[Docs] [txt|pdf|xml|html] [Tracker] [Email] [Nits]

Versions: 00 01 02 03 04

DPRIVE WG                                                       T. Reddy
Internet-Draft                                                    McAfee
Intended status: Standards Track                                 D. Wing
Expires: September 6, 2019
                                                           M. Richardson
                                                Sandelman Software Works
                                                            M. Boucadair
                                                                  Orange
                                                           March 5, 2019


 A Bootstrapping Procedure to Discover and Authenticate DNS-over-(D)TLS
                       and DNS-over-HTTPS Servers
               draft-reddy-dprive-bootstrap-dns-server-00

Abstract

   This document specifies mechanisms to automatically bootstrap
   endpoints (e.g., hosts, Customer Equipment) to discover and
   authenticate DNS-over-(D)TLS and DNS-over-HTTPS servers provided by a
   local network.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 6, 2019.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents



Reddy, et al.           Expires September 6, 2019               [Page 1]


Internet-Draft          DoT/DoH server discovery              March 2019


   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Bootstrapping IoT Devices and CPE . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  Bootstrapping Endpoint Devices  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   5.  Discovery Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     5.1.  DNS Reference Identifier DHCP Options . . . . . . . . . .   6
       5.1.1.  DHCPv6 DNS Reference Identifier Option  . . . . . . .   7
       5.1.2.  DHCPv4 DNS Reference Identifier Option  . . . . . . .   8
     5.2.  Resolution  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   7.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     7.1.  DHCPv6 Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     7.2.  DHCPv4 Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     7.3.  Application Service & Application Protocol Tags . . . . .  10
       7.3.1.  DNS Application Service Tag Registration  . . . . . .  10
       7.3.2.  dns.tls Application Protocol Tag Registration . . . .  10
       7.3.3.  dns.dtls Application Protocol Tag Registration  . . .  10
       7.3.4.  dns.https Application Protocol Tag Registration . . .  10
   8.  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   9.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     9.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     9.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13

1.  Introduction

   Various network security services are provided by Enterprise, secure
   home and wall-gardened networks to protect endpoints (e.g,. hosts,
   IoT devices).  Some of these security services act on DNS requests
   from endpoints.  However, if an endpoint is configured to use public
   DNS-over-(D)TLS [RFC7858] [RFC8094] or DNS-over-HTTPS [RFC8484]
   servers, network security services in the local network cannot act
   efficiently on DNS requests from the endpoints.  In order to act on
   DNS requests from endpoints, network security services can block DNS-
   over-(D)TLS traffic by dropping outgoing packets to destination port
   853, and by identifying the domains offering DNS-over-HTTPS servers,
   DNS-over-HTTPS traffic can be blocked by dropping outgoing packets to
   these domains.  If the endpoint has enabled strict privacy profile
   (Section 5 of [RFC8310]), and the network security service blocks the
   traffic to the public DNS server, DNS service is not available to the



Reddy, et al.           Expires September 6, 2019               [Page 2]


Internet-Draft          DoT/DoH server discovery              March 2019


   endpoint and ultimately the endpoint cannot access Internet.  If the
   endpoint has enabled opportunistic privacy profile (Section 5 of
   [RFC8310]), and the network security service blocks traffic to the
   public DNS server, the endpoint will either fallback to an encrypted
   connection without authenticating the DNS-over-(D)TLS and DNS-over-
   HTTPS servers provided by the local network or fallback to clear text
   DNS, and cannot exchange encrypted DNS messages.  This can compromise
   the endpoint security and privacy; some of the potential security
   threats are listed below:

   o  Pervasive monitoring of DNS traffic.

   o  If the endpoint is an IoT device which is configured to use public
      DNS-over-(D)TLS or DNS-over-HTTPS servers, and if a policy
      enforcement point in the local network is programmed using a
      Manufacturer Usage Description (MUD) file [I-D.ietf-opsawg-mud] by
      a MUD manager to only allow intented communications to and from
      the IoT device, the policy enforcement point cannot enforce the
      Network Access Control List rules based on domain names (Section 8
      of [I-D.ietf-opsawg-mud]).

   o  The network security service cannot prevent an endpoint from
      accessing malicious domains.  Attacks like DNS cache poisoning can
      lead the user to visit malicious website to inject malware on the
      endpoint.  For instance, malwares like DNSChanger can modify the
      endpoint's DNS entries to point toward its own rogue name servers
      which then injected its own advertising into Web pages.

   The DPRIVE and DoH working groups have not defined an automated
   mechanism to securely bootstrap the endpoints to discover and
   authenticate DNS-over-(D)TLS and DNS-over-HTTPS servers in the local
   network.  Some clients have pre-configured specific public DNS
   servers (such as Mozilla using Cloudflare's DNS-over-HTTPS server).
   If endpoints continue to use hard-coded public DNS servers, this has
   a risk of relying on few centralized DNS services.  Further, Content
   Delivery Networks (CDNs) that map traffic based on DNS may lose the
   ability to direct end-user traffic to a nearby cluster in cases where
   a DNS service is being used that is not affiliated with the local
   network and which does not send "EDNS Client Subnet" (ECS)
   information to the CDN's DNS authorities [CDN].

   The document proposes a mechanism to automatically bootstrap the
   endpoints to discover and authenticate the DNS-over-(D)TLS and DNS-
   over-HTTPS servers provided by the local network.  The overall
   procedure can be structured into the following steps:






Reddy, et al.           Expires September 6, 2019               [Page 3]


Internet-Draft          DoT/DoH server discovery              March 2019


   o  Bootstrapping phase (Section 3 and Section 4) is meant to
      automatically to automatically bootstrap endpoints with local
      network's CA certificates and DNS server certificate.

   o  Discovery phase (Section 5) is meant to discover an authentication
      domain (defined in [RFC8310]) to authenticate the privacy-enabling
      DNS server, the privacy-enabling protocols supported by the DNS
      server and usable DNS server IP addresses.

   o  Connection handshake and service invocation: The DNS client
      initiates (D)TLS handshake with the DNS server learned in the
      discovery phase.  Furthermore, DNS client uses the credentials
      discovered during the bootstrapping phase to validate the server
      certificate.

   This document uses the terms defined in [RFC8499].

2.  Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119][RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

3.  Bootstrapping IoT Devices and CPE

   The following steps discuss the mechanism to automatically bootstrap
   IoT devices with local network's CA certificates and DNS server
   certificate.  The below steps can also be used by CPE acting as DNS
   forwarders to discover and authenticate DNS-over-(D)TLS and DNS-over-
   HTTPS servers provided by the access networks.

   o  The IoT device can use Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key
      Infrastructures (BRSKI) discussed in
      [I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra] to automatically bootstrap
      the IoT device using the IoT manufacturer provisioned X.509
      certificate, in combination with a registrar provided by the local
      network and IoT device manufacturer's authorizing service (MASA).

      1.  The IoT device authenticates to the local network using the
          IoT manufacturer provisioned X.509 certificate.  The IoT
          device can request and get a voucher from the MASA service via
          the registrar.  The voucher is signed by the MASA service and
          includes the local network's CA public key.

      2.  The IoT device validates the signed voucher using the
          manufacturer installed trust anchor associated with the MASA,



Reddy, et al.           Expires September 6, 2019               [Page 4]


Internet-Draft          DoT/DoH server discovery              March 2019


          stores the CA's public key and validates the provisional TLS
          connection to the registrar.

      3.  The IoT device requests the full Enrollment over Secure
          Transport (EST) [RFC7030] distribution of current CA
          certificates (Section 5.9.1 in
          [I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra]) from the registrar
          operating as a BRSKI-EST server.  The IoT device uses the
          Explicit Trust Anchor database to validate the DNS server
          certificate.

      4.  TBD: The IoT device learns the End-Entity certificates
          [RFC8295] from the BRSKI-EST server.  The certificate
          provisioned to the DNS server in the local network will be
          treated as a End-Entity certificate.  The IoT device needs to
          identify the End-Entity certificate is provisioned to the DNS
          server, the key usage extension [RFC5280] can be used to
          restrict the use of the End-Entity certificate to authenticate
          the DNS server, a new bit will be added to the KeyUsage type
          to identify the DNS server certificate.

4.  Bootstrapping Endpoint Devices

   The following steps explain the mechanism to automatically bootstrap
   an endpoint with the local network's CA certificates and DNS server
   certificate:

   1.  The endpoint authenticates to the local network and establishes
       provisional TLS connection with the registrar operating as the
       BRSKI-EST server.  The endpoint discovers registrar using DNS-
       based Service Discovery [RFC6763].

   2.  The endpoint uses Salted Challenge Response Authentication
       Mechanism (SCRAM) [RFC7804] to perform mutual authentication with
       the discovered BRSKI-EST server.

   3.  If the BRSKI-EST server authentication is successful, the
       endpoint requests the full EST distribution of current CA
       certificates and validates the provisional TLS connection to the
       BRSKI-EST server.  If the BRSKI-EST server certificate cannot be
       verified using the CA certificates downloaded, the TLS connection
       is immediately discarded and the endpoint abandons the attempt to
       bootstrap from the BRSKI-EST server and discards the CA
       certificates conveyed by the BRSKI-EST server.  The endpoint uses
       the Explicit Trust Anchor database to validate the DNS server
       certificate.





Reddy, et al.           Expires September 6, 2019               [Page 5]


Internet-Draft          DoT/DoH server discovery              March 2019


   4.  TBD: The endpoint learns the End-Entity certificates [RFC8295]
       from the BRSKI-EST server.  The certificate provisioned to the
       DNS server in the local network will be treated as a End-Entity
       certificate.  The endpoint needs to identify the End-Entity
       certificate is provisioned to the DNS server, the key usage
       extension [RFC5280] can be used to restrict the use of the End-
       Entity certificate to authenticate the DNS server, a new bit will
       be added to the KeyUsage type to identify the DNS server
       certificate.

5.  Discovery Procedure

   A DNS client discovers the DNS server in the local network supporting
   DNS-over-TLS, DNS-over-DTLS and DNS-over-HTTPS protocols by using the
   following discovery mechanism:

   o  The DNS client uses DHCP to discover the authentication domain
      name for the DNS server, as specified in Section 5.1.

   o  The DNS client then uses S-NAPTR [RFC3958] lookup to learn the
      protocols DNS-over-TLS, DNS-over-DTLS, and DNS-over-HTTPS
      supported by the DNS server and the DNS privacy protocol preferred
      by the DNS server administrators, as specified in Section 5.2 and
      Section 7.3.1.  If DNS-over-HTTPS protocol is supported by the DNS
      server, the DNS client queries for the URI resource record type
      [RFC7553] to use the https URI scheme (Section 3 of [RFC8484]).

   o  The DNS client initiates (D)TLS handshake with the DNS server, the
      server presents its certificate and the client validates the
      server certificate using the End-Entity certificate and Explicit
      Trust Anchor database downloaded in steps 3 and 4 in Section 3 and
      Section 4.  The DNS client uses validation techniques as described
      in [RFC6125] to compare the authentication domain name to the
      certificate provided by the DNS server.

   o  If the DNS client cannot reach or establish an authenticated and
      encrypted connection with the privacy-enabling DNS server provided
      by the local network, the DNS client can fallback to the privacy-
      enabling public DNS server.

5.1.  DNS Reference Identifier DHCP Options

   As reported in Section 1.7.2 of [RFC6125]:

      "few certification authorities issue server certificates based on
      IP addresses, but preliminary evidence indicates that such
      certificates are a very small percentage (less than 1%) of issued
      certificates".



Reddy, et al.           Expires September 6, 2019               [Page 6]


Internet-Draft          DoT/DoH server discovery              March 2019


   In order to allow for certificate authentication between a DNS client
   and server while accommodating for the current best practices for
   issuing certificates, this document allows for configuring
   authentication domain name to clients.  This name can be used as a
   reference identifier for authentication purposes.

5.1.1.  DHCPv6 DNS Reference Identifier Option

5.1.1.1.  Option Format

   The DHCPv6 DNS Reference Identifier option is used to configure an
   authentication domain name.  The format of this option is shown in
   Figure 1.

       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |     OPTION_V6_AUTH_DOMAIN     |         Option-length         |
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |                                                               |
      |            authentication-domain-name (FQDN)                  |
      |                                                               |
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+


             Figure 1: DHCPv6 DNS Reference Identifier option

   The fields of the option shown in Figure 1 are as follows:

   o  Option-code: OPTION_V6_AUTH_DOMAIN (TBA1, see Section 7.1)
   o  Option-length: Length of the authentication-domain-name field in
      octets.
   o  authentication-domain-name: A fully qualified domain name of the
      DNS server.  This field is formatted as specified in Section 10 of
      [RFC8415].

5.1.1.2.  DHCPv6 Client Behavior

   DHCP clients MAY request options OPTION_V6_AUTH_DOMAIN as defined in
   [RFC8415], Sections 18.2.1, 18.2.2, 18.2.4, 18.2.5, 18.2.6, and 21.7.
   As a convenience to the reader, it is mentioned here that the DHCP
   client includes the requested option code in the Option Request
   Option.

   If the DHCP client receives more than one instance of
   OPTION_V6_AUTH_DOMAIN option, it MUST use only the first instance of
   that option.





Reddy, et al.           Expires September 6, 2019               [Page 7]


Internet-Draft          DoT/DoH server discovery              March 2019


5.1.2.  DHCPv4 DNS Reference Identifier Option

5.1.2.1.  Option Format

   The DHCPv4 DNS Reference Identifier option is used to configure an
   authentication domain name.  The format of this option is illustrated
   in Figure 2.

            Code  Length   authentication domain name
           +-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+--
           |TBA2 |  n  |  s1 |  s2 |  s3 |  s4 | s5  |  ...
           +-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+--

     The values s1, s2, s3, etc. represent the domain name labels in the
     domain name encoding.


             Figure 2: DHCPv4 DNS Reference Identifier option

   The fields of the option shown in Figure 2 are as follows:

   o  Code: OPTION_V4_AUTH_DOMAIN (TBA2, see Section 7.2);
   o  Length: Includes the length of the authentication domain name
      field in octets; the maximum length is 255 octets.
   o  Authentication domain name: The domain name of the DNS server.
      This field is formatted as specified in Section 10 of [RFC8415].

5.1.2.2.  DHCPv4 Client Behavior

   To discover a authentication domain name, the DHCPv4 client MUST
   include OPTION_V4_AUTH_DOMAIN in a Parameter Request List Option
   [RFC2132].

   If the DHCP client receives more than one instance of
   OPTION_V4_AUTH_DOMAIN option, it MUST use only the first instance of
   that option.  The content of OPTION_V4_AUTH_DOMAIN is used as
   reference identifier for authentication purposes.

5.2.  Resolution

   Once the DNS client has retrieved the authentication domain name for
   the DNS server, an S-NAPTR lookup with 'DPRIVE' application service
   and the desired protocol tag is made to obtain information necessary
   to securely connect to the DNS server.  The S-NAPTR lookup is
   performed using an untrusted recursive DNS resolver from an untrusted
   source (such as DHCP).





Reddy, et al.           Expires September 6, 2019               [Page 8]


Internet-Draft          DoT/DoH server discovery              March 2019


   This specification defines "DPRIVE" as an application service tag
   (Section 7.3.1) and "dns.tls" (Section 7.3.2), "dns.dtls"
   (Section 7.3.3), and "dns.https" (Section 7.3.4) as application
   protocol tags.

   If no DNS-specific S-NAPTR records can be retrieved, the discovery
   procedure fails for this authentication domain name.  However, before
   retrying a lookup that has failed, a DNS client MUST wait a time
   period that is appropriate for the encountered error (e.g., NXDOMAIN,
   timeout, etc.).

6.  Security Considerations

   The bootstrapping procedure to discover and authenticate DNS-
   over-(D)TLS and DNS-over-HTTPS Servers MUST be enabled by the
   endpoint in a trusted network (e.g.  Enterprise, Secure home
   networks) and disabled in a untrusted network (e.g. public WiFi
   network), similar to the way VPN connection from the endpoint to a
   VPN gateway is disconnected in a trusted network and VPN connection
   is established in a untrusted network.

   If the endpoint has enabled strict privacy profile, and the network
   security service blocks the traffic to the privacy-enabling public
   DNS server, a hard failure occurs and the user is notified.  The user
   has a choice to switch to another network or if the user trusts the
   network, the user can enable strict privacy profile with the DNS-
   over-(D)TLS or DNS-over-HTTPS server discovered in the network
   instead of downgrading to opportunistic privacy profile.

   The primary attack against the methods described in Section 5 is one
   that would lead to impersonation of a DNS server.  An attacker could
   attempt to compromise the DHCP discovery and S-NAPTR resolution.  The
   attack is prevented by validating the certificate presented by the
   DNS server.  DHCP-related security considerations are discussed in
   [RFC2131] and [RFC8415].

   Security considerations in [I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra]
   and [RFC7804] need to be taken into consideration.

7.  IANA Considerations

7.1.  DHCPv6 Option

   IANA is requested to assign the following new DHCPv6 Option Code in
   the registry maintained in http://www.iana.org/assignments/
   dhcpv6-parameters:





Reddy, et al.           Expires September 6, 2019               [Page 9]


Internet-Draft          DoT/DoH server discovery              March 2019


                                  Option Name Value
                        --------------------- -----
                        OPTION_V6_AUTH_DOMAIN TBA1

7.2.  DHCPv4 Option

   IANA is requested to assign the following new DHCPv4 Option Code in
   the registry maintained in http://www.iana.org/assignments/bootp-
   dhcp-parameters/:

             Option Name Value Data length          Meaning
   --------------------- ----- -------------------- --------------------
   OPTION_V4_AUTH_DOMAIN TBA2  Variable; the        Includes the
                               maximum length is    authentication
                               255 octets.          domain name.

7.3.  Application Service & Application Protocol Tags

   This document requests IANA to make the following allocations from
   the registry available at: https://www.iana.org/assignments/s-naptr-
   parameters/s-naptr-parameters.xhtml.

7.3.1.  DNS Application Service Tag Registration

   o  Application Protocol Tag: DPRIVE
   o  Intended Usage: See Section 5.2
   o  Security Considerations: See Section 6
   o  Contact Information: <one of the authors>

7.3.2.  dns.tls Application Protocol Tag Registration

   o  Application Protocol Tag: dns.tls
   o  Intended Usage: See Section 5.2
   o  Security Considerations: See Section 6
   o  Contact Information: <one of the authors>

7.3.3.  dns.dtls Application Protocol Tag Registration

   o  Application Protocol Tag: dns.dtls
   o  Intended Usage: See Section 5.2
   o  Security Considerations: See Section 6
   o  Contact Information: <one of the authors>

7.3.4.  dns.https Application Protocol Tag Registration

   o  Application Protocol Tag: dnshttps
   o  Intended Usage: See Section 5.2
   o  Security Considerations: See Section 6



Reddy, et al.           Expires September 6, 2019              [Page 10]


Internet-Draft          DoT/DoH server discovery              March 2019


   o  Contact Information: <one of the authors>

8.  Acknowledgments

   Thanks to Joe Hildebrand for his comments and suggestions.

9.  References

9.1.  Normative References

   [I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra]
              Pritikin, M., Richardson, M., Behringer, M., Bjarnason,
              S., and K. Watsen, "Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key
              Infrastructures (BRSKI)", draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-
              keyinfra-18 (work in progress), January 2019.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC2131]  Droms, R., "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol",
              RFC 2131, DOI 10.17487/RFC2131, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2131>.

   [RFC2132]  Alexander, S. and R. Droms, "DHCP Options and BOOTP Vendor
              Extensions", RFC 2132, DOI 10.17487/RFC2132, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2132>.

   [RFC3958]  Daigle, L. and A. Newton, "Domain-Based Application
              Service Location Using SRV RRs and the Dynamic Delegation
              Discovery Service (DDDS)", RFC 3958, DOI 10.17487/RFC3958,
              January 2005, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3958>.

   [RFC5280]  Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
              Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
              (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.

   [RFC6125]  Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and
              Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity
              within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509
              (PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer
              Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, DOI 10.17487/RFC6125, March
              2011, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6125>.





Reddy, et al.           Expires September 6, 2019              [Page 11]


Internet-Draft          DoT/DoH server discovery              March 2019


   [RFC6763]  Cheshire, S. and M. Krochmal, "DNS-Based Service
              Discovery", RFC 6763, DOI 10.17487/RFC6763, February 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6763>.

   [RFC7030]  Pritikin, M., Ed., Yee, P., Ed., and D. Harkins, Ed.,
              "Enrollment over Secure Transport", RFC 7030,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7030, October 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7030>.

   [RFC7553]  Faltstrom, P. and O. Kolkman, "The Uniform Resource
              Identifier (URI) DNS Resource Record", RFC 7553,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7553, June 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7553>.

   [RFC7804]  Melnikov, A., "Salted Challenge Response HTTP
              Authentication Mechanism", RFC 7804, DOI 10.17487/RFC7804,
              March 2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7804>.

   [RFC7858]  Hu, Z., Zhu, L., Heidemann, J., Mankin, A., Wessels, D.,
              and P. Hoffman, "Specification for DNS over Transport
              Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 7858, DOI 10.17487/RFC7858, May
              2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7858>.

   [RFC8094]  Reddy, T., Wing, D., and P. Patil, "DNS over Datagram
              Transport Layer Security (DTLS)", RFC 8094,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8094, February 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8094>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

   [RFC8295]  Turner, S., "EST (Enrollment over Secure Transport)
              Extensions", RFC 8295, DOI 10.17487/RFC8295, January 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8295>.

   [RFC8415]  Mrugalski, T., Siodelski, M., Volz, B., Yourtchenko, A.,
              Richardson, M., Jiang, S., Lemon, T., and T. Winters,
              "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6)",
              RFC 8415, DOI 10.17487/RFC8415, November 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8415>.

   [RFC8484]  Hoffman, P. and P. McManus, "DNS Queries over HTTPS
              (DoH)", RFC 8484, DOI 10.17487/RFC8484, October 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8484>.






Reddy, et al.           Expires September 6, 2019              [Page 12]


Internet-Draft          DoT/DoH server discovery              March 2019


9.2.  Informative References

   [CDN]      "End-User Mapping: Next Generation Request Routing for
              Content Delivery", 2015,
              <https://conferences.sigcomm.org/sigcomm/2015/pdf/papers/
              p167.pdf>.

   [I-D.ietf-opsawg-mud]
              Lear, E., Droms, R., and D. Romascanu, "Manufacturer Usage
              Description Specification", draft-ietf-opsawg-mud-25 (work
              in progress), June 2018.

   [RFC8310]  Dickinson, S., Gillmor, D., and T. Reddy, "Usage Profiles
              for DNS over TLS and DNS over DTLS", RFC 8310,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8310, March 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8310>.

   [RFC8499]  Hoffman, P., Sullivan, A., and K. Fujiwara, "DNS
              Terminology", BCP 219, RFC 8499, DOI 10.17487/RFC8499,
              January 2019, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8499>.

Authors' Addresses

   Tirumaleswar Reddy
   McAfee, Inc.
   Embassy Golf Link Business Park
   Bangalore, Karnataka  560071
   India

   Email: kondtir@gmail.com


   Dan Wing
   USA

   Email: dan@danwing.org


   Michael C. Richardson
   Sandelman Software Works
   USA

   Email: mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca








Reddy, et al.           Expires September 6, 2019              [Page 13]


Internet-Draft          DoT/DoH server discovery              March 2019


   Mohamed Boucadair
   Orange
   Rennes  35000
   France

   Email: mohamed.boucadair@orange.com













































Reddy, et al.           Expires September 6, 2019              [Page 14]


Html markup produced by rfcmarkup 1.129c, available from https://tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcmarkup/