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Versions: 00

SFC Working Group                                               T. Reddy
Internet-Draft                                                     Cisco
Intended status: Informational                                D. Migault
Expires: July 24, 2016                                          Ericsson
                                                            C. Pignataro
                                                                P. Quinn
                                                                   Cisco
                                                               C. Inacio
                                                            CERT/SEI/CMU
                                                        January 21, 2016


                 NSH Security and Privacy requirements
                draft-reddy-sfc-nsh-security-req-00.txt

Abstract

   This document defines Network Service Header (NSH) security and
   privacy requirements.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on July 24, 2016.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must



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   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Requirements notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   3.  NSH Security and Privacy Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   6.  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   7.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     7.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     7.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5

1.  Introduction

   Service function chaining (SFC) [RFC7665] involves steering traffic
   flows through a set of service functions in a specific order, such an
   ordered list of service functions is called a Service Function Chain
   (SFC).  The actual forwarding path used to realize an SFC is called
   the Service Function Path (SFP).  Network Service Headers (NSH)
   [I-D.ietf-sfc-nsh] provides a mechanism to carry metadata between
   service functions.  The NSH structure is defined in
   [I-D.ietf-sfc-nsh] and NSH data can be divided into two parts:

   o  Path information used to construct the SFP such as the SFP ID and
      Service Index.

   o  Metadata carrying the information about the packets being chained.

   Note that the payload encapsulated by NSH is not part of the NSH
   data.

   This document defines security requirments for NSH data and privacy
   requirements for NSH metadata.

2.  Requirements notation

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].







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3.  NSH Security and Privacy Requirements

   This section provides requirements and recommendation for the SFC
   Data Plane.

   REQ1:  In a SFC domain where attackers can modify NSH data or
          generate spoofed NSH data, NSH data MUST be authenticated and
          integrity protected.

   REQ2:  In a SFC domain where attackers can capture and replay NSH
          data, NSH data MUST provide a mechanism for replay detection
          and replay prevention mechanism MUST be enforced by the SF
          component processing the NSH data.

   REQ3:  In a SFC domain where attackers can modify the NSH
          encapsulated packet, NSH encapsulated packet MUST be
          authenticated and integrity protected.

   REQ4:  In a SFC domain where pervasive monitoring [RFC7258] is
          possible, NSH metadata MUST be encrypted and MUST NOT reveal
          privacy sensitive metadata to attackers.  Privacy specific
          threats are discussed in Section 5.2 of [RFC6973].

   REQ5:  TBD: To avoid fragmentation and amplification attacks, NSH
          data MUST be kept under Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU)
          including the byte overhead of the encapsulated packet.

   REQ6:  Negotiation of authentication, message integrity protection
          and encryption algorithms between SF components MUST be
          capable of detecting downgrade attacks.

   REQ7:  No device other than the SF components in the SFP SHOULD be
          able to update the integrity protected NSH data.  SF
          components not in the SFP SHOULD NOT hold the keying material
          to act on the NSH data.

   REQ8:  No device other than the SF components in the SFP SHOULD be
          able to decrypt and update the NSH metadata.  SF components
          not in the SFP SHOULD NOT hold the keying material to decrypt
          the NSH metadata.

4.  IANA Considerations

   None.







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5.  Security Considerations

   NSH data is at risk from four primary attacks:

   o  A man-in-the middle attacker modifying NSH data.

   o  Attacker spoofing NSH data.

   o  Attacker capturing and replaying NSH data.

   o  NSH metadata revealing privacy sensitive information to attackers.

   In a SFC domain where all the above attacks are possible, NSH data
   MUST be authenticated, integrity protected, replay protection MUST be
   supported and NSH metadata MUST be encrypted for confidentiality.

6.  Acknowledgments

   TODO

7.  References

7.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC7258]  Farrell, S. and H. Tschofenig, "Pervasive Monitoring Is an
              Attack", BCP 188, RFC 7258, DOI 10.17487/RFC7258, May
              2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7258>.

7.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.ietf-sfc-nsh]
              Quinn, P. and U. Elzur, "Network Service Header", draft-
              ietf-sfc-nsh-01 (work in progress), July 2015.

   [RFC7665]  Halpern, J., Ed. and C. Pignataro, Ed., "Service Function
              Chaining (SFC) Architecture", RFC 7665,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7665, October 2015,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7665>.








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   [RFC6973]  Cooper, A., Tschofenig, H., Aboba, B., Peterson, J.,
              Morris, J., Hansen, M., and R. Smith, "Privacy
              Considerations for Internet Protocols", RFC 6973,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6973, July 2013,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6973>.

Authors' Addresses

   Tirumaleswar Reddy
   Cisco Systems, Inc.
   Cessna Business Park, Varthur Hobli
   Bangalore, Karnataka  560103
   India

   Phone: +91 9886
   Email: tireddy@cisco.com


   Daniel Migault
   Ericsson
   8400 boulevard Decarie
   Montreal, QC  H4P 2N2
   Canada

   Phone: +1 514-452-2160
   Email: daniel.migault@ericsson.com


   Carlos Pignataro
   Cisco Systems, Inc.
   7200-12 Kit Creek Road
   Research Triangle Park, NC  27709
   USA

   Phone: +1 919-392-7428
   Email: cpignata@cisco.com


   Paul Quinn
   Cisco Systems, Inc.

   Email: paulq@cisco.com









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   Christopher Inacio
   CERT, Software Engineering Institute, Carnegie Mellon University
   4500 5th Ave
   Pittsburgh, PA  15213
   USA

   Phone: +1 412-268-3098
   Email: inacio@cert.org











































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