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Versions: 01 02 03 04

PCP Working Group                                               T. Reddy
Internet-Draft                                                  P. Patil
Intended status: Standards Track                                 D. Wing
Expires: October 24, 2013                                       R. Penno
                                                                   Cisco
                                                          April 22, 2013


                    PCP Authentication Requirements
                      draft-reddy-pcp-auth-req-02

Abstract

   In an attempt to reach consensus on a PCP authentication mechanism,
   this document describes requirements for PCP authentication.  It is
   hoped this can serve as the basis for a comparison of PCP
   authentication mechanisms.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
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   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on October 24, 2013.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.












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   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   3.  Requirements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   4.  Third Party Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   5.  Other recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   8.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     8.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     8.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   Appendix A.  Change History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     A.1.  Change from -01 to -02  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7

1.  Introduction

   This document derives requirements for PCP Authentication from PCP
   deployment scenarios and scope described in PCP-base
   [I-D.ietf-pcp-base] and other PCP drafts.  The document focuses on
   requirements and does not make a suggestion on the authentication
   mechanism to be used to satisfy requirements.

2.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

3.  Requirements

   REQ-1:  PCP client and server MUST provide client authentication.
      The client could be a host running a PCP client or middle box
      (e.g., NAT) running a PCP Proxy.

      *  The identity details of the client could be used by the PCP
         server to grant access to certain PCP opcodes or PCP options.



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         For example GUESTS would not be permitted to use MAP opcode,
         ADMINISTRATOR is only permitted to use THIRD_PARTY option.

      *  The identity details of the client could be used for auditing.

      PCP Authentication MUST also generate message authentication key
      for integrity protection of PCP request and response.

   REQ-2:  PCP Servers MUST be able to indicate that a request will not
      be processed without authentication.

   REQ-3:  If the original PCP request/response was authenticated,

      a.  A client MUST be able to verify the integrity and origin of a
          subsequent response from the server.

      b.  A server MUST be able to send subsequent authenticated
          unsolicited responses.

      c.  If a server wants to send an unsolicited message, but the
          previous security association has expired

          1.  The server can continue to use the same SA to protect
              messages pertaining to that mapping, even if the SA is
              technically expired.

              -  Such server notifications will not change state in the
                 PCP client.

              -  The notification could be a trigger for the client to
                 re-authenticate.  For example, if the server indicates
                 that external IP address/port has changed, the PCP
                 client can then re-authenticate with the server to
                 confirm if the external IP address/port for the mapping
                 has indeed changed.

          2.  The server can optionally trigger re-authentication with
              the client.

      d.  If a PCP response does not include integrity related to a
          current security association, then those messages MUST NOT be
          trusted without soliciting an integrity protected version.

   REQ-4:  It is important that PCP not leak privacy information between
      the PCP client and PCP server,

      a.  The authentication mechanism MUST be able to keep credentials
          hidden from eavesdroppers on path between client and server.



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      b.  Confidentiality of the PCP messages is OPTIONAL for PCP
          request and response of opcodes MAP, PEER, ANNOUNCE and
          options THIRD_PARTY, PREFER_FAILURE and FILTER explained in
          PCP-base [I-D.ietf-pcp-base].  Other PCP drafts MUST evaluate
          if confidentiality is OPTIONAL or not for new PCP opcodes and
          options introduced.

      c.  PCP authentication SHOULD be immune to passive dictionary
          attacks.

      d.  PCP Authentication MUST ensure that an attacker snooping PCP
          messages cannot guess the SA.

   REQ-5:  To ease troubleshooting and ensure fate sharing, PCP
      authentication and PCP messages MUST be multiplexed over the same
      port.

   REQ-6:  PCP authentication MUST accommodate authentication between
      administrative domains.  For example, a PCP client may wish to
      communicate directly to an ISP's PCP server, even though the in-
      home CPE router does not support PCP.  In this scenario the PCP
      client needs to directly authenticate with the ISP's PCP server.

   REQ-7:  PCP client and server MUST be able mutually authenticate,
      especially when the PCP server is located in a different
      administrative domain from the PCP client.  Credentials to gain
      access to the network could be different from the credentials used
      to authenticate with the PCP server.

   REQ-8:  For the scenarios described in REQ-6, PCP authentication
      mechanism MUST be functional across address and port translation,
      including NAPT64 and NAPT44.

   REQ-9:  A PCP proxy, that modifies PCP request/response before
      forwarding messages,

      +------------+                       |
      | PCP Client |-----+                 |
      +--(Host 1)--+     |   +-----------+ |     +----------+
                         +---|           | |     |          |
                             | PCP Proxy |-------|PCP Server|
                         +---|           | |     |          |
      +------------+     |   +-----------+ |     +----------+
      | PCP Client |-----+                 |
      +--(Host 2)--+               possible boundary
                              <- Home side | ISP side ->





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      a.  MUST validate message integrity of PCP messages from the PCP
          server and client respectively.

      b.  MUST ensure message integrity after updating the PCP message
          for cases described in sections 6 and 7 of
          [I-D.ietf-pcp-proxy].

   REQ-10:  It is RECOMMENDED that PCP authentication support a
      mechanism where only one PCP client on the host authenticates with
      the PCP server and other PCP clients be able to reuse the
      previously negotiated key for integrity protection.  For example,
      multiple applications on the host like BitTorrent [BitTorrent],
      WebRTC[I-D.ietf-rtcweb-overview]/SIP [RFC3261] using PCP.
      Multiple authentication exchanges increase load on the PCP server
      and chatter on the network.  For example, if 'N' messages are to
      be exchanged for PCP authentication and 'M' independent
      applications implement their own PCP client, a total of N*M
      messages have to be exchanged and 'M' number of SAs maintained for
      each host.

   REQ-11:  All else equal, it is RECOMMENDED to choose a widely
      deployed authentication technique with known security properties
      rather than inventing a new authentication mechanism.

   REQ-12:  Changes in PCP to accommodate authentication SHOULD be
      minimal so that updates and additions to the authentication
      mechanism have no bearing on modifying PCP.

4.  Third Party Authorization

   In addition to two party authentication that has been discussed in
   this draft, a mechanism for third party authorization must also be
   supported.  This is required in cases where a third party authorizes
   the use of a resource on a PCP server for a desired PCP client.  For
   example, a PCP request to a PCP capable firewall authorized by a SIP
   proxy rather than by virtue of the end user making the PCP request.
   The PCP server is to permit a PCP MAP request if a user is making a
   SIP call with the Enterprise SIP server, otherwise do not allow MAP
   request from that particular user.  In this scenario the first party
   is the user, second party is the PCP server (which is also the
   firewall) and the third party is the SIP Server, where the user is
   authorized to use MAP request only when making a call using the
   trusted SIP Server.

5.  Other recommendations

   o  It is recommended that there be support for a means to provide
      integrity protection without user authentication.  For example,



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      upon receiving a challenge with a certain REALM, if the PCP client
      does not have credentials for that REALM, the client will attempt
      to use a default username and password.  Default credentials are
      expected to be configured on infrastructure where PCP
      authentication is not necessary, but such guest users are given
      some (minimal) authorization to use PCP.  This addresses the
      problem when the client is visiting foreign networks like a hotel,
      hot spot etc where it may gain access to the network but does not
      know the credentials to authenticate to the ISP's PCP server when
      the in-home CPE router does not support PCP and the PCP client
      needs to directly authenticate with the ISP's PCP server.

6.  IANA Considerations

   This document does not require any action from IANA.

7.  Security Considerations

   This document does not define an architecture nor a protocol; as such
   it does not raise any security concerns.

8.  References

8.1.  Normative References

   [I-D.ietf-pcp-base]
              Wing, D., Cheshire, S., Boucadair, M., Penno, R., and P.
              Selkirk, "Port Control Protocol (PCP)", draft-ietf-pcp-
              base-29 (work in progress), November 2012.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

8.2.  Informative References

   [BitTorrent]
              , "Cohen, B., "The BitTorrent Protocol Specification
              Version 11031", February 2008.", September 2012.

   [I-D.ietf-pcp-proxy]
              Boucadair, M., Penno, R., and D. Wing, "Port Control
              Protocol (PCP) Proxy Function", draft-ietf-pcp-proxy-02
              (work in progress), February 2013.

   [I-D.ietf-rtcweb-overview]
              Alvestrand, H., "Overview: Real Time Protocols for Brower-
              based Applications", draft-ietf-rtcweb-overview-06 (work
              in progress), February 2013.



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   [RFC3261]  Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston,
              A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E.
              Schooler, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261,
              June 2002.

Appendix A.  Change History

A.1.  Change from -01 to -02

   o  Requirements reorganized based on commonality

   o  New requirement 3(c(2)) added.

Authors' Addresses

   Tirumaleswar Reddy
   Cisco Systems, Inc.
   Cessna Business Park, Varthur Hobli
   Sarjapur Marathalli Outer Ring Road
   Bangalore, Karnataka  560103
   India

   Email: tireddy@cisco.com


   Prashanth Patil
   Cisco Systems, Inc.
   Bangalore
   India

   Email: praspati@cisco.com


   Dan Wing
   Cisco Systems, Inc.
   170 West Tasman Drive
   San Jose, California  95134
   USA

   Email: dwing@cisco.com











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   Reinaldo Penno
   Cisco Systems, Inc.
   170 West Tasman Drive
   San Jose, California  95134
   USA

   Email: repenno@cisco.com











































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