[Docs] [txt|pdf|xml|html] [Tracker] [Email] [Diff1] [Diff2] [Nits] [IPR]

Versions: (draft-pritikin-bootstrapping-keyinfrastructures) 00 01 02 draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra

ANIMA WG                                                     M. Pritikin
Internet-Draft                                              M. Behringer
Intended status: Informational                              S. Bjarnason
Expires: August 17, 2015                                           Cisco
                                                       February 13, 2015


                   Bootstrapping Key Infrastructures
             draft-pritikin-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra-01

Abstract

   This document specifies automated bootstrapping of an key
   infrastructure using vendor installed IEEE 802.1AR manufacturing
   installed certificates, in combination with a vendor based service on
   the Internet.  Before being authenticated, a new device has only
   link-local connectivity, and does not require a routable address.
   When a vendor provides an Internet based service, devices can be
   forced to join only specific domains but for constrained environments
   we describe a variety of options that allow bootstrapping to proceed.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on August 17, 2015.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect



Pritikin, et al.         Expires August 17, 2015                [Page 1]


Internet-Draft      Bootstrapping Key Infrastructures      February 2015


   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.1.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   2.  Architectural Overview  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Operational Overview  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     3.1.  Instantiating the Domain Certification Authority  . . . .   7
     3.2.  Instantiating the Registrar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     3.3.  Accepting New Entities  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     3.4.  Automatic Enrolment of Devices  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     3.5.  Operating the Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   4.  Functional Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     4.1.  Behavior of a new entity  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       4.1.1.  Proxy Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
       4.1.2.  Receiving and accepting the Domain Identity . . . . .  12
       4.1.3.  Enrollment  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
       4.1.4.  After Enrollment  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     4.2.  Behavior of a proxy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     4.3.  Behavior of the Registrar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
       4.3.1.  Authenticating the Device . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
       4.3.2.  Accepting the Entity  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
       4.3.3.  Claiming the new entity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     4.4.  Behavior of the MASA Service  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
       4.4.1.  Issue Authorization Token and Log the event . . . . .  16
       4.4.2.  Retrieve Audit Entries from Log . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     4.5.  Leveraging the new key infrastructure / next steps  . . .  16
       4.5.1.  Network boundaries  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   5.  Protocol Details  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     5.1.  EAP-EST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     5.2.  Request bootstrap token . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     5.3.  Request MASA authorization token  . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     5.4.  Request MASA authorization log  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
   6.  Reduced security operational modes  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
   7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
     7.1.  Trust Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
   8.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
   9.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
     9.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
     9.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23






Pritikin, et al.         Expires August 17, 2015                [Page 2]


Internet-Draft      Bootstrapping Key Infrastructures      February 2015


1.  Introduction

   To literally "pull yourself up by the bootstraps" is an impossible
   action.  Similarly the secure establishment of a key infrastructure
   without external help is also an impossibility.  Today it is accepted
   that the initial connections between nodes are insecure, until key
   distribution is complete, or that domain-specific keying material is
   pre-provisioned on each new device in a costly and non-scalable
   manner.  This document describes a zero-touch approach to
   bootstrapping an entity by securing the initial distribution of key
   material using third-party generic keying material, such as a
   manufacturer installed IEEE 802.1AR certificate [IDevID], and a
   corresponding third-party service on the Internet.

   The two sides of an association being bootstrapped authenticate each
   other and then determine appropriate authorization.  This process is
   described as four distinct steps between the existing domain and the
   new entity being added:

   o  New entity authentication: "Who is this?  What is its identity?"

   o  New entity authorization: "Is it mine?  Do I want it?  What are
      the chances it has been compromised?"

   o  Domain authentication: "What is this domain's claimed identity?"

   o  Domain authorization: "Should I join it?"

   A precise answer to these questions can not be obtained without
   leveraging an established key infrastructure(s).  The domain's
   decisions are based on the new entity's authenticated identity, as
   established by verification of previously installed credentials such
   as a manufacturer installed IEEE 802.1AR certificate, and verified
   back-end information such as a configured list of purchased devices
   or communication with a trusted third-party.  The new entity's
   decisions are made according to verified communication with a trusted
   third-party or in a strictly auditable fasion.

   Optimal security is achieved with IEEE 802.1AR certificates on each
   new entity, accompanied by a third-party Internet based service for
   verification.  The concept also works with less requirements, but is
   then less secure.  A domain can choose to accept lower levels of
   security when a trusted third-party is not available so that
   bootstrapping proceeds even at the risk of reduced security.  Only
   the domain can make these decisions based on administrative input and
   known behavior of the new entity.





Pritikin, et al.         Expires August 17, 2015                [Page 3]


Internet-Draft      Bootstrapping Key Infrastructures      February 2015


   The result of bootstrapping is that a domain specific key
   infrastructure is deployed.  Since IEEE 802.1AR PKI certificates are
   used for identifying the new entity and the public key of the domain
   identity is leveraged during communiciations with an Internet based
   service, which is itself authenticated using HTTPS, bootstrapping of
   a domain specific Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is fully described.
   Sufficient agility to support bootstrapping alternative key
   infrastructures (such as symmetric key solutions) is considered
   although no such key infrastructure is described.

1.1.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
   [RFC2119].

   The following terms are defined for clarity:

2.  Architectural Overview

   The logical elements of the bootstrapping framework are described in
   this section.  Figure 1 provides a simplified overview of the
   components.  Each component is logical and may be combined with other
   components as necessary.


























Pritikin, et al.         Expires August 17, 2015                [Page 4]


Internet-Draft      Bootstrapping Key Infrastructures      February 2015


                                                 Factory components
                                                        .
                                                        . +------------+
                                                        . | Factory CA |
                                                        . +------------+
                                                        .        |
                                                        . +------------+
                                                        . |            |
      +--------------(provides)---------------------------|  Factory   |
      |                                       +---------->|            |
      |                                       |         . +------------+
      |                                       V         .
      |                              +---------------+  . +------------+
      |                              | Orchestrator  |  . | MASA       |
      V                              +---------------+  . | Service    |
   +-------+                                  |         . |            |
   | New   |        +------------+       +-----------+  . +------------+
   | Entity|<--L2-->|    Proxy   |<----->|           |  .......  ^
   |       |        +------------+       |           |           |
   |       |                             | Registrar |           |
   |       |                             |           |           |
   |       |<--DHCP-->(L3 bootstrap)     |           |           |
   |       |                             |           |           |
   |       |<-----L3---------------------( registrar )-----------+
   |       |                             ( may proxy )        |
   +-------+                             +-----------+
                                                   |
                             +----------------------------+
                    ^        |  Domain Certification      | ^
                    .        |      Authority             | .
                    .        +----------------------------+ .
                    .                                       .
                    .........................................
                                      |
                              "domain" components




   Figure 1

   Domain:  The set of entities that trust a common key infrastructure
      trust anchor.

   Domain CA:  The domain Certification Authority (CA) provides
      certification functionalities to the domain.  At a minimum it
      provides certification functionalities to the Registrar and stores




Pritikin, et al.         Expires August 17, 2015                [Page 5]


Internet-Draft      Bootstrapping Key Infrastructures      February 2015


      the trust anchor that defines the domain.  Optionally, it
      certifies all elements.

   Domain Identity:  The domain identity is the 160-bit SHA-1 hash of
      the BIT STRING of the subjectPublicKey of the domain trust anchor
      that is stored by the Domain CA.  This is consistent with the
      RFC5280 Certification Authority subject key identifier of the
      Domain CA's self signed root certificate.  (A string value bound
      to the Domain CA's self signed root certificate subject and issuer
      fields is often colloquially used as a humanized identity value
      but during protocol discussions the more exact term as defined
      here is used).

   Orchestrator:  Although bootstrapping of an individual device is
      automated and requires zero administrative involvement
      (particularly on the New Entity) the orchestrator drives general
      operations of the domain.  This can be an automated process or a
      human administrator, see Section 3.3 for more details.

   Factory:  This instantiates the New Entity.  For physical devices
      this can be representative of third-party vendor manufacturing,
      ordering and shipping process(es) that results in a physical
      hardware device with an IEEE 802.1AR identity being drop shipped
      to a destination domain for physical installation.  In a virtual
      machine environment this can be the virtual machine hypervisor
      control software that initiates a virtual machine instance, in
      which case the factory is a "virtual factory" and might be managed
      by the domain itself.

   Factory CA:  This Certification Authority is leveraged by the Factory
      to issue IEEE 802.1AR identities to each New Entity.  For a
      virtual factory it may be reasonable to assume the domain
      certification authority is directly used but in a complex
      environment it is assumed the Factory does not have direct access
      to the Domain Certification Authority.

   Registrar:  A representative of the domain that is configured,
      perhaps autonomically, to decide whether a new device is allowed
      to join the domain.  The administrator of the domain interfaces
      with a Registrar to control this process.  Typically a Registrar
      is "inside" its domain.

   New Entity:  A new device or virtual machine or software component
      that is not yet part of the domain.

   Proxy:  A domain entity that helps the New Entity join the domain.  A
      Proxy facilitates communication for devices that find themselves




Pritikin, et al.         Expires August 17, 2015                [Page 6]


Internet-Draft      Bootstrapping Key Infrastructures      February 2015


      in an environment where they are not provided L3 connectivity
      until after they are validated as members of the domain.

   MASA Service:  A Manufacturer Authorized Signing Authority (MASA)
      service on the global Internet.  At a minimum the MASA provides a
      trusted repository for audit information concerning privacy
      protected bootstrapping events.  As a service offering the MASA
      can incorporate many of the bootstrapping elements (such as the
      Registrar and the Domain CA) into the overall service.  The MASA
      is not a mandatory component, but it enables the new device to
      validate which domain it is joining.  This allows for a completely
      secure zero-touch bootstrap of domain certificates with mutual
      authentication (device <-> domain).

   We assume a multi-vendor network.  In such an environment, there
   could a MASA for each vendor that supports devices following this
   document's specification, or an integrator could provide a MASA
   service for all devices which he supplies.  Note again that the MASA
   is not mandatory.  Also, this approach describes a secure zero-touch
   approach to bootstrapping a key infrastructure; if certain devices in
   a network do not support this approach, they can still be
   bootstrapped manually.

3.  Operational Overview

   This section describes how an operator interacts with a domain that
   supports the bootstrapping as described in this document.

3.1.  Instantiating the Domain Certification Authority

   This is a one time step by the domain administrator.  This is an "off
   the shelf" CA with the exception that it is designed to work as an
   integrated part of the security solution.  This precludes the use of
   3rd party certification authority services that do not provide
   support for delegation of certificate issuance decisions to a domain
   managed Registration Authority.

3.2.  Instantiating the Registrar

   This is a one time step by the domain administrator.  One or more
   devices in the domain are configured take on a Registrar function.

   A device can be configured to act as a Registrar or a device can
   auto-select itself to take on this function, using a detection
   mechanism to resolve potential conflicts and setup communication with
   the Domain Certification Authority.  Automated Registrar selection is
   outside scope for this document.




Pritikin, et al.         Expires August 17, 2015                [Page 7]


Internet-Draft      Bootstrapping Key Infrastructures      February 2015


3.3.  Accepting New Entities

   For each New Entity the Registrar is informed the unique identifier
   (e.g. serial number) along with the manufacturer's identifying
   information (e.g. manufacturer root certificate).  This can happen in
   different ways:

   1.  Default acceptance: In the simplest case, the new device itself
       provides its identity to the registrar, which then accepts any
       device blindly, without validating its identity.  This mode does
       not provide any security against intruders and is not
       recommended.

   2.  Per device acceptance: Also here the device provides its identity
       directly to the registrar during enrollment.  A non-technical
       human validates the identity, for example by comparing the
       identity displayed by the registrar (for example using a
       smartphone app) with the identity shown on the packaging of the
       device.  Acceptance may be triggered by a click on a smartphone
       app "accept this device", or by other forms of pairing.  See also
       [I-D.behringer-homenet-trust-bootstrap] for how the approach
       could work in a homenet.

   3.  Whitelist approach: In larger networks, neither of the previous
       approaches is acceptable.  Default acceptance is not secure, and
       a manual real-time acceptance per device does not scale.  Here,
       the registrar is provided a priori with a list of identifiers of
       devices that belong to the network.  This list can be for example
       extracted from an inventory database, or sales records.  If a
       device is detected that is not on the list of known devices, it
       can still be manually accepted or declined.

   4.  Automated Orchestrator: an automated process that queries the
       MASA service or an inventory database either a priori for all
       devices, or in real time for each new device.  It feeds this
       information into the Registrar.  Once set up, no human
       intervention is required in this process.

   None of the approaches requires the network to have permanent
   Internet connectivity.  Even when the Internet based MASA service is
   used, it is possible to pre-fetch the required information from the
   MASA a priori, for example at time of purchase.  In this case devices
   can enrol later even in a completely isolated network.

   Additional policy can be stored for future authorization decisions.
   For example an expected deployment time window or that a certain
   Proxy must be used.




Pritikin, et al.         Expires August 17, 2015                [Page 8]


Internet-Draft      Bootstrapping Key Infrastructures      February 2015


3.4.  Automatic Enrolment of Devices

   The approach outlined in this document provides a secure zero-touch
   method to enrol new devices without any pre-staged configuration.
   New devices communicate with already enrolled devices of the domain,
   which proxy between the new device and a Registrar.  As a result of
   this completely automatic operation, all devices obtain a domain
   based certificate.

3.5.  Operating the Network

   The certificate installed in the previous step can be used for all
   subsequent operations.  For example, to determine the boundaries of
   the domain: If a neighbor has a certificate from the same trust
   anchor it can be assumed "inside" the same organization; if not, as
   outside.  See also Section 4.5.1.  The certificate can also be used
   to securely establish a connection between devices and central
   control functions.  Also autonomic transactions can use the domain
   certificates to authenticate and/or encrypt direct interactions
   between devices.  The usage of the domain certificates is outside
   scope for this document.

4.  Functional Overview

   Entities behave in an autonomic fashion.  They discover each other
   and autonomically establish a key infrastructure deliminating the
   autonomic domain.  See [I-D.irtf-nmrg-autonomic-network-definitions]
   for more information.

   The overall flow is shown in Figure 2:





















Pritikin, et al.         Expires August 17, 2015                [Page 9]


Internet-Draft      Bootstrapping Key Infrastructures      February 2015


   +---------+                +----------+                +-----------+
   |  New    |                |          |                |  MASA     |
   | Entity  |                |  Domain  |                |  Service  |
   |         |                |          |                | (Internet)|
   +---------+                +----------+                +-----------+
       |                           |                            |
       |<-------discovery--------->|                            |
       |---802.1AR credential----->|                            |
       |                           |                            |
       |                    [ accept device? ]                  |
       |                           |                            |
       |                           |---802.1AR identity-------->|
       |                           |---Domain ID--------------->|
       |                           |                            |
       |                           |                    [device belongs]
       |                           |                    [to domain?    ]
       |                           |                            |
       |                           |                  [update audit log]
       |                           |                            |
       |                           |<---device history log------|
       |                           |<-- authorization token-----|
       |                           |                            |
       |                  [ still accept device?]               |
       |                           |                            |
       |<----authorization token---|                            |
       |<----domain information----|                            |
       |                           |                            |
  [auth token valid?]              |                            |
       |                           |                            |
       |----domain enrolment------>|                            |
       |<----domain certificate----|                            |
       |                           |


   Figure 1

4.1.  Behavior of a new entity

   A New Entity that has not yet been bootstrapped attempts to find a
   local domain and join it.  A number of methods are attempted for
   establishing communications with the domain in a specified order.

   Client behavior is as follows:

   1.  Discover a communication channel to the "closest" Registrar by
       trying the following steps in this order:





Pritikin, et al.         Expires August 17, 2015               [Page 10]


Internet-Draft      Bootstrapping Key Infrastructures      February 2015


       A.  Search for a Proxy on the local link using a link local
           discovery protocol (no routable addresses are required for
           this approach).  If multiple local proxies are discovered
           attempt communications with each before widening the search
           to other options.  The proxy relays information to the
           registrar.  If this fails:

       B.  Obtain an IP address using existing methods, such as SLAAC or
           DHCPv6, and search for a local registrar using DNS service
           discovery.  If this fails:

       C.  Obtain an IP address (as above), and search for the domain
           registrar using a pre-defined Factory provided Internet based
           re-direct service.  Various methods could be used, such as
           DNS or RESTful APIs.

   2.  Present IEEE 802.1AR credentials to the discovered Registrar (via
       a Proxy if necessary).  Included is a generated nonce that is
       specific to this attempt.

   3.  Verify the MASA service generated authorization token as provided
       by the contacted Registrar.  The authorization token contains the
       valid domain(s) for this device and is signed by the MASA
       service.  The device uses a pre-installed certificate of the MASA
       service to validate the signature of the MASA.  The nonce
       information previously provided is also checked, if it was not
       removed by the Registrar.

   4.  If and only if step three is successful: Join Domain, by
       accepting the domain specific information from the registrar, and
       by enrolling a domain certificate from the registrar.

   5.  The New Entity is now a member of the domain and will only repeat
       the discovery aspects of bootstrapping if it is returned to
       factory default settings.

   The following sections describe each of these steps in more detail.

4.1.1.  Proxy Discovery

   Existing protocols provide the appropriate functionality for both
   discovering the Proxy and facilitating communication through the
   Proxy:

   IEEE 802.1X  Where the New Entity can be cast as the "supplicant" and
      the Proxy is the "authenticator".  The bootstrapping protocol
      messages are encapsulated as EAP methods.  The "authenticator"




Pritikin, et al.         Expires August 17, 2015               [Page 11]


Internet-Draft      Bootstrapping Key Infrastructures      February 2015


      reencapsulates the EAPOL frames and forwards them to the
      "Authentication Server", which provides Registrar functionalities.

   PANA [RFC5191]  [[EDNOTE: TBD]]

   ND [RFC2461] / [RFC4861]  [[EDNOTE: TBD]] NOTE: Neighbor Discovery
      protocols do not describe a mechanism for forwarding messages.

   Each provides a method for the New Entity to discover and initiate
   communication with a local neighbor.  In each protocol methods are
   available to support encapsulation of the bootstrapping protocol
   messages described elsewhere in this document.  Other protocols for
   transporting bootstrapping messages can be added in future
   references.

   All security assocaitions established are between the new device and
   the Registrar regardless of proxy operations.

   If multiple proxies are available the New Entity tries each until a
   successful bootstrapping occurs.  The New Entity may prioritize
   proxies selection order as appropriate for the anticipated
   environment.

   If Proxy discovery fails the New Entity moves on to discovering a
   Registrar directly.

4.1.2.  Receiving and accepting the Domain Identity

   The domain trust anchor is received by the New Entity during the
   boostrapping protocol exchange.

   An enrollment protocol such as EST [RFC7030] details a set of non-
   autonomic bootstrapping methods such as:

   o  using the Implicit Trust Anchor database (not an autonomic
      solution because the URL must be securely distributed),

   o  engaging a human user to authorize the CA certificate using out-
      of-band data (not an autonomic solution because the human user is
      involved),

   o  using a configured Explicit TA database (not an autonomic solution
      because the distribution of an explicit TA database is not
      autonomic),

   o  and using a Certificate-Less TLS mutual authentication method (not
      an autonomic solution because the distribution of symmetric key
      material is not autonomic).



Pritikin, et al.         Expires August 17, 2015               [Page 12]


Internet-Draft      Bootstrapping Key Infrastructures      February 2015


   This document describes an additional autonomic method:

   MASA authorization token  Authorization tokens are obtained by the
      Registrar from the MASA service and presented to the New Entity
      for validation.

   If the autonomic methods fails the New Entity returns to discovery
   state and attempts bootstrapping with the next available discovered
   Registrar.

4.1.3.  Enrollment

   As the final step of bootstrapping a Registrar helps to issue a
   domain specific credential to the New Entity.  For simplicity in this
   document, a Registrar primarily facilitates issuing a credential by
   acting as an RFC5280 Registration Authority for the Domain
   Certification Authority.

   Enrollment proceeds as described in Enrollment over Secure Transport
   (EST) [RFC7030].  The New Entity contacts the Registrar using EST as
   indicated:

   o  The New Entity is authenticated using the IEEE 802.1AR
      credentials.  (EST support for .

   o  The EST section 4.1.3 CA Certificates Response is verified using
      the MASA authorization token provided domain identity.

4.1.4.  After Enrollment

   Functionality to provide generic "configuration" is supported.  The
   parsing of this data and any subsequent use of the data, for example
   communications with a Network Management System is out of scope but
   is expected to occur after bootstrapping enrollment is complete.

   See Section 4.5.

4.2.  Behavior of a proxy

   The role of the Proxy is to facilitate communications.  The Proxy
   forwards messages between the New Entity and a Registrar.  Where
   existing protocols, as detailed in Section 4.1.1, already provide
   this functionality nothing additional is defined.








Pritikin, et al.         Expires August 17, 2015               [Page 13]


Internet-Draft      Bootstrapping Key Infrastructures      February 2015


4.3.  Behavior of the Registrar

   Once a registrar is established it listens for new entities and
   determines if they can join the domain.  The registrar delivers any
   necessary authorization information to the new device and facilitates
   enrollment with the domain PKI.

   Registrar behavior is as follows:

4.3.1.  Authenticating the Device

   The applicable authentication methods detailed in EST [RFC7030] are:

   o  the use of an IEEE 802.1AR IDevID credential,

   o  or the use of a secret that is transmitted out of band between the
      New Entity and the Registrar (this use case is not autonomic).

4.3.2.  Accepting the Entity

   In a fully automated network all devices must be securely identified.

   A Registrar accepts or declines a request to join the domain, based
   on the authenticated identity presented and other policy defined
   criteria such as Proxy identity.  Automated acceptance criteria
   include:

   o  allow any device of a specific type (as determined by the IEEE
      802.1AR device identity),

   o  allow any device from a specific Factory (as determined by the
      IEEE 802.1AR identity),

   o  allow a specific device from a Factory (as determined by the IEEE
      802.1AR identity)

   In all cases a Registrar must use the globally available MASA service
   to verify that the device's history log does not include unexpected
   Registrars.  Because if a device had previously registered with
   another domain, the registrar of that domain would show in the log.

   If a device is accepted into the domain, it is then invited to
   request a domain certificate through a certificate enrolment process.
   The result is a common trust anchor and device certificates for all
   autonomic devices in a domain.  These certificates can subsequently
   be used to determine the boundaries of the homenet, to authenticate
   other domain nodes, and to autonomically enable services on the
   homenet.



Pritikin, et al.         Expires August 17, 2015               [Page 14]


Internet-Draft      Bootstrapping Key Infrastructures      February 2015


   For each entity that will be accepted a Registrar maintains the
   Factory CA identity and the entity's unique identifier.  The Factory
   CA identity could be implemented as the Factory CA root certificate
   keyIdentifier (the 160-bit SHA-1 hash of the value of the BIT STRING
   subjectPublicKey).  For user interface purposes the keyIdentifier
   information can be mapped to a colloquial Factory name (Registrars
   can be shipped with the keyIdentifier of a significant number of
   third-party manufacturers).

4.3.3.  Claiming the new entity

   During initial bootstrapping the New Entity provides a nonce specific
   to the particular bootstrapping attempt.  The registrar should
   include this nonce when claiming the New Entity from the Internet
   based MASA service.  If a nonce is provided by the Registrar, then
   claims from an unauthenticated Registrar are serviced by the MASA
   resource.

   The Registrar can claim a New Entity that is not online by forming
   the request using the entities unique identifier but not including a
   nonce in the claim request.  MASA authorization tokens obtained in
   this way do not have a lifetime and they provide a permanent method
   for the domain to claim the device.  Evidence of such a claim is
   provided in the audit log entries available to any future Registrar.
   Such claims reduce the ability for future domains to secure
   bootstrapping and therefore the Registrar MUST be authenticated by
   the MASA service.

   Claiming an entity establishes an audit log at the MASA server and
   provides the Registrar with proof, in the form of a MASA
   authorization token, that the log entry has been inserted.  As
   indicated in Section 4.1.2 a New Entity will only proceed with
   bootstrapping if a validated MASA authorization token has been
   recieved.  The New Entity therefore enforces that bootstrapping only
   occurs if the claim has been logged.

4.4.  Behavior of the MASA Service

   The MASA service is provided by the Factory provider on the global
   Internet.  The URI of this service is well known.  The URI should be
   provided as an IEEE 802.1AR IDevID X.509 extension (a "MASA
   authorization token Distribution Point" extension).

   The MASA service provides the following functionalities to
   Registrars:






Pritikin, et al.         Expires August 17, 2015               [Page 15]


Internet-Draft      Bootstrapping Key Infrastructures      February 2015


4.4.1.  Issue Authorization Token and Log the event

   A Registrar POSTs a claim message optionally containing the bootstrap
   nonce to the MASA server.

   If a nonce is provided the MASA service responds to all requests.
   The MASA service verifies the Registrar is representative of the
   domain and generates a privacy protected log entry before responding
   with the authorization token.

   If a nonce is not provided then the MASA service MUST authenticate
   the Registrar as a valid customer.  This prevents denial of service
   attacks.  The specific level of authentication provided by the
   customer is not defined here.  An MASA Practice Statement (MPS)
   similar to the Certification Authority CPS, as defined in RFC5280, is
   provided by the Factory such that Registrar's can determine the level
   of trust they have in the Factory.

4.4.2.  Retrieve Audit Entries from Log

   When determining if a New Entity should be accepted into a domain the
   Registrar retrieves a copy of the audit log from the MASA service.
   This contains a list of privacy protected domain identities that have
   previously claimed the device.  Included in the list is an indication
   of the time the entry was made and if the nonce was included.

4.5.  Leveraging the new key infrastructure / next steps

   As the devices have a common trust anchor, device identity can be
   securely established, making it possible to automatically deploy
   services across the domain in a secure manner.

   Examples of services:

   o  Device management.

   o  Routing authentication.

   o  Service discovery.

4.5.1.  Network boundaries

   When a device has joined the domain, it can validate the domain
   membership of other devices.  This makes it possible to create trust
   boundaries where domain members have higher level of trusted than
   external devices.  Using the autonomic User Interface, specific
   devices can be grouped into to sub domains and specific trust levels
   can be implemented between those.



Pritikin, et al.         Expires August 17, 2015               [Page 16]


Internet-Draft      Bootstrapping Key Infrastructures      February 2015


5.  Protocol Details

   For simplicity the bootstrapping protocol is described as extensions
   to EST [RFC7030].

   EST provides a bootstrapping mechanism for new entities that are
   configured with the URI of the EST server such that the Implicit TA
   database can be used to authenticate the EST server.  Alternatively
   EST clients can "engage a human user to authorize the CA certificate
   using out-of-band data such as a CA certificate".  EST does not
   provide a completely automated method of bootstrapping the PKI as
   both of these methods require some user input (either of the URI or
   authorizing the CA certificate).

   This section details additional EST functionality that support
   automated bootstrapping of the public key infrastructure.  These
   additions provide for fully automated bootstrapping.  These additions
   are to be optionally supported by the EST server within the same
   .well-known URI tree as the existing EST URIs.

   The "New Entity" is the EST client and the "Registrar" is the EST
   server.

   The extensions for the client are as follows:

   o  The New Entity provisionally accept the EST server certificate
      during the TLS handshake as detailed in EST section 4.1.1
      ("Bootstrap Distribution of CA Certificates").

   o  The New Entity request and validates a "bootstrap token" as
      described below.  At this point the New Entity has sufficient
      information to validate domain credentials.

   o  The New Entity calls the EST defined /cacerts method to obtain the
      current CA certificate.  These are validated using the "bootstrap
      token".

   o  The New Entity completes bootstrapping as detailed in EST section
      4.1.1.

   These extensions could be implemented as an independent protocol from
   EST but since the overlap with basic enrollment is extensive,
   particularly with respect to client authorization, they are presented
   here as additions to EST.

   In order to obtain a validated bootstrap token and history logs the
   Registrar contacts the MASA service Service using REST calls.




Pritikin, et al.         Expires August 17, 2015               [Page 17]


Internet-Draft      Bootstrapping Key Infrastructures      February 2015


5.1.  EAP-EST

   In order to support Proxy environments EAP-EST is defined.

   [[EDNOTE: TBD.  EST is TLS with some data.  EAP-TLS and other similar
   protocols provide an example framework for filling out this section]]

5.2.  Request bootstrap token

   When the New Entity reaches the EST section 4.1.1 "Bootstrap
   Distribution of CA Certificates" state but wishes to proceed in a
   fully automated fashion it makes a request for a MASA authorization
   token from the Registrar.

   This is done with an HTTPS POST using the operation path value of
   "/requestbootstraptoken".

   The request format is JSON object containing a nonce.

   Request media type: application/masanonce

   Request format: a json file with the following:

   {"nonce":"<64bit nonce value>"}

   [[EDNOTE: exact format TBD.  There is an advantage to having the
   client sign the nonce (similar to a PKI Certification Signing
   Request) since this allows the MASA service to confirm the actual
   device identity.  It is not clear that there is a security benefit
   from this.]]

   The Registrar validates the client identity as described in EST
   [RFC7030] section 3.3.2.  The registrar performs authorization as
   detailed in Section 4.3.2.  If authorization is successful the
   Registrar obtains a MASA authorization token from the MASA service
   (see Section 5.3).

   The recieved MASA authorization token is returned to the New Entity.

5.3.  Request MASA authorization token

   A registrar requests the MASA authorization token from the MASA
   service using a REST interface.

   This is done with an HTTP POST using the operation path value of
   "/requestMASAauthorization".





Pritikin, et al.         Expires August 17, 2015               [Page 18]


Internet-Draft      Bootstrapping Key Infrastructures      February 2015


   The request format is a JSON object optionally containing the nonce
   value (as obtained from the bootstrap request) and the IEEE 802.1AR
   identity of the device as a serial number (the full certificate is
   not needed and no proof-of-possession information for the device
   identity is included).  The New Entity's serial number is extracted
   from the subject name :

   {"nonce":"<64bit nonce value>", "serialnumber", "<subjectname/
   subjectaltname serial number>"}

   Inclusion of the nonce is optional because the Registar might request
   an authorization token when the New Entity is not online, or when the
   target bootstrapping environment is not on the same network as the
   MASA server.

   This information is encapsulated in a PKCS7 signed data structure
   that is signed by the Registrar.  The entire certificate chain, up to
   and including the Domain CA, is included in the PKCS7.

   The MASA service checks the internal consistency of the PKCS7 but is
   unable to actually authenticate the domain identity information.  The
   domain is not know to the MASA server in advance and a shared trust
   anchor is not implied.  The MASA server verifies that the PKCS7 is
   signed by a Registrar (by checking for the cmc-idRA field in the
   Registrar certificate) certificate that was issued by the root
   certificate included in the PKCS7.

   The domain ID is extracted from the root certificate and is used to
   generate the MASA authorization token and to update the audit log.

   [[EDNOTE: This assumes the Registrar can extract the serial number
   successfullly from the cilent certificate.  The RFC4108
   hardwareModuleName is likely the best known location.]]

5.4.  Request MASA authorization log

   A registrar requests the MASA authorization log from the MASA service
   using this EST extension.

   This is done with an HTTP GET using the operation path value of
   "/requestMASAlog".

   The log data returned is a file consisting of all previous log
   entries.  For example:







Pritikin, et al.         Expires August 17, 2015               [Page 19]


Internet-Draft      Bootstrapping Key Infrastructures      February 2015


   "log":[
     {"date":"<date/time of the entry>"},
      "domainID":"<domainID as extracted from the root
                   certificate within the PKCS7 of the
                   authorization token request>",
      "nonce":"<any nonce if supplied (or NULL)>"},

     {"date":"<date/time of the entry>"},
      "domainID":"<domainID as extracted from the root
                   certificate within the PKCS7 of the
                   authorization token request>",
      "nonce":"<any nonce if supplied (or NULL)>"},
   ]

   Distribution of a large log is less than ideal.  This structure can
   be optimized as follows: only the most recent nonce'd log entry is
   required in the response.  All nonce-less entries for the same
   domainID can be condensed into the single most recent nonceless
   entry.

   The Registrar uses this log information to make an informed decision
   regarding the continued bootstrapping of the New Entity.

   [[EDNOTE: certificate transparency might offer an alternative log
   entry method]]

6.  Reduced security operational modes

   A common requirement of bootstrapping infrastructures is often that
   they support less secure operational modes.  To support these
   operational modes the Registrar can choose to accept devices using
   less secure methods.  For example:

   1.  The registrar may choose to accept all devices, or all devices of
       a particular type, at the administrator's discretion.  This may
       occur when: Informing the Registrar of unique identifiers of new
       entities might be operationally difficult.

   2.  The registrar may choose to accept devices that claim a unique
       identity without the benefit of authenticating that claimed
       identity.  This may occur when: The New Entity does not include
       an IEEE 802.1AR factory installed credential.

   3.  A representative of the Registrar (e.g. the Orchestrator) may
       request nonce-less authorization tokens from the MASA service
       when network connectivity is available.  These tokens can then be
       transmitted to the Registrar and stored until they are needed
       during bootstrapping operations.  This may occur when: The target



Pritikin, et al.         Expires August 17, 2015               [Page 20]


Internet-Draft      Bootstrapping Key Infrastructures      February 2015


       network is protected by an air gap and therefore can not contact
       the MASA service during New Entity deployment.

   4.  The device may have an operational mode where it skips
       authorization token validation.  For example if a physical button
       is depressed during the bootstrapping operation.  This may occur
       when: A device Factory goes out of business or otherwise fails to
       provide a reliable MASA service.

   5.  The device may not require the MASA service authorization token.
       An entity that does not validate the domain identity is
       inherently dangerous as it may contain malware.  This risk should
       be mitigated using attestation and measurement technologies.  In
       order to support an unsecured imprint the New Entity MUST support
       remote attestation technologies such as is defined by the Trusted
       Computing Group.  [[EDNOTE: How to include remote attestation
       into the boostrapping protocol exchange is TBD]].  This may occur
       when: The device Factory does not provide a MASA service.

7.  Security Considerations

   In order to support a variety of use cases, devices can be claimed by
   a registrar without proving possession of the device in question.
   This would result in a nonceless, and thus always valid, claim.  The
   MASA service is required to authenticate such Registrars but no
   programmatic method is provided to ensure good behavior by the MASA
   service.  Nonceless entries into the audit log therefore permanently
   reduce the value of a device because future Registrars, during future
   bootstrap attempts, must now be configured with policy to ignore
   previously (and potentially unknown) domains.

   Future registrars are recommended to take the audit history of a
   device into account when deciding to join such devices into their
   network.

   It is possible for an attacker to send an authorization request to
   the MASA service directly after the real Registrar obtains an
   authorization log.  If the attacker could also force the
   bootstrapping protocol to reset there is a theoretical opportunity
   for the attacker to use the authorization token to take control of
   the New Entity but then proceed to enrol with the target domain.  To
   prevent this the MASA service is rate limited to only generate
   authorization tokens at a rate of 1 per minute.  The Registrar
   therefore has at least 1 minute to get the response back to the New
   Entity.  [[EDNOTE: a better solution can likely be found.  This text
   captures the issue for now.]] Also the Registrar can double check the
   log information after enrolling the New Entity.




Pritikin, et al.         Expires August 17, 2015               [Page 21]


Internet-Draft      Bootstrapping Key Infrastructures      February 2015


   The MASA service could lock a claim and refuse to issue a new token.
   Or the MASA service could go offline (for example if a vendor went
   out of business).  This functionality provides benefits such as theft
   resistance, but it also implies an operational risk.  This can be
   mitigated by Registrars that request nonce-less authorization tokens.

7.1.  Trust Model

   [[EDNOTE: (need to describe that we need to trust the device h/w.  To
   be completed.)]]

8.  Acknowledgements

   We would like to thank the various reviewers for their input, in
   particular Markus Stenberg, Michael Richardson, Brian Carpenter, Fuyu
   Eleven.

9.  References

9.1.  Normative References

   [IDevID]   IEEE Standard, , "IEEE 802.1AR Secure Device Identifier",
              December 2009, <http://standards.ieee.org/findstds/
              standard/802.1AR-2009.html>.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC7030]  Pritikin, M., Yee, P., and D. Harkins, "Enrollment over
              Secure Transport", RFC 7030, October 2013.

9.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.behringer-homenet-trust-bootstrap]
              Behringer, M., Pritikin, M., and S. Bjarnason,
              "Bootstrapping Trust on a Homenet", draft-behringer-
              homenet-trust-bootstrap-02 (work in progress), February
              2014.

   [I-D.irtf-nmrg-autonomic-network-definitions]
              Behringer, M., Pritikin, M., Bjarnason, S., Clemm, A.,
              Carpenter, B., Jiang, S., and L. Ciavaglia, "Autonomic
              Networking - Definitions and Design Goals", draft-irtf-
              nmrg-autonomic-network-definitions-05 (work in progress),
              December 2014.






Pritikin, et al.         Expires August 17, 2015               [Page 22]


Internet-Draft      Bootstrapping Key Infrastructures      February 2015


Authors' Addresses

   Max Pritikin
   Cisco

   Email: pritikin@cisco.com


   Michael H. Behringer
   Cisco

   Email: mbehring@cisco.com


   Steinthor Bjarnason
   Cisco

   Email: sbjarnas@cisco.com

































Pritikin, et al.         Expires August 17, 2015               [Page 23]


Html markup produced by rfcmarkup 1.129c, available from https://tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcmarkup/