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Versions: 00 01

Network Working Group                                         E. Kinnear
Internet-Draft                                                Apple Inc.
Intended status: Standards Track                              P. McManus
Expires: May 4, 2020                                              Fastly
                                                                T. Pauly
                                                                 C. Wood
                                                              Apple Inc.
                                                       November 01, 2019


                        Oblivious DNS Over HTTPS
                  draft-pauly-dprive-oblivious-doh-01

Abstract

   This document describes an extension to DNS Over HTTPS (DoH) that
   allows hiding client IP addresses via proxying encrypted DNS
   transactions.  This improves privacy of DNS operations by not
   allowing any one server entity to be aware of both the client IP
   address and the content of DNS queries and answers.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on May 4, 2020.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect



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   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Specification of Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Deployment Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  HTTP Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     4.1.  HTTP Request  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     4.2.  HTTP Request Example  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     4.3.  HTTP Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.4.  HTTP Response Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   5.  Public Key Discovery  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   6.  Oblivious DoH Public Key Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   7.  Oblivious DoH Message Format  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     7.1.  Oblivious Queries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     7.2.  Oblivious Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   8.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     8.1.  Denial of Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   9.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     9.1.  Oblivious DoH Message Media Type  . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     9.2.  Oblivious DoH Public Key DNS Parameter  . . . . . . . . .  12
   10. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   11. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     11.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     11.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13

1.  Introduction

   DNS Over HTTPS (DoH) [RFC8484] defines a mechanism to allow DNS
   messages to be transmitted in encrypted HTTP messages.  This provides
   improved confidentiality and authentication for DNS interactions in
   various circumstances.

   While DoH can prevent eavesdroppers from directly reading the
   contents of DNS exchanges, it does not allow clients to send DNS
   queries and receive answers from servers without revealing their
   local IP address, and thus information about the identity or location
   of the client.

   Proposals such as Oblivious DNS ([I-D.annee-dprive-oblivious-dns])
   allow increased privacy by not allowing any single DNS server to be
   aware of both the client IP address and the message contents.



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   This document defines Oblivious DoH, an extension to DoH that allows
   for a proxied mode of resolution, in which DNS messages are encrypted
   in such a way that no DoH server can independently read both the
   client IP address and the DNS message contents.

   This mechanism is intended to be used as one option for resolving
   privacy-sensitive content in the broader context of Adaptive DNS
   [I-D.pauly-dprive-adaptive-dns-privacy].

1.1.  Specification of Requirements

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

2.  Terminology

   This document defines the following terms:

   Oblivious Proxy:  A server that proxies encrypted client DNS queries
      to a resolution server that will be able to decrypt the query (the
      Oblivious Target).  Oblivious DoH servers can function as proxies,
      but other non-resolver proxy servers could also be used.

   Oblivious Target:  A resolution server that receives encrypted client
      DNS queries and generates encrypted DNS responses transferred via
      an Oblivious Proxy.

3.  Deployment Requirements

   Oblivious DoH requires, at a minimum:

   o  Two DoH servers, where one can act as an Oblivious Proxy, and the
      other can act as an Oblivious Target.

   o  Public keys for encrypting DNS queries that are passed from a
      client through a proxy to a target (Section 6).  These keys
      guarantee that only the intended Oblivious Target can decrypt
      client queries.

   o  Client ability to generate random [RFC4086] one-time-use symmetric
      keys to encrypt DNS responses.  These symmetric keys ensure that
      only the client will be able to decrypt the response from the
      Oblivious Target.  They are only used once to prevent the
      Oblivious Target from tracking clients based on keys.




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   The mechanism for discovering and provisioning the DoH URI Templates
   and public keys is via parameters added to DNS resource records.  The
   mechanism for discovering the public key is decribed in Section 5.
   The mechanism for discovering a DoH URI Template is described in
   [I-D.pauly-dprive-adaptive-dns-privacy].

4.  HTTP Exchange

   Unlike direct resolution, oblivious hostname resolution over DoH
   involves three parties:

   1.  The Client, which generates queries.

   2.  The Oblivious Proxy, which is a resolution server that receives
       encrypted queries from the client and passes them on to another
       resolution server.

   3.  The Oblivious Target, which is a resolution server that receives
       proxied queries from the client via the Oblivious Proxy.

        --- [ Request encrypted with target public key ] -->
   +---------+             +-----------+             +-----------+
   | Client  +-------------> Oblivious +-------------> Oblivious |
   |         <-------------+   Proxy   <-------------+  Target   |
   +---------+             +-----------+             +-----------+
      <-- [ Response encrypted with client symmetric key ] ---

                     Figure 1: Obvlivious DoH Exchange

4.1.  HTTP Request

   Oblivious DoH queries are created by the Client, and sent to the
   Oblivious Proxy.  Requests to the Oblivious Proxy indicate which DoH
   server to use as an Oblivious Target by specifying two variables:
   "targethost", which indicates the host name of the Oblivious Target
   server, and "targetpath", which indicates the path on which the
   Oblivious Target's DoH server is running.  See Section 4.2 for an
   example request.

   Oblivious DoH messages have no cache value since both requests and
   responses are encrypted using ephemeral key material.  Clients SHOULD
   prefer using HTTP methods and headers that will prevent unhelpful
   cache storage of these exchanges (i.e., preferring POST instead of
   GET).

   Clients MUST set the HTTP Content-Type header to "application/
   oblivious-dns-message" to indicate that this request is an Oblivious




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   DoH query intended for proxying.  Clients also SHOULD set this same
   value for the HTTP Accept header.

   Upon receiving a request that contains a "application/oblivious-dns-
   message" Content-Type, the DoH server looks for the "targethost" and
   "targetpath" variables.  If the variables are not present, then it is
   the target of the query, and it can decrypt the query (Section 7).
   If the variables are present, then the DoH server is acting as an
   Oblivious Proxy.  If it is a proxy, it is expected to send the
   request on to the Oblivious Target using the URI template constructed
   as "https://targethost/targetpath".

4.2.  HTTP Request Example

   The following example shows how a client requests that an Oblivious
   Proxy, "dnsproxy.example.net", forwards an encrypted message to
   "dnstarget.example.net".  The URI template for the Oblivious Proxy is
   "https://dnsproxy.example.net/dns-query{?targethost,targetpath}".
   The URI template for the Oblivious Target is
   "https://dnstarget.example.net/dns-query".

:method = POST
:scheme = https
:authority = dnsproxy.example.net
:path = /dns-query?targethost=dnstarget.example.net&targetpath=/dns-query
accept = application/oblivious-dns-message
cache-control = no-cache, no-store
content-type = application/oblivious-dns-message
content-length = 106

<Bytes containing the encrypted payload for an Oblivious DNS query>

   The Oblivious Proxy then sends the following request on to the
   Oblivious Target:

   :method = POST
   :scheme = https
   :authority = dnstarget.example.net
   :path = /dns-query
   accept = application/oblivious-dns-message
   cache-control = no-cache, no-store
   content-type = application/oblivious-dns-message
   content-length = 106

   <Bytes containing the encrypted payload for an Oblivious DNS query>






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4.3.  HTTP Response

   The response to an Oblivious DoH query is generated by the Oblivious
   Target.  It MUST set the Content-Type HTTP header to "application/
   oblivious-dns-message" for all successful responses.  The body of the
   response contains a DNS message that is encrypted with the client's
   symmetric key (Section 7).

   All other aspects of the HTTP response and error handling are
   inherited from standard DoH.

4.4.  HTTP Response Example

   The following example shows a response that can be sent from an
   Oblivious Target to a client via an Oblivious Proxy.

  :status = 200
  content-type = application/oblivious-dns-message
  content-length = 154

  <Bytes containing the encrypted payload for an Oblivious DNS response>

5.  Public Key Discovery

   In order to use a DoH server as an Oblivious Target, the client must
   know a public key to use for encrypting its queries.  This key can be
   discovered using the SVCB or HTTPSSVC record type
   ([I-D.nygren-dnsop-svcb-httpssvc]) for a name owned by the server.

   The Service Binding key name is "odohkey" (Section 9).  If present,
   this key/value pair contains the public key to use when encrypting
   Oblivious DoH messages that will be targeted at a DoH server.  The
   format of the key is defined in (Section 6).

   Clients MUST only use keys that were retrieved from records protected
   by DNSSEC [RFC4033] to encrypt messages to an Oblivious Target.

6.  Oblivious DoH Public Key Format

   An Oblivious DNS public key is a structure encoded, using TLS-style
   encoding [RFC8446], as follows:

   struct {
      uint16 kem_id;
      uint16 kdf_id;
      uint16 aead_id;
      opaque public_key<1..2^16-1>;
   } ObliviousDNSKey;



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   It contains the information needed to encrypt a message under
   ObliviousDNSKey.public_key such that only the owner of the
   corresponding private key can decrypt the message.  The values for
   ObliviousDNSKey.kem_id, ObliviousDNSKey.kdf_id, and
   ObliviousDNSKey.aead_id are described in [I-D.irtf-cfrg-hpke]
   Section 7.  For convenience, let Identifier(ObliviousDNSKey) be
   defined as the SHA256 value of ObliviousDNSKey serialized.

7.  Oblivious DoH Message Format

   There are two types of Oblivious DoH messages: Queries (0x01) and
   Responses (0x02).  Both are encoded as follows:

   struct {
      uint8  message_type;
      opaque key_id<0..2^16-1>;
      opaque encrypted_message<1..2^16-1>;
   } ObliviousDNSMessage;

   ObliviousDNSMessage.message_type = 0x01 for Query messages and
   ObliviousDNSMessage.message_type = 0x02 for Response messages.
   ObliviousDNSMessage.key_id contains the identifier of the
   corresponding ObliviousDNSKey key.
   ObliviousDNSMessage.encrypted_message contains an encrypted message
   for the Oblivious Target (for Query messages) or client (for Response
   messages).  The following sections describe how these meessage bodies
   are constructed.

7.1.  Oblivious Queries

   Oblivious DoH Query messages must carry the following information:

   1.  A symmetric key under which the DNS response will be encrypted.
       The AEAD algorithm used for the client's response key is the one
       associated with the server's public key.

   2.  A DNS query message which the client wishes to resolve.

   3.  Padding of arbitrary length which MUST contain all zeros.

   The key and message are encoded using the following structure:

   struct {
      opaque dns_message<1..2^16-1>;
      opaque response_seed[32];
      opaque padding<0..2^16-1>;
   } ObliviousDNSQueryBody;




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   Let M be a DNS message a client wishes to protect with Oblivious DoH.
   When sending an Oblivious DoH Query for resolving M to an Oblivious
   Target with ObliviousDNSKey key pk, a client does the following:

   1.  Generate a random response seed of length 32 octets according to
       the guidelines in [RFC4086].

   2.  Create an ObliviousDNSQueryBody structure, carrying the message
       M, response_seed, and padding, to produce Q_plain.

   3.  Unmarshal pk.public_key to produce a public key pkR of type
       pk.kem_id.

   4.  Compute the encrypted message as Q_encrypted =
       encrypt_query_body(pkR, key_id, Q_plain).  key_id is defined as
       Identifier(pk).

   5.  Output a ObliviousDNSMessage message Q where Q.message_type =
       0x01, Q.key_id carries Identifier(pk), and Q.encrypted_message =
       Q_encrypted.

   The client then sends Q to the Oblivious Proxy according to
   Section 4.1.

   def encrypt_query_body(pkR, key_id, Q_plain):
     enc, context = SetupBaseI(pkR, "odns-query")
     aad = 0x01 || key_id
     ct = context.Seal(aad, Q_plain)
     Q_encrypted = enc || ct
     return Q_encrypted

7.2.  Oblivious Responses

   An Oblivious DoH Response message carries the DNS response
   (dns_message) along with padding.  This message is encrypted with the
   client's chosen response key.

   struct {
      opaque dns_message<1..2^16-1>;
      opaque padding<0..2^16-1>;
   } ObliviousDNSResponseBody;

   Targets that receive a Query message Q decrypt and process it as
   follows:

   1.  Look up the ObliviousDNSKey according to Q.key_id.  If no such
       key exists, the Target MAY discard the query.  Otherwise, let skR
       be the private key corresponding to this public key, or one



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       chosen for trial decryption, and pk be the corresponding
       ObliviousDNSKey.

   2.  Compute Q_plain, error = decrypt_query_body(skR, Q.key_id,
       Q.encrypted_message).

   3.  If no error was returned, and Q_plain.padding is valid (all
       zeros), resolve Q_plain.dns_message as needed, yielding a DNS
       message M.

   4.  Create an ObliviousDNSResponseBody structure, carrying the
       message M and padding, to produce R_plain.

   5.  Compute akey, anonce = derive_keys(Q_plain).  (See definition for
       derive_keys below.  Hash, Expand, Extract, Nn, and Nk are
       functions and parameters bound to the target's HPKE public key.)

   6.  Compute R_encrypted = encrypt_response_body(R_plain, akey,
       anonce).  (See definition for encrypt_response_body below.  The
       key_id field used for encryption is empty, yielding 0x0000 as
       part of the AAD.)

   7.  Output a ObliviousDNSMessage message R where R.message_type =
       0x02, R.key_id = nil, and R.encrypted_message = R_encrypted.

def derive_keys(Q_plain):
  context = Hash(Q_plain.dns_message)
  key = Expand(Q_plain.response_seed, concat("odoh key", context), Nk)
  nonce = Expand(Q_plain.response_seed, concat("odoh nonce", context), Nn)
  return key, nonce

   def decrypt_query_body(skR, key_id, Q_encrypted):
     enc || ct = Q_encrypted
     dec, context = SetupBaseR(skR, "odns-query")
     aad = 0x01 || key_id
     Q_plain, error = context.Open(aad, ct)
     return Q_plain, error

   def encrypt_response_body(R_plain, akey, anonce):
     aad = 0x02 || 0x0000 // 0x0000 represents a 0-length KeyId
     R_encrypted = Seal(akey, anonce, aad, R_plain)
     return R_encrypted

   The Target then sends R to the Proxy according to Section 4.3.

   The Proxy forwards the message R without modification back to the
   client as the HTTP response to the client's original HTTP request.




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   Once the client receives the response, it can use its known
   response_seed to derive the decryption key and nonce, decrypt
   R.encrypted_message using decrypt_response_body (defined below), and
   produce R_plain.  Clients MUST validate R_plain.padding (as all
   zeros) before using R_plain.dns_message.

   def decrypt_response_body(R_encrypted):
     aad = 0x02 || 0x0000
     R_plain = Open(response_key, 0^Nn, aad, R_encrypted)
     return R_plain

8.  Security Considerations

   DISCLAIMER: this is a work in progress draft and has not yet seen
   significant security analysis.

   Oblivious DoH aims to keep knowledge of the true query origin and its
   contents known to only clients.  In particular, it assumes a Dolev-
   Yao style attacker which can observe all client queries, including
   those forwarded by oblivious proxies, and does not collude with
   target resolvers.  (Indeed, if a target colludes with the network
   attacker, then said attacker can learn the true query origin and its
   contents.)  Oblivious DoH aims to achieve the following
   confidentiality goals in the presence of this attacker:

   1.  Queries and answers are known only to clients and targets in
       possession of the corresponding response key and HPKE keying
       material.  In particular, proxies know the origin and destination
       of an oblivious query, yet do not know the plaintext query.
       Likewise, targets know only the oblivious query origin, i.e., the
       proxy, and the plaintext query.  Only the client knows both the
       plaintext query contents and destination.

   2.  Target resolvers cannot link queries from the same client in the
       absence of unique per-client keys.

   Traffic analysis mitigations are outside the scope of this document.
   In particular, this document does not recommend padding lengths for
   ObliviousDNSQueryBody and ObliviousDNSResponseBody messages.
   Implementations SHOULD follow the guidance for choosing padding
   length in [RFC8467].

   Oblivious DoH security does not depend on proxy and target
   indistinguishability.  Specifically, an on-path attacker could
   determine whether a connection a specific endpoint is used for
   oblivious or direct DoH queries.  However, this has no effect on
   confidentiality goals listed above.




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8.1.  Denial of Service

   Malicious clients (or proxies) may send bogus Oblivious DoH queries
   to targets as a Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack.  Target servers may
   throttle processing requests if such an event occurs.

   Malicious targets or proxies may send bogus answers in response to
   Oblivious DoH queries.  Response decryption failure is a signal that
   either the proxy or target is misbehaving.  Clients can choose to
   stop using one or both of these servers in the event of such failure.

9.  IANA Considerations

9.1.  Oblivious DoH Message Media Type

   This document registers a new media type, "application/oblivious-dns-
   message".

   Type name: application

   Subtype name: oblivious-dns-message

   Required parameters: N/A

   Optional parameters: N/A

   Encoding considerations: This is a binary format, containing
   encrypted DNS requests and responses, as defined in this document.

   Security considerations: See this document.  The content is an
   encrypted DNS message, and not executable code.

   Interoperability considerations: This document specifies format of
   conforming messages and the interpretation thereof.

   Published specification: This document.

   Applications that use this media type: This media type is intended to
   be used by clients wishing to hide their DNS queries when using DNS
   over HTTPS.

   Additional information: None

   Person and email address to contact for further information: See
   Authors' Addresses section

   Intended usage: COMMON




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   Restrictions on usage: None

   Author: IETF

   Change controller: IETF

9.2.  Oblivious DoH Public Key DNS Parameter

   This document defines one new key to be added to the Service Binding
   (SVCB) Parameter Registry [I-D.nygren-dnsop-svcb-httpssvc].

   Name:  odohkey

   SvcParamKey:  TBD

   Meaning:  Public key used to encrypt messages in Oblivious DoH

   Reference:  This document.

10.  Acknowledgments

   This work is inspired by Oblivious DNS
   [I-D.annee-dprive-oblivious-dns].  Thanks to all of the authors of
   that document.  Thanks to Frederic Jacobs, Elliot Briggs, Paul
   Schmitt, Brian Swander, and Tommy Jensen for the feedback and input.

11.  References

11.1.  Normative References

   [I-D.irtf-cfrg-hpke]
              Barnes, R. and K. Bhargavan, "Hybrid Public Key
              Encryption", draft-irtf-cfrg-hpke-00 (work in progress),
              July 2019.

   [I-D.nygren-dnsop-svcb-httpssvc]
              Schwartz, B., Bishop, M., and E. Nygren, "Service binding
              and parameter specification via the DNS (DNS SVCB and
              HTTPSSVC)", draft-nygren-dnsop-svcb-httpssvc-00 (work in
              progress), September 2019.

   [I-D.pauly-dprive-adaptive-dns-privacy]
              Kinnear, E., Pauly, T., Wood, C., and P. McManus,
              "Adaptive DNS: Improving Privacy of Name Resolution",
              draft-pauly-dprive-adaptive-dns-privacy-00 (work in
              progress), October 2019.





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   [RFC4033]  Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
              Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements",
              RFC 4033, DOI 10.17487/RFC4033, March 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4033>.

   [RFC4086]  Eastlake 3rd, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker,
              "Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4086, June 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4086>.

   [RFC8446]  Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
              Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.

   [RFC8467]  Mayrhofer, A., "Padding Policies for Extension Mechanisms
              for DNS (EDNS(0))", RFC 8467, DOI 10.17487/RFC8467,
              October 2018, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8467>.

   [RFC8484]  Hoffman, P. and P. McManus, "DNS Queries over HTTPS
              (DoH)", RFC 8484, DOI 10.17487/RFC8484, October 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8484>.

11.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.annee-dprive-oblivious-dns]
              Edmundson, A., Schmitt, P., Feamster, N., and A. Mankin,
              "Oblivious DNS - Strong Privacy for DNS Queries", draft-
              annee-dprive-oblivious-dns-00 (work in progress), July
              2018.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

Authors' Addresses

   Eric Kinnear
   Apple Inc.
   One Apple Park Way
   Cupertino, California 95014
   United States of America

   Email: ekinnear@apple.com



Kinnear, et al.            Expires May 4, 2020                 [Page 13]


Internet-Draft                Oblivious DoH                November 2019


   Patrick McManus
   Fastly

   Email: mcmanus@ducksong.com


   Tommy Pauly
   Apple Inc.
   One Apple Park Way
   Cupertino, California 95014
   United States of America

   Email: tpauly@apple.com


   Chris Wood
   Apple Inc.
   One Apple Park Way
   Cupertino, California 95014
   United States of America

   Email: cawood@apple.com





























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