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anima Working Group                                        M. Richardson
Internet-Draft                                  Sandelman Software Works
Intended status: Standards Track                                  W. Pan
Expires: September 10, 2020                          Huawei Technologies
                                                          March 09, 2020


Operational Considerations for Manufacturer Authorized Signing Authority
             draft-richardson-anima-masa-considerations-03

Abstract

   This document describes a number of operational modes that a BRSKI
   Manufacturer Authorized Signing Authority (MASA) may take on.

   Each mode is defined, and then each mode is given a relevance within
   an over applicability of what kind of organization the MASA is
   deployed into.  This document does not change any protocol
   mechanisms.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
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   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 10, 2020.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must



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   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Operational Considerations for Manufacturer IDevID Public Key
       Infrastructure  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.1.  Key Generation process  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
       2.1.1.  On-device private key generation  . . . . . . . . . .   4
       2.1.2.  Off-device private key generation . . . . . . . . . .   5
       2.1.3.  Key setup based on 256-bit secret seed  . . . . . . .   5
     2.2.  Public Key infrastructure for IDevID  . . . . . . . . . .   6
   3.  Operational Considerations for Manufacturer Authorized
       Signing Authority (MASA)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     3.1.  Self-contained multi-product MASA . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     3.2.  Self-contained per-product MASA . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     3.3.  Per-product MASA keys intertwined with IDevID PKI . . . .  10
     3.4.  Rotating MASA authorization keys  . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   4.  Operational Considerations for Constrained MASA . . . . . . .  11
   5.  Operational Considerations for creating Nonceless vouchers  .  11
   6.  Privacy Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   8.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   9.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   10. Changelog . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   11. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     11.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     11.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14

1.  Introduction

   [I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra] introduces a mechanism for
   new devices (called pledges) to be onboarded into a network without
   intervention from an expert operator.

   This mechanism leverages the pre-existing relationship between a
   device and the manufacturer that built the device.  There are two
   aspects to this relationship: the provision of an identity for the
   device by the manufacturer (the IDevID), and a mechanism which
   convinces the device to trust the new owner (the [RFC8366] voucher).

   The manufacturer, or their designate, is involved in both aspects of
   this process.  This requires the manufacturer to operate a
   significant process for each aspect.




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   This document offers a number of operational considerations for each
   aspect.

   The first aspect is the device identity in the form of an
   [ieee802-1AR] certificate that is installed at manufacturing time in
   the device.  The first section of this document deals with
   operational considerations of building this public key
   infrastructure.

   The second aspect is the use of the Manufacturer Authorized Signing
   Authority (MASA), as described in
   [I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra] section 2.5.4.  The device
   needs to have the MASA anchor built in; the exact nature of the
   anchor is subject to many possibilities.  The second section of this
   document deals with a number of options for architecting the security
   of the MASA relationship.

   There are some additional considerations for a MASA that deals with
   constrained vouchers as described in
   [I-D.ietf-anima-constrained-voucher].  In particular in the COSE
   signed version, there are no PKI structure included in the voucher
   mechanism, so cryptographic hygiene needs a different set of
   tradeoffs.

2.  Operational Considerations for Manufacturer IDevID Public Key
    Infrastructure

   The manufacturer has the responsability to provision a keypair into
   each device as part of the manufacturing process.  There are a
   variety of mechanisms to accomplish this, which this document will
   overview.

   There are two fundamental ways to generate IDevID certificates for
   devices:

   1) generating a private key on the device, creating a Certificate
   Signing Request (or equivalent), and then returning a certificate to
   the device.

   2) generating a private key outside the device, signing the
   certificate, and the installing both into the device.

   3) deriving the private key from a previously installed secret seed,
   that is shared with only the manufacturer

   There is a third situation where the IDevID is provided as part of a
   Trusted Platform Module (TPM), in which case the TPM vendor may be




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   making the same tradeoffs.  Or the mechanisms to install the
   certificate into the TPM will use TPM APIs.

   The document [I-D.moskowitz-ecdsa-pki] provides some practical
   instructions on setting up a reference implementation for ECDSA keys
   using a three-tier mechanism.  This document recommends the use of
   ECDSA keys for the root and intermediate CAs, but there may be
   operational reasons why an RSA intermediate CA will be required for
   some legacy TPM equipment.

2.1.  Key Generation process

2.1.1.  On-device private key generation

   Generating the key on-device has the advantage that the private key
   never leaves the device.  The disadvantage is that the device may not
   have a verified random number generator.

   There are a number of options of how to get the public key securely
   from the device to the certification authority.  This transmission
   must be done in an integral manner, and must be securely associated
   with the assigned serial number.  The serial number goes into the
   certificate, and the resulting certificate needs to be loaded into
   the manufacturer's asset database.  This asset database needs to be
   shared with the MASA.

   One way to do the transmission is during a manufacturing during a Bed
   of Nails (see [BedOfNails]) or Boundary Scan.  There are other ways
   that could be used where a certificate signing request is sent over a
   special network channel when the device is powered up in the factory.
   After the key generation, the device needs to set a flag such that it
   no longer generates a key, or will accept a new IDevID via the
   factory connection.  This may be a software settings, or could be as
   dramatic as blowing a fuse.

   There may be risks with this methods if an attacker with physical
   access is able to put device back into an unconfigured mode,
   particularly if this may permit the attacker to get access to the
   private key material.  When done on a single device, Such an attack
   may be able to replace the IDevID with one signed by another
   manufacturer.  That does not result in a risk of counterfeit devices.
   An attack that is able to extract the private key could clone the
   device.








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2.1.2.  Off-device private key generation

   Generating the key off-device has the advantage that the randomness
   of the private key can be better analyzed.  As the private key is
   available to the manufacturing infrastructure, the authenticity of
   the public key is well known ahead of time.  If the device does not
   come with a serial number in silicon, then one should be be assigned
   and placed into a certificate.  The private key and certificate could
   be programmed into the device along with the initial bootloader
   firmware in a single step.

   The major downside to generating the private key off-device is that
   it could be seen by the manufacturing infrastructure.  This makes the
   manufacturing infrastructure a high-value attack target, so a
   mechanism is needed to keep the private key secure within the
   manufacturing process.

   Encrypting the private key would solve this, but then the symmetric
   key would need to be shared with the device, which is back to the
   original problem.

   If keys are generated by the manufacturing plant, and are immediately
   installed, but never stored, then the window in which an attacker can
   gain access to the private key is immensely reduced.

2.1.3.  Key setup based on 256-bit secret seed

   A hybrid of the previous two methods leverages a symmetric key that
   is often provided by a silicon vendor to OEM manufacturers.  Each CPU
   (or a Trusted Execution Environment [I-D.ietf-teep-architecture], or
   a TPM) is provisioned at fabrication time with a unique, secret seed,
   usually at least 256-bits in size.

   This value is revealed to the OEM board manufacturer only via a
   secure channel.  Upon first boot, the system (probably within a TEE,
   or within a TPM) will generate a key pair using the seed to
   initialize a Pseudo-Random-Number-Generator (PRNG).  The OEM, in a
   separate system, will initialize the same PRNG, generating the same
   key pair.  The OEM then derives the public key part, signs it and
   turns it into a certificate.  The private part is then destroyed,
   ideally never stored or seen by anyone.  The certificate (being
   public information) is placed into a database, in some cases it is
   loaded by the device as its IDevID, in other cases, it is retrieved
   during the onboarding process based upon a unique serial number
   asserted by the device.

   This method appears to have all of the downsides of the previous two
   methods: the device must correctly derive its own private key, and



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   the OEM has access to the private key, making it also vulnerable.
   The secret seed must be created in a secure way and it must also be
   communicated.

   There are some advantages to the OEM however: the major one is that
   the problem of securely communicating with the device is outsourced
   to the silicon vendor.  The private keys and certificates may be
   calculated by the OEM asynchronously to the manufacturing process,
   either done in batches in advance of actual manufacturing, or on
   demand when an IDevID is demanded.  Doing the processing in this way
   permits the key derivation system to be completely disconnected from
   any network, and requires placing very little trust in the system
   assembly factory.  Operational security such as is often incorrectly
   presented fictionalized stories of a "mainframe" system to which only
   physical access is permitted begin to become realistic.  That trust
   has been replaced with a heightened trust placed in the silicon
   (integrated circuit) fabrication facility.

   The downsides of this method to the OEM are: they must be supplied by
   a trusted silicon fabrication system, which must communicate the set
   of secrets seeds to the OEM in batches, and they OEM must store and
   care for these keys very carefully.  There are some operational
   advantages to keeping the secret seeds around in some form, as they
   same secret seed could be used for other things.  There are some
   significant downsides to keeping that secret seed around.

2.2.  Public Key infrastructure for IDevID

   A three-tier PKI infrastructure is appropriate.  This entails having
   a root CA created with the key kept offline, and a number of
   intermediate CAs that have online keys that issue "day-to-day"
   certificates.

   The root private key should be kept offline, quite probably in a
   Hardware Security Module if financially feasible.  If not, then it
   should be secret-split across seven to nine people, with a threshold
   of four to five people.  The split secrets should be kept in
   geographically diverse places if the manufacturer has operations in
   multiple places.

   Ongoing access to the root-CA is important, but not as critical as
   access to the MASA key.

   The root CA is then used to sign a number of intermediate entities.
   If manufacturing occurs in multiple factories, then an intermediate
   CA for each factory is appropriate.  It is also reasonable to use
   different intermediate CAs for different product lines.  It may also




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   be valuable to split IDevID certificates across intermediate CAs in a
   round-robin fashion for products with high volumes.

   Cycling the intermediate CAs after a period of a few months or so is
   a quite reasonable strategy.  The intermediate CAs private key may be
   destroyed after it signed some number of IDevIDs, and a new key
   generated.  The IDevID certificates have very long (ideally infinite)
   validity lifetimes for reasons that [ieee802-1AR] explains.  The
   intermediate CA will have a private key, likely kept online, which is
   used to sign each generated IDevID.  Once the IDevID are created, the
   private key is no longer needed and can either be destroyed, or taken
   offline.  In other CAs, the intermediate CA's private key (or another
   designated key) is often needed to sign OCSP [RFC6960] or CRLS
   [RFC5280].  As the IDevID process does not in general support
   revocation, keeping such keys online is not necessary. {EDIT NOTE:
   REVIEW of this NEEDED}

   The intermediate CA certificate SHOULD be signed by the root-CA with
   indefinite (notAfter: 99991231) duration as well.

   In all cases the serialNumber embedded in the certificate must be
   unique across all products produced by the manufacturer.  This
   suggests some amount of structure to the serialNumber, such that
   different intermediate CAs do not need to coordinate when issuing
   certificates.

3.  Operational Considerations for Manufacturer Authorized Signing
    Authority (MASA)

   The manufacturer needs to make a Signing Authority available to new
   owners so that they may obtain [RFC8366] format vouchers to prove
   ownership.  This section initially assumes that the manufacturer will
   provide this Authority internally, but subsequent sections deal with
   some adjustments when the authority is externally run.

   The MASA is a public facing web system.  It will be subject to loads
   from legitimate users when a network is bootstrapped for the first
   time.  The legitimate load will be proportional to sales.

   The MASA will be subject to a malicious load: the best way to deflect
   unwanted users is to require TLS Client Certificates for all
   connections, even if the TLS Certificate is not validated.  This
   increases the effort requires for attackers, and if they repeat the
   same certificate then it becomes easier to reject such attackers
   earlier.  The use of this certificate forces attackers to generate
   new key pairs and certificates each time.  The accompanying document
   [I-D.richardson-anima-registrar-considerations] recommends in section




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   5.2.1 recommends the use of a public anchor, or an anchor that is
   known to the MASA.

   Web framework three-tier mechanisms are the most obvious.  See
   [threetier] for an overview.  Consideration should be made to
   deploying the presentation layer into multiple data centers in order
   to provide resiliency against distributed denial of service (DDoS)
   attacks that affect all tenants of that data center.  Consideration
   should be given to the use of a cloud front end to mitigate attacks,
   however, such a system needs to be able to securely transmit the TLS
   Client Certificates, if the MASA wants identify Registrars at the TLS
   connection time.

   The middle (application) tier needs to be scalable, but it is
   unlikely that it needs to scale very much on a per-minute or even
   per-hour basis.  It is probably easier and more reliable to have
   application tiers do database operations across the Internet or via
   VPN to a single location database cluster than it is to handle
   asynchronous database operations resulting from geographically
   dispersed multi-master database systems.  The assets tables that the
   MASA needs scale linearly with the number of products sold.  Many
   columns could be replicated in a read-only manner from a sales
   database.  Direct integration with a sales system could be
   considered, but would involve a more significant security impact
   analysis.

   In any case, the manufacturer SHOULD plan for a situation where the
   manufacturer is no longer able or interested in running the
   Authority: this does not have to an unhappy situation of the
   manufacturer going out of business.  It could be a happy event where
   the manufacturer goes through a merge or acquisition and it makes
   sense to consolidate the Signing Authority in another part of the
   organziation.

   Business continuity plan should including backing up the voucher
   signing keys.  This may involve multiple Hardware Security Modules,
   and secret splitting mechanisms SHOULD be employed.  For large value
   items, customers are going to need to review the plan as part of
   their contingency audits.

   The anchors for the MASA need to be "baked-in" to the device firmware
   so that they are always available to validate vouchers.  In order to
   avoid locking down a single validation key, a PKI infrastructure is
   appropriate.  Note that constrained devices without code space to
   parse and validate a public key certificate chain require different
   considerations, and this document does not (yet) provide that
   consideration.




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   There are many ways to construct a resilient PKI to sign vouchers.

3.1.  Self-contained multi-product MASA

   The most obvious is to just create a new offline CA, have it
   periodically sign a new End-Entity (EE) Certificate with an online
   private key, and use that to sign voucher requests.  The entity used
   to sign [RFC8366] format vouchers does not need to be a certificate
   authority.

   The public key of the offline CA is then built-in to the firmware of
   the device, providing a trust anchor with which to validate vouchers.
   The End-Entity certificate used to sign the voucher is included in
   the certificate set in the CMS structure that is used to sign the
   voucher.  The root CA's trust anchor should _also_ be included, even
   though it is self-signed, as this permits auditing elements in a
   Registrar to validate the End-Entity Certificate.

   The inclusion of the full chain also supports a Trust-on-First-Use
   (TOFU) workflow for the manager of the Registrar: they can see the
   trust anchor chain and can compare a fingerprint displayed on their
   screen with one that could be included in packaging or other sales
   channel information.

   When building the MASA public key into a device, only the public key
   contents matter, not the structure of the self-signed certificate
   itself.  Using only the public key enables a MASA architecture to
   evolve from a single self-contained system into a more complex
   architecture later on.

3.2.  Self-contained per-product MASA

   A simple enhancement to the previous scenario is to have a unique
   MASA offline key for each product line.  This has a few advantages:

   o  if the private keys are kept separately (under different
      encryption keys), then compromise of a single product lines MASA
      does not compromise all products.

   o  if a product line is sold to another entity, or if it has to go
      through an escrow process due to the product going out of
      production, then the process affects only a single product line.

   o  it is safe to have serialNumber duplicated among different product
      lines since a voucher for one product line would not validate on
      another product line.





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   The disadvantage is that it requires a private key to be stored per
   product line, and most large OEMs have many dozens of product lines.
   If the keys are stored in a single Hardware Security Module (HSM),
   with the access to it split across the same parties, then some of the
   cryptographic advantages of different private keys goes away, as a
   compromise of one key likely compromises them all.  Given a HSM, the
   most likely way a key is compromised is by an attacker getting
   authorization on the HSM through theft or coercion.

   The use of per-product MASA signing keys is encouraged.

3.3.  Per-product MASA keys intertwined with IDevID PKI

   The IDevID certificate chain (the intermediate CA and root CA that
   signed the IDevID certificate) should be included in the device
   firmware so that they can be communicated during the BRSKI-EST
   exchange.

   Since they are already present, could they be used as the MASA trust
   anchor as well?

   In order to do this there is an attack that needs to mitigated.
   Since the root-CA that creates IDevIDs and the root-CA that creates
   vouchers are the same, when validating a voucher, a pledge needs to
   make sure that it is signed by a key authorized to sign vouchers.  In
   other scenarios any key signed by the voucher-signing-root-CA would
   be valid, but in this scenario that would also include any IDevID,
   such as would be installed in any other device.  Without an
   additional signal as to which keys can sign vouchers, and which keys
   are just IDevID keys, then it would be possible to sign vouchers with
   any IDevID private key, rather than just the designated voucher-
   signing key.  An attacker that could extract a private key from even
   one instance of a product, could use that to sign vouchers, and
   impersonate the MASA.

   The challenge with combining it into the IDevID PKI is making sure
   that only an authorized entity can sign the vouchers.  The solution
   is that it can not be the same intermediate CA that is used to sign
   the IDevID, since that CA should have the authority to sign vouchers.

   The PKI root CA therefore needs to sign an intermediate CA, or End-
   Entity certificate with an extension OID that is specific for Voucher
   Authorization.  This is easy to do as policy OIDs can be created from
   Private Enterprise Numbers.  There is no need for standardization, as
   the entity doing the signing is also creating the verification code.
   If the entire PKI operation was outsource, then there would be a
   benefit for standardization.




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3.4.  Rotating MASA authorization keys

   As a variation of the scenario described in Section 3.2, there could
   be multiple Signing Authority keys per product line.  They could be
   rotated though in some deterministic order.  For instance, serial
   numbers ending in 0 would have MASA key 0 embedded in them at
   manufacturing time.  The asset database would have to know which key
   that corresponded to, and it would have to produce vouchers using
   that key.

   There are significant downsides to this mechanism:

   o  all of the MASA signing keys need to be online and available in
      order to respond to any voucher request

   o  it is necessary to keep track of which device trust which key in
      the asset database

   There is no obvious advantage to doing this if all the MASA signing
   private keys are kept in the same device, under control of the same
   managers.  But if the keys are spread out to multiple locations and
   are under control of different people, then there may be some
   advantage.  A single MASA signing authority key compromise does not
   cause a recall of all devices, but only the portion that had that key
   embedded in it.

   The relationship between signing key and device could be temporal:
   all devices made on Tuesday could have the same key, there could be
   hundreds of keys, each one used only for a few hundred devices.
   There are many variations possible.

   The major advantage comes with the COSE signed constrained-vouchers
   described in [I-D.ietf-anima-constrained-voucher].  In this context
   there isn't space in the voucher for a certificate chain, nor is
   there code space in the device to validate a certificate chain.  The
   (public) key used to sign is embedded directly in the firmware of
   each device without the benefit of any public key infrastructure to
   allow indirection of the key.

4.  Operational Considerations for Constrained MASA

   TBD

5.  Operational Considerations for creating Nonceless vouchers

   TBD





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6.  Privacy Considerations

   YYY

7.  Security Considerations

   ZZZ

8.  IANA Considerations

   This document makes no IANA requests.

9.  Acknowledgements

   Hello.

10.  Changelog

11.  References

11.1.  Normative References

   [I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra]
              Pritikin, M., Richardson, M., Eckert, T., Behringer, M.,
              and K. Watsen, "Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key
              Infrastructures (BRSKI)", draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-
              keyinfra-35 (work in progress), February 2020.

   [I-D.ietf-anima-constrained-voucher]
              Richardson, M., Stok, P., and P. Kampanakis, "Constrained
              Voucher Artifacts for Bootstrapping Protocols", draft-
              ietf-anima-constrained-voucher-07 (work in progress),
              January 2020.

   [I-D.moskowitz-ecdsa-pki]
              Moskowitz, R., Birkholz, H., Xia, L., and M. Richardson,
              "Guide for building an ECC pki", draft-moskowitz-ecdsa-
              pki-08 (work in progress), February 2020.

   [I-D.richardson-anima-registrar-considerations]
              Richardson, M., "Operational Considerations for BRSKI
              Registrar", draft-richardson-anima-registrar-
              considerations-02 (work in progress), December 2019.

   [ieee802-1AR]
              IEEE Standard, ., "IEEE 802.1AR Secure Device Identifier",
              2009, <http://standards.ieee.org/findstds/
              standard/802.1AR-2009.html>.



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   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

   [RFC8366]  Watsen, K., Richardson, M., Pritikin, M., and T. Eckert,
              "A Voucher Artifact for Bootstrapping Protocols",
              RFC 8366, DOI 10.17487/RFC8366, May 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8366>.

   [threetier]
              Wikipedia, ., "Multitier architecture", December 2019,
              <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multitier_architecture>.

11.2.  Informative References

   [BedOfNails]
              Wikipedia, "In-circuit test", 2019,
              <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/In-
              circuit_test#Bed_of_nails_tester>.

   [I-D.ietf-teep-architecture]
              Pei, M., Tschofenig, H., Thaler, D., and D. Wheeler,
              "Trusted Execution Environment Provisioning (TEEP)
              Architecture", draft-ietf-teep-architecture-06 (work in
              progress), February 2020.

   [RambusCryptoManager]
              Qualcomm press release, "Qualcomm Licenses Rambus
              CryptoManager Key and Feature Management Security
              Solution", 2014, <https://www.rambus.com/qualcomm-
              licenses-rambus-cryptomanager-key-and-feature-management-
              security-solution/>.

   [RFC5280]  Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
              Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
              (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.

   [RFC6960]  Santesson, S., Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A.,
              Galperin, S., and C. Adams, "X.509 Internet Public Key
              Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP",
              RFC 6960, DOI 10.17487/RFC6960, June 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6960>.







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Internet-Draft             MASA Considerations                March 2020


   [RFC7030]  Pritikin, M., Ed., Yee, P., Ed., and D. Harkins, Ed.,
              "Enrollment over Secure Transport", RFC 7030,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7030, October 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7030>.

Authors' Addresses

   Michael Richardson
   Sandelman Software Works

   Email: mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca


   Wei Pan
   Huawei Technologies

   Email: william.panwei@huawei.com


































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