.

                                 Figure 3

4.  Alternative solutions

   An alternative solution to creating the MP_CAPABLE_ACK option would
   have been to emit the MP_CAPABLE-option together with the DSS-option
   on the first data segment.  However, as the MP_CAPABLE option is 20
   bytes long and the DSS-option (using 4-byte sequence numbers)
   consumes 16 bytes, a total of 36 bytes of the TCP option space would
   be consumed by this approach.  This option has been dismissed as it
   would prevent any other TCP option in the first data segment, a
   constraint that would severely limit TCP's extensibility in the
   future.

5.  IANA Considerations

   Our proposal requires the change of the MPTCP-version number.

6.  Security Considerations

   Sending the keys in a reliable way after the three-way handshake
   implies that there is a larger window during which an on-path
   attacker might modify the keys that are being sent in the
   MP_CAPABLE_ACK.  However, we do not think that this can actually be



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   considered as a security issue.  If an attacker modifies the keys,
   the outcome will be that the client and the server won't agree
   anymore on the data-sequence numbers.  The data-flow will thus stall.
   Considering that the attacker has to be an active on-path attacker to
   launch this attack, he has already other means of interfering with
   the connection.  Thus, this attack is considered as irrelevant.

   Further, if servers implement the proposal from Section 3.2, to
   handle the scenario where the first data-segment is lost, the
   incoming segments need to be stored in the out-of-order queue.  The
   server will store these segments without having verified the key that
   the client provides in the MP_CAPABLE option.  This might be
   considered as a security risk where an attacker could consume buffer
   space in the server.  It must be noted however that in order to
   achieve this, the attacker needs to correctly guess the SYN-cookie so
   that the verification described in Section 3.2 is successful.  As
   MPTCP does not try to be more secure than regular TCP, this thread
   can be considered acceptable, as it uses the same level of security
   as regular TCP's SYN-cookies.  Nevertheless, servers are free to
   avoid storing those segments in the out-of-order queue if the thread
   is considered important enough.

7.  Acknowledgments

   We would like to thank Olivier Bonaventure, Yoshifumi Nishida and
   Alan Ford for their comments and suggestions on this draft.

8.  References

8.1.  Normative References

   [RFC4987]  Eddy, W., "TCP SYN Flooding Attacks and Common
              Mitigations", RFC 4987, August 2007.

   [RFC6824]  Ford, A., Raiciu, C., Handley, M., and O. Bonaventure,
              "TCP Extensions for Multipath Operation with Multiple
              Addresses", RFC 6824, January 2013.

8.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.barre-mptcp-tfo]
              Barre, S., Detal, G., and O. Bonaventure, "TFO support for
              Multipath TCP", draft-barre-mptcp-tfo-01 (work in
              progress), January 2015.

   [M08]      McManus, P., "Improving syncookies", 2008,
              <http://lwn.net/Articles/277146/>.




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Internet-Draft          Multipath TCP deployment            October 2015


   [RFC0793]  Postel, J., "Transmission Control Protocol", STD 7, RFC
              793, September 1981.

   [RFC2018]  Mathis, M., Mahdavi, J., Floyd, S., and A. Romanow, "TCP
              Selective Acknowledgment Options", RFC 2018, October 1996.

   [RFC7323]  Borman, D., Braden, B., Jacobson, V., and R.
              Scheffenegger, "TCP Extensions for High Performance", RFC
              7323, September 2014.

   [RFC7413]  Cheng, Y., Chu, J., Radhakrishnan, S., and A. Jain, "TCP
              Fast Open", RFC 7413, December 2014.

Authors' Addresses

   Christoph Paasch
   Apple, Inc.
   Cupertino
   US

   Email: cpaasch@apple.com


   Anumita Biswas
   Apple, Inc.
   Cupertino
   US

   Email: anumita_biswas@apple.com


   Darren Haas
   Apple, Inc.
   Cupertino
   US

   Email: dhaas@apple.com














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