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Versions: 00 01

Network Working Group                                          L. Pardue
Internet-Draft                                               R. Bradbury
Intended status: Informational                BBC Research & Development
Expires: February 12, 2018                               August 11, 2017


         Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) over multicast QUIC
                    draft-pardue-quic-http-mcast-01

Abstract

   This document specifies a profile of the QUIC protocol and the HTTP/
   QUIC mapping that facilitates the transfer of HTTP resources over
   multicast IP using the QUIC transport as its framing and
   packetisation layer.  Compatibility with the QUIC protocol's syntax
   and semantics is maintained as far as practical and additional
   features are specified where this is not possible.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on February 12, 2018.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of




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   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     1.1.  Notational Conventions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     1.2.  Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   2.  Multicast QUIC Sessions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     2.1.  Session States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       2.1.1.  Session Establishment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       2.1.2.  Session Termination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       2.1.3.  Session Migration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     2.2.  Session Parameters  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     2.3.  Session Identification  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     2.4.  Session Security  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   3.  Session Advertisement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     3.1.  Version Advertisement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     3.2.  Security Context  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     3.3.  Session Identification  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     3.4.  Session Idle Timeout  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     3.5.  Session Peak Flow Rate  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     3.6.  Resource Concurrency  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     3.7.  Additional TransportParameter Considerations  . . . . . .  14
     3.8.  Digest Algorithm  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     3.9.  Signature Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   4.  QUIC Profile  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     4.1.  Packet Size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     4.2.  Version Negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     4.3.  Connection Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     4.4.  Stream Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     4.5.  Flow Control  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     4.6.  Stream Termination  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     4.7.  Session Shutdown  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     4.8.  Session Keep-alive  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     4.9.  Loss Detection and Recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     4.10. Prohibited QUIC Frames and Packets  . . . . . . . . . . .  18
   5.  HTTP/QUIC Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     5.1.  HTTP Connection Settings  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     5.2.  Server Push . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     5.3.  Metadata Compression  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
     5.4.  Prioritisation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
     5.5.  Session Tear-down . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
     5.6.  HTTP/2 Extension frames . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
     5.7.  Prohibited HTTP/2 Frames  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
   6.  Application-Layer Security  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
     6.1.  Content Integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
     6.2.  Content Authenticity  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22



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     6.3.  Content Confidentiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
   7.  Loss Recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
     7.1.  Forward Error Correction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
     7.2.  Unicast Repair  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
   8.  Transmission of Partial Content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
   9.  Protocol Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
     9.1.  Draft Version Identification  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
   10. Discovery of Multicast QUIC Sessions  . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
     10.1.  Source-specific Multicast Advertisement  . . . . . . . .  26
     10.2.  Session Parameter Advertisement  . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
       10.2.1.  Version  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
       10.2.2.  Cipher Suite . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
       10.2.3.  Session Key  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
       10.2.4.  Session Cipher Initialization Vector . . . . . . . .  28
       10.2.5.  Session Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28
       10.2.6.  Session Idle Timeout Period  . . . . . . . . . . . .  28
       10.2.7.  Resource Concurrency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  29
       10.2.8.  Session Peak Flow Rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  29
       10.2.9.  Digest Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  29
       10.2.10. Signature Algorithm  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  30
   11. Security and Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . .  30
     11.1.  Pervasive Monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  31
       11.1.1.  Large-scale Data Gathering and Correlation . . . . .  31
       11.1.2.  Changing Content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  31
     11.2.  Protection of Discovery Mechanism  . . . . . . . . . . .  32
     11.3.  Spoofing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  32
       11.3.1.  Spoofed Ack Attacks  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  32
       11.3.2.  Sender Spoofing  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  32
       11.3.3.  Receiver Spoofing  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  32
     11.4.  Replay Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  33
     11.5.  Message Deletion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  33
     11.6.  Denial of Service  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  33
       11.6.1.  Unprotected Frames and Packets . . . . . . . . . . .  33
       11.6.2.  Network Performance Degradation  . . . . . . . . . .  34
       11.6.3.  Unicast Repair Stampeding Herd . . . . . . . . . . .  34
     11.7.  Receiver Resource Usage  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  34
     11.8.  Unicast Repair Information Leakage . . . . . . . . . . .  34
   12. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  35
     12.1.  Registration of Protocol Identification String . . . . .  35
     12.2.  Registration of Alt-Svc parameters . . . . . . . . . . .  35
       12.2.1.  Source Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  35
       12.2.2.  Cipher Suite . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  35
       12.2.3.  Key  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  36
       12.2.4.  Initialization Vector  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  36
       12.2.5.  Session Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  36
       12.2.6.  Session Idle Timeout . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  36
       12.2.7.  Maximum Concurrent Resources . . . . . . . . . . . .  36
       12.2.8.  Peak Flow Rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  36



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       12.2.9.  Digest Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  36
       12.2.10. Signature Algorithm  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  36
   13. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  37
     13.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  37
     13.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  38
   Appendix A.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  40
   Appendix B.  Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  40
     B.1.  Session Advertisement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  40
       B.1.1.  Source-specific Multicast QUIC Session  . . . . . . .  40
       B.1.2.  Source-specific Multicast QUIC Session with Transport
               Encryption using a Symmetric Key  . . . . . . . . . .  41
       B.1.3.  Source-specific Multicast QUIC Session with Transport
               Encryption, Content Integrity and Authenticity  . . .  41
     B.2.  Resource Transfer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  42
       B.2.1.  Transfer without Content Integrity or Authenticity  .  42
       B.2.2.  Transfer of Partial Content without Content Integrity
               or Authenticity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  42
       B.2.3.  Transfer with Content Integrity and without
               Authenticity  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  43
       B.2.4.  Partial Transfer with Content Integrity and without
               Authenticity  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  44
       B.2.5.  Transfer with Content Integrity and Authenticity  . .  44
       B.2.6.  Partial Transfer with Content Integrity and
               Authenticity  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  45
   Appendix C.  Changelog  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  46
     C.1.  Since draft-pardue-quic-http-mcast-00 . . . . . . . . . .  46
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  47

1.  Introduction

   The means to bulk transfer resources over multicast IP [RFC1112]
   using HTTP semantics presents an opportunity to more efficiently
   deliver services at scale, while leveraging the wealth of existing
   HTTP-related standards, tools and applications.  Audio-visual
   segmented media, in particular, would benefit from this mode of
   transmission.

   The carriage of HTTP over multicast IP may be satisfied using
   existing technologies, for example the Real-time Transport Protocol
   (RTP) [RFC3550].  However, such protocols typically require the
   translation or encapsulation of HTTP.  This introduces concerns for
   providers of services, such as defining the translation, additional
   workload, complication of workflows, manageability issues, versioning
   issues, and so on.

   In contrast, this document describes a simpler and more direct
   expression of HTTP semantics over multicast IP.  HTTP over multicast
   QUIC is a profile of the QUIC protocol [QUIC-TRANSPORT] (Section 4)



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   and the HTTP/QUIC mapping [QUIC-HTTP] (Section 5).  This includes the
   repurposing of certain QUIC packet fields and changes to some
   protocol procedures (e.g. prohibition of the usage of certain frame
   types) which, in turn, change the behavioural expectations of
   endpoints.  However, the profile purposely limits the scope of change
   in order to preserve maximum compatibility with conventional QUIC.

   This profile prohibits the transmission of QUIC packets from receiver
   to sender via multicast IP.  The use of side-channel or out-of-band
   feedback mechanisms is not prohibited by this specification, but is
   out of scope and these are not considered further by the present
   document.

   Experience indicates that a generally available multicast deployment
   is difficult to achieve on the Internet notwithstanding the
   improvements that IPv6 [RFC2460] makes in this area.  There is
   evidence that discretely referenced multicast "islands" can more
   pragmatically be deployed.  Discovery of such islands by receivers,
   as they become available, is typically difficult, however.  To
   address the problem, this document describes an HTTP-based discovery
   mechanism that uses HTTP Alternative Services [RFC7838] to advertise
   the existence of multicast QUIC sessions (Section 3).  This provides
   the means for multicast-capable endpoints to learn about and make use
   of them in an opportunistic and user-imperceptible manner.  This
   mechanism results in a common HTTP application layer for both the
   discovery and delivery of services across unicast and multicast
   networks.  This provides support for users and devices accessing
   services over a heterogeneous network.  This is a departure from
   conventional multicast discovery technologies such as SDP [RFC4566]
   and SAP [RFC2974].

   The discovery mechanism also addresses some of the issues related to
   using QUIC over a unidirectional network association by replacing
   connection establishment aspects that depend on a bidirectional
   transport.

   The present document includes a number of optional features.  It is
   anticipated that further specifications will define interoperability
   profiles suited to particular application domains.

1.1.  Notational Conventions

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

   This document uses the Augmented BNF defined in [RFC5234] and updated
   by [RFC7405] along with the "#rule" extension defined in Section 7 of



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   [RFC7230].  The rules below are defined in [RFC5234], [RFC7230], and
   [RFC7234]:

   o  quoted-string = <quoted-string, see [RFC7230], Section 3.2.6>

   o  token = <token, see [RFC7230], Section 3.2.6>

   o  uri-host = <uri-host, see [RFC7230], Section 2.7>

1.2.  Definitions

   Definitions of terms that are used in this document:

   o  endpoint: A host capable of being a participant in a multicast
      QUIC session.

   o  multicast QUIC session: A logical unidirectional flow of metadata
      and data over multicast IP, framed according to this
      specification.  The lifetime of a session is independent of any
      endpoint.

   o  participant: A sender or receiver that is taking part in a
      multicast QUIC session.

   o  sender: A participant sending multicast traffic according to this
      specification.

   o  receiver: A participant receiving multicast traffic according to
      this specification.

   o  session: See multicast QUIC session.

   o  session ID: The identifier for a multicast QUIC session.

   o  session parameter: Characteristic of a multicast QUIC session.

2.  Multicast QUIC Sessions

   An HTTP/QUIC connection [QUIC-TRANSPORT] carried over bidirectional
   unicast is defined as a conversation between two QUIC endpoints that
   multiplexes several logical streams within a single encryption
   context.  This is a one-to-one relationship.  Furthermore, QUIC
   connections achieve decoupling from the underlying network (IP and
   port) by means of a Connection ID.  Use of a consistent connection
   identifier allows QUIC connections to survive changes to the network
   connectivity.  The establishment of a QUIC connection relies upon an
   up-front, in-band exchange (and possible negotiation) of
   cryptographic and transport parameters (conveyed in QUIC handshake



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   messages) and HTTP-specific settings (conveyed in "SETTINGS" HTTP/2
   frames).  Such parameters may be required or optional and may be used
   by either endpoint to control the characteristics of connection
   usage.

   This concept of a connection does not suit the carriage of HTTP/QUIC
   over unidirectional network associations such as multicast IP.  In
   fact, there is no requirement for either endpoint (multicast sender
   or receiver) to be in existence in order for the other to start or
   join this one-sided conversation.  The term "connection" is
   misleading in this context; therefore we introduce an alternative
   term "multicast QUIC session" or simply "session", which is defined
   as the logical entity describing the characteristics of the
   anticipated unidirectional flow of metadata and data.  Such
   characteristics are expressed as "session parameters", described in
   Section 2.2.  Advertisement of multicast QUIC sessions, specified in
   Section 3, allows for the senders and receivers to discover a session
   and to form multicast IP network associations that permit traffic
   flow.

2.1.  Session States

   The lifecycle of a multicast QUIC session is decoupled from the
   lifecycle of any particular endpoint.  Multicast receivers or senders
   that take part in a session are called participants.  The state of a
   session is influenced by the actions of participants.  The loose
   coupling of participants means that they are unlikely to have a
   consistent shared view of the current state of a session.  There is
   no requirement for a participant to know the session state and the
   present document does not define a method to explicitly determine it.
   The definitions of session states provided below are intended to
   assist higher-level operational treatment of sessions:

   o  Quiescent: the session has no participants and is ready to accept
      them.

   o  Half-established: the session has a participant.

   o  Fully-established: the session has a sender and at least one
      receiver participant.

   o  Finished: the session has ended, and there are no participants.

   Permitted states transitions are shown in Figure 1 below.

   The transmission of QUIC packets is expected to occur only during the
   Half-Established and Fully-Established states.




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 +-----------+         +------------------+        +-------------------+
 |           |-------->|                  |------->|                   |
 | Quiescent |         | Half-Established |        | Fully-Established |
 |           |<--------|                  |<-------|                   |
 +-----------+         +------------------+        +-------------------+
       |                        |
       |                        v
       |                   +----------+
       |                   |          |
       +------------------>| Finished |
                           |          |
                           +----------+

                  Figure 1: Multicast QUIC session states

2.1.1.  Session Establishment

   A session begins in the Quiescent state.  A typical session
   establishment sequence would see the transition from Quiescent to
   Half-Established when a sender joins the session.  The transition
   from Half-Established to Fully-Established occurs when at least one
   receiver joins the session.

   It is equally valid for a receiver to join a session in the Quiescent
   state, triggering the transition to Half-Established.  In this case,
   the transition to Fully-Established takes place only when a sender
   joins the session.

2.1.2.  Session Termination

   A session enters the Finished state when all participants leave it.
   The methods for leaving a session are either explicit shutdown
   (Section 5.5), implicit shutdown (i.e. idle timeout, Section 3.4) or
   migration away (described in the next section).

   In a typical case, a session that is in the Fully-Established state
   would be closed in two stages.  In the first stage the sender sends
   explicit shutdown messages to the multicast group and subsequently
   stops transmitting packets.  This causes the session to transition
   from Fully-Established to Half-Established.  In the second stage,
   receivers that have received explicit shutdown messages leave the
   multicast group.  Once all receivers have left the session it
   transitions from Half-Established to Finished.

   The transition from Quiescent to Finished could also occur in
   response to out-of-band actions, for example the availability of a
   session being withdrawn without any participants having made use of
   it.



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2.1.3.  Session Migration

   Endpoints MAY migrate between multicast QUIC sessions (for example,
   to make use of alternate session parameters that are preferred).
   Session migration requires participants to leave the current session
   and join the new session.  These actions affect the state of the
   respective sessions as explained above.

   The discovery of multicast QUIC sessions is described in Section 3.

2.2.  Session Parameters

   The characteristics of multicast QUIC sessions are expressed as
   session parameters, which cover cryptographic and transport
   parameters, HTTP-specific settings and multicast-specific
   configuration.

   Session parameter exchange over IP multicast is difficult:

   o  In-band exchanges are one-way, and so the client does not have the
      means to send session parameters.

   o  The lifecycle of any multicast sender is independent of the
      multicast receiver.  It is therefore unlikely that all receivers
      will have joined a session in time to receive parameters sent at
      the start of a multicast session.

   A range of strategies exists to mitigate these points.  However, each
   has the possibility to add complexity to deployment and
   manageability, transmission overhead, or other such concerns.  This
   document defines a solution that relies on the one-way announcement
   of session parameters in advance of session establishment.  This is
   achieved using HTTP Alternative Services [RFC7838] and is explained
   in Section 3.  Other advertisement solutions are not prohibited but
   are not explored in this document.

   Session parameters MUST NOT change during the lifetime of a session.
   This restriction also applies to HTTP-level settings (see
   Section 5.1).

2.3.  Session Identification

   This document defines a 64-bit session identifier used to identify a
   session.  This "Session ID" affords independence from multicast IP,
   creating the possibility for a session to span multiple multicast
   groups, or to migrate a session to a different multicast group.
   Assignment of Session ID is considered out of this document's scope.




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   The Session ID is carried in the Connection ID field of the QUIC
   packet (see Section 4.3).

   A multicast sender participating in a session MUST send QUIC packets
   with a matching Session ID.  A multicast receiver participating in a
   session MUST validate that the Session ID of received QUIC packets
   matches that advertised in the session parameters (Section 3,
   Section 10.2) before any HTTP-level processing is done.  In the case
   of validation failure, the receiver SHOULD ignore the packet in order
   to protect itself from denial-of-service attacks.

2.4.  Session Security

      *Authors' Note:* Security handshake (as described in WG documents)
      is in flux.  This section will track developments and will be
      updated accordingly.

   The QUIC Crypto and Transport handshake (see [QUIC-TRANSPORT],
   [QUIC-TLS] and [QUICCrypto]) sets out methods to achieve the goals of
   authenticated key exchange and record protection between two
   endpoints forming a QUIC connection.  The design facilitates low-
   latency connection; 1-RTT or 0-RTT.  The Crypto handshake [QUIC-TLS]
   reserves QUIC stream 0 for TLS handshake messages.

   This specification replaces the in-band security handshake, achieving
   similar goals through the use of session parameters described in
   Section 3.2.  For the purpose of compatibility, the use of QUIC
   stream 0 (see Section 4.4) is reserved.

   Integrity and authenticity concerns are addressed in Section 6.1 and
   Section 6.2 respectively.  In order to protect themselves from attack
   vectors, endpoints SHOULD NOT participate in sessions for which they
   cannot establish reasonable confidence over the cipher suite or key
   in use for that session.  Participants MAY leave any session that
   fails to successfully match anticipated security characteristics.

3.  Session Advertisement

   In this specification, connection negotiation is replaced with a
   session advertisement mechanism based on HTTP Alternative Services
   (Alt-Svc) [RFC7838].  This document specifies how the parameters of a
   multicast QUIC session are expressed as Alt-Svc parameters.  The
   following sections provide a high-level view of these; further
   details are provided in Section 10.2, with examples provided in
   Appendix B.1.  QUIC connection parameters not defined as, or related
   to, Alt-Svc parameters are not used.





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   The definition of a session (including the session ID and its
   parameters) is not the responsibility of any endpoint.  Rather,
   endpoints SHOULD use session advertisements to determine if they are
   capable of participating in a given session.  This document does not
   specify which party is responsible for defining and/or advertising
   multicast QUIC sessions.

   The freshness of Alt-Svc multicast QUIC session advertisements is as
   described in section 2.2 of [RFC7838].

   It is RECOMMENDED that session advertisements are carried over a
   secure transport (such as HTTPS) which can guarantee the authenticity
   and integrity of the Alt-Svc information.  This addresses some of the
   concerns around the protection of session establishment described in
   Section 11.2.

      *Authors' Note:* We invite review comments on mandating the use of
      a secure transport for advertising sessions.

   Senders MAY also advertise the availability of alternative sessions
   by carrying Alt-Svc in a multicast QUIC session.

3.1.  Version Advertisement

      *Authors' Note:* Version negotiation (as described in WG
      documents) is in flux.  This section will track developments and
      will be updated accordingly.

   Conventional QUIC connection establishment begins with version
   negotiation.  In a unidirectional multicast environment, there is no
   reasonable way to negotiate in such a manner.  [QUIC-HTTP] defines an
   Alt-Svc "quic" parameter that can be advertised to clients for use as
   a version negotiation hint.  This specification uses "quic" as a
   session parameter for a similar purpose but with the additional
   constraint that the parameter MUST appear exactly once: it is not
   optional and the parameter MUST NOT be repeated.

   This mechanism replaces the use of the Version field in the QUIC
   packet long header (see Section 4.2).

   A multicast sender participating in a session MUST send QUIC packets
   and frames in the format corresponding to the advertised version.  If
   the sender does not support the advertised version it MUST NOT send
   any data.  A receiver MUST NOT join a session where the "quic"
   parameter is absent.  A receiver SHOULD NOT join a session for which
   it does not support the advertised version, in order to avoid wasting
   processing resources.




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3.2.  Security Context

      *Authors' Note:* Security handshake (as described in WG documents)
      is in flux.  This section will track developments and will be
      updated accordingly.

   This specification replaces the in-band security handshake:

   o  Cipher suite negotiation is replaced with a "cipher suite" session
      parameter, which is advertised as the Alt-Svc parameter "cipher-
      suite" (Section 10.2.2).  If present, this parameter MUST contain
      only one value that corresponds to an entry in the TLS Cipher
      Suite Registry (see http://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-
      parameters/tls-parameters.xhtml#tls-parameters-4).  If absent, the
      multicast QUIC session is assumed to be operating with cipher
      suite 0x00,0x00 (NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL).

   o  Key exchange is replaced with a "key" session parameter, which is
      advertised as the Alt-Svc parameter "key" (Section 10.2.3).  The
      parameter carries a variable-length hex-encoded key for use with
      the session cipher suite.  In the absence of the "key" parameter,
      the key may be available via an out-of-band method not described
      in this document.

   o  Initialization Vector (IV) exchange is replaced with an "iv"
      session parameter, which is advertised as the Alt-Svc parameter
      "iv" (Section 10.2.4).  The parameter carries a variable-length
      hex-encoded IV for use with the session cipher suite and key.  In
      the absence of the "iv" parameter, the IV may be available via an
      out-of-band method not described in this document.

   In order to protect themselves, endpoints SHOULD NOT participate in
   sessions for which they cannot establish reasonable confidence over
   the cipher suite or key in use for that session.  Endpoints SHOULD
   leave any sessions which fail to successfully match anticipated
   security characteristics.

3.3.  Session Identification

   [QUIC-TRANSPORT] specifies how the QUIC Connection ID is used, in
   particular the client-side generation of this value.  In a
   unidirectional multicast environment, there is no meaningful way for
   a client to generate a Connection ID and use it.  This document
   defines a "session identifier" session parameter, which is advertised
   as the Alt-Svc parameter "session-id" (Section 10.2.5).  The
   requirements for the usage of session identifiers have already been
   described in Section 2.3.




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3.4.  Session Idle Timeout

   Conventional QUIC connections may be implicitly terminated following
   a period of idleness (lack of network activity).  The required QUIC
   TransportParameter "idle_timeout" provides a means for endpoints to
   specify the timeout period.  This document defines a "session idle
   timeout" session parameter, which is advertised as the Alt-Svc
   parameter "session-idle-timeout" (Section 10.2.6).  This session
   parameter mimics the behaviour of "idle_timeout", providing a means
   for multicast QUIC sessions to define their own idle timeout periods.

   Session advertisements that omit the Alt-Svc parameter "session-idle-
   timeout" imply that the default timeout period is in use.  The
   default value is 30 seconds.

   Receiving participants SHOULD leave multicast QUIC sessions when the
   session idle timeout period has elapsed (Section 4.7).  Leaving
   participants MUST use the silent close method, in which no
   "CONNECTION_CLOSE" QUIC frame is sent.

3.5.  Session Peak Flow Rate

   [QUIC-TRANSPORT] specifies a credit-based stream- and connection-
   level flow control scheme which prevents a fast sender from
   overwhelming a slow receiver.  Window size connection parameters are
   exchanged on connection establishment using the required QUIC
   TransportParameters "initial_max_data" and "initial_max_stream_data".
   In a unidirectional multicast environment, such a scheme is
   infeasible.  This document defines a "peak flow rate" session
   parameter, expressed in units of bits per second, which is advertised
   as the Alt-Svc parameter "peak-flow-rate" (Section 10.2.8).  This
   replaces "initial_max_data" and "initial_max_stream_data" completely,
   instead indicating the maximum bit rate of "STREAM" QUIC frame
   payloads transmitted on all multicast groups comprising the session.

   Session advertisements that omit the Alt-Svc parameter "peak-flow-
   rate" imply that the flow rate is unlimited.

   A multicast sender SHOULD NOT cause the advertised peak flow rate of
   a session to be exceeded.  A receiver MAY leave any session where the
   advertised peak flow rate is exceeded.

3.6.  Resource Concurrency

   [QUIC-TRANSPORT] considers concurrency in terms of the number of
   active incoming streams, which is varied by the receiving endpoint
   adjusting the maximum stream ID.  The initial value of maximum stream
   ID is controlled by the required QUIC TransportParameter



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   "initial_max_stream_id".  It is increased during the lifetime of a
   QUIC connection by the "MAX_STREAM_ID" QUIC frame.  In a
   unidirectional multicast environment, there is no way for a receiver
   to specify the limit nor increase it.  Therefore the maximum stream
   ID mechanism is not used to manage concurrency in multicast QUIC.
   The "STREAM_ID_NEEDED" QUIC frame MAY be sent by a sending
   participant but it will have no effect.  This frame SHALL be ignored
   by receiving participants.

   This document specifies a "maximum concurrent resources" session
   parameter, which is advertised as the Alt-Svc parameter "max-
   concurrent-resources" (Section 10.2.7).  This parameter replaces
   "initial_max_stream_id".  It advertises the maximum number of
   concurrent active resources generated by a sender in a given
   multicast QUIC session.

   Session advertisements that omit the Alt-Svc parameter "maximum
   concurrent resources" imply that the maximum concurrency is
   unlimited.

   A multicast sender participating in a session MUST NOT cause the
   advertised "max-concurrent-resources" to be exceeded.  A receiver MAY
   leave any session where the advertised limit is exceeded, in order to
   protect itself from denial-of-service attacks.

3.7.  Additional TransportParameter Considerations

      *Authors' Note:* Google QUIC Connection Options (COPTs) are no
      longer referred to in WG documents.  This section will consider
      TransportParameters, tracking developments and issues that may
      arise.

3.8.  Digest Algorithm

   A method to provide content integrity is described in Section 6.1.
   This specifies the means to convey a value computed by a particular
   digest algorithm.  The identity of the selected algorithm is also
   indicated.  Valid digest algorithms are collected in the IANA HTTP
   Digest Algorithm Values registry (http://www.iana.org/assignments/
   http-dig-alg/http-dig-alg.xhtml#http-dig-alg-1).

   This document specifies a "digest algorithm" session parameter, which
   is advertised as the Alt-Svc parameter "digest-algorithm"
   (Section 10.2.9).

      *Authors' Note:* Section 6.1 contains an author's note on the
      potential for content integrity to become mandatory.  This section
      will be updated in line with the outcome of that decision.



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   Repetition of the "digest algorithm" parameter in a single
   advertisement describes an algorithm set that MAY be used across the
   session.  Session advertisements that omit the Alt-Svc parameter
   "digest-algorithm" imply that either:

   o  the session does not use the content integrity mechanism, or

   o  the algorithm set is unrestricted, i.e. a sender may vary the
      algorithm as it so chooses.  This may lead to undesirable results
      if receivers do not support a chosen algorithm.

   Advertising the algorithm set for a session gives receivers the
   opportunity to selectively join sessions where the algorithms are
   known to be supported.  This may help to mitigate latency issues in
   the receiver resulting from joining a session only to discover some
   of its parameters are not supported.

   A multicast sender participating in a session MUST NOT use algorithms
   outside the signalled digest algorithm set.  A receiver MAY leave any
   session where an algorithm outside the digest algorithm set is used.

3.9.  Signature Algorithm

   A method to provide content authenticity is described in Section 6.2.
   This specifies the means to convey a value computed by a particular
   signature algorithm.  The identity of the selected algorithm is also
   indicated.  Valid signature algorithms are collected in the IANA
   Signature Algorithms registry (http://www.iana.org/assignments/
   signature-algorithms).

   This document specifies a "signature algorithm" session parameter,
   which is advertised as the Alt-Svc parameter "signature-algorithm"
   (Section 10.2.10).

      *Authors' Note:* Section 6.2 contains an author's note on the
      potential for content authenticity to become mandatory.  This
      section will be updated in line with the outcome of that decision.

   Repetition of the "signature algorithm" parameter in a single
   advertisement describes an algorithm set that MAY be used across the
   session.  Session advertisements that omit the Alt-Svc parameter
   "signature-algorithm" imply that either:

   o  the session does not use the content authenticity mechanism, or

   o  the algorithm set is unrestricted i.e. a sender may vary the
      algorithm as it so chooses.  This may lead to undesirable results
      if receivers do not support a chosen algorithm.



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   Advertising the algorithm set for a session gives receivers the
   opportunity to selectively join sessions where the algorithms are
   known to be supported.  This may help to mitigate latency issues in
   the receiver resulting from joining a session only to discover some
   of its parameters are not supported.

   A multicast sender participating in a session MUST NOT use algorithms
   outside the signalled signature algorithm set.  A receiver MAY leave
   any session where an algorithm outside the signature algorithm set is
   used.

4.  QUIC Profile

      *Authors' Note:* The QUIC transport document is subject to change.
      This section is based on our best understanding of draft-ietf-
      quic-transport-04.  The authors will track developments and will
      update this section accordingly.

   The profile of [QUIC-TRANSPORT] is presented in this section.  In
   order to preserve compatibility with conventional QUIC, the
   specification works with a limited scope of change.  However, the
   nature of unidirectional multicast communications means that some
   protocol procedures or behaviours need to be modified.

4.1.  Packet Size

   The means for determining an appropriate size for QUIC packets are
   described in Section 9 of [QUIC-TRANSPORT].  Implementations of this
   specification SHOULD bear in mind that the Path Maximum Transmission
   Unit (PTMU) may be affected by multicast IP technologies such as
   Automatic Multicast Tunneling (AMT) [RFC7450].  Additionally,
   consideration should be given toward the applicability of maximum
   transmission unit discovery methods (such as PLPMTUD [RFC4821] and
   PMTUD [RFC1191]) to multicast IP.

4.2.  Version Negotiation

   Endpoints implementing this specification MUST only send QUIC packets
   with the short header format.  This header format omits a Version
   field.

      *Authors' Note:* The authors welcome suggestions for conveying the
      QUIC version in every multicast QUIC packet.








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4.3.  Connection Identifier

   The Connection ID field MUST be present in every QUIC packet, and the
   corresponding flag in the packet header MUST be set to indicate that
   the Connection ID field is present.

4.4.  Stream Identifier

   Senders MUST NOT send any QUIC frames on QUIC stream 0.  Receivers
   MUST ignore QUIC frames received on stream 0.

4.5.  Flow Control

   Conventional QUIC provides stream- and connection-level flow control,
   and endpoints manage this by sending "MAX_DATA" or "MAX_STREAM_DATA"
   QUIC frames as required.  When a sender is blocked from sending flow-
   controlled frames, it sends an informational "BLOCKED" or
   "STREAM_BLOCKED" QUIC frame.

   In a unidirectional environment, the sender never has a receive
   window and the receiver cannot send in-band updates.  Therefore, the
   management of flow-control windows and transmission of blockage
   information is not supported by this profile.  The "MAX_DATA",
   "MAX_STREAM_DATA", "BLOCKED" and "STREAM_BLOCKED" QUIC frames are
   prohibited by this profile.  Participants MUST NOT send these frame
   types.  Reception of these frame types MUST be handled as described
   in Section 4.10.

4.6.  Stream Termination

   A sender MAY prematurely terminate the transmission on any unreserved
   QUIC stream ID by setting the "FIN" bit of a "STREAM" QUIC frame, or
   by sending a "RST_STREAM" QUIC frame (as specified in
   [QUIC-TRANSPORT] and [QUIC-HTTP]).

   Receiving participants MUST NOT make any attempt to send "RST_STREAM"
   to the multicast group.

4.7.  Session Shutdown

   Explicit shutdown of a multicast QUIC session using QUIC methods is
   not supported by this profile.  The "GOAWAY" and "CONNECTION_CLOSE"
   QUIC frames, and the Public Reset packet are prohibited.
   Participants MUST NOT send these and reception MUST be handled as
   described in Section 4.10.

   Explicit session tear-down using HTTP semantics is allowed, as
   described in Section 5.5.



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   Implicit shutdown by means of silent close is also supported, as
   described in Section 3.4.

4.8.  Session Keep-alive

   The flow of traffic in a multicast QUIC session is driven by a
   sender.  There may be periods where the sender has no data to send
   for a period longer than the session idle timeout.  This profile
   repurposes the "PING" QUIC frame to act as a unidirectional keep-
   alive message that may be sent in order to inform receivers that the
   session should remain in the Fully-established state.

   Senders MAY send a "PING" frame at any time in order to inform
   receivers that the session traffic flow has not fallen idle.  This
   frame MUST NOT be acknowledged.  (Indeed "ACK" frames are banned by
   Section 4.9.)

   Receiving participants MUST NOT make any attempt to send "PING"
   frames.

4.9.  Loss Detection and Recovery

   Receivers implementing this profile MUST NOT make any attempt to
   acknowledge the reception of QUIC packets.  The "ACK" QUIC frame is
   prohibited for both senders and receivers.  Reception of this frame
   MUST be handled as described in Section 4.10.

   Section 7 specifies alternative strategies for loss recovery.

4.10.  Prohibited QUIC Frames and Packets

   The following QUIC packets MUST NOT be transmitted by participants:
   0-RTT Protected, 1-RTT Protected (key phase 0), 1-RTT Protected (key
   phase 1), Client Cleartext, Client Initial, Public Reset, Server
   Cleartext, Server Initial, Version Negotiation.

   The following QUIC frames MUST NOT be transmitted by participants:
   "ACK", "BLOCKED", "CONNECTION_CLOSE", "GOAWAY", "MAX_DATA",
   "MAX_STREAM_DATA", "STREAM_BLOCKED".

   The following QUIC frames MUST NOT be transmitted by receivers:
   "RST_STREAM".

   Reception of a prohibited QUIC frame or packet is a protocol error.
   Receivers MUST ignore all prohibited QUIC frames and packets.






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5.  HTTP/QUIC Profile

      *Authors' Note:* The HTTP/QUIC mapping document is subject to
      change.  This section is based on our best understanding of draft-
      ietf-quic-http-04.  The authors will track developments and will
      update this section accordingly.

   HTTP over multicast QUIC depends on HTTP server push, as described in
   Section 4.4 of [QUIC-HTTP].  Section 5.2 below applies an additional
   constraint on the use of server push.  A multicast sender
   participating in a session pushes resources as a series of "STREAM"
   QUIC frames carrying HTTP/2 "PUSH_PROMISE", "HEADERS" and body data.
   Examples of this are provided in Appendix B.2.  Senders MUST comply
   with the requirements of the session parameters, as described earlier
   in Section 3.

   The profile of HTTP/QUIC specified in this section places additional
   constrains on the use of metadata compression (Section 5.3) and
   prioritisation (Section 5.4).

5.1.  HTTP Connection Settings

   The "SETTINGS" HTTP/2 frame is prohibited by this profile.
   Participants MUST NOT make any attempt to send this frame type.
   Reception of this frame MUST be handled as described in Section 5.7.

5.2.  Server Push

   Server push is, by default, enabled for HTTP/QUIC connections.  A
   conventional HTTP/QUIC client may disable server push via a
   "SETTINGS" HTTP/2 frame but the use of that frame is prohibited by
   this profile (Section 5.1).  This profile mandates the use of server
   push, and specifies no means to disable it.

   Conventionally, pushed responses are associated with an explicit
   request from a client.  This is not possible when using a
   unidirectional transport such as multicast IP.  This profile reserves
   the HTTP/2 stream ID that would normally be used for the first client
   request.  "PUSH_PROMISE" frames MUST reference this reserved ID.

      *Authors' Note:* The exact value of this stream ID is currently in
      flux.  This section will track developments and will be updated
      accordingly.








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5.3.  Metadata Compression

   The compression of HTTP header fields is considered in HPACK
   [RFC7541], which describes two methods for the compression of HTTP
   header fields: indexing (via static or dynamic tables) and Huffman
   encoding.

   A multicast QUIC session, as described in the present document, does
   not provide the assurances (receiver participation, transport
   reliability) required to sufficiently maintain the dynamic decoding
   context.  Therefore, this document requires that endpoints SHALL NOT
   use dynamic indexing.  It is RECOMMENDED that endpoints use static
   indexing and/or Huffman encoding in order to benefit from the
   remaining compression methods available.

      *Authors' Note:* In the context of QUIC, changes to HPACK may
      allow for better leverage of the transport.  QPACK [QPACK] and
      [QCRAM] are active proposals in this space.  This section will
      track developments and will be updated accordingly.

5.4.  Prioritisation

   The "PRIORITY" HTTP/2 frame is prohibited by this profile.
   Participants MUST NOT make any attempt to send this frame type.
   Reception of this frame MUST be handled as described in Section 5.7.

5.5.  Session Tear-down

   A multicast QUIC session MAY be explicitly torn down by means of the
   "Connection: close" HTTP header described in section 6.6 of
   [RFC7230].  A sender intending to leave the session SHOULD include
   the "Connection: close" header in its response metadata.  A sender
   SHOULD transmit all outstanding frames related to remaining request/
   response exchanges before ending transmission to the multicast group.
   A receiver SHOULD continue to receive and process frames until all
   outstanding request/response exchanges are complete.

5.6.  HTTP/2 Extension frames

   HTTP/2 extension frames (e.g.  "ALTSVC") are prohibited by this
   profile.  Participants MUST NOT make any attempt to send extension
   frame types.  Reception of these MUST be handled as described in
   Section 5.7.








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5.7.  Prohibited HTTP/2 Frames

   The following HTTP/2 frames MUST NOT be transmitted by participants:
   "PRIORITY", "SETTINGS".

   In addition, all HTTP/2 extension frame types MUST NOT be transmitted
   by participants.

   Reception of a prohibited HTTP/2 frame is a protocol error.
   Receivers MUST ignore prohibited HTTP/2 frames.

6.  Application-Layer Security

   As already described in Section 3.2, the implicit cipher suite used
   by a multicast QUIC session makes very limited provision for security
   in the transport and session layers.  This section profiles the use
   of some additional features to provide equivalent functionality at
   the application-layer.

6.1.  Content Integrity

   In many applications, it is important to ensure that an HTTP
   representation has been received intact (i.e. has not suffered from
   transmission loss or random bit errors) before passing the received
   object on to the receiving application.  A mechanism is therefore
   specified here to provide end-to-end content integrity protection for
   HTTP representations in transit.  The use of this content integrity
   mechanism is RECOMMENDED.

      *Authors' Note:* We invite review comments on mandating the use of
      this content integrity mechanism.

   [RFC3230] specifies an instance digest HTTP header called "Digest".
   A sender MAY include this header in the "HEADERS" frame of any
   representation it transmits and a receiver MAY use this header to
   validate the integrity of the received representation once it has
   been reassembled.  Where this validation fails, the receiver SHOULD
   discard the representation without processing it further.

   Note that the digest value protects a whole HTTP instance (i.e. the
   representation of a resource at the point of transmission as opposed
   to the body of a particular HTTP message).  In cases where partial
   representations are fragmented over one or more HTTP response
   messages, the digest value is computed over the complete
   representation prior to fragmentation into partial responses.

   In cases where the complete representation is not available at the
   start of multicast transmission, the "Digest" header MAY be conveyed



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   as a trailing header field after the body data of the representation,
   in accordance with Section 8.1 of [RFC7540].

   Any of the algorithms specified in the IANA registry of digest
   algorithms (http://www.iana.org/assignments/http-dig-alg/http-dig-
   alg.xhtml#http-dig-alg-1) MAY be used in conjunction with the
   "Digest" header.  There is no requirement for participants to support
   the full set of algorithms.

6.2.  Content Authenticity

   In some applications, it is important for a receiver to reassure
   itself that an HTTP representation has been received from an
   authentic source.  It is also sometimes useful for a receiver to know
   that the information has not been tampered with in transit by a
   malicious intermediate actor.  A mechanism is therefore specified
   here to prove the authenticity of HTTP messages in transit.  The use
   of this content authenticity mechanism is RECOMMENDED for senders
   implementing this specification.

      *Authors' Note:* We invite review comments on mandating the use of
      this content authenticity mechanism.

   [I-D.cavage-http-signatures] specifies a means of securely signing
   metadata associated with any HTTP message.  The resulting digital
   signature is conveyed in the "Signature" header of the message
   itself.  The "Signature" header also conveys a list of HTTP header
   fields over which the signature was computed.  A receiver MAY verify
   the "Signature" header in order to validate the authenticity of
   received metadata.  Where this validation fails, the receiver SHOULD
   discard or ignore any related metadata and/or data without processing
   it further.

   Note that the signature proves the authenticity of the metadata in a
   single HTTP message.  A "Signature" header MAY be included separately
   in the "PUSH_PROMISE" frame (protecting the request metadata) and in
   the final (or only) "HEADERS" frame relating to a particular resource
   (protecting the response metadata).  In order to provide an
   additional level of protection, however, it is RECOMMENDED that the
   signature be computed over the combined request metadata (from the
   "PUSH_PROMISE" frame) and the corresponding response metadata (from
   the "HEADERS" frames) of the same resource.  This binds the request
   metadata and response metadata together, providing the receiver with
   additional reassurance of authenticity.  In this latter case, the
   combined digital signature SHALL be conveyed in the final (or only)
   "HEADERS" frame.





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   In cases where not all metadata is known at the start of
   transmission, the "Signature" header MAY be conveyed as a trailing
   header field after the body data of the representation, in accordance
   with Section 8.1 of [RFC7540].

   In applications where the detection of replay attacks is a
   requirement, it is RECOMMENDED that the "Date" header be included in
   the scope of the signature.  It is RECOMMENDED that receivers use the
   value of the "Date" header for replay detection using appropriate
   strategies (e.g. checking for freshness).  The definition of such
   strategies is beyond the scope of this document.

   In applications where the authenticity and integrity of the
   transmission are both important, it is RECOMMENDED that the "Digest"
   header specified in Section 6.1 above is included in the scope of the
   signature.  By signing the instance digest, the authenticity and
   integrity of the HTTP message body are also assured in addition to
   that of the metadata.

   Any of the algorithms specified in the IANA registry of signature
   algorithms (http://www.iana.org/assignments/signature-algorithms) MAY
   be used in conjunction with the "Signature" header.  There is no
   requirement for participants to support the full set of algorithms.

6.3.  Content Confidentiality

   In applications where there is a requirement for the content itself
   to remain confidential, appropriate steps SHOULD be taken to protect
   the application payload, for example by encrypting it.  This document
   does not preclude the use of application-level encryption, but does
   not specify a mechanism for the distribution of content decryption
   keys.

7.  Loss Recovery

   Because the acknowledgement of received packets to multicast groups
   is prohibited by this specification (Section 4.9) the detection of
   discarded or corrupted packets is the sole responsibility of the
   receiver, and such losses must be recovered by means other than the
   retransmission mechanism specified in [QUIC-TRANSPORT] and
   [QUIC-RECOVERY].

7.1.  Forward Error Correction

      *Authors' Note:* A simple parity-based Forward Error Correction
      scheme was removed from the experimental QUIC wire protocol
      specification in version Q032.  The IETF's QUIC Working Group is
      chartered to specify one (or more) new FEC schemes in the future.



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      This section will track developments in this area, and will be
      updated accordingly.

   A sender MAY make use of a suitable Forward Error Correction scheme
   to allow a receiver to reconstruct lost packets from those that have
   been successfully received.

7.2.  Unicast Repair

   In the case where a lost QUIC packet cannot be recovered using
   Forward Error Correction, either because the number of packets lost
   exceeds the scheme's threshold for reconstruction, or because FEC is
   not in use on the multicast QUIC session, a receiver MAY instead
   recover the missing payload data using conventional unicast HTTP
   requests to an origin server.

   o  The total size of the resource is indicated in the "content-
      length" response header carried in the "HEADERS" HTTP/2 frame.

   o  The location of the missing data can be determined by examining
      the Offset field in the "STREAM" QUIC frame headers of
      successfully received QUIC packets.

   Using this information, a receiver MAY compose an efficient HTTP
   range request [RFC7233] to the origin server indicated in the URL.
   Several disjoint ranges MAY be combined into a single HTTP request.
   A receiver MAY direct its request to an alternative server using Alt-
   Svc information received on the multicast QUIC session, or else
   received as part of a previous unicast HTTP response according to the
   rules in [RFC7838].

8.  Transmission of Partial Content

   Under certain circumstances, a sender may not be in full possession
   of a resource body when transmission begins, or may not be able to
   guarantee that a transmission will complete.  In such cases, the
   sender MAY employ the syntax of an HTTP range request [RFC7233] to
   indicate partial content, as specified below.  All receivers SHALL
   implement support for such HTTP range requests.

   If partial content is to be transmitted:

   o  The "range" header (Section 3.1 of [RFC7233]) SHALL be present in
      the "PUSH_PROMISE" HTTP/2 frame.

   o  The corresponding "HEADERS" HTTP/2 frame SHALL indicate HTTP
      status code 206.




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      *  The range being transmitted SHALL be indicated in a "content-
         range" header field and the size of the complete resource
         indicated in a "content-length" header field.  Either or both
         of these headers fields MAY be transmitted in a trailing
         "HEADERS" frame if their values are not known at the start of
         transmission.

9.  Protocol Identifier

   The HTTP over multicast QUIC protocol specified in this document is
   identified by the application-layer protocol negotiation (ALPN)
   [RFC7301] identifier "hqm".  The IANA registration of this protocol
   identifier can be found in Section 12.1.  This reserves the ALPN
   identifier space but describes a protocol that does not use TLS.  The
   usage of the "hqm" identifier for discoverability is described in
   Section 10.

9.1.  Draft Version Identification

      *RFC Editor's Note:* Please remove this section prior to
      publication of a final version of this document.

   Only implementations of the final, published RFC can identify
   themselves as "hqm".  Until such an RFC exists, implementations MUST
   NOT identify themselves using this string.

   Implementations of draft versions of the protocol MUST add the string
   "-" and the corresponding draft number to the identifier.  For
   example, draft-pardue-quic-http-mcast-00 is identified using the
   string "hqm-00".

   Non-compatible experiments that are based on these draft versions
   MUST append the string "-" and an experiment name to the identifier.
   For example, an experimental implementation based on draft-pardue-
   quic-http-mcast-09 which removes the requirement to ensure version
   matches might identify itself as "hqm-09-version-ignorant".  Note
   that any label MUST conform to the "token" syntax defined in
   Section 3.2.6 of [RFC7230].  Experimenters are encouraged to
   coordinate their experiments.

10.  Discovery of Multicast QUIC Sessions

   The announcement and discovery of services operating over multicast
   IP has previously been specified by the Session Description Protocol
   (SDP) [RFC4566], Session Announcement Protocol [RFC2974] and Session
   Initiation Protocol [RFC3261].  These are typically deployed together
   and in conjunction with a multicast-friendly transport such as the
   Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP) [RFC3550].



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   In contrast, the present document specifies a mechanism for
   advertising services that is built into HTTP metadata and is
   consistent across unicast and multicast resource delivery modes.
   This means that a single application-layer can be used for service
   advertisement/discovery, and for bulk data transmission/reception.
   Specifically, the "Alt-Svc" HTTP header is specified as the means to
   advertise multicast services from a unicast service.  A unicast HTTP
   response MAY be decorated with an Alt-Svc value that hints to the
   client about the availability of the resource via a multicast QUIC
   session.  A client that supports such a multicast QUIC session MAY
   then transparently switch to it.

   Symmetrically, the "Alt-Svc" header can also be used to advertise the
   unicast service from a multicast service.  A resource transmitted as
   part of a multicast QUIC session MAY be decorated with an Alt-Svc
   value that hints to the client about the availability of the resource
   via an alternative unicast HTTP server.  A receiver MAY then use this
   HTTP server for unicast resource patching (Section 7.2).

   Where HTTP over multicast QUIC sessions are advertised using Alt-Svc,
   the protocol identifier SHALL be "hqm", as specified in Section 9.

10.1.  Source-specific Multicast Advertisement

   Source-specific multicast (SSM) [RFC4607] MAY be used for the
   delivery of multicast services.

      *Authors' Note:* We invite review comments on mandating the use of
      source-specific multicast only.

   This document specifies the "source-address" parameter for Alt-Svc,
   which is used to provide the SSM source address to endpoints.

   Syntax:

   source-address = uri-host; see RFC7230, Section 2.7

   For example:

   source-address="192.0.2.1"

   When a multicast QUIC session is provided using SSM, the "source-
   address" parameter MUST be advertised.








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10.2.  Session Parameter Advertisement

   The concept of session parameters is introduced in Section 2.2.  This
   section details how the session parameters are expressed as Alt-Svc
   parameters.

10.2.1.  Version

   The version of QUIC supported in a multicast QUIC session is
   advertised with the "quic" parameter.  The requirements for endpoint
   usage of "quic" are specified in Section 3.1.

10.2.2.  Cipher Suite

   This document specifies the "cipher-suite" parameter for Alt-Svc,
   which carries the cipher suite in use by a multicast QUIC session.
   "cipher-suite" MUST contain one of the values contained in the TLS
   Cipher Suite Registry (http://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-
   parameters/tls-parameters.xhtml#tls-parameters-4):

   Syntax:

   cipher-suite = 4*4 HEXDIG

   For example, the following specifies cipher suite 0x13,0x01
   ("TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256"):

   cipher-suite=1301

   The requirements for endpoint usage of "cipher-suite" are described
   in Section 3.2.

10.2.3.  Session Key

   This document specifies the "key" parameter for Alt-Svc, which
   carries the cryptographic key in use by the multicast QUIC session.

   Syntax:

   key = *HEXDIG

   For example:

   key=4adf1eab9c2a37fd

   The requirements for endpoint usage of "key" are described in
   Section 3.2.




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10.2.4.  Session Cipher Initialization Vector

   This document specifies the "iv" parameter for Alt-Svc, which carries
   the cipher Initialization Vector (IV) in use by the multicast QUIC
   session.

   Syntax:

   iv = *HEXDIG

   For example:

   iv=4dbe593acb4d1577ad6ba7dc3189834e

   The requirements for endpoint usage of "iv" are described in
   Section 3.2.

10.2.5.  Session Identification

   This document defines the "session-id" parameter for Alt-Svc, which
   carries the multicast QUIC session identifier.

   Syntax:

   session-id = 1*16HEXDIG ; 64-bit value

   For example, the following specifies session 101 (0x65 hexadecimal):

   session-id=65

   The requirements for endpoint usage of "session-id" are described in
   Section 2.3.

10.2.6.  Session Idle Timeout Period

   This document specifies the "session-idle-timeout" parameter for Alt-
   Svc, which carries the idle timeout period of a multicast QUIC
   session.

   Syntax:

   session-idle-timeout = *DIGIT ; number of seconds between 0 and 600

   For example, the following specifies a one-minute session idle
   timeout period:

   session-idle-timeout=60




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   The requirements for endpoint usage of "session-idle-timeout" are
   described in Section 3.4.

10.2.7.  Resource Concurrency

   This document specifies the "max-concurrent-resources" parameter for
   Alt-Svc, which expresses the maximum number of concurrent active
   resources from the sender in a multicast QUIC session.

   Syntax:

   max-concurrent-resources = *DIGIT ; unsigned 32-bit integer

   For example, the following specifies that no more than 12 (decimal)
   resources will be concurrently active in the session:

   max-concurrent-resources=12

   The requirements for endpoint usage of "max-concurrent-resources" are
   described in Section 3.6.

10.2.8.  Session Peak Flow Rate

   This document specifies the "peak-flow-rate" parameter for Alt-Svc,
   which expresses the expected maximum aggregate transfer rate of data
   from all sources of the multicast QUIC session.

   Syntax:

   peak-flow-rate = *DIGIT ; bits per second

   For example, the following specifies a peak flow rate of 550 kbits/s
   in the session:

   peak-flow-rate=550000

   The requirements for endpoint usage of "peak-flow-rate" are described
   in Section 3.5.

10.2.9.  Digest Algorithm

   This document specifies the "digest-algorithm" parameter for Alt-Svc,
   which carries the digest algorithm in use by a multicast QUIC
   session. "digest-algorithm" MUST contain one of the values defined in
   the HTTP Digest Algorithm Values registry
   (https://www.iana.org/assignments/http-dig-alg/http-dig-
   alg.xhtml#http-dig-alg-1).




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   Syntax:

   digest-algorithm = token

   For example, the following specifies a digest algorithm of SHA-256:

   digest-algorithm=SHA-256

   The requirements for endpoint usage of "digest-algorithm" are
   described in Section 3.8.

10.2.10.  Signature Algorithm

   This document specifies the "signature-algorithm" parameter for Alt-
   Svc, which carries the signature algorithm in use by a multicast QUIC
   session. "signature-algorithm" MUST contain one of the values defined
   in the Signature Algorithms registry
   (http://www.iana.org/assignments/signature-algorithms).

   Syntax:

   signature-algorithm = token

   For example, the following specifies a signature algorithm of SHA-
   256:

   signature-algorithm=rsa-sha256

   The requirements for endpoint usage of "signature-algorithm" are
   described in Section 3.9.

11.  Security and Privacy Considerations

   This document specifies a profile of QUIC and HTTP/QUIC that changes
   the security model.  In order to address this, application-level
   security methods are described in Section 6.  This document does not
   preclude the use of secure multicast approaches that may provide
   additional security assurances required for certain use cases.

   The use of side-channel or out-of-band technologies (potentially
   bidirectional interactions) to support multicast QUIC sessions are
   considered out of this document's scope.  Services using such
   technologies should apply their security considerations accordingly.








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11.1.  Pervasive Monitoring

   Certain multicast deployment architectures may require the use of a
   session decryption key shared by all participants.  Furthermore, the
   discovery mechanism described in this document provides a means for a
   receiver to obtain a session decryption key without joining the
   session.  The act of removing packet protection in order to inspect
   or modify application contents may, in certain deployments, be
   trivial.  The exploration of restricting key learning or session
   joining to authorised participants goes beyond the scope of this
   document.

   Because in-band multicast interactions are unidirectional, the impact
   of Pervasive Monitoring [RFC7258] on in-band traffic flows is
   inherently reduced.  Actors can only inspect or modify sender-
   initiated traffic.  Additional measures for content confidentiality
   may mitigate the impact further.  This is discussed in Section 6.3.

   Further Pervasive Monitoring concerns are addressed in the following
   sections.

11.1.1.  Large-scale Data Gathering and Correlation

   Multicast QUIC sessions decouple sending and receiving participants.
   Session participation is subject to operations that allow an endpoint
   to join or leave a multicast group, typically IGMP [RFC3376] or MLD
   [RFC3810].  The propagation intent of these messages travelling
   deeper through a network hierarchy generally leads to the
   anonymisation of data if implemented as specified.  It may be
   possible to gather user-identifiable messages close to the network
   edge, for example a router logging such messages.  However, this
   would require wide-ranging access across Internet Service Provider
   networks.  Therefore, while such attacks are feasible, it can be
   asserted that gathering and correlating user-identifiable traffic is
   difficult to perform covertly and at scale.

11.1.2.  Changing Content

   Sessions that use a symmetric key for packet protection are subject
   to the possibility of a malicious actor modifying traffic at some
   point in the network between a legitimate sender and one (or more)
   receivers.  Receiver-side validation, as specified in Section 6 of
   the present document, and also in [QUIC-TRANSPORT], allows for the
   detection of such modification.  Two approaches help mitigate the
   impact of modification; the first is application-level methods that
   protect data (Section 6.1) and metadata (Section 6.2); the second is
   reduction of the QUIC packet attack surface by means of removal of
   many frame types (Section 4.10 and Section 5.7).



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11.2.  Protection of Discovery Mechanism

   Multicast QUIC session advertisements SHOULD be conveyed over a
   secure transport that guarantees authenticity and integrity in order
   to mitigate attacks related to a malicious service advertisement, for
   example a "man in the middle" directing endpoints to a service that
   may lead to other attacks or exploitations.

      *Authors' Note:* We invite review comments on mandating the use of
      a secure transport for advertising sessions.

   Endpoints that make use of multicast QUIC session advertisements
   SHOULD have reasonable assurance that the alternative service is
   under control of, and valid for, the whole origin, as described in
   Section 2.1 of [RFC7838].  Section 6.2 discusses measures that may be
   used to fulfil this requirement.

11.3.  Spoofing

11.3.1.  Spoofed Ack Attacks

   The Spoofed "ACK" attack described in Section 13.1 of
   [QUIC-TRANSPORT] is out of scope because use of the "ACK" frame is
   prohibited (Section 4.9) by the present document.

11.3.2.  Sender Spoofing

   A malicious actor may be able to stage a spoof attack by sending fake
   QUIC packets to a multicast QUIC session.  This could affect the
   operation or behaviour of receivers.  In a multicast scenario, this
   form of attack has the potential to scale massively.

   The feasibility of spoofing a multicast sender is governed by the
   characteristics of the multicast deployment and network
   infrastructure.  The use of source-specific multicast [RFC4607] may
   reduce the feasibility.  The use of content authenticity
   (Section 6.2) may mitigate concerns for the application-level
   messages.  However, there remains the possibility for transport-level
   messages to be spoofed.  Multicast applications should consider
   further mitigations to address this concern.

11.3.3.  Receiver Spoofing

   Client source address concerns discussed in Section 7.5 of
   [QUIC-TRANSPORT] are out of scope because the connection
   establishment is replaced with session establishment in the present
   document.  Further, the impact that spoofed receivers would have on




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   the sender is minimal.  The impact of malicious participants on the
   network is discussed in Section 11.6.2.

11.4.  Replay Attacks

   Conventional QUIC strategies for protecting against replay attacks
   apply similarly here.

   Certain multicast QUIC sessions may use a shared key for transport-
   level encryption, which would allow an attacker to record, decrypt,
   repackage and replay QUIC packets.  Section 6.2 discusses how the
   application-level contents may be protected from replay (by signing
   the "Date" HTTP header), which provides some mitigation to the
   success rate or effects of replay attacks.

11.5.  Message Deletion

   Since HTTP over multicast QUIC is designed to tolerate unreliable
   delivery, the impacts of message deletion attacks are presumed to be
   small.  Deletion of packets carrying HTTP headers will cause a
   receiver to ignore subsequent packets carrying body data.
   Furthermore, the use of multicast QUIC sessions is opportunistic;
   disruption in service (for example, deleting packets and causing a
   receiver to fail in construction of a content object) is mitigated by
   falling back to a unicast service.  Considerations for how this may
   affect the performance of the unicast service are given in
   Section 11.6.3.

11.6.  Denial of Service

11.6.1.  Unprotected Frames and Packets

   The handling of unprotected QUIC packets is discussed in section
   9.1.4 of [QUIC-TLS].  The profile described in the present document
   provides the means for a multicast sender to protect QUIC packets
   with a shared key, which is not a strong protection.  The weak
   protection of QUIC packets could present a denial-of-service risk.
   To mitigate the impact of handling such QUIC packets, certain frames
   and packets are prohibited as described in (Section 4.10 and
   Section 5.7).

   The frame types that are allowed by this profile do not present a
   risk of denial of service.  Concerns over authenticity and integrity
   are addressed by the application-layer protection mechanisms
   described in Section 6.






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11.6.2.  Network Performance Degradation

   The possibility for malfunctioning or malicious participants to
   degrade the network is a broad issue and considered out of scope for
   this document.  Guidelines and concerns discussed in UDP Best
   Practices [RFC8085] and other sources apply equally here.  This
   specification does not preclude the use of network performance
   degradation mitigation solutions such as network circuit breakers.

11.6.3.  Unicast Repair Stampeding Herd

   Deployments that support the unicast repair mechanism described in
   Section 7.2 should be aware that a triggering of this behaviour
   (either deliberate, planned or unplanned) in a large population of
   multicast receivers may cause a stampeding herd of client requests to
   the unicast repair service.  Service operators SHOULD mitigate the
   impact of stampeding herd on their deployment.

11.7.  Receiver Resource Usage

   The application of receiver-side validation, as defined in the
   present document and in [QUIC-TRANSPORT], adds some protection
   against allocating resource to the processing of bad data.

11.8.  Unicast Repair Information Leakage

   The unicast repair mechanism may lead to the leakage of user
   behaviour data.  An attacker could gain insight into any receiver
   participating in a multicast QUIC session, for example by monitoring
   the TCP port of the unicast alternative.  This alone is no worse than
   current abilities to monitor unicast interactions, for example
   observing the SNI field contained in a TLS ClientHello.  The complete
   protection of unicast interactions is beyond the scope of this
   document.  However, knowledge that a user (or group of users) has
   participated in a session is sensitive and may be obtained by
   correlation between with observable multicast and unicast traffic.

   To give an example, a malicious "man in the middle" could purposely
   cause all receivers to perform a unicast repair (by disrupting the
   QUIC traffic flow in some way).  The disruption is untargeted and may
   be simple to orchestrate, but the correlation of user activity data,
   especially across a distributed repair service (e.g. a CDN), requires
   resources that may reduce the attractiveness of such an attack.

   The ability for an attacker to disrupt multicast QUIC sessions is
   mitigated by this profile (mainly the prohibition of frames and
   packets).  Application-layer security measures described in Section 6
   reduce the feasibility further.



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   Multicast receivers concerned about this form of leakage can
   eliminate this risk completely by disabling support for unicast
   repair, at the potential cost of reduced service quality.

12.  IANA Considerations

12.1.  Registration of Protocol Identification String

   This document creates a new registration for the identification of
   the HTTP over multicast QUIC protocol in the "Application-Layer
   Protocol Negotiation (ALPN) Protocol IDs" registry established by
   [RFC7301].

   The "hqm" string identifies HTTP semantics expressed as HTTP mapped
   to a QUIC layer and carried over IP multicast:

   Protocol:  Bulk data transport using HTTP over multicast QUIC

   Identification Sequence:  0x68 0x71 0x6D ("hqm")

   Specification:  This document, Section 9

   This entry reserves an identifier that is not allowed to appear in
   TLS Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation.

12.2.  Registration of Alt-Svc parameters

   This document creates seven registrations for the identification of
   parameters for the "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Alt-Svc
   Parameter Registry" established by [RFC7838]
   (http://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-extensiontype-values/tls-
   extensiontype-values.xhtml#alpn-protocol-ids).

12.2.1.  Source Address

   Parameter name:  source-address

   Specification:  This document, Section 10.1

12.2.2.  Cipher Suite

   Parameter name:  cipher-suite

   Specification:  This document, Section 10.2.2







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12.2.3.  Key

   Parameter name:  key

   Specification:  This document, Section 10.2.3

12.2.4.  Initialization Vector

   Parameter name:  iv

   Specification:  This document, Section 10.2.4

12.2.5.  Session Identifier

   Parameter name:  session-id

   Specification:  This document, Section 10.2.5

12.2.6.  Session Idle Timeout

   Parameter name:  session-idle-timeout

   Specification:  This document, Section 10.2.6

12.2.7.  Maximum Concurrent Resources

   Parameter name:  max-concurrent-resources

   Specification:  This document, Section 10.2.7

12.2.8.  Peak Flow Rate

   Parameter name:  peak-flow-rate

   Specification:  This document, Section 10.2.8

12.2.9.  Digest Algorithm

   Parameter name:  digest-algorithm

   Specification:  This document, Section 10.2.9

12.2.10.  Signature Algorithm

   Parameter name:  signature-algorithm

   Specification:  This document, Section 10.2.10




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13.  References

13.1.  Normative References

   [I-D.cavage-http-signatures]
              Cavage, M. and M. Sporny, "Signing HTTP Messages", draft-
              cavage-http-signatures-07 (work in progress), July 2017.

   [QUIC-HTTP]
              Bishop, M., Ed., "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) over
              QUIC", draft-ietf-quic-http-04 (work in progress).

   [QUIC-RECOVERY]
              Iyengar, J., Ed. and I. Swett, Ed., "QUIC Loss Detection
              and Congestion Control", draft-ietf-quic-recovery-04 (work
              in progress).

   [QUIC-TLS]
              Thomson, M., Ed. and S. Turner, Ed, Ed., "Using Transport
              Layer Security (TLS) to Secure QUIC", draft-ietf-quic-
              tls-04 (work in progress).

   [QUIC-TRANSPORT]
              Iyengar, J., Ed. and M. Thomson, Ed., "QUIC: A UDP-Based
              Multiplexed and Secure Transport", draft-ietf-quic-
              transport-04 (work in progress).

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC3230]  Mogul, J. and A. Van Hoff, "Instance Digests in HTTP",
              RFC 3230, DOI 10.17487/RFC3230, January 2002,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3230>.

   [RFC4607]  Holbrook, H. and B. Cain, "Source-Specific Multicast for
              IP", RFC 4607, DOI 10.17487/RFC4607, August 2006,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4607>.

   [RFC5234]  Crocker, D., Ed. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax
              Specifications: ABNF", STD 68, RFC 5234,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5234, January 2008,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5234>.







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   [RFC7230]  Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
              Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Message Syntax and Routing",
              RFC 7230, DOI 10.17487/RFC7230, June 2014,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7230>.

   [RFC7233]  Fielding, R., Ed., Lafon, Y., Ed., and J. Reschke, Ed.,
              "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Range Requests",
              RFC 7233, DOI 10.17487/RFC7233, June 2014,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7233>.

   [RFC7234]  Fielding, R., Ed., Nottingham, M., Ed., and J. Reschke,
              Ed., "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Caching",
              RFC 7234, DOI 10.17487/RFC7234, June 2014,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7234>.

   [RFC7301]  Friedl, S., Popov, A., Langley, A., and E. Stephan,
              "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Application-Layer Protocol
              Negotiation Extension", RFC 7301, DOI 10.17487/RFC7301,
              July 2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7301>.

   [RFC7405]  Kyzivat, P., "Case-Sensitive String Support in ABNF",
              RFC 7405, DOI 10.17487/RFC7405, December 2014,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7405>.

   [RFC7540]  Belshe, M., Peon, R., and M. Thomson, Ed., "Hypertext
              Transfer Protocol Version 2 (HTTP/2)", RFC 7540,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7540, May 2015,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7540>.

   [RFC7838]  Nottingham, M., McManus, P., and J. Reschke, "HTTP
              Alternative Services", RFC 7838, DOI 10.17487/RFC7838,
              April 2016, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7838>.

13.2.  Informative References

   [QCRAM]    Krasic, C., Ed., "Header Compression for HTTP over QUIC",
              draft-krasic-quic-qcram-02 (work in progress).

   [QPACK]    Bishop, M., Ed., "Header Compression for HTTP/QUIC",
              draft-bishop-quic-http-and-qpack-02 (work in progress).

   [QUICCrypto]
              Langley, A. and W. Chang, "QUIC Crypto", May 2016,
              <http://goo.gl/OuVSxa>.

   [RFC1112]  Deering, S., "Host extensions for IP multicasting", STD 5,
              RFC 1112, DOI 10.17487/RFC1112, August 1989,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1112>.



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   [RFC1191]  Mogul, J. and S. Deering, "Path MTU discovery", RFC 1191,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC1191, November 1990,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1191>.

   [RFC2460]  Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6
              (IPv6) Specification", RFC 2460, DOI 10.17487/RFC2460,
              December 1998, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2460>.

   [RFC2974]  Handley, M., Perkins, C., and E. Whelan, "Session
              Announcement Protocol", RFC 2974, DOI 10.17487/RFC2974,
              October 2000, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2974>.

   [RFC3261]  Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston,
              A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E.
              Schooler, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3261, June 2002,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3261>.

   [RFC3376]  Cain, B., Deering, S., Kouvelas, I., Fenner, B., and A.
              Thyagarajan, "Internet Group Management Protocol, Version
              3", RFC 3376, DOI 10.17487/RFC3376, October 2002,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3376>.

   [RFC3550]  Schulzrinne, H., Casner, S., Frederick, R., and V.
              Jacobson, "RTP: A Transport Protocol for Real-Time
              Applications", STD 64, RFC 3550, DOI 10.17487/RFC3550,
              July 2003, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3550>.

   [RFC3810]  Vida, R., Ed. and L. Costa, Ed., "Multicast Listener
              Discovery Version 2 (MLDv2) for IPv6", RFC 3810,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3810, June 2004,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3810>.

   [RFC4566]  Handley, M., Jacobson, V., and C. Perkins, "SDP: Session
              Description Protocol", RFC 4566, DOI 10.17487/RFC4566,
              July 2006, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4566>.

   [RFC4821]  Mathis, M. and J. Heffner, "Packetization Layer Path MTU
              Discovery", RFC 4821, DOI 10.17487/RFC4821, March 2007,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4821>.

   [RFC5737]  Arkko, J., Cotton, M., and L. Vegoda, "IPv4 Address Blocks
              Reserved for Documentation", RFC 5737,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5737, January 2010,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5737>.






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   [RFC6676]  Venaas, S., Parekh, R., Van de Velde, G., Chown, T., and
              M. Eubanks, "Multicast Addresses for Documentation",
              RFC 6676, DOI 10.17487/RFC6676, August 2012,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6676>.

   [RFC7258]  Farrell, S. and H. Tschofenig, "Pervasive Monitoring Is an
              Attack", BCP 188, RFC 7258, DOI 10.17487/RFC7258, May
              2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7258>.

   [RFC7450]  Bumgardner, G., "Automatic Multicast Tunneling", RFC 7450,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7450, February 2015,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7450>.

   [RFC7541]  Peon, R. and H. Ruellan, "HPACK: Header Compression for
              HTTP/2", RFC 7541, DOI 10.17487/RFC7541, May 2015,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7541>.

   [RFC8085]  Eggert, L., Fairhurst, G., and G. Shepherd, "UDP Usage
              Guidelines", BCP 145, RFC 8085, DOI 10.17487/RFC8085,
              March 2017, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8085>.

Appendix A.  Acknowledgements

   The authors would like to thank the following for their contributions
   to the design described in the present document: Brandon Butterworth,
   Sam Hurst, Chris Poole, Craig Taylor and David Waring.

   We are also grateful to Thomas Swindells and Magnus Westerlund for
   their helpful review comments.

Appendix B.  Examples

   This appendix contains examples of multicast QUIC session
   advertisement and resource transfer (with and without application-
   layer content security).

B.1.  Session Advertisement

   This section shows several different examples of an HTTP service
   advertising a multicast QUIC session.  Examples are given in IPv4
   form, using reserved address ranges as specified in [RFC5737] and
   [RFC6676].

B.1.1.  Source-specific Multicast QUIC Session

   Advertisement of a multicast QUIC session operating on the source-
   specific multicast group address 232.0.0.1 on port 2000 with the
   source address 192.0.2.1.  The session ID is 16 (0x10) and the idle



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   timeout is one minute.  At most 10 resources may be concurrently
   active in the session and the flow rate should not exceed 10 kbits/s.
   The multicast transport is unencrypted.

   HTTP Alternative Service header field:

   Alt-Svc:
       hqm="232.0.0.1:2000"; source-address="192.0.2.1"; quic=1;
       session-id=10; session-idle-timeout=60;
       max-concurrent-resources=10; peak-flow-rate=10000

B.1.2.  Source-specific Multicast QUIC Session with Transport Encryption
        using a Symmetric Key

   Advertisement of a multicast QUIC session operating on the IPv6
   globally-scoped source-specific multicast group address ff3e::1234 on
   port 2000 with the source address 2001:db8::1.  The session ID is 16
   (0x10) and the idle timeout is one minute.  At most 10 resources may
   be concurrently active in the session and the flow rate should not
   exceed 10 kbits/s.  The multicast transport is encrypted using the
   AEAD cipher suite 0x13,0x01 ("TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256") with the
   shared session key and IV provided.

   HTTP Alternative Service header field:

Alt-Svc:
    hqm="[ff3e::1234]:2000"; source-address="2001:db8::1"; quic=1;
    session-id=10; session-idle-timeout=60;
    max-concurrent-resources=10; peak-flow-rate=10000;
    cipher-suite=1301; key=4adf1eab9c2a37fd; iv=4dbe593acb4d1577ad6ba7dc3189834e

B.1.3.  Source-specific Multicast QUIC Session with Transport
        Encryption, Content Integrity and Authenticity

   Advertisement of a multicast QUIC session operating on the IPv6
   globally-scoped source-specific multicast group address ff3e::1234 on
   port 2000 with the source address 2001:db8::1.  The session ID is 16
   (0x10) and the idle timeout is one minute.  At most 10 resources may
   be concurrently active in the session and the flow rate should not
   exceed 10 kbits/s.  The multicast transport is encrypted using the
   AEAD cipher suite 0x13,0x01 ("TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256") with the
   shared session key and IV provided.  Content integrity is in use with
   the digest algorithm set restricted to SHA-256.  Content authenticity
   is in use with the signature algorithm set restricted to rsa-sha256.

   HTTP Alternative Service header field:





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Alt-Svc:
    hqm="[ff3e::1234]:2000"; source-address="2001:db8::1"; quic=1;
    session-id=10; session-idle-timeout=60;
    max-concurrent-resources=10; peak-flow-rate=10000;
    cipher-suite=1301; key=4adf1eab9c2a37fd; iv=4dbe593acb4d1577ad6ba7dc3189834e
    digest-algorithm=SHA-256; signature-algorithm=rsa-sha256

B.2.  Resource Transfer

   This section shows several different examples of the HTTP message
   patterns for a single resource.

   Examples that show "PUSH_PROMISE" or "HEADERS" HTTP/2 frames describe
   the contents of enclosed header block fragments.

B.2.1.  Transfer without Content Integrity or Authenticity

   "PUSH_PROMISE" HTTP/2 frame:

   :method: GET
   :scheme: https
   :path: /files/example.txt
   :authority: example.org

   "HEADERS" HTTP/2 frame;

   :status: 200
   content-length: 100
   content-type: text/plain
   date: Fri, 20 Jan 2017 10:00:00 GMT

   QUIC "STREAM" frame containing 100 bytes of response body data:

   ...

B.2.2.  Transfer of Partial Content without Content Integrity or
        Authenticity

   In this example, partial content is transferred as described in
   Section 8.  The "Range" request header is used to indicate the
   sender's intention to transfer all 100 bytes of the representation,
   but the "Content-Range" trailing response header indicates that only
   the first 50 bytes were actually transferred.

   "PUSH_PROMISE" HTTP/2 frame:






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   :method: GET
   :scheme: https
   :path: /files/example.txt
   :authority: example.org
   range: bytes=0-*

   Leading "HEADERS" HTTP/2 frame:

   :status: 206
   content-length: 100
   content-type: text/plain
   date: Fri, 20 Jan 2017 10:00:00 GMT

   "STREAM" QUIC frame containing 50 bytes of response body data:

   ...

   Trailing "HEADERS" HTTP/2 frame indicating the range of bytes sent:

   content-range: bytes 0-49/100

B.2.3.  Transfer with Content Integrity and without Authenticity

   In this example, content integrity is assured by the inclusion of the
   "Digest" response header, as described in Section 6.1.

   "PUSH_PROMISE" HTTP/2 frame:

   :method: GET
   :scheme: https
   :path: /files/example.txt
   :authority: example.org

   "HEADERS" HTTP/2 frame including the "Digest" header:

   :status: 200
   content-length: 100
   content-type: text/plain
   date: Fri, 20 Jan 2017 10:00:00 GMT
   digest: SHA-256=DieQ9zfRaDdyAilTVCvmBePuxMm+B6cNocP+QCrNSqo=

   "STREAM" QUIC frame containing 100 bytes of response body data:

   ...







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B.2.4.  Partial Transfer with Content Integrity and without Authenticity

   In this example, partial content is transferred as described in
   Section 8.  The "Range" request header is used to indicate the
   sender's intention to transfer all 100 bytes of the representation,
   but the "Content-Range" trailing response header indicates that only
   the first 50 bytes were actually transferred.  Content integrity is
   assured by the inclusion of the "Digest" response header, as
   described in Section 6.1.

   "PUSH_PROMISE" HTTP/2 frame:

   :method: GET
   :scheme: https
   :path: /files/example.txt
   :authority: example.org
   range: bytes=0-*

   Leading "HEADERS" HTTP/2 frame including the "Digest" header:

   :status: 206
   content-length: 100
   content-type: text/plain
   date: Fri, 20 Jan 2017 10:00:00 GMT
   digest: SHA-256=DieQ9zfRaDdyAilTVCvmBePuxMm+B6cNocP+QCrNSqo=

   "STREAM" QUIC frame containing 50 bytes of response body data:

   ...

   Trailing "HEADERS" HTTP/2 frame indicating the range of bytes sent:

   content-range: bytes 0-49/100

B.2.5.  Transfer with Content Integrity and Authenticity

   In this example, content integrity is assured by the inclusion of the
   "Digest" response header, as described in Section 6.1.  Content
   authenticity is assured separately for the request and the response
   messages by the "Signature" header which protects the header fields
   described in further detail below.  The "Signature" header parameter
   "keyId" contains the URL of a file containing the public key related
   to the multicast sender's private key used to create the digital
   signature.

   "PUSH_PROMISE" HTTP/2 frame including a "Signature" header protecting
   the ":method" and ":path" (the request target), as well as the
   ":scheme" and ":authority" of the pseudo-request:



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   :method: GET
   :scheme: https
   :path: /files/example.txt
   :authority: example.org
   signature: keyId="https://example.org/mcast-sender.example.org.pem",
       algorithm=rsa-sha256,
       headers="(request-target) :scheme :authority",
       signature="MGQCMFTaFptaM2FhgzJq2i9AaChuFDHjp6GiXVtRnI8BsA"

   "HEADERS" HTTP/2 frame including a "Signature" header protecting the
   ":method", ":path", ":scheme" and ":authority" of the pseudo-request
   above, plus the "Date" and "Digest" of the response:

   :status: 200
   content-length: 100
   content-type: text/plain
   date: Fri, 20 Jan 2017 10:00:00 GMT
   digest: SHA-256=DieQ9zfRaDdyAilTVCvmBePuxMm+B6cNocP+QCrNSqo=
   signature: keyId="https://example.org/mcast-sender.example.org.pem",
       algorithm=rsa-sha256,
       headers="(request-target) :scheme :authority date digest",
       signature="MGUCMBgx6cuwTzg0W29zNUra8xfMsEcb3rFA3Y"

   "STREAM" QUIC frame containing response body data:

   ...

B.2.6.  Partial Transfer with Content Integrity and Authenticity

   In this example, partial content is transferred and the "Range"
   header (as described in Section 8) is used to indicate that 50 bytes
   out of 100 bytes were transferred.  Content integrity is provided by
   the inclusion of the "Digest" header, as described in Section 6.1.
   Authenticity is provided by the "Signature" header which protects the
   header fields described in further detail.  The "Signature" header
   parameter "keyId" contains the URL of a file containing the public
   key related to the multicast sender's private key used to create the
   digital signature.

   "PUSH_PROMISE" HTTP/2 frame:











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   :method: GET
   :scheme: https
   :path: /files/example.txt
   :authority: example.org
   range: bytes=0-*
   signature: keyId="https://example.org/mcast-sender.example.org.pem",
       algorithm=rsa-sha256,
       headers="(request-target) :scheme :authority range",
       signature="MGQCMFTaFptaM2FhgzJq2i9AaChuFDHjp6GiXVtRnI8BsA"

   Leading "HEADERS" HTTP/2 frame:

   :status: 206
   content-length: 100
   content-type: text/plain
   date: Fri, 20 Jan 2017 10:00:00 GMT
   digest: SHA-256=DieQ9zfRaDdyAilTVCvmBePuxMm+B6cNocP+QCrNSqo=

   "STREAM" QUIC frame containing response body data:

   ...

   Trailing "HEADERS" HTTP/2 frame protecting the ":method", ":path",
   ":scheme" and ":authority" of the pseudo-request above, plus the
   "Date", "Digest" and "Content-Range" of the response:

   content-range: bytes 0-49/100
   signature: keyId="https://example.org/mcast-sender.example.org.pem",
       algorithm=rsa-sha256,
       headers="(request-target) :scheme :authority
           date digest content-range",
       signature="MGUCMBgx6cuwTzg0W29zNUra8xfMsEcb3rFA3Y"

Appendix C.  Changelog

      *RFC Editor's Note:* Please remove this section prior to
      publication of a final version of this document.

C.1.  Since draft-pardue-quic-http-mcast-00

   o  Update references to QUIC I-Ds.

   o  Relax session leaving requirements language.

   o  Clarify handling of omitted session parameter advertisements.

   o  Rename "Idle" state to "Quiescent".




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   o  Add digest algorithm session parameter.

   o  Add signature algorithm session parameter.

   o  Add Initialization Vector session parameter.

   o  Replace COPT tag-value-pairs with TransportParameter values.

   o  Add example of an advertisement for a session with content
      authenticity and integrity.

Authors' Addresses

   Lucas Pardue
   BBC Research & Development

   Email: lucas.pardue@bbc.co.uk


   Richard Bradbury
   BBC Research & Development

   Email: richard.bradbury@bbc.co.uk




























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