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Internet Engineering Task Force                             P. Porambage
Internet-Draft                                                  P. Kumar
Intended status: Experimental                                  A. Gurtov
Expires: December 25, 2013                                 M. Ylianttila
                                                              E. Harjula
                                                 CWC, University of Oulu
                                                           June 23, 2013


          Certificate based keying scheme for DTLS secured IoT
                     draft-pporamba-dtls-certkey-00

Abstract

   The IP-based Internet of Things (IoT) stands for the universal
   interconnection of smart objects and back end users with the help of
   IP protocols.  Secure key management among the smart objects is an
   important aspect of IoT security.  Due to the high levels of resource
   constraints of the devices in terms of memory, battery capacity and
   CPU power, and other network characteristics such as mobility,
   scalability, heterogeneity and limited bandwidth, the conventional
   security protocols cannot be directly deployed in IoT networks in
   their raw formats.  We propose a lightweight DTLS-based keying
   mechanism for CoAP IoT smart objects which supports the scalability
   of the network and node mobility.  The protocol consumes less device
   resources and minimum network bandwidth by incurring low message
   overhead.  The smart objects can securely access the network and
   obtain certificates after an initial configuration irrespective of
   the manufacturer standards.

Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any



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   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on December 25, 2013.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

   This document may not be modified, and derivative works of it may not
   be created, and it may not be published except as an Internet-Draft.

1.  Introduction

   The IP-based Internet of Things (IoT) will enable smart objects to
   communicate among each other and with backend users of the Internet
   during different activities such as sensing, controlling, smart
   metering and etc.  Due to the massive size networks and resource
   constrained nodes, IoT networks are inherently vulnerable to security
   attacks.  In each of the application scenarios a secure object
   authorization mechanism and a common session key is needed between
   two parties for trustworthy data communication.

   IoT networks and the network devices have several specific
   characteristics.  Mainly the devices are tightly resource constrained
   in terms of memory, battery capacity, CPU power and bandwidth.
   Therefore, the standard expensive IP-based protocols cannot be
   deployed in such networks and inexpensive communication protocols are
   required.  Currently IETF is contributing to the development of
   lightweight protocols for Low-power Lossy IoT networks.  E.g. IPV6
   over Wireless Personal Area Networks (6LoWPAN) and Constrained
   Application Protocol (CoAP).  Likewise security protocols have been
   introduced such as DTLS, HIP-DEX and light versions of EAP.  However
   they are still in an immature stage and not standardized
   correspondingly TLS, IKE or IPSec.  The network can be comprised of
   heterogeneous devices which are manufactured by different vendors
   with different specifications.  Therefore, it is quite challenging to



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   define a common security protocol that is compatible with all the
   device specifications.  The devices can also be mobile and
   application specific.  The size of the network might be varying from
   hundreds to billions of nodes.

   In this draft we propose a secure network access and a key management
   scheme for resource restricted IoT networks.  Furthermore, we analyze
   how the new protocol supports mobility of the devices and scalability
   of the network.  Secure network access enables the nodes to obtain
   authorized identity from a trusted root.  The two-phase solution is
   formulated with Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) handshaking
   protocol.  The certificate generation and key establishment are based
   on Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) arithmetic.  The rest of the
   Internet-draft is organized as follows.  Section 2 gives some related
   work and background about DTLS secured IoT networks.  Section 3
   describes the use cases and the problem statement.  Section 4
   presents the proposed security scheme.  Finally, Section 5 concludes
   the proposed IoT security solution with future improvements.

2.  Related Work and Background

   DTLS protocol is a lighter version of Transport Layer Security (TLS)
   protocol which runs on unreliable User Datagram Protocol (UDP)
   connections [RFC6347].  Though DTLS uses similar messages as TLS
   handshaking it has some internal mechanisms to withstand against DoS
   attacks, replay attacks, packet losses and packet reordering.
   Therefore, DTLS is proposed as the main security binding for
   Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) [I-D.ietf-core-coap].
   Basically the DTLS secured CoAP has three modes of security.

   PreSharedKey: A list of pre-shared keys is deployed in the network
   nodes.  When a connection is formed with a new node, the system
   selects the appropriate key based on the new node and establishes a
   DTLS session using DTLS PSK mode.  This implementation is mandatory
   to consider cipher suite TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 as specified in
   [RFC6655] and security considerations of [RFC4279].

   RawPublicKey: The DTLS enabled devices have asymmetric key pair
   without an X.509 certificate.  The raw public keys are pre-configured
   in the devices in accordance to the cipher suite
   TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 as specified in
   [I-D.mcgrew-tls-aes-ccm-ecc], [RFC5246], [RFC4492].  Each smart
   object calculates an identifier based on its public key.  The
   identifiers are used to associate the endpoints with further device
   information and to perform access control.

   Certificate: The DTLS enabled devices have asymmetric key pair with
   an X.509 certificate.  The certificates are issued and signed by a



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   common trust root.  Sometimes a device might have one or several
   certificates issued by more than one certificate authority.  When a
   device is forming a new connection with a remote device, the
   certificates should be verified.

   The last two phases of DTLS based security modes are more dynamic and
   scalable.  Since the nodes might be manufactured by different vendors
   with different specifications, it is yet an open issue to bring the
   security solution to a common platform.  However the use of X.509
   certificates is still quite expensive for resource constrained
   network devices such as tiny sensors, actuators and smart home
   appliances.  Instead of using a costly explicit certificate scheme,
   it will be highly appropriate to replace with an implicit certificate
   scheme which consumes fewer resources and induces low network
   overhead.  The same certificates are to be utilized in pairwise key
   establishment between CoAP nodes.  Though, DTLS is considered a
   lighter and robust security solution, the number of message transfers
   to establish the secure connection (i.e. 12 messages) still
   introduces a large communication overhead.  In
   [I-D.garcia-core-security-05], the authors have presented the most
   significant security considerations in the IP-based Internet of
   Things.  The internet-draft [I-D.keoh-lwig-dtls-iot] proposes
   pervasive security architecture for the IoT in order to provide
   network access control to smart devices, the management of keys and
   securing unicast/multicast communication.

3.  Use Cases and Problem Statement

   Our work aims an IoT network running on 6LoWPAN/CoAP enabled smart
   network devices.  The network devices can be stationary or mobile,
   battery powered and highly resource constrained in terms of memory
   and CPU power.  The communication links might have bandwidth
   limitations too.  In applications such as smart power metering,
   health monitoring and smart home, the IoT network is connected to the
   public internet through a number of 6LoWPAN border routers (6LBR).
   In defining this key establishment protocol, we consider the 6LBR is
   performing as the controlling entity of the IoT network.  For
   instance take into account a particular scenario of a smart building
   where the lighting devices, window panes and air condition machines
   are controlled, monitored and billed by a central authority.  The
   functionality of each device is controlled by the central node, based
   on the sensed data related to the network.









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3.1.  Problem Statement and Requirements

   As explained in the previous section, DTLS plays a prominent role in
   CoAP-based IoT security.  Nevertheless, it produces a reasonable
   message overhead to low-power lossy networks.  If DTLS is not used,
   however, there should be a strong and inexpensive secure key
   establishment protocol for IoT networks.  The demand for a secure
   lightweight keying mechanism is significant for both DTLS and non-
   DTLS secured IoT networks.  The utilization of implicit certificates
   as a replacement for X.509 certificates will also be a low-cost
   solution.  Therefore we identify two main problems with security in
   CoAP-based IoT networks.

   o  A new joining device must have secure and authorized identity to
      perform as legitimate nodes in the network.  The nodes can claim
      their legitimacy by having implicit certificates granted by a
      common trust root (e.g. 6LBR).

   o  Lightweight pairwise key establishment is mandatory for mutual
      communication between nodes or nodes and back end internet users.
      The two entities should be able to use the certificates as an
      implicit assurance for being legitimate users of the particular
      network.

   Additionally the solution requires being scalable and supporting
   mobility and heterogeneity of the network devices.  Since the network
   might contain thousand to billions of nodes, the solution should be
   easily extensible.  Furthermore, since the devices have to be
   accessed and controlled via standard IP protocols, the authorized
   identification should be IP supportive.

3.2.  Security Requirements

   We consider the Internet Threat Model in [RFC3552] where a malicious
   attacker can read and modify the network traffic while transmitting
   between devices.  However, it is assumed that the devices themselves
   are protected and not exposed to node capture or compromising
   attacks.

   The security scheme should be lightweight as well as strongly
   secured.  PKC based schemes are more secured than symmetric key
   algorithms.  Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) which is an
   inexpensive alternative for PKC is to be used for protocol design.
   Random numbers are supposed to be generated as given in
   [NIST-800-108].

4.  Design




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   This section provides a brief overview of the design of the protocol
   which consists of two phases as (i) secure network access and
   certificate receipt (ii) secure pairwise key establishment between
   communicating nodes.

4.1.  Overview

   The first phase associates with a new node accesses to a secure
   network and obtains its authorized certificate and private key
   construction data for deriving its own private-public key pair.  When
   a new node is added to the network with an initial configuration of
   cryptographic primitives it has to generate a certificate request to
   the certificate authority (CA) (i.e. 6LBR).  Since the smart devices
   have limited transmission they might not be able to access the trust
   root or 6LBR in single hop.  Therefore the certificate requests can
   be sent as multiple hops by means of relaying devices.  Since 6LBR is
   a resource rich device, it can directly transmit the certificates to
   all the smart devices within the network.

   The second phase of the protocol supports to establish secure traffic
   encryption keys between any two legitimate nodes which can prove
   their authenticity using the certificates and other cryptographic
   primitives.  Even a back end user of the traditional internet can
   establish pairwise keys with smart devices in the IoT network.
   However, the users should obviously possess the security parameters
   (i.e. certificate issued by the same trust root) similar to the other
   nodes it the particular IoT network.  In such scenarios, the back end
   users also have to access the corresponding border router initially.
   Afterwards the secure communication can be established according to
   DTLS Certificate mode as explained in section 4.3.

4.2.  Hash Function Selection

   During both phases, a cryptographic hash function has to be used.  As
   specified in [SEC4], hash function selection should be carefully done
   for low-power devices and their security algorithms.  The use of
   SHA-1 is not recommended anymore due its security collapse shown by
   Wang, [Collisions-SHA1].  SHA-2 and SHA-3 functions induce a high
   processing overhead and memory footprint on devices which are not
   affordable by resource constrained network devices.  In
   [I-D.ietf-suiteee], the author has proposed a suitable block cipher
   based hash function for resource constrained devices.  The motivation
   is to use a hash function with reduced codes size, suitable for
   hardware implementation, reduced computational cost and less energy
   consumption, however with strong security.  As explained in
   [I-D.ietf-suiteee], AES-MMO (Matyas-Meyer-Oseas) hash function
   provides a reasonable level of security with less resource
   consumption.  Specifically it supports the hardware specifications of



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   IEEE 802.15.4 standard including AES encryption.  AES-MMO provides
   128-bit security level and MD-strengthening padding scheme is used
   for existing deployments in ZigBee Smart Energy applications which
   reduces padding on small messages.  However, the use of AES-MMO hash
   function for real-time implementation requires careful
   considerations.

4.3.  Certificate Generation

   DTLS message exchange for secure network access has to be performed
   when a new node is joining to an existing IoT network.  The
   certificate generation is inspired by the ECQV implicit certificate
   scheme presented in [SEC4].  First the node should be pre-installed
   with several security parameters namely, Elliptic Curve (EC) domain
   parameters (q, a, b, G - base point generator with n order, q - a
   prime), authentication key K, CAs public key (Q_CA) and a valid IPV6
   address.  K is common to all the smart objects and trust root of the
   network.  Then the node can be located in the network and start
   exchanging messages with the corresponding trust root (i.e. CA).  The
   simple timeout and retransmission scheme with the standard DTLS state
   machine is also applicable to this handshaking too.

   Initially the client (i.e. smart device) sends the Client Hello
   message and upon receiving the message, the server (i.e. CA) verifies
   the message and responds with a HelloVerifyRequest.  After the client
   verifies the server Hello message successfully, it generates a random
   integer r_U and true nonce N_U, creates a certificate request (EC
   point) R_U and sends to the server the certificate request along with
   its IPV6 address and MAC value.

   Upon receiving the certificate request, the server checks the
   legitimacy of IPV6 address and verifies the MAC value.  If both are
   successful, the server computes public key reconstruction data P_U
   for the client, using the request point R_U. Then the certificate is
   generated as an encoded version of P_U, client IPV6 address and time
   stamp T. The server computes an integer (r_U) value for calculating
   client private key construction value s. Hash value of the
   certificate is computed during this stage.  The selection of hash
   function is described in section 4.1.1.  CA private key (d_CA) is
   utilized while calculating s.

   On receiving the certificate and private key construction integer,
   the client first verifies the integrity of the message using the MAC
   and analyses the certificate for further verifications.

   The client calculates private key (d_U) and public key (Q_U) as
   depicted in Figure 1.  During this stage, the client computes its
   public key by two mechanisms for authenticating whether the



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   certificate is granted by the given trusted root.  If the
   verification is successful, the client sends Finish message to the
   server.  Finally, the server concludes the handshaking with the
   Server Finished message.

           Client                                      Server
         (Node U)                                    (CA)
         --------                                 --------

         Client Hello        ---------->
                             <---------- HelloVerifyRequest

         Certificate Request
         Generation
         generate r_U
         R_U = r_U * G
         Generate N_U
         Calculate
         MAC[R_U, U, N_U]

         Certificate Request
         R_U, N_U, U, MAC    ---------->
                                         Check validity of U
                                         Verify MAC
                                         Generate r_CA
                                         P_U = R_U + r_CA * G
                                         Cert_U = {U, P_U, T}
                                         e = H(Cert_U)
                                         s = e*r_CA + d_CA (mod n)
                                         Generate N_CA
                                         Calculate
                                         MAC [Cert_U, s, N_CA]
                                         Message
                             <---------- Cert_U, s, N_CA, MAC
         Verify MAC
         Analyze Cert_U
         e = H(Cert_U)
         d_U = e*r_U + s (mod n)
         Method 1: Q_U = d_U*G
         Method 2: Q1_U = eP_U + Q_CA
         Verify Q_U == Q1_U

         ClientFinished      ---------->
                             <---------- ServerFinished



                                 Figure 1



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4.4.  Secure Pairwise Key Establishment

   When the IoT network nodes possess valid certificates and public-
   private key pairs, they are in a position to communicate equivalently
   in the Certificate mode of DTLS secured CoAP.  Two smart devices can
   setup a secure communication channel along with a pairwise key
   establishment for traffic encryption as illustrated in Figure 2.
   Here we consider the initiator node as the client and the responder
   node as the server.

         Client                                      Server
        (Node U)                                Node V)
       --------                                 --------

       Client Hello        ---------->
                           <---------- HelloVerifyRequest

       Generate N_U
       Calculate MAC [Cert_U, U, N_U]
       Key Establishment Request
       Cert_U, N_U, U, MAC ---------->
                                       Check validity of U
                                       Verify MAC
                                       e = H(Cert_U)
                                       Q_U = eCert_U + Q_CA
                                       Generate N_V
                                       Calculate MAC[Cert_V, V, N_V]
                                       Response
                           <---------- Cert_V, N_V, V, MAC
       Verify MAC                      K_UV = d_V*Q_U = d_V*d_U*G
       e = H(Cert_V)
       Q_V = eCert_V + Q_CA
       K_UV = d_U*Q_V = d_U*d_V*G

       ClientFinished      ---------->
                           <---------- ServerFinished



                                 Figure 2

   The initial handshake is performed between the client and the server
   by exchanging Hello messages according to the standard DTLS protocol.
   The client node (U) chooses a true random nonce NU and broadcasts it
   along with Cert_U, IPV6 address U and MAC[Cert_U, N_U, U].  Similarly
   in Phase I, MAC is appended for the initial authentication.  Once the
   server node (V) receives the message, it verifies the MAC.  If the
   verification succeeds, it can ensure that U is an authenticated user.



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   Furthermore, V can have an implicit assurance that U is a legitimate
   user of the given cluster by computing sender public key QU using
   Q_CA; e = H(Cert_U) and Q_U = eCert_U + Q_CA.  According to the
   following derivation in Figure 3, the calculation also gives exactly
   the same Q_U as computed by node U.

               Q_U =   d_U * G
                   =   (er_U + s (mod n)) * G
                   =   (er_U + er_CA + d_CA (mod n)) *G
                   =   e (r_U + r_CA (mod n)) * G + d_CA * G
                   =   e(r_U * G + r_CA * G) + Q_CA
                   =   e(R_U + r_CA * G) + Q_CA
                   =   eCert_U + Q_CA

                                 Figure 3

   Then the node V generates a random nonce NV and sends it along with
   Cert_V , identity V and MAC[Cert_V , N_V , V].  In the meantime V
   computes the pairwise key K_UV from its private key d_V and Q_U, K_UV
   = d_V Q_U. Similar to V, upon receiving the message, node U verifies
   the MAC and if the verification is successful it computes QV and K_UV
   = d_UQ_V . Therefore, at the end of two way message transferring,
   both parties can derive a common pairwise key for actual secure
   communication.

   Comparing to the standard ECDH key exchange, our scheme is more
   secure since it validates the legitimacy of both parties before
   deriving the final key.  Instead of transmitting the public keys in
   the air, the nodes send their Cert values to derive the public keys
   (at the other node).  This will also implicitly assure the
   authenticity and legitimacy of smart objects.

   Finally the handshaking is concluded by exchanging Finished messages.
   We assume that DTLS handshaking messages are delivered reliably as
   explained in [RFC6347].

   Likewise, the same handshaking can be performed between a smart
   device in the IoT network and a backend user in the Internet.
   However the Internet users should also possess valid certificates
   from the same trust root.

5.  Conclusion and Future Work

   In this Internet draft we have proposed a DTLS-based certificate
   scheme and a secure key establishment for IoT networks.  The protocol
   is lightweight and strongly secured due to the exploitation of ECC
   arithmetic throughout the entire design.  The implementation of the
   proposed protocol on TelosB mote platform shows the feasibility of



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   deploying it on tightly resource constrained devices.  The
   performance measurements in terms of memory foot-prints (ROM and RAM)
   and execution time illustrate the necessity of applying optimization
   techniques for ECC operations.

   Our protocol supports the scalability of the network and the topology
   changes (i.e, location changes or mobility) of the smart objects with
   in the same IoT network.  When a new node is added to the network, a
   valid node identity, keying information (i.e, K and QCA) and EC
   domain parameters should be stored.  Then, at the bootstrapping
   phase, the node can send the certificate request and obtain a
   certificate from the CA for computing its own keys.  Therefore, the
   size of the network is not necessary to be pre-defined during the
   initial deployment phase.  The CA only needs to verify the validity
   of the sensor node IPV6 identities to issue the certificate.
   Similarly, the nodes do not need a prior knowledge about their
   neighbors.  Whenever a new node is added to the network or it changes
   the neighboring set, it can establish the pairwise link keys, with
   the corresponding neighbors using the certificate.

   The certificates always provide an implicit assurance for the nodes,
   that they are authenticated nodes in the given domain.  Irrespective
   of the location of the devices (within the given IoT network) they
   can derive the pairwise keys securely without previous awareness of
   the new communicating nodes.  If the pairwise keys between
   communicating nodes (i.e. node to node or node to Internet user) are
   pre-installed, there should be a large number of stored keys per
   node, which may not be desirable for large scale networks.  However,
   in our protocol such a large scale key pre-installation is not
   needed.  Bandwidth utilization is also preserved by restricting two
   message transactions for both certificate generation and key
   establishment scenarios.

   In future we intend to extend the certificate generation phase for
   enabling secure multicast operations.  Afterwards the multicast keys
   are to be established to protect CoAP messages on top of IP
   multicast.  Moreover the protocol is to be extended for further
   supporting the mobility of nodes and scalability of the network.
   Similar implicit certificates can be incorporated with other
   pervasive secure handshaking mechanisms such as HIP-DEX for securing
   IoT networks.

6.  IANA Considerations

7.  Security Considerations






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   This document discusses different design aspects of DTLS based secure
   key establishment scenarios.  This document is entirely focused on
   security.

8.  Acknowledgements

   The authors would like to thank Zach Shelby for his valuable comments
   and suggestions.

9.  References

9.1.  Normative References

   [Collisions-SHA1]
              Wang, X., Yin, Y., and H. Yu, "Finding Collisions in the
              Full SHA-1", in Proceedings of Crypto, 2005.

   [I-D.garcia-core-security-05]
              Garcia-Morchon, O., Keoh, S., Kumar, S., Hummen, R., and
              R. Struik, "Security Considerations in the IP-based
              Internet of Things", draft-gracia-core-security-05 (work
              in progress), March 2013.

   [I-D.keoh-lwig-dtls-iot]
              Keoh, S., Kumar, S., and O. Garcia-Morchon, "Securing the
              IP-based Internet of Things with DTLS", dtraft-keoh-lwig-
              dtls-iot-01 (work in progress), February 2013.

   [I-D.mcgrew-tls-aes-ccm-ecc]
              McGrew, D., Bailey, D., Campagna, M., and R. Dugal,
              "AESCCM ECC Cipher Suites for TLS", draft-mcgrew-tls-aes-
              ccm-ecc-06 (work in progress) (work in progress), February
              2013.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC3552]  Rescorla, E. and B. Korver, "Guidelines for Writing RFC
              Text on Security Considerations", BCP 72, RFC 3552, July
              2003.

   [RFC4279]  Eronen, P. and H. Tschofenig, "Pre-Shared Key Ciphersuites
              for Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 4279, December
              2005.

   [RFC5246]  Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
              (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.




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9.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.ietf-core-coap]
              Shelby, Z., Hartke, K., Bormann, C., and B. Frank,
              "Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP)", draft-ietfcore-
              coap-12(work in progress) (work in progress), October
              2012.

   [I-D.ietf-suiteee]
              Campagna, M., "A Cryptographic Suite for Embedded Systems
              (SuiteE)", draft-campagna-suitee-04 (work in progress),
              October 2012.

   [NIST-800-108]
              National Institute of Standards and Technology , "NIST SP
              800-108, Recommendation for Key Derivation Using
              Pseudorandom Functions", NIST Special Publication 800-108,
              , <http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/ 800-108/
              sp800-108.pdf>.

   [RFC4492]  Blake-Wilson, S., Bolyard, N., Gupta, V., Hawk, C., and B.
              Moeller, "Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites
              for Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 4492, May 2006.

   [RFC6347]  Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer
              Security Version 1.2", RFC 6347, Janurary 2012.

   [RFC6655]  McGrew, D. and D. Bailey, "AES-CCM Cipher Suites for
              Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 6655, July 2012.

   [SEC4]     Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group , "Elliptic
              Curve Qu-Vanstone Implicit Certificate Scheme (ECQV),
              v0.97", SEC 4, March 2011,
              <http://www.secg.org/download/aid-785/sec4-0.97.pdf>.

Authors' Addresses

   Pawani Porambage
   CWC, University of Oulu
   P.O. Box 4500, FI-90014
   Oulu
   Finland

   Phone: +358 8 553 2965
   Email: pporamba@ee.oulu.fi
   URI:   http://www.cwc.oulu.fi





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Internet-Draft                DTLS CERTREQ                     June 2013


   Pradeep Kumar
   CWC, University of Oulu
   P.O. Box 4500, FI-90014
   Oulu
   Finland

   Phone: +358 8 553 2965
   Email: pkumar@ee.oulu.fi
   URI:   http://www.cwc.oulu.fi


   Andrei Gurtov
   CWC, University of Oulu
   P.O. Box 4500, FI-90014
   Oulu
   Finland

   Phone: +358 40 596 3729
   Email: gurtov@ee.oulu.fi
   URI:   http://www.cwc.oulu.fi


   Mika Ylianttila
   CWC, University of Oulu
   P.O. Box 4500, FI-90014
   Oulu
   Finland

   Phone: +358 40 535 0505
   Email: mika.ylianttila@ee.oulu.fi
   URI:   http://www.cwc.oulu.fi


   Erkki Harjula
   CWC, University of Oulu
   P.O. Box 4500, FI-90014
   Oulu
   Finland

   Phone: +358 40 535 0505
   Email: erkkih@ee.oulu.fi
   URI:   http://www.cwc.oulu.fi









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