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Network Group                                                 H. Rafiee
INTERNET-DRAFT                     Huawei Technologies Duesseldorf GmbH
Intended status: Experimental                                  C. Meinel
                                                Hasso Plattner Institute
Expires: March 19, 2015                               September 19, 2014


   A Simple Secure Addressing Scheme for IPv6 AutoConfiguration (SSAS)
                     <draft-rafiee-6man-ssas-11.txt>

Abstract

   Since performance and security are, both, two important criteria for
   a mechanism to be widely used by different nodes with various
   resources, the purpose of this document is to propose a mechanism for
   local security and to prevent IP spoofing. This mechanism also
   consider user's privacy.



Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working
   documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is
   at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on March 19, 2015.





Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to
   BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF
   Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the
   date of publication of this document. Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must


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   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.



Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  Conventions used in this document  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   3.  Algorithms Overview  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     3.1.  Interface ID (IID) Generation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
       3.1.1.  Signature Generation   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
       3.1.2.  Generation of NDP/SeND Messages  . . . . . . . . . . .  6
         3.1.2.1.  SSAS signature data field  . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
       3.1.3.  SSAS verification process  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     3.2.  Resource Public key Infrastructure (RPKI)  . . . . . . . .  9
   4.  SSAS Applications  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     4.1.  A solution for all nodes   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     4.2.  Authentication in Network layer  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     4.3.  Authentication in Application Layer  . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     4.4.  Other Applications   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   5.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   6.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
   7.  Privacy Consideration  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
   8.  Appendix A   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     8.1.  Comparison of CGA and SSAS generation time   . . . . . . . 11
   9.  Appendix B   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
     9.1.  Network-based protection vs. Node-based protection   . . . 12
   10.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
   11.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
     11.1.  Normative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
     11.2.  Informative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16





















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1.  Introduction

   In IPv6 networks, nodes can use two different mechanisms to configure
   their IP addresses -- Neighbor Discovery Protocol (NDP) [RFC4861,
   RFC4862] and Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCPv6) [RFC3315].
   Unfortunately none of these mechanisms are natively secure. So, they
   open the nodes with so many local security problems. There are
   several attacks possible in local network [RFC3756]. One example is
   IP spoofing that enable an attacker to forge the identity of a victim
   node, the other example is preventing the node from configuring its
   IP address.

   The reasons that local security is important are as follows
   [localSecurity]:

   - Not all the nodes on the local link are trusted: viruses or other
   malware can infect a legitimate node in the local link and turn it to
   an attacker.

   - Attacker might be inside the network: The networks of big
   enterprises might be harmed by one of the staff that was recently
   fired.

   There is currently a mechanism available to secure the NDP, i.e.,
   Secure Neighbor Discovery (SeND) [RFC3971]. SeND does this protection
   by adding 4 options to NDP packets. Among these options,
   Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA) [RFC3972] is a very
   important option that provides the node with the proof of IP address
   ownership by finding a binding between the node's public key and its
   IP address. Unfortunately CGA has some problems that are listed as
   follows:

   - CGA sec value problem: This problem is explained in [cgaattack] and
   addressed in [cgabis].

   - CGA increases complexity and decreases performance: CGA uses sec
   value (the value between 0 to 7) and claims to complicate the brute
   force attacks. (However it is not true based on [cgaattack]) If CGA
   sec value higher than 0 is in use, then this will reduce the
   performance because CGA algorithm needs to repeat some steps and it
   needs the high attention of the CPU and makes the CPU busy. So, CGA
   sec value higher than 0, consumes more energy than other nodes that
   do not use CGA. Today, the demands on malti-functioning smaller
   devices are increasing but unfortunately the battery technology is
   not as advanced as expected. So, the use of CGA algorithm that needs
   to use higher level of energy is not ideal for these types of nodes
   and the use of CGA sec value zero does not protect the node as
   expected. (Please refer to appendix A for more information)

   - CGA might cause privacy issue: Since the generation of CGA higher
   sec values might take time. The nodes might not be willing to change
   its IP address and keep this address as long as the subnet prefix is


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   valid. If the node is a fixed node in the network, then it will be
   vulnerable to node tracking. The node might also not change the CGA
   address when it visits a new network or it might not generate any new
   key pairs. In other word, it might use the same CGA parameters
   (excluding prefix) as used in the old network and thus it will be
   vulnerable to node tracking.

   - Packet size

   CGA uses RSA as a default key pair generation algorithm. This is why,
   if SeND with CGA option is in use to secure NDP messages, the minimum
   packet size needs to carry this public key for CGA nodes is 460
   bytes. Packet size also reduces the performance and causes delays in
   the network.

   Since privacy and security are, both, very important issues in
   everyday life, the purpose of this document is to offer an
   alternative and simple addressing mechanism to generate an interface
   ID (IID) which provides the node with both security and privacy while
   does not sacrifice the performance, and tries to decrease the packet
   size as much as possible.


2.  Conventions used in this document

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC-2119 [RFC2119].

   In this document, these words will appear with that interpretation
   only when in ALL CAPS. Lower case uses of these words are not to be
   interpreted as carrying RFC-2119 significance.

   In this document the use of || indicates the concatenation of the
   values on either side of the sign.


3.  Algorithms Overview

   As explained earlier, one of the problems with using the current IID
   generation approach is the intensive computer processing that is
   needed for the IID algorithm generation. Another concern is for the
   lack of security (if CGA is not in use). This is what this document
   intends to address.


3.1.  Interface ID (IID) Generation

   To generate the IID a node will need to execute the following steps.

   1. Generate key pairs (public/private keys) using one of the latest
   version of ECC algorithm [RFC6090] or other fastest short key size
   algorithms. . The implementations SHOULD be updated with any new


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   version of ECC algorithm when ECC current version is no longer
   secure. ECC is the default algorithm, but any algorithm capable of
   generating a small key size in a short amount of time is viable. The
   node then uses this new value for the generation of the IP address
   and signature. Comparing the use of ECC to that of RSA shows that an
   ECC with a 192 bit key is equivalent to a RSA with a 7680 bit key
   (according to US National Security Agency) In this case the packet
   size would be decreased by a factor 11 times smaller than that when
   using RSA.

   Note 1: The node MUST not generate the weak key. For ECC, the node
   MUST not use ECC key size lower than 192 bits. If any nodes used a
   weak key size, then the other nodes MUST discard receiving the
   message from that node. If in future, key size 192 bits is considered
   as a weak key size, the default key size value MUST be changed to the
   next strong key size.

   2. Execute a hash function on the public key. The default hash
   function is SHA256. If in future, this hash function is no longer
   secure, the node MUST use the next strong hash function.

   3. Take the first 64bits of the digest and call it IID. In case
   collision count is higher than 1, then depends on the number, takes
   second 64 bits or third 64 bits of this hash value.

   It is not RECOMMENDED to use this algorithm in case IID is less than
   64 bits [variableprefix]. A node MUST obtain the prefix length
   information form router advertisement messages.

   4. Concatenate the IID with the local subnet prefix to set the link
   local IP address.

   5. Concatenate the IID with the router subnet prefix (Global subnet
   prefix), obtained from the Router Advertisement (RA) message, and set
   it as a tentative public IP address. This IP address will become
   permanent after Duplicate Address Detection (DAD) processing. (For
   more information about DAD refer to section 3.1.2.)

   Note 1: In this document bits u and g does not have any particular
   meaning and is used as a part of public key. This assumption is by
   the clarification of using these bits in [RFC7136].


3.1.1.  Signature Generation

   SSAS is not dependent to SeND but it can be used as a new option of
   SeND. When SSAS is used as an option of SeND, SSAS signature can be
   placed as a RSA signature in SeND. If SSAS is used alone, this
   section MUST be included in SSAS data structure. This proves that
   SSAS is compatible to use with SeND.

   The SSAS signature is added to NDP messages in order to protect them
   from IP spoofing and spoofing types of attack. SSAS will provide


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   proof of IP address ownership. To generate the SSAS signature, the
   node needs to execute the following steps:

   1. Concatenate the timestamp with the MAC address, collision count,
   algorithm type and the global (public) IP address. (see figure 1)

   +---------+-----------+---------------+--------------+
   |timestamp|Mac address|Collision Count|Algorithm type|
   | 8 bytes |  6 bytes  |     3 bits    |    1 byte    |
   +---------------------+---------------+--------------+
   |Global IP address    | Other Options |
   |    16 bytes         |    variable   |
   +---------------------+---------------+
   Figure  1 SSAS Signature format
   2. Sign the resulting value from step 1, using the ECC private key
   (or any other short key size algorithm), and call the resulting
   output the SSAS signature.

   If NDP messages contain other data that must be protected, such as
   important routing information, then this data SHOULD also be included
   in the signature. The signature is designed for the inclusion of any
   data needing protection. If there is no data that needs protection,
   then the signature will only contain the timestamp, MAC address,
   Collision count and Global IP address (Router subnet prefix plus
   IID).


3.1.2.  Generation of NDP/SeND Messages

   After a node generates its IP address, it should then process
   Duplicate Address Detection in order to avoid address collisions in
   the network. In order to do this the node needs to generate a
   Neighbor Solicitation (NS) message. The SSAS signature is added to
   the ICMPv6 options of NS messages. The SSAS signature data field is
   an extended version of the standard format of the RSA signature
   option of SeND [RFC3971]. The timestamp option is the same as that
   used with SeND. In the SSAS signature, the data field contains the
   following items: type, length, reserved, Other Len, algorithm type,
   collision count, subnet prefix, other option and padding.


3.1.2.1.  SSAS signature data field

   +------+-------+------------+---------+
   | Type |Length |  Reserved  |Other len|
   |1 byte|1 byte |  2 bytes   | 1 byte  |
   +----------+---------+------+---------+
   | Algorithm|Collision|Subnet| Other   |
   |   type   |  count  |prefix|Options  |
   |  1 byte  |  3 bits |8bytes|         |
   +-------------------------------------+
   |Hash      | Response|                |
   |Function  | No.     | SSAS Signature |


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   | 1 byte   | 2 byte  |                |
   +-------------------------------------+
   |             padding                 |
   +-------------------------------------+
   Figure 2 NDP Message Format with SSAS Signature Data Field
   - Type: This option is set to 15. This is the sequential number used
   in SeND to indicate a SSAS data field.

   - Length: The length of the Signature Data field, including the Type,
   Length, Reserved, Algorithm type, Signature and padding, must be a
   multiple of eight.

   - Reserved: A 2 byte field reserved for future use. The value must be
   initialized to zero by the sender and should be ignored by the
   receiver.

   - Other Len: The length of other options in multiples of eight. The
   length of this field is 1 byte.

   - Algorithm type: The algorithm used to generate key pairs and sign
   the message. The length of this field is 1 byte. For ECC, this value
   is 0. Future algorithms will start at one and increase from there.

   - Collision count: When a collision occurs during the DAD, the node
   will increment this value and store it in a file to be included in
   the sent packets for as long as the current IP address is valid. This
   value indicates to the node where it needs to start its check from,
   i.e., the first or second or third 64 bytes from the start of the
   hash value (digest) array of the public key.

   - Subnet Prefix: This is the router subnet prefix.

   - Hash Function: A hash function used to generate IID. The length of
   this field is 1 byte. For SHA256, this value is 0. Future algorithms
   will start at one and increase from there.

   - Response No: This is similar to nonce but by the use of different
   mechanism. This value is not random and it is a copy of timestamp. In
   sender?s message, this value MUST be set to zero and in response
   message (sent from a receiver node), this value MUST be set to the
   timestamp of the sender?s message. The length of this field is 2
   bytes. The sender node should cache this value in order to compare it
   with all responses sent by other nodes. This informs the sender node
   that the message is the response to his message and protects the node
   against replay attack.

   - Other Options. This variable-length field contains important data
   that needs to be protected in the packet. The padding is used to
   insure that the field is a multiple of eight in length.

   - Padding. A variable-length field containing padding to insure that
   the entire signature field is a multiple of eight in length. It thus
   contains the number of blanks needed to make the entire signature


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   field end on a multiple of eight.

   All NDP messages (except RS messages) SHOULD contain the SSAS
   signature data field which allows receivers to verify senders. If a
   node receives a solicited NA message in response to its NS message
   showing that another node claims to own this address, then, after a
   successful verification process, this node increments the collision
   count by one and this value is used as explained in the "Collision
   count" item above. It will start from that section of the public key
   for the generation of a new IP address. The node repeats this 3 times
   and after 3 times generates a new public/private keys. Since the
   likelihood of two nodes having the same value is 1/(2^63). This is
   really a small value while we also considered the order of magnitude
   relative to roughly 2 power 64 against sloppy implementations.


3.1.3.  SSAS verification process

   A node's verification process should start when it receives NDP
   messages. Following are the steps used in the verification process:

   1. Obtain Response No from the sender?s packet. Compare this value
   with its own timestamp that used in its previous message. If it is
   the same go to the next step, otherwise discard the message. (If SSAS
   is a part of SeND, this step should be skipped.)

   2. Obtain prefix information from its own cache or from a router
   advertisement to make sure about the prefix sizes and number of bits
   used for IID.

   3. Obtain the timestamp from the NDP message and call this value t1.

   4. Obtain the timestamp from the node's system, convert it to UTC,
   and call this value t2.

   5. If (t2- x) < = t1 < = (t2 + x) go to step 6. Otherwise, the
   message SHOULD be discarded without further processing. The value of
   x is dependent on network delays and network policy. The default
   value would be the value of Round Trip Time (RTT). The
   implementations SHOULD allow to set different values.

   6. Obtain the public key from its own neighboring cache. If no
   matches are found in the node cache and if there is a centralized
   RPKI model available in the local network, then the node MIGHT obtain
   this public key from that node. Otherwise go to the next step.

   7. Compare this to its own public key. If it is not the same, go to
   the next step. Otherwise, the message should be discarded without
   further processing. (This step should be skipped when the node uses
   the RPKI to obtain the other nodes' public key.)

   8. Obtain the hash algorithm from the packet. By default it is
   SHA256.


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   9. Execute hash function on the public key. Takes 64bits, depends on
   collision count, from the hash function. Compare this value with the
   node's IID source IP. If it is the same, go to the next step.
   Otherwise, discard the message without further processing.

   10. Concatenate the timestamp with the MAC address, algorithm type,
   collision count, sender's Global IP address (subnet prefix and IID),
   and other options (if any) and call this entity the plain message.

   11. Obtain the SSAS signature from the SSAS signature data field.
   Obtain the Algorithm type from the message.

   12. Verify the Signature using the public key and then enter the
   plain message and the SSAS signature as an input to the verification
   function. If the verification process is successful, process the
   message. Otherwise, the message should be discarded without further
   processing.

   After a successful verification, the node SHOULD store the public key
   and MAC address of the sender node in its neighboring cache. By
   default, the cache is valid for two days but the implementation
   SHOULD consider a way to let the end users change this default value.


3.2.  Resource Public key Infrastructure (RPKI)

   To Authorize the Routers in the network and increase the security of
   the nodes in this network, it is recommended to use an RPKI explained
   in RFC 6494 and 6495. It is explained in more detail in
   [SSASAnalysis] and local security deployment [localSecurity].


4.  SSAS Applications


4.1.  A solution for all nodes

   SSAS is capable to be used in standard nodes (standard computers) and
   nodes where limited computational resources are available. One
   example is the use of SSAS in sensor networks. Sensor networks are a
   prime example of nodes with limited resources (such as battery, CPU,
   and etc); see RFC 4919 [RFC4919] for use in IPv6 networks. Because
   currently, as explained in section 4. RFC 6775, the generation of the
   IID is based on EUI-64 which makes these nodes vulnerable to privacy
   and security attacks. One of these types of attack can occur during
   the Duplicate Address Detection (DAD) process.


4.2.  Authentication in Network layer

   Another example for the use of SSAS would be in mobile networks
   during the generation of IP addresses, as explained in section 4.4


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   RFC 6275 [RFC6275]. The current problem with the addressing mechanism
   in a mobile node is that no privacy is observed when a node moves to
   another network while usually keeping its Home Address. If there were
   a fast and secure mechanism available, then it would be possible to
   set this Home Address and change it and re-register it to the Home
   network. Another possible use for SSAS in mobile nodes could be as a
   security mechanism during the configuration of Care of Address (CoA);
   see section 3. RFC 5213 [RFC5213]. In that RFC, home proxy plays the
   role of a home agent for mobile nodes and mobile nodes set their CoA
   by the use of either stateful or stateless autoconfiguration.
   Currently they MUST use IPsec in order to secure this process.
   Section 4 of that RFC discusses the possibility of using another
   algorithm in order to secure mobile nodes.


4.3.  Authentication in Application Layer

   SSAS can be used as a means of authentication for the nodes in
   application layer. It is really important that the nodes know who
   they are talking to. This is because a user uses an application to
   connect to another node on the internet. This application either uses
   a domain name of the destination node (that later translates to the
   IP addresses) or directly uses the IP address of this node. This is
   where the attacker can play a role and spoof this IP address and play
   a MITM attack or other types of attacks. If the node uses this
   approach, the attacker does not have a possibility to spoof the IP
   address of the communicating node. So, this approach can mitigate IP
   spoofing during the authentication of two nodes in application layer.


4.4.  Other Applications

   With the wide usage of IP addresses in different types of devices and
   by the use of autoconfiguration mechanisms to configure these IP
   addresses, the need for the use of a security algorithm is increased.
   One type of application would be for use in vehicular networks or in
   the car-to-car networks. There is currently some work in progress
   that makes use of Neighbor Discovery. SSAS could also be a solution
   for enabling fast protection against ND attacks.

5.  Security Considerations

   There are two security considerations:

   Since SSAS cannot prevent the layer 2 attacks but can mitigate it
   after the first verification, therefore one would need to use a
   monitoring device to prevent MAC spoofing. The other possibility is
   to have a dynamic MAC address. This means the SSAS node can use the
   48 rightmost bits of the its public key as a MAC address. In this
   case there is a binding between the IP address, MAC address and
   public key. Since the verification process would have failed, it
   cannot be spoofed. However, this approach might be problematic from
   an operational view and might need to have some consideration before


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   being used.

   Another security consideration is how to attack SSAS. One might ask
   oneself that what are the odds of an attacker being able to generate
   a public key having two four sequential bytes (from two different
   halves of public key) that are the same as 64 bits of that in
   Interface ID? If he could, he could then generate the signature using
   his own private key and thus break SSAS. Mathematically it has been
   shown that the likelihood of matching 64 bits in the public key
   against 64bits in the IID is 1/(2^64). in [SSASAnalysis] the analysis
   of SSAS is explained and compared to CGA. Since the nodes in the
   network need to keep the public key and the MAC address of other
   nodes in the cache, the attacker only has a few seconds to perform
   this attack and then the attacker needs to perform this attack
   against the whole public key. For CGA, this value is less. in
   [cgaattack], the attack in CGA was explained. So, in general, SSAS is
   faster and in a good security level. In other word, SSAS tried to
   address the security and performance problem exists in CGA and offer
   a fastest algorithm.



6.  IANA Considerations

   There is no IANA consideration




7.  Privacy Consideration

   When an attacker is inside a local link, he is enable to identify a
   node. although, this target node changes its IP address. The reason
   is because the target node does not change its MAC address. However,
   if the public key needs to be used for verification in other
   mechanisms and not in local link, then it is RECOMMENDED that the
   public/private keys to be valid for a short period of time. The
   default value would be a week. The implementations need to consider
   the automatic key generation to avoid administrative requirements for
   this process.


8.  Appendix A


8.1.  Comparison of CGA and SSAS generation time

   The following information was retrieved from [cgatime]. It shows the
   time required to generate CGA in different sec value. This is why, in
   practice, only sec value 0 and 1 can be used.

   sec value 1 => ~ 1 second



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   sec value 2 => ~ 3 hours

   sec value 3 => ~ 24 years

   sec value 4 => ~ 1.16*10^6 years

   sec value 5 => ~ 1*10^11 years

   sec value 6 => ~ 6.8*10^15 years

   The above information is based on the fact that one uses RSA key
   sizes less than 1280 bits. If one needs to use the higher security,
   then it needs more time for the generation of CGA value. Using RSA
   higher key sizes also increases the packet size needs to carry the
   public key. Here is our evaluation of ECC and RSA key generation time
   in a standard computer with 2.6 GHz CPU.

   SSAS generation time is about the time needed to generate key pairs.
   Since, by default, SSAS uses ECC 192 bits, the following values
   compares ECC with RSA. RSA is the algorithm uses in CGA. As explained
   earlier, the security of ECC 192 bits is equivalent to the security
   of RSA 7680 bits.

   ECC 192 bits: Average key generation time = 195011 microseconds

   RSA 1280 bits: Average key generation time = 681039 microseconds

   RSA 7680 bits: Average key generation time = 163473350 microseconds


9.  Appendix B


9.1.  Network-based protection vs. Node-based protection

   Node-based protection is the ability of the node to protect against
   some types of attacks such as IP spoofing, MITM attack. On the other
   hand, network-based protection is the use of some devices in the
   network edges to protect the nodes inside this network against router
   advertisement spoofing attacks or other types of attack. Both of
   these protection is required and both can complement each other. This
   is because the attacker might be inside the network and play a role
   of MITM, spoof the other nodes' IP address, prevent other nodes from
   configuring their IP address and cause many delays and problems in
   the local network (Not all the nodes in the network is ever trustee).
   One important consideration about node-based protection is that, it
   should support any node and apply to any nodes (Including nodes with
   limited energy resources or limited memory resources). This is why
   there is a need for a good mechanism to provide this protection with
   less cost. The proposed mechanism in this document, i.e., SSAS can
   provide the node with node-based protection. With only node-based
   protection, the malicious node inside this network can claim to be a
   router and the node does not have any means to authorize him. This is


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   why, the network-based protection is also the complement solution to
   a node-based protection. There are some approaches to provide the
   node with network-based protection. One such approach might be
   RA-gaurd [RAgaurd]] which limits subnet prefixes. Unfortunately with
   this approach, still the node inside this network can maliciously
   claim to be a router and play the MITM attack inside the network by
   sending unicast router advertisement messages. So, the attack is
   still possible. The other approach is the use of RPKI as explained in
   RFC 6494 and RFC 6495. Unfortunately these RFCs only explain the
   possibility of using them but not the detail of implementation. The
   detail implementation is explained in [SSASAnalysis]. The local RPKI
   node also can play a role of monitoring device in the network.

10.  Acknowledgements

   The Authors would like to acknowledge Erik Nordmard and Joel M.
   Halpern for their supports and assistance to improve this
   document.The authors also would like to acknowledge Michael
   Richardson, Dan Wing, Tim Chown, Christian Huitema, Joel M. Halpern
   for their comments to improve this document



11.  References

11.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to
             Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC4291] Hinden, R., Deering, S., "IP Version 6 Addressing
             Architecture," RFC 4291, February 2006.

   [RFC3972] Aura, T., "Cryptographically Generated Addresses
             (CGA)", RFC 3972, March 2005.

   [RFC4941] Narten, T., Draves, R., Krishnan, S., "Privacy
             Extensions for Stateless Address Autoconfiguration in
             IPv6", RFC 4941, September 2007.

   [RFC3971] Arkko, J., Kempf, J., Zill, B., and Nikander, P.,
             "SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND)", RFC 3971, March 2005.

   [RFC3315] Droms, R., Bound, J., Volz, B., Lemon, T.,
             Perkins, C., Carney, M. , " Dynamic Host Configuration
             Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6)", RFC 3315, July 2003.

   [RFC3756] Nikander, P., Kempf, J., Nordmark, E., "IPv6
             Neighbor Discovery (ND) Trust Models and Threats", RFC
             3972, May 2004.

   [RFC4919] Kushalnagar, N., Montenegro, G., Schumacher, C.,"
             IPv6 over Low-Power Wireless Personal Area Networks


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             (6LoWPANs): Overview, Assumptions, Problem Statement, and
             Goals", RFC 4919, August 2007.

   [RFC6775] Shelby, Z., Chakrabarti, S., Nordmark, E.,
             Bormann, C. , " Neighbor Discovery Optimization for IPv6
             over Low-Power Wireless Personal Area Networks (6LoWPANs)",
             RFC 6775, November 2012.

   [RFC6275] Perkins, C., Johnson, D., Arkko, J., "Mobility
             Support in IPv6", RFC 6275, July 2011.

   [RFC6543] Gundavell, S., "Reserved IPv6 Interface
             Identifier for Proxy Mobile IPv6", RFC 6543, May 2012.

   [RFC6090] McGrew, D., Igoe, K., Salter, M., "Fundamental
             Elliptic Curve Cryptography Algorithms", RFC 6090, February
             2012.

   [RFC3756] Nikander, F., Kempf, J., Nordmark, E., "IPv6
             Neighbor Discovery (ND) Trust Models and Threats", RFC
             3756, May 2004.

   [RFC7136] Carpenter, B., Jiang, S.,"Significance of IPv6
             Interface Identifiers", RFC 7136, 2013

11.2.  Informative References

   [SSASAnalysis] Rafiee, H., Meinel, C., "'SSAS: a
                  Simple Secure Addressing Scheme for IPv6
                  AutoConfiguration". In Proceedings of the 11th IEEE
                  International conference on Privacy, Security and
                  Trust (PST), IEEE Catalog number: CFP1304F-ART, ISBN:
                  978-1-4673-5839-2.

   [cgaattack] Rafiee,H., Meinel, C., "Possible Attack on
               Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA)"
               ,http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-rafiee-6man-cga-attack,
               2014

   [RAgaurd] Gont, F., "Implementation Advice for IPv6 Router
             Advertisement Guard (RA-Guard)",
             http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-v6ops-ra-guard-implementation,
             2012

   [localSecurity] Rafiee,H., Meinel, C.,
                   "Recommendations for Local Security Deployments"
                   ,http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-rafiee-6man-local-security,
                   2013

   [cgatime] Bos, J., Oezen, O., Hubaux, J., "Analysis and
             Optimization of Cryptographically Generated Addresses", In
             Proceedings of the 12th International conference on
             Information Security (2009), ACM, pp. 17 ? 32.


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   [variableprefix] Carpenter, B., Chown, T, Gont, F.,
                    Jiang, S., Petrescu, A., Yourtchenko, A.," Analysis
                    of the 64-bit Boundary in IPv6 Addressing",
                    http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-6man-why64 ,
                    April 2014

   [cgabis] Rafiee,H., Zhang, D., "CGA Security Improvement"
            ,http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-rafiee-rfc3972-bis, 2014














































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Authors' Addresses

      Hosnieh Rafiee
      HUAWEI TECHNOLOGIES Duesseldorf GmbH
      Riesstrasse 25, 80992,
      Munich, Germany
      Phone: +49 (0)162 204 74 58
      Email: hosnieh.rafiee@huawei.com


      Christoph Meinel
      Hasso-Plattner-Institute
      Prof.-Dr.-Helmert-Str. 2-3
      Potsdam, Germany
      Email: meinel@hpi.uni-potsdam.de






































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