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Network Working Group                                          A. Pastor
Internet-Draft                                                  D. Lopez
Intended status: Experimental                             Telefonica I+D
Expires: December 28, 2015                                       K. Wang
                                                               X. Zhuang
                                                                   M. Qi
                                                            China Mobile
                                                                M. Zarny
                                                           Goldman Sachs
                                                                S. Majee
                                                             F5 Networks
                                                              N. Leymann
                                                        Deutsche Telekom
                                                               L. Dunbar
                                                                  Huawei
                                                           M. Georgiades
                                                                PrimeTel
                                                           June 26, 2015


    Use Cases and Requirements for an Interface to Network Security
                               Functions
                 draft-pastor-i2nsf-merged-use-cases-00

Abstract

   This document describes use cases and requirements for a common
   interface to Network Security Functions (NSF).  It considers several
   use cases, organized in two basic scenarios.  In the access network
   scenario, mobile and residential users access NSF capabilities using
   their network service provider infrastructure.  In the data center
   scenario customers manage NSFs hosted in the data center
   infrastructure.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."



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   This Internet-Draft will expire on December 28, 2015.

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   described in the Simplified BSD License.



































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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   2.  Requirements Language  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   3.  Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   4.  General Use Cases  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     4.1.  Instantiation and Configuration of NSFs  . . . . . . . . .  6
     4.2.  Updating of NSFs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     4.3.  Collecting the Status of NSFs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     4.4.  Validation of NSFs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   5.  Access Network Scenario  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     5.1.  vNSF Deployment  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     5.2.  vNSF Customer Provisioning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   6.  Cloud Datacenter Scenario  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     6.1.  On-Demand Virtual Firewall Deployment  . . . . . . . . . .  8
     6.2.  Firewall Policy Deployment Automation  . . . . . . . . . .  9
       6.2.1.  Client-Specific Security Policy in Cloud VPNs  . . . .  9
   7.  Considerations on Policy and Configuration . . . . . . . . . . 10
     7.1.  Translating Policies into NSF Capabilities . . . . . . . . 11
   8.  Key Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
   9.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
   10. IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
   11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
     11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
     11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

























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1.  Introduction

   Not only enterprise customers, but also residential and mobile ones
   are becoming more and more aware of the need for network security,
   just to find that security services are hard to operate and become
   expensive in the case of reasonably sophisticated ones.  This general
   trend has caused numerous operators and security vendors to start to
   leverage on cloud-based models to deliver security solutions.  In
   particular, the methods around Network Function Virtualization (NFV)
   are meant to facilitate the elastic deployment of software images
   providing the network services, and require the management of various
   resources by customers, who may not own or physically host those
   network functions.

   There are numerous benefits by defining such interfaces.  Operators
   could provide more flexible and customized security services for
   specific users and this would provide more efficient and secure
   protection to each user.

   This document analyzes the use cases for the provisioning, operation
   and management of Network Security Functions (NSF) in the access
   network environment, and cloud-based services as shown in the
   following figure.


         Customer   +     Access     +     PoP/Datacenter
                    |                |     +--------+
                    |          ,-----+--.  |Network |
                    |        ,'      |   `-|Operator|
    +-------------+ |       /+----+  |     |Mgmt Sys|
    | Residential |-+------/-+vCPE+----+   +--------+
    +-------------+ |     /  +----+  |  \     |    :
                    |    /           |   \    |     |
        +-------+   |   ;    +----+  |    +----+    |
        | Cloud |---+---+----+ vPE+--+----+ NSF|    |
        +-------+   |   :    +----+  |    +----+    |
                    |    :           |   /          |
         +--------+ |    :   +----+  |  /           ;
         | Mobile |-+-----\--+vEPC+----+           /
         +--------+ |      \ +----+  |          ,-'
                    |       `--.     |      _.-'
                    |           `----+----''
                    +                +


                         Figure 1:  NSF and actors





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2.  Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

   In this document, these words will appear with that interpretation
   only when in ALL CAPS.  Lower case uses of these words are not to be
   interpreted as carrying RFC-2119 significance.


3.  Terminology

   Network Security Function (NSF): A functional block within a network
   infrastructure to ensure integrity, confidentiality and availability
   of network communications, to detect unwanted activity, and to deter
   and block this unwanted activity or at least mitigate its effects on
   the network

   vNSF: Virtual Network Security Function: A network security function
   that runs as a software image on a virtualized infrastructure, and
   can be requested by one domain but may be owned or managed by another
   domain.

   NSFs considered in this draft include virtualized and non-virtualized
   NSFs.


4.  General Use Cases

   User request security services through specific clients (a customer
   app, the NSP BSS/OSS or management platform...) and the appropriate
   NSP network entity will invoke the (v)NSFs according to the user
   service request.  We will call this network entity the security
   controller.  The interaction between the entities discussed above
   (client, security controller, NSF) is shown in the following diagram:

                          +----------+
   +-------+              |          |                  +-------+
   |       |  Interface 1 |Security  |   Interface 2    | NSF(s)|
   |Client <-------------->          <------------------>       |
   |       |              |Controller|                  |       |
   +-------+              |          |                  +-------+
                          +----------+

                  Figure 2: Interaction between Entities

   Interface 1 is used for receiving security requirements from client



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   and translating them into commands that NSFs can understand and
   execute.  Moreover, it is also responsible for giving feedback of the
   NSF security statistics to client.  Interface 2 is used for
   interacting with NSFs according to commands, and collect status
   information about NSFs.

4.1.  Instantiation and Configuration of NSFs

   Client sends collected security requirements through Interface 1 to
   the security controller in the NSP network, which then translates
   them into a a set of security functions.  Then the corresponding NSFs
   are instantiated and configured through Interface 2.

   As an example, consider an enterprise user A who wants to prevent a
   certain kind of traffic from flowing to their network.  Such a
   requirement is sent from client to security controller through
   Interface 1.  The security controller translates the requirement into
   a firewall function plus a rules for filtering out TCP and/or UDP
   data packets.  Then it instantiates a firewall NSF through Interface
   2.  The corresponding filter rules are also configured onto this
   firewall NSF through Interface 2.

4.2.  Updating of NSFs

   A user can direct the client to require the update of security
   service functions, including adding/deleting a security service
   function and updating configurations of former security service
   function.

   As an example, consider a user who has instantiated a security
   service before and decides to enable an additional IDS service.  This
   requirement will be sent to the security controller through Interface
   1 and be translated, so the security controller instantiates and
   configures an IDS NSF through Interface 2.

4.3.  Collecting the Status of NSFs

   When users want to get the executing status of security service, they
   can request the status statistics information of NSFs from the
   client.  The security controller will collect NSF status statistics
   information through Interface 2, consolidate them, and give feedback
   to client through Interface 1.  This interface can be used to collect
   not only individual service information, but also aggregated data
   suitable for tasks like infrastructure security assessment.







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4.4.  Validation of NSFs

   Customers may require to validate NSF availability, provenance, and
   its correct execution.  This validation process, especially relevant
   for vNSFs, includes at least:

   o  Integrity of the NSF.  Ensure that the NSF is not manipulated.

   o  Isolation.  The execution of the NSF is self-contained for privacy
      requirements in multi-tenancy scenarios.

   In order to achieve this the security controller has to collect
   security measurements and share them with an independent and trusted
   third party, allowing the user to attest the NSF by using Interface 1
   and the information of the trusted third party.


5.  Access Network Scenario

   This scenario describes use cases for users (enterprise user, network
   administrator, residential user...) that request and manage security
   services hosted in the network service provider (NSP) infrastructure.
   Given that NSP customers are essentially users of their access
   networks, the scenario is essentially associated with their
   characteristics, as well as with the use of vNSFs.

   The Virtual CPE described in [NFVUC] use cases #5 and #7 cover the
   model of virtualization for mobile and residential access, where the
   operator may offload security services from the customer local
   environment (or even the terminal) to the operator infrastructure
   supporting the access network.

   These use cases defines the operator interaction with vNSFs through
   automated interfaces, typically by B2B communications performed by
   the operator management systems (OSS/BSS).

5.1.  vNSF Deployment

   The deployment process consists of instantiating a NSF on a
   Virtualization Infrastructure (NFVI), within the NSP administrative
   domain(s) or with other external domain(s).  This is a required step
   before a customer can subscribe to a security service supported in
   the vNSF.

5.2.  vNSF Customer Provisioning

   Once a vNSF is deployed, any customer can subscribe to it.  The
   provisioning lifecycle includes:



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   o  Customer enrollment and cancellation of the subscription to a
      vNSF.

   o  Configuration of the vNSF, based on specific configurations, or
      derived from common security policies defined by the NSP.

   o  Retrieve and list of the vNSF functionalities, extracted from a
      manifest or a descriptor.  The NSP management systems can demand
      this information to offer detailed information through the
      commercial channels to the customer.


6.  Cloud Datacenter Scenario

   In a datacenter, network security mechanisms such as firewalls may
   need to be added or removed dynamically for a number of reasons.  It
   may be explicitly requested by the user, or triggered by a pre-
   agreed-upon service level agreement (SLA) between the user and the
   provider of the service.  For example, the service provider may be
   required to add more firewall capacity within a set timeframe
   whenever the bandwidth utilization hits a certain threshold for a
   specified period.  This capacity expansion could result in adding new
   instances of firewalls.  Likewise, a service provider may need to
   provision a new firewall instance in a completely new environment due
   to a new requirement.

   The on-demand, dynamic nature of deployment essentially requires that
   the network security "devices" be in software or virtual form
   factors, rather than in a physical appliance form.  (This is a
   provider-side concern.  Users of the firewall service are agnostic,
   as they should, as to whether or not the firewall service is run on a
   VM or any other form factor.  Indeed, they may not even be aware that
   their traffic traverses firewalls.)

   Furthermore, new firewall instances need to be placed in the "right
   zone" (domain).  The issue applies not only to multi-tenant
   environments where getting the tenant right is of paramount
   importance but also to environments owned and operated by a single
   organization with its own service segregation policies.  For example,
   an enterprise may mandate that firewalls serving Internet traffic and
   business-to-business (B2B) traffic be separate; or that IPS/IDS
   services for investment banking and non-banking traffic be separate
   for regulatory reasons.

6.1.  On-Demand Virtual Firewall Deployment

   A service provider operated cloud data center could serve tens of
   thousands of clients.  Clients' compute servers are typically hosted



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   on virtual machines (VMs), which could be deployed across different
   server racks located in different parts of the data center.  It is
   often not technically and/or financially feasible to deploy dedicated
   physical firewalls to suit each client's myriad security policy
   requirements.  What is needed is the ability to dynamically deploy
   virtual firewalls for each client's set of servers based on
   established security policies and underlying network topologies.

      ---+-----------------------------+-----
         |                             |
       +---+                         +-+-+
       |vFW|                         |vFW|
       +---+                         +-+-+
         |    Client #1                |  Client #2
      ---+-------+---               ---+-------+---
       +-+-+   +-+-+                 +-+-+   +-+-+
       |vM |   |vM |                 |vM |   |vM |
       +---+   +---+                 +---+   +---+

                       Figure 3:  NSF in DataCenter

6.2.  Firewall Policy Deployment Automation

   Firewall configuration today is a highly complex process that
   involves consulting established security policies, translating those
   policies into firewall rules, further translating those rules into
   vendor-specific configuration sets, identifying all the firewalls,
   and pushing configurations to those firewalls.

   This is often a time consuming, complex and error-prone process even
   within a single organization/enterprise framework.  It becomes far
   more complex in provider-owned cloud networks that serve myriad
   customers.

   Automation can help address many of these issues.  Automation works
   best when it can leverage a common set of standards that will work
   across multiple entities.

6.2.1.  Client-Specific Security Policy in Cloud VPNs

   Clients of service provider operated cloud data centers need not only
   secure virtual private networks (VPNs) but also virtual security
   functions that enforce the clients' security policies.  The security
   policies may govern communications within the clients' own virtual
   networks and those with external networks.  For example, VPN service
   providers may need to provide firewall and other security services to
   their VPN clients.  Today, it is generally not possible for clients
   to dynamically view, much less change, what, where and how security



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   policies are implemented on their provider-operated clouds.  Indeed,
   no standards-based framework that allows clients to retrieve/manage
   security policies in a consistent manner across different providers
   exists.


7.  Considerations on Policy and Configuration

   NSF configurations can vary from simple rules (i.e. block a DDoS
   attack) to very complex configuration ( i.e. define a user firewall
   rules per application, protocol, source and destination port and
   address).  The possibility of using configuration templates per
   control and management type is a common option as well.

   A NSP can push security policies using complex configurations in
   their managed vNSF through its management system.  The open Control
   and management interface has to accommodate this application-driven
   behavior.

   Computer-savvy customers may pursue a similar application-driven
   configuration through the open Control and management interface, but
   standard residential and mobile customers may prefer to use the
   definition of security policies in the form of close-to-natural-
   language sentences with high-level directives or a guide
   configuration process.  The representation for these policies will be
   of the form:


   +-------+   +------+   +------+   +------------------+
   |Subject| + |Action| + |Object| + |Field_type = Value|
   +-------+   +------+   +------+   +------------------+


                Figure 4: High-Level Security Policy Format

   Subject indicates the customer or device in the access.

   Action can include a variety of intent-based actions: check,
   redirect, allow, block, record, inspect...

   Object can be optional and specifies the nature of the action.  The
   default is all the customer traffic, but others possible values are
   connections and connections attempts.

   Field_type allows to create fine-grained policies, including
   destinations list (i.e.  IPs, domains), content types (i.e. files,
   emails), windows of time (i.e. weekend), protocol or network service
   (i.e.  HTTP).



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   An example of a customer policy is:

   "My son is allowed to access Facebook from 18:30 to 20:00"

7.1.  Translating Policies into NSF Capabilities

   Policies expressed in the above model are suitable for what we
   depicted as Interface 1 in Figure 2.  In order to allow the security
   controller to deal with the different NSFs an intermediate
   representation used for expressing specific configurations in a
   device-independent format is required.  For this purpose, the
   definition of a set of security capabilities provides a means for
   categorizing the actions performed by network security functions.  An
   initial, high-level set of such capabilities consists of:

   o  Identity Management: Includes all services related with identity,
      authentication and key management.  Some examples are:

      *  AAA (Authentication, Authorization, Accounting) services

      *  Remote identity management

      *  Secure key management

   o  Traffic Inspection: A common use case for customers accessing the
      Internet or additional services through it is security
      supervision.  Control and Management interfaces will allow the
      configuration of the vNSF inspection features: signatures updates,
      behavioral parameters or type of traffic to supervise.  Some
      examples are:

      *  IDS/IPS (Intrusion Detection System/Intrusion Prevention System

      *  Deep packet inspection

      *  Data leakage protection

   o  Traffic Manipulation: A more intrusive use case of NSF includes
      the capacity of manipulate the client traffic.  Control and
      Management interfaces will allow the configuration of the NSF
      manipulation features, such as redirect and block rules.  Some
      examples are:

      *  Redirect traffic, as in the case of captive portals

      *  Block traffic: Firewalls, intrusion prevention system, DDOS/
         Anti-DOS (Distributed Denial-of-Service/Anti-Denial-of-Service)




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      *  Encrypt traffic: VPN services that encapsulate and encrypt the
         user traffic.  A SSL VPN is a representative example.

   o  Impersonation:Some NSFs can impersonate a customer service or
      Internet service to provide security functions.  Control and
      Management interfaces will allow the configuration of the service
      to impersonate and his behavioral.  Some examples are:

      *  Honeypots, impersonating customer services, such as HTTP,
         NetBios or SSH

      *  Anonymization services, hiding the source identity, as in the
         case of TOR

   Service Chain will allow for more than one of the aforementioned
   functions to engage in a specific order to a particular flow


8.  Key Requirements

   The I2NSF framework should provide a set of standard interfaces that
   facilitate:

   o  Dynamic creation, enablement, disablement, and removal of network
      security functions;

   o  Policy-driven placement of new function instances in the right
      administrative domain;

   o  Attachment of appropriate security and traffic policies to the
      function instances

   o  Management of deployed instances in terms of fault monitoring,
      utilization monitoring, event logging, inventory, etc.

   Moreover, an I2NSF must support different deployment scenarios:

   o  Single and multi-tenant environments: The term multi-tenant does
      not mean just different companies subscribing to a provider's
      offering.  It can for instance cover administrative domains/
      departments within a single firm that require different security
      and traffic policies.

   o  Premise-agnostic: Said network security functions may be deployed
      on premises or off premises of an organization.

   The I2NSF framework should provide a standard set of interfaces that
   enable:



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   o  Translation of security policies into functional tasks.  Security
      policies may be carried out by one or more security functions.
      For example, a security policy may be translated into an IDS/IPS
      policy and a firewall policy for a given application type.

   o  Translation of functional tasks into vendor-specific configuration
      sets.  For example, a firewall policy needs to be converted to
      vendor-specific configurations.

   o  Retrieval of information such as configuration, utilization,
      status, etc.  Such information may be used for monitoring,
      auditing, troubleshooting purposes.  The above functionality
      should be available in single- or multi-tenant environments as
      well as on-premise or off-premise clouds.


9.  Security Considerations

   The relationship between different actors define the security level
   for the different use cases and must be associated with
   administrative domains:

   o  Closed environments where there is only one administrative network
      domain.  More permissive access controls and lighter validation
      shall be allowed inside the domain because of the protected
      environment.  Integration with existing identity management
      systems is also possible.

   o  Open environments where some NSFs can be hosted in different
      administrative domains, and more restrictive security controls are
      required.  The interfaces to the NSFs must use trusted channels.
      Identity frameworks and federations are common models for
      authentication and Authorization.  Security controllers will be in
      charge of this functionalities.

   Virtualization applied to NSF environment (vNSF) generate several
   concerns in security, being one of the most relevant the attestation
   of the vNSF by the clients.  A holistic analysis has been done in
   [NFVSEC].


10.  IANA Considerations

   This document requires no IANA actions.


11.  References




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11.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

11.2.  Informative References

   [NFVSEC]   "ETSI NFV Group Specification, Network Functions
              Virtualization (NFV) NFV Security; Problem Statement", <ht
              tp://www.etsi.org/deliver/etsi_gs/NFV-SEC/001_099/001/
              01.01.01_60/gs_NFV-SEC001v010101p.pdf>.

   [NFVUC]    "ETSI NFV Group Specification, Network Functions
              Virtualization (NFV) Use Cases", <http://www.etsi.org/
              deliver/etsi_gs/NFV/001_099/001/01.01.01_60/
              gs_NFV001v010101p.pdf>.


Authors' Addresses

   Antonio Pastor
   Telefonica I+D
   Don Ramon de la Cruz, 82
   Madrid,   28006
   Spain

   Phone: +34 913 128 778
   Email: antonio.pastorperales@telefonica.com


   Diego R. Lopez
   Telefonica I+D
   Don Ramon de la Cruz, 82
   Madrid,   28006
   Spain

   Phone: +34 913 129 041
   Email: diego.r.lopez@telefonica.com


   Ke Wang
   China Mobile
   32 Xuanwumenxi Ave,Xicheng District
   Beijing,   100053
   China

   Email: wangkeyj@chinamobile.com




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   Xiaojun Zhuang
   China Mobile
   32 Xuanwumenxi Ave,Xicheng District
   Beijing,   100053
   China

   Email: zhuangxiaojun@chinamobile.com


   Minpeng Qi
   China Mobile
   32 Xuanwumenxi Ave,Xicheng District
   Beijing,   100053
   China

   Email: quiminpeng@chinamobile.com


   Myo Zarny
   Goldman Sachs
   30 Hudson Street
   Jersey City,   NJ 07302
   USA

   Email: myo.zarny@gs.com


   Sumandra Majee
   F5 Networks

   Email: lal2ghar@gmail.com


   Nic Leymann
   Deutsche Telekom

   Email: n.leymann@telekom.de


   Linda Dunbar
   Huawei

   Email: linda.dunbar@huawei.com








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   Michael Georgiades
   PrimeTel

   Email: michaelg@prime-tel.com















































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