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Versions: 00 01 02 03 04 draft-ietf-dots-signal-call-home

DOTS                                                            T. Reddy
Internet-Draft                                                 J. Harsha
Intended status: Standards Track                                  McAfee
Expires: June 23, 2019                                      M. Boucadair
                                                                  Orange
                                                              J. Shallow
                                                               NCC Group
                                                       December 20, 2018


Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Signal Channel Call Home
                    draft-reddy-dots-home-network-03

Abstract

   This document presents DOTS signal channel Call Home service, which
   enables a DOTS server to initiate a secure connection to a DOTS
   client, and to receive the attack traffic information from the DOTS
   client.  The DOTS server in turn uses the attack traffic information
   to identify the compromised devices launching the outgoing DDOS
   attack and takes appropriate mitigation action.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on June 23, 2019.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents



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   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  The Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.2.  The Solution  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     1.3.  Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   2.  Notational Conventions and Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   3.  DOTS Signal Channel Call Home . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.1.  Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.2.  DOTS Signal Channel Extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       3.2.1.  Mitigation Request  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       3.2.2.  DOTS Signal Call Home YANG Module . . . . . . . . . .   9
   4.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     4.1.  DOTS Signal Channel Call Home UDP and TCP Port Number . .  12
     4.2.  DOTS Signal Channel CBOR Mappings Registry  . . . . . . .  12
     4.3.  New DOTS Conflict Cause . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     4.4.  DOTS Signal Call Home YANG Module . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   6.  Privacy Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   7.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   8.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     8.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     8.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18

1.  Introduction

1.1.  The Problem

   The DOTS signal channel protocol [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel] is
   used to carry information about a network resource or a network (or a
   part thereof) that is under a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)
   attack.  Such information is sent by a DOTS client to one or multiple
   DOTS servers so that appropriate mitigation actions are undertaken on
   traffic deemed suspicious.  Various use cases are discussed in
   [I-D.ietf-dots-use-cases].

   IoT devices are becoming more and more prevalent in home networks,
   and with compute and memory becoming cheaper and cheaper, various
   types of IoT devices become available in the consumer market at
   affordable price.  But on the downside, the main threat being most of
   these IoT devices are bought off-the-shelf and most manufacturers



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   haven't considered security in the product design.  IoT devices
   deployed in home networks can be easily compromised, they do not have
   an easy mechanism to upgrade, and IoT manufactures may cease
   manufacture and/or discontinue patching vulnerabilities on IoT
   devices.  However, these vulnerable and compromised devices will
   continue be used for a long period of time in the home, and the end-
   user does not know that IoT devices in his/her home are compromised.
   The compromised IoT devices are typically used for launching DDoS
   attacks on the victim while the owner/administrator of the home
   network is not aware about such misbehaviors.  Similar to other DDoS
   attacks, the victim in this attack can be an application server, a
   host, a router, a firewall, or an entire network.

   Nowadays, network devices in a home network offer network security,
   for instance, firewall/IPS service on a home router or gateway to
   protect the devices connected to the home network from external and
   internal attacks.  Over the years several techniques have been
   identified to detect DDoS attacks, some of these techniques can be
   enabled on home network devices but most of them are used in the
   Internet Service Provider (ISP)'s network.  The ISP offering DDoS
   mitigation service can detect outgoing DDoS attack traffic
   originating from its subscribers or the ISP may receive filtering
   rules (for example, using BGP flowspec [RFC5575]) from downstream
   service provider to filter, block, or rate-limit DDoS attack traffic
   originating from the ISP's subscribers to the downstream target.

   Some of the DDoS attacks like spoofed RST or FIN packets, Slowloris,
   and TLS re-negotiation are difficult to detect on the home network
   devices without adversely affecting its performance.  The reason is
   typically home routers have fast path to boost the throughput.  For
   every new TCP/UDP flow, only the first few packets are punted through
   the slow path.  Hence, it is not possible to detect various DDoS
   attacks in the slow path, since the attack payload is sent to the
   target server after the flow is switched to fast path.  Deep packet
   inspection (DPI) of all the packets of a flow would be able to detect
   some of the attacks.  However, a full-fledged DPI to detect these
   type of DDoS attacks is functionally or operationally not possible
   for all the devices attached to the home network owing to the memory
   and CPU limitations of the home routers.  Further, for certain DDoS
   attacks the ability to distinguish legitimate traffic from attacker
   traffic on a per packet basis is complex.  This complexity originates
   from the fact that the packet itself may look "legitimate" and no
   attack signature can be identified.  The anomaly can be identified
   only after detailed statistical analysis.

   The ISP on the other hand can detect the DDoS attack originating from
   a home network, but the ISP does not have a mechanism to detect which
   device in the home network is generating the DDoS attack traffic.



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   The primary reason being that devices in a IPv4 Home network are
   typically behind a NAT border.  Even in case of a IPv6 Home network,
   although the ISP can identify the infected device in the Home network
   launching the DDoS traffic by tracking its unique IPv6 address, the
   infected device can easily change the IP address to evade
   remediation.

   Existing approaches are still suffering from misused access network
   resources by abusing devices; the support of means for blocking such
   attacks close to the sources are missing.  In particular, the DOTS
   signal protocol does not discuss cooperative DDoS mitigation between
   the home network and ISP to the suppress the outbound DDoS attack
   traffic originating from the home network.

1.2.  The Solution

   This specification addresses the problems discussed in Section 1.1
   and presents DOTS signal channel Call Home extension, which enables
   the DOTS server to initiate a secure connection to the DOTS client,
   and the DOTS client then conveys the attack traffic information to
   the DOTS server.

   In a typical deployment scenario, the DOTS server is enabled on a
   CPE, which is aligned with recent trends to enrich the CPE with
   advanced security features.  Unlike classic DOTS deployments
   [I-D.ietf-dots-use-cases], such DOTS server maintains a single DOTS
   signal channel session for each DOTS-capable upstream provisioning
   domain [I-D.boucadair-dots-multihoming].

   For instance, the DOTS server in the home network initiates the Call
   Home during peace time and then subsequently the DOTS client in the
   ISP environment can initiate a mitigation request whenever the ISP
   detects there is an attack from a compromised device in the DOTS
   server's domain.

   The DOTS server uses the DDoS attack traffic information to identify
   the compromised device in its domain launching the DDoS attack,
   notifies the network administrator, and takes appropriate mitigation
   action.  The mitigation action can be to quarantine the compromised
   device or block its traffic to the attack target until the mitigation
   request is withdrawn.

1.3.  Scope

   The aforementioned problems may be encountered in other deployments
   than those discussed Section 1.1.  The solution proposed in this
   document can be used for those deployments to block DDoS attack
   traffic closer to the source(s) of the attack.



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   It is out of the scope of this document to identify an exhaustive
   list of such deployments.

2.  Notational Conventions and Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119][RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

   The reader should be familiar with the terms defined in
   [I-D.ietf-dots-requirements].

3.  DOTS Signal Channel Call Home

3.1.  Procedure

   DOTS signal channel Call Home preserves all but one of the DOTS
   client/server roles in the DOTS protocol stack, as compared to DOTS
   client-initiated DOTS signal channel protocol.  The one and only role
   reversal that occurs are at the TCP/TLS or DTLS layers; that is, the
   DOTS server acts as a DTLS client and the DOTS client acts as a DTLS
   server or the DOTS server acts as a TCP/TLS client and the DOTS
   client acts as a TCP/TLS server.  The DOTS server initiates TCP/TLS
   handshake or DTLS handshake to the DOTS client.

   For example, a home network element (e.g., home router) co-located
   with a DOTS server (likely, a client-domain DOTS gateway) is the TCP/
   TLS server and DTLS server.  However, when calling home, the DOTS
   server initially assumes the role of the TCP/TLS client and DTLS
   client, but the network element's role as a DOTS server remains the
   same.  Further, existing certificate chains and mutual authentication
   mechanisms between the DOTS agents are unaffected by Call Home
   function.  This Call Home function enables the DOTS server co-located
   with a network element (possibly behind NATs and firewalls) reachable
   by only the intended DOTS client and hence the DOTS server cannot be
   subjected to DDoS attacks.  Other motivations for introducing Call
   Home are discussed in Section 1.1 of [RFC8071].

   Figure 1 illustrates a sample Call Home flow exchange:










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                   DOTS                                DOTS
                  Server                              Client
                    |                                    |
                    |         1. (D)TLS connection       |
                    |----------------------------------->|
                    |         2. Mitigation request      |
                    |<-----------------------------------|
                    |                                    |

         Figure 1: DOTS Signal Channel Call Home Sequence Diagram

   The Call Home behavior is as follows:

   1.  If UDP transport is used, the DOTS server begins by initiating a
       DTLS connection to the DOTS client.  The DOTS client MUST support
       accepting DTLS connection on the IANA-assigned port defined in
       Section 4.1, but MAY be configured to listen to a different port.

       If TCP is used, the DOTS server begins by initiating a TCP
       connection to the DOTS client.  The DOTS client MUST support
       accepting TCP connections on the IANA-assigned port defined in
       Section 4.1, but MAY be configured to listen to a different port.
       Using this TCP connection, the DOTS server initiates an TLS
       connection to the DOTS client.

       The happy eyeballs mechanism explained in Section 4.3 of
       [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel] can be used for initiation of both
       TCP and UDP sessions.

   2.  Using this (D)TLS connection, the DOTS client requests,
       withdraws, or retrieves the status of mitigation requests.

3.2.  DOTS Signal Channel Extension

3.2.1.  Mitigation Request

   This specification extends the mitigation request defined in
   [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel] to convey the attacker source prefixes
   and source port numbers.  The DOTS client in the mitigation request
   conveys the following new parameters in the CBOR body of the
   mitigation request:

   source-prefix:  A list of attacker prefixes used to attack the
      target.  Prefixes are represented using Classless Inter-Domain
      Routing (CIDR) notation [RFC4632].

      As a reminder, the prefix length MUST be less than or equal to 32
      (resp. 128) for IPv4 (resp.  IPv6).



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      The prefix list MUST NOT include broadcast, loopback, or multicast
      addresses.  These addresses are considered as invalid values.  In
      addition, the DOTS client MUST validate that attacker prefixes are
      within the scope of the DOTS server's domain.

      This is an optional attribute.

   source-port-range:  A list of port numbers used by the attack traffic
      flows.

      A port range is defined by two bounds, a lower port number (lower-
      port) and an upper port number (upper-port).  When only 'lower-
      port' is present, it represents a single port number.

      For TCP, UDP, Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP)
      [RFC4960], or Datagram Congestion Control Protocol (DCCP)
      [RFC4340], a range of ports can be, for example, 0-1023,
      1024-65535, or 1024-49151.

      This is an optional attribute.

   source-icmp-type:  A list of ICMP types used by the attack traffic
      flows.  An ICMP type range is defined by two bounds, a lower ICMP
      type (lower-type) and an upper ICMP type (upper-type).  When only
      'lower-type' is present, it represents a single ICMP type.

      This is an optional attribute.

   The 'source-prefix' parameter is a mandatory attribute when the
   attack traffic information is signaled by the DOTS client in the call
   home scenario.  The 'target-uri' or 'target-fqdn' parameters can be
   included in the mitigation request for diagnostic purpose to notify
   the DOTS server domain administrator, but SHOULD NOT be used to
   determine the target IP addresses.  Note that 'target-prefix' becomes
   a mandatory attribute in the mitigation request signaling the attack
   information because 'target-uri' and 'target-fqdn' are optional
   attributes and 'alias-name' will not be conveyed in the mitigation
   request.

   In order to help attack source identification by the DOTS server, the
   DOTS client SHOULD include in its mitigation request additional
   information such as 'source-port-range' or 'source-icmp-type-range'.
   The DOTS client MAY NOT include such information if 'source-prefix'
   conveys an IPv6 address/prefix.

   If a Carrier Grade NAT (CGN, including NAT64) is located between the
   DOTS client domain and DOTS server domain, communicating an external
   IP address in a mitigation request is likely to be discarded by the



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   DOTS server because the external IP address is not visible locally to
   the DOTS server.  The DOTS server is only aware of the internal IP
   addresses/prefixes bound to its domain.  Thus, the DOTS client MUST
   NOT include the external IP address and/or port number identifying
   the suspect attack source, but MUST include the internal IP address
   and/or port number.  To that aim, the DOTS client SHOULD rely on
   mechanisms, such as [I-D.ietf-opsawg-nat-yang] or
   [I-D.ietf-softwire-dslite-yang], to retrieve the internal IP address
   and port number which are mapped to an external IP address and port
   number.

   If a MAP Border Relay [RFC7597] or lwAFTR [RFC7596] is enabled in the
   provider's domain to service its customers, the identification of an
   attack source bound to an IPv4 address/prefix MUST also rely on
   source port numbers because the same IPv4 address is assigned to
   multiple customers.  The port information is required to
   unambiguously identify the source of an attack.

   If a translator is enabled on the boundaries of the domain hosting
   the DOTS server (a CPE with NAT enabled, typically), the DOTS server
   uses the attack traffic information conveyed in a mitigation request
   to find the internal source IP address of the compromised device and
   blocks the traffic from the compromised device traffic to the attack
   target until the mitigation request is withdrawn.  Doing so allows to
   isolate the suspicious device while avoiding to disturb other
   services.

   The DOTS server domain administrator consent MAY be required to block
   the traffic from the compromised device to the attack target.  An
   implementation MAY have a configuration knob to block the traffic
   from the compromised device to the attack target with or without DOTS
   server domain administrator consent.  If the attack traffic is
   blocked, the DOTS server informs the DOTS client that the attack is
   being mitigated.

   If the attack traffic information is identified by the DOTS server or
   the DOTS server domain administrator as legitimate traffic, the
   mitigation request is rejected, and 4.09 (Conflict) is returned to
   the DOTS client.  The conflict-clause (defined in Section 4.4.1 of
   [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel]) indicates the cause of the conflict.
   The following new value is defined:

   4: Mitigation request rejected.  This code is returned by the DOTS
      server to indicate the attack traffic has been classified as
      legitimate traffic.

   If the DOTS server is co-located with a home router, it can program
   the packet processor to punt all the traffic from the compromised



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   device to the target to slow path.  The home router inspects the
   punted slow path traffic to detect and block the outgoing DDoS attack
   traffic or quarantine the device (e.g., using MAC level filtering)
   until it is remediated, and notifies the home administrator about the
   compromised device.

3.2.2.  DOTS Signal Call Home YANG Module

3.2.2.1.  Tree Structure

   This document augments the "dots-signal-channel" DOTS signal YANG
   module defined in [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel] for signaling the
   attack traffic information.  This document defines the YANG module
   "ietf-dots-signal-call-home", which has the following tree structure:

module: ietf-dots-signal-call-home
  augment /ietf-signal:dots-signal/ietf-signal:message-type
          /ietf-signal:mitigation-scope/ietf-signal:scope:
    +--rw source-prefix*            inet:ip-prefix {source-signaling}?
    +--rw source-port-range* [lower-port upper-port] {source-signaling}?
    |  +--rw lower-port    inet:port-number
    |  +--rw upper-port    inet:port-number
    +--rw source-icmp-type-range* [lower-type upper-type] {source-signaling}?
       +--rw lower-type    uint8
       +--rw upper-type    uint8


3.2.2.2.  YANG Module

   <CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-dots-signal-call-home@2018-09-28.yang"

   module ietf-dots-signal-call-home {
     yang-version 1.1;
     namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-dots-signal-call-home";
     prefix signal-call-home;

     import ietf-inet-types {
       prefix inet;
       reference
         "Section 4 of RFC 6991";
     }
     import ietf-dots-signal-channel {
       prefix ietf-signal;
       reference
         "RFC YYYY: Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat
                    Signaling (DOTS) Signal Channel Specification";
     }




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     organization
       "IETF DDoS Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Working Group";
     contact
       "WG Web:   <https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/dots/>
        WG List:  <mailto:dots@ietf.org>

        Editor:  Konda, Tirumaleswar Reddy
                 <mailto:TirumaleswarReddy_Konda@McAfee.com>;

        Editor:  Mohamed Boucadair
                 <mailto:mohamed.boucadair@orange.com>;

        Editor:  Jon Shallow
                 <mailto:ietf-supjps@jpshallow.com>";

     description
       "This module contains YANG definition for the signaling
        messages exchanged between a DOTS client and a DOTS server
        for the call home deployment scenario.

        Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as
        authors of the code.  All rights reserved.

        Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
        without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject
        to the license terms contained in, the Simplified BSD License
        set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions
        Relating to IETF Documents
        (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).

        This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX; see
        the RFC itself for full legal notices.";

     revision 2018-09-28 {
       description
         "Initial revision.";
       reference
         "RFC XXXX: Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat
                    Signaling (DOTS) Signal Channel Call Home";
     }

     feature source-signaling {
       description
         "This feature means that source-related information
          can be supplied in mitigation requests.";
     }

     augment "/ietf-signal:dots-signal/ietf-signal:message-type/" +



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             "ietf-signal:mitigation-scope/ietf-signal:scope" {
       if-feature source-signaling;
       description "Attacker source details";

       leaf-list source-prefix {
         type inet:ip-prefix;
         description
           "IPv4 or IPv6 prefix identifying the attacker(s).";
       }
       list source-port-range {
         key "lower-port upper-port";
         description
           "Port range. When only lower-port is
            present, it represents a single port number.";
         leaf lower-port {
           type inet:port-number;
           mandatory true;
           description
             "Lower port number of the port range.";
         }
         leaf upper-port {
           type inet:port-number;
           must ". >= ../lower-port" {
              error-message
                "The upper port number must be greater than
                 or equal to lower port number.";
           }
           description
             "Upper port number of the port range.";
         }
       }
       list source-icmp-type-range {
         key "lower-type upper-type";
         description
           "ICMP type range. When only lower-type is
            present, it represents a single ICMP type.";
         leaf lower-type {
           type uint8;
           mandatory true;
           description
             "Lower ICMP type of the ICMP type range.";
         }
         leaf upper-type {
           type uint8;
           must ". >= ../lower-type" {
              error-message
                "The upper ICMP type must be greater than
                or equal to lower ICMP type.";



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           }
           description
             "Upper type of the ICMP type range.";
         }
       }
     }
   }
   <CODE ENDS>

4.  IANA Considerations

4.1.  DOTS Signal Channel Call Home UDP and TCP Port Number

   IANA is requested to assign the port number TBD to the DOTS signal
   channel Call Home protocol for both UDP and TCP from the "Service
   Name and Transport Protocol Port Number Registry" available at:
   https://www.iana.org/assignments/service-names-port-numbers/service-
   names-port-numbers.xhtml.

   The assignment of port number 4647 is strongly suggested (DOTS signal
   channel uses port number 4646).

4.2.  DOTS Signal Channel CBOR Mappings Registry

   This specification registers the 'source-prefix' and 'source-port-
   range' parameters in the IANA "DOTS Signal Channel CBOR Mappings"
   registry established by [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel].

   The 'source-prefix', 'source-port-range', and 'source-icmp-type-
   range' are comprehension-optional parameters.

   o  Note to the RFC Editor: Please delete (TBD1)-(TBD5) once CBOR keys
      are assigned from the 0x8000 - 0xBFFF range.


















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   +-------------------+------------+--------+---------------+--------+
   | Parameter Name    | YANG       | CBOR   | CBOR Major    | JSON   |
   |                   | Type       | Key    |    Type &     | Type   |
   |                   |            |        | Information   |        |
   +-------------------+------------+--------+---------------+--------+
   | source-prefix     | leaf-list  | 0x8000 | 4 array       | Array  |
   |                   | inet:      | (TBD1) |               |        |
   |                   |  ip-prefix |        | 3 text string | String |
   | source-port-range | list       | 0x8001 | 4 array       | Array  |
   |                   |            | (TBD2) |               |        |
   | source-icmp-type- | list       | 0x8002 | 4 array       | Array  |
   |  range            |            | (TBD3) |               |        |
   | lower-type        | uint8      | 0x8003 | 0 unsigned    | Number |
   |                   |            | (TBD4) |               |        |
   | upper-type        | uint8      | 0x8004 | 0 unsigned    | Number |
   |                   |            | (TBD5) |               |        |
   +-------------------+------------+--------+---------------+--------+

4.3.  New DOTS Conflict Cause

   This document requests IANA to assign a new code from the "DOTS
   Conflict Cause Codes" registry:

   +------+------------------+-----------------------------+-----------+
   | Code | Label            | Description                 | Reference |
   +------+------------------+-----------------------------+-----------+
   | 4    | request-rejected | Mitigation request          | [RFCXXXX] |
   |      |                  | rejected. This code is      |           |
   |      |                  | returned by the DOTS server |           |
   |      |                  | to indicate the attack      |           |
   |      |                  | traffic has been classified |           |
   |      |                  | as legitimate traffic.      |           |
   +------+------------------+-----------------------------+-----------+

4.4.  DOTS Signal Call Home YANG Module

   This document requests IANA to register the following URI in the
   "IETF XML Registry" [RFC3688]:

            URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-dots-signal-call-home
            Registrant Contact: The IESG.
            XML: N/A; the requested URI is an XML namespace.


   This document requests IANA to register the following YANG module in
   the "YANG Module Names" registry [RFC7950].





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         name: ietf-signal-call-home
         namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-dots-signal-call-home
         prefix: signal-call-home
         reference: RFC XXXX


5.  Security Considerations

   This document deviates from standard DOTS signal channel usage by
   having the DOTS server initiate the TCP/TLS or DTLS connection.  DOTS
   signal channel related security considerations discussed in
   Section 10 of [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel] MUST be considered.
   DOTS agents MUST authenticate each other using (D)TLS before a DOTS
   signal channel session is considered valid.

   An attacker may launch a DoS attack on the DOTS client by having it
   perform computationally expensive operations, before deducing that
   the attacker doesn't possess a valid key.  For instance, in TLS 1.3
   [RFC8446], the ServerHello message contains a Key Share value based
   on an expensive asymmetric key operation for key establishment.
   Common precautions mitigating DoS attacks are recommended, such as
   temporarily blacklisting the source address after a set number of
   unsuccessful authentication attempts.

   DOTS servers may not blindly trust mitigation requests from DOTS
   clients.  For example, DOTS servers can use the attack flow
   information in a mitigation request to enable full-fledged packet
   inspection function to inspect all the traffic from the compromised
   to the target or to re-direct the traffic from the compromised device
   to the target to a DDoS mitigation system to scrub the suspicious
   traffic.  DOTS servers can also seek the consent of DOTS server
   domain administrator to block the traffic from the compromised device
   to the target (see Section 3.2.1).

6.  Privacy Considerations

   Considerations discussed in [RFC6973] were taken into account to
   assess whether the DOTS Call Home extension introduces privacy
   threats.

   Concretely, the protocol does not leak any new information that can
   be used to ease surveillance.  In particular, the DOTS server is not
   required to share information that is local to its network (e.g.,
   internal identifiers of an attack source) with the DOTS client.

   The DOTS Call Home extension does not preclude the validation of
   mitigation requests received from a DOTS client.  For example, a
   security service running on the CPE may require administrator's



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   consent before the CPE acts upon the mitigation request indicated by
   the DOTS client.  How the consent is obtained is out of scope of this
   document.

   Note that a DOTS server can seek for an administrator's consent,
   validate the request by inspecting the traffic, or proceed with both.

   The DOTS Call Home extension is only advisory in nature.  Concretely,
   the DOTS Call Home extension does not impose any action to be
   enforced within the home network; it is up to the DOTS server (and/or
   network administrator) to decide whether and which actions are
   required.

   Moreover, the DOTS Call Home extension avoids misattribution by
   appropriately identifying the network to which a suspect attack
   source belongs to (e.g., address sharing issues discussed in
   Section 3.2.1).

   Triggers to send a DOTS mitigation request to a DOTS server are
   deployment-specific.  For example, a DOTS client may rely on the
   output of some DDoS detection systems deployed within the DOTS
   client's network to detect potential outbound DDoS attacks or on
   abuse claims received from remote victim networks.  Such DDoS
   detection and mitigation techniques are not meant to track the
   activity of users, but to protect the Internet and avoid altering the
   IP reputation of the DOTS client's domain.

7.  Acknowledgements

   Thanks to Wei Pei, Xia Liang, Roman Danyliw, and Dan Wing for the
   comments.

8.  References

8.1.  Normative References

   [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel]
              K, R., Boucadair, M., Patil, P., Mortensen, A., and N.
              Teague, "Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat
              Signaling (DOTS) Signal Channel Specification", draft-
              ietf-dots-signal-channel-25 (work in progress), September
              2018.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.




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   [RFC3688]  Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3688, January 2004,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3688>.

   [RFC7950]  Bjorklund, M., Ed., "The YANG 1.1 Data Modeling Language",
              RFC 7950, DOI 10.17487/RFC7950, August 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7950>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

   [RFC8446]  Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
              Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.

8.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.boucadair-dots-multihoming]
              Boucadair, M. and R. K, "Multi-homing Deployment
              Considerations for Distributed-Denial-of-Service Open
              Threat Signaling (DOTS)", draft-boucadair-dots-
              multihoming-04 (work in progress), October 2018.

   [I-D.ietf-dots-requirements]
              Mortensen, A., Moskowitz, R., and R. K, "Distributed
              Denial of Service (DDoS) Open Threat Signaling
              Requirements", draft-ietf-dots-requirements-16 (work in
              progress), October 2018.

   [I-D.ietf-dots-use-cases]
              Dobbins, R., Migault, D., Fouant, S., Moskowitz, R.,
              Teague, N., Xia, L., and K. Nishizuka, "Use cases for DDoS
              Open Threat Signaling", draft-ietf-dots-use-cases-16 (work
              in progress), July 2018.

   [I-D.ietf-opsawg-nat-yang]
              Boucadair, M., Sivakumar, S., Jacquenet, C., Vinapamula,
              S., and Q. Wu, "A YANG Module for Network Address
              Translation (NAT) and Network Prefix Translation (NPT)",
              draft-ietf-opsawg-nat-yang-17 (work in progress),
              September 2018.

   [I-D.ietf-softwire-dslite-yang]
              Boucadair, M., Jacquenet, C., and S. Sivakumar, "A YANG
              Data Model for Dual-Stack Lite (DS-Lite)", draft-ietf-
              softwire-dslite-yang-17 (work in progress), May 2018.




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   [RFC4340]  Kohler, E., Handley, M., and S. Floyd, "Datagram
              Congestion Control Protocol (DCCP)", RFC 4340,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4340, March 2006,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4340>.

   [RFC4632]  Fuller, V. and T. Li, "Classless Inter-domain Routing
              (CIDR): The Internet Address Assignment and Aggregation
              Plan", BCP 122, RFC 4632, DOI 10.17487/RFC4632, August
              2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4632>.

   [RFC4732]  Handley, M., Ed., Rescorla, E., Ed., and IAB, "Internet
              Denial-of-Service Considerations", RFC 4732,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4732, December 2006,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4732>.

   [RFC4960]  Stewart, R., Ed., "Stream Control Transmission Protocol",
              RFC 4960, DOI 10.17487/RFC4960, September 2007,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4960>.

   [RFC5575]  Marques, P., Sheth, N., Raszuk, R., Greene, B., Mauch, J.,
              and D. McPherson, "Dissemination of Flow Specification
              Rules", RFC 5575, DOI 10.17487/RFC5575, August 2009,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5575>.

   [RFC6973]  Cooper, A., Tschofenig, H., Aboba, B., Peterson, J.,
              Morris, J., Hansen, M., and R. Smith, "Privacy
              Considerations for Internet Protocols", RFC 6973,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6973, July 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6973>.

   [RFC7596]  Cui, Y., Sun, Q., Boucadair, M., Tsou, T., Lee, Y., and I.
              Farrer, "Lightweight 4over6: An Extension to the Dual-
              Stack Lite Architecture", RFC 7596, DOI 10.17487/RFC7596,
              July 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7596>.

   [RFC7597]  Troan, O., Ed., Dec, W., Li, X., Bao, C., Matsushima, S.,
              Murakami, T., and T. Taylor, Ed., "Mapping of Address and
              Port with Encapsulation (MAP-E)", RFC 7597,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7597, July 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7597>.

   [RFC8071]  Watsen, K., "NETCONF Call Home and RESTCONF Call Home",
              RFC 8071, DOI 10.17487/RFC8071, February 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8071>.







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Authors' Addresses

   Tirumaleswar Reddy
   McAfee, Inc.
   Embassy Golf Link Business Park
   Bangalore, Karnataka  560071
   India

   Email: kondtir@gmail.com


   Joshi Harsha
   McAfee, Inc.
   Embassy Golf Link Business Park
   Bangalore, Karnataka  560071
   India

   Email: harsha_joshi@mcafee.com


   Mohamed Boucadair
   Orange
   Rennes  35000
   France

   Email: mohamed.boucadair@orange.com


   Jon Shallow
   NCC Group
   UK

   Email: supjps-ietf@jpshallow.com


















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