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FecFrame                                                         V. Roca
Internet-Draft                                                 M. Cunche
Intended status: Experimental                                      INRIA
Expires: January 13, 2011                                       J. Lacan
                                                          A. Bouabdallah
                                                          ISAE/LAAS-CNRS
                                                            K. Matsuzono
                                                         Keio University
                                                           July 12, 2010


    Reed-Solomon Forward Error Correction (FEC) Schemes for FECFRAME
                       draft-roca-fecframe-rs-03

Abstract

   This document describes two fully-specified simple FEC schemes for
   Reed-Solomon codes that can be used to protect media streams along
   the lines defined by the FECFRAME framework.  Reed-Solomon codes
   belong to the class of Maximum Distance Separable (MDS) codes which
   means they offer optimal protection against packet erasures.  They
   are also systematic codes, which means that the source symbols are
   part of the encoding symbols.  The price to pay is a limit on the
   maximum source block size, on the maximum number of encoding symbols,
   and a computational complexity higher than that of LDPC codes for
   instance.

   The first scheme is for Reed-Solomon codes over GF(2^^m), with 2 <= m
   <= 16 and arbitrary packet flows.  The second scheme is similar to
   the first scheme, with the exception that it is restricted to a
   single sequenced flow.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 13, 2011.



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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.


Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   2.  Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   3.  Definitions Notations and Abbreviations  . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     3.1.  Definitions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     3.2.  Notations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     3.3.  Abbreviations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   4.  Common Procedures Related to the ADU Block and Source
       Block Creation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     4.1.  Restrictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     4.2.  ADU Block Creation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     4.3.  Source Block Creation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   5.  Simple Reed-Solomon FEC Encoding Scheme over GF(2^^m) for
       Arbitrary ADU Flows  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     5.1.  Formats and Codes  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
       5.1.1.  FEC Framework Configuration Information  . . . . . . . 11
       5.1.2.  Explicit Source FEC Payload ID . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
       5.1.3.  Repair FEC Payload ID  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
     5.2.  Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
     5.3.  FEC Code Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
   6.  Reed-Solomon FEC Encoding Scheme over GF(2^^m) for a
       Single Sequenced ADU Flow  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
   7.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
     7.1.  Problem Statement  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
     7.2.  Attacks Against the Data Flow  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
       7.2.1.  Access to Confidential Contents  . . . . . . . . . . . 16
       7.2.2.  Content Corruption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
     7.3.  Attacks Against the FEC Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
   8.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
   9.  Acknowledgments  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
   10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18



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     10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
     10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
















































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1.  Introduction

   The use of Forward Error Correction (FEC) codes is a classic solution
   to improve the reliability of unicast, multicast and broadcast
   Content Delivery Protocols (CDP) and applications.  The
   [FECFRAME-FRAMEWORK] document describes a generic framework to use
   FEC schemes with media delivery applications, and for instance with
   real-time streaming media applications based on the RTP real-time
   protocol.  Similarly the [RFC5052] document describes a generic
   framework to use FEC schemes with with objects (e.g., files) delivery
   applications based on the ALC [RFC5775] and NORM [RFC5740] reliable
   multicast transport protocols.

   More specifically, the [RFC5053] and [RFC5170] FEC schemes introduce
   erasure codes based on sparse parity check matrices for object
   delivery protocols like ALC and NORM.  These codes are efficient in
   terms of processing but not optimal in terms of erasure recovery
   capabilities when dealing with "small" objects.

   The Reed-Solomon FEC codes described in this document belong to the
   class of Maximum Distance Separable (MDS) codes that are optimal in
   terms of erasure recovery capability.  It means that a receiver can
   recover the k source symbols from any set of exactly k encoding
   symbols.  These codes are also systematic codes, which means that the
   k source symbols are part of the encoding symbols.  However they are
   limited in terms of maximum source block size and number of encoding
   symbols.  Since the real-time constraints of media delivery
   applications usually limit the maximum source block size, this is not
   considered to be a major issue in the context of the FEC Framework
   for many (but not necessarily all) use-cases.  Additionally, if the
   encoding/decoding complexity is higher with Reed-Solomon codes than
   it is with [RFC5053] or [RFC5170] codes, it remains reasonable for
   most use-cases, even in case of a software codec.

   Many applications dealing with reliable content transmission or
   content storage already rely on packet-based Reed-Solomon erasure
   recovery codes.  In particular, many of them use the Reed-Solomon
   codec of Luigi Rizzo [RS-codec] [Rizzo97].  The goal of the present
   document is to specify simple Reed-Solomon schemes that are
   compatible with this codec.

   More specifically, the [RFC5510] document introduced such Reed-
   Solomon codes and several associated FEC schemes that are compatible
   with the [RFC5052] framework.  The present document inherits from
   [RFC5510] the specification of the core Reed-Solomon codes based on
   Vandermonde matrices, and specifies FEC schemes that are compatible
   with the FECFRAME framework [FECFRAME-FRAMEWORK].  Therefore this
   document specifies only the information specific to the FECFRAME



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   context and refers to [RFC5510] for the core specifications of the
   codes.

   To that purpose, the present document introduces:
   o  the Fully-Specified FEC Scheme with FEC Encoding ID XXX that
      specifies a simple way of using of Reed-Solomon codes over
      GF(2^^m), with 2 <= m <= 16, with a simple FEC encoding for
      arbitrary packet flows;
   o  the Fully-Specified FEC Scheme with FEC Encoding ID XXX is similar
      to Scheme XXX except that it is for a single sequenced flow;

   For instance, with the first (resp. second) scheme, a set of
   Application Data Units (or ADUs) coming from one or several (resp.
   one) media delivery applications (e.g., a set of RTP packets), are
   grouped in a ADU block and FEC encoded as a whole.  With Reed-Solomon
   codes over GF(2^^8), there is a strict limit over the number ADUs
   that can be protected together, since the number of encoded symbols,
   n, must be inferior or equal to 255.  This constraint is relaxed when
   using a higher finite field size (m > 8), at the price of an
   increased computational complexity.


2.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].


3.  Definitions Notations and Abbreviations

3.1.  Definitions

   This document uses the following terms and definitions.  Some of them
   are FEC scheme specific and are in line with [RFC5052]:
   Source symbol:  unit of data used during the encoding process.  In
      this specification, there is always one source symbol per ADU.
   Encoding symbol:  unit of data generated by the encoding process.
      With systematic codes, source symbols are part of the encoding
      symbols.
   Repair symbol:  encoding symbol that is not a source symbol.
   Code rate:  the k/n ratio, i.e., the ratio between the number of
      source symbols and the number of encoding symbols.  By definition,
      the code rate is such that: 0 < code rate <= 1.  A code rate close
      to 1 indicates that a small number of repair symbols have been
      produced during the encoding process.





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   Systematic code:  FEC code in which the source symbols are part of
      the encoding symbols.  The Reed-Solomon codes introduced in this
      document are systematic.
   Source block:  a block of k source symbols that are considered
      together for the encoding.
   Packet Erasure Channel:  a communication path where packets are
      either dropped (e.g., by a congested router, or because the number
      of transmission errors exceeds the correction capabilities of the
      physical layer codes) or received.  When a packet is received, it
      is assumed that this packet is not corrupted.

   Some of them are FECFRAME framework specific and are in line with
   [FECFRAME-FRAMEWORK]:
   Application Data Unit (ADU):  a unit of data coming from (sender) or
      given to (receiver) the media delivery application.  Depending on
      the use-case, an ADU can use an RTP encapsulation.  In this
      specification, there is always one source symbol per ADU.
   (Source) ADU Flow:  a flow of ADUs from a media delivery application
      and to which FEC protection is applied.  Depending on the use-
      case, several ADU flows can be protected together by the FECFRAME
      framework.
   ADU Block:  a set of ADUs that are considered together by the
      FECFRAME instance for the purpose of the FEC scheme.  Along with
      the F[], L[], and Pad[] fields, they form the set of source
      symbols over which FEC encoding will be performed.
   ADU Information (ADUI):  a unit of data constituted by the ADU and
      the associated Flow ID, Length and Padding fields (Section 4.3).
      This is the unit of data that is used as source symbols.
   FEC Framework Configuration Information:  the FEC scheme specific
      information that enables the synchronization of the FECFRAME
      sender and receiver instances.
   FEC Source Packet:  a data packet submitted to (sender) or received
      from (receiver) the transport protocol.  It contains an ADU along
      with its optional Explicit Source FEC Payload ID.
   FEC Repair Packet:  a repair packet submitted to (sender) or received
      from (receiver) the transport protocol.  It contains a repair
      symbol along with its Explicit Repair FEC Payload ID.

   The above terminology is illustrated in Figure 1 (sender's point of
   view):











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   +----------------------+
   |     Application      |
   +----------------------+
              |
    ADU flow  | (1) Application Data Unit (ADU)
              v
   +----------------------+                           +----------------+
   |    FEC Framework     |                           |                |
   |                      |------------------------- >|  FEC Scheme    |
   |(2) Construct an ADU  | (4) Source Symbols for    |                |
   |    block             |     this Source Block     |(5) Perform FEC |
   |(3) Construct ADU Info|                           |    Encoding    |
   |(7) Construct FEC Src |< -------------------------|                |
   |    Packets and FEC   |(6) Ex src FEC Payload Ids,|                |
   |    Repair Packets    |    Repair FEC Payload Ids,|                |
   +----------------------+    Repair Symbols         +----------------+
       |             |
       |(8) FEC Src  |(8') FEC Repair
       |    packets  |     packets
       v             v
   +----------------------+
   |   Transport Layer    |
   |    (e.g., UDP )      |
   +----------------------+

           Figure 1: Terminology used in this document (sender).

3.2.  Notations

   This document uses the following notations: Some of them are FEC
   scheme specific:
   k      denotes the number of source symbols in a source block.
   max_k  denotes the maximum number of source symbols for any source
          block.
   n      denotes the number of encoding symbols generated for a source
          block.
   E      denotes the encoding symbol length in bytes.
   GF(q)  denotes a finite field (also known as Galois Field) with q
          elements.  We assume that q = 2^^m in this document.
   m      defines the length of the elements in the finite field, in
          bits.  In this document, m belongs to {2..16}.
   q      defines the number of elements in the finite field.  We have:
          q = 2^^m in this specification.
   CR     denotes the "code rate", i.e., the k/n ratio.







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   a^^b   denotes a raised to the power b.

   Some of them are FECFRAME framework specific:
   B      denotes the number of ADUs per ADU block.
   max_B  denotes the maximum number of ADUs for any ADU block.

3.3.  Abbreviations

   This document uses the following abbreviations:
   ADU    stands for Application Data Unit.
   ESI    stands for Encoding Symbol ID.
   FEC    stands for Forward Error Correction code.
   FFCI   stands for FEC Framework Configuration Information.
   RS     stands for Reed-Solomon.
   MDS    stands for Maximum Distance Separable code.


4.  Common Procedures Related to the ADU Block and Source Block Creation

   This section introduces the procedures that are used during the ADU
   block and the related source block(s) creation, for the various FEC
   schemes considered.

4.1.  Restrictions

   This specification has the following restrictions:
   o  there MUST be exactly one source symbol per ADU;
   o  there MUST be exactly one repair symbol per FEC Repair Packet;
   o  there MUST be exactly one source block per ADU block;

4.2.  ADU Block Creation

   Several aspects must be considered, that impact the ADU block
   creation:
   o  the maximum source block size (k parameter) and number of encoding
      symbols (n parameter), that are constrained by the finite field
      size (m parameter);
   o  the potential real-time constraints, that impact the maximum ADU
      block size, since the larger the block size, the larger the
      decoding delay;
   We now detail each of these aspects.

   The finite field size parameter, m, defines the number of non zero
   elements in this field which is equal to: q - 1 = 2^^m - 1.  This q -
   1 value is also the theoretical maximum number of encoding symbols
   that can be produced for a source block.  For instance, when m = 8
   (default) there is a maximum of 2^^8 - 1 = 255 encoding symbols.  So:
   k < n <= 255.  Given the target FEC code rate (e.g., provided by the



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   end-user or upper application when starting the FECFRAME framework,
   and taking into account the (known or estimated) packet loss rate),
   the sender calculates:
      max_k = floor((2^^m - 1) * CR)
   This max_k value leaves enough room for the sender to produce the
   desired number of repair symbols.  Since there is one source symbol
   per ADU, max_k is also an upper bound to the maximum number of ADUs
   per ADU block.

   The source ADU flows usually have real-time constraints.  It means
   that the maximum number of ADUs of an ADU block must not exceed a
   certain threshold since it directly impacts the decoding delay.  It
   is the role of the developer, who knows the flow real-time features,
   to define an appropriate upper bound to the ADU block size, max_rt.

   If we take into account these constraints, we find: max_B =
   min(max_k, max_rt).  Then max_B gives an upper bound to the number of
   ADUs that can constitute an ADU block.

4.3.  Source Block Creation

   In its most general form the FECFRAME framework and the RS FEC
   schemes are meant to protect a set of independent flows.  Since the
   flows have no relationship to one another, the ADU size of each flow
   can potentially vary significantly.  Even in the special case of a
   single flow, the ADU sizes can largely vary (e.g., the various frames
   of a "Group of Pictures (GOP) of an H.264 flow).  This diversity must
   be addressed since the RS FEC scheme requires a constant encoding
   symbol size (E parameter) per source block.  Since this specification
   requires that there is only one source symbol per ADU, E must be
   large enough to contain all the ADUs of an ADU block along with their
   prepended 3 bytes (see below).

   In situations where E is determined per source block (default,
   specified by the FCCI/FSSI with S = 0, Section 5.1.1.2), E is equal
   to the size of the largest ADU of this source block plus three (for
   the prepended 3 bytes, see below).  In this case, upon receiving the
   first FEC Repair Packet for this source block, since this packet MUST
   contain a single repair symbol (Section 5.1.3), a receiver determines
   the E parameter used for this source block.

   In situations where E is fixed (specified by the FCCI/FSSI with S =
   1, Section 5.1.1.2), then E must be greater or equal to the size of
   the largest ADU of this source block plus three (for the prepended 3
   bytes, see below).  If this is not the case, an error is returned.
   How to handle this error is use-case specific (e.g., a larger E
   parameter may be communicated to the receivers in an updated FFCI
   message, using an appropriate mechanism) and is not considered by



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   this specification.

   The ADU block is always encoded as a single source block.  There are
   a total of B <= max_B ADUs in this ADU block.  For the ADU i, with 0
   <= i <= B-1, 3 bytes are prepended (Figure 2):
   o  The first byte, FID[i] (Flow ID), contains the integer identifier
      associated to the source ADU flow to which this ADU belongs to.
      It is assumed that a single byte is sufficient, or said
      differently, that no more than 256 flows will be protected by a
      single instance of the FECFRAME framework.
   o  The following two bytes, L[i] (Length), contain the length of this
      ADU, in network byte order (i.e., big endian).  This length is for
      the ADU itself and does not include the FID[i], L[i], or Pad[i]
      fields.

   Then zero padding is added to ADU i (if needed) in field Pad[i], for
   alignment purposes up to a size of exactly E bytes.  The data unit
   resulting from the ADU i and the F[i], L[i] and Pad[i] fields, is
   called ADU Information (or ADUI).  Each ADUI contributes to exactly
   one source symbol to the source block.

                        Encoding Symbol Length (E)
   < -------------------------------------------------------------- >
   +----+----+-----------------------+------------------------------+
   |F[0]|L[0]|        ADU[0]         |            Pad[0]            |
   +----+----+----------+------------+------------------------------+
   |F[1]|L[1]| ADU[1]   |                         Pad[1]            |
   +----+----+----------+-------------------------------------------+
   |F[2]|L[2]|                    ADU[2]                            |
   +----+----+------+-----------------------------------------------+
   |F[3]|L[3]|ADU[3]|                             Pad[3]            |
   +----+----+------+-----------------------------------------------+
   \_______________________________  _______________________________/
                                   \/
                          simple FEC encoding

   +----------------------------------------------------------------+
   |                            Repair 4                            |
   +----------------------------------------------------------------+
   .                    .
   .                    .
   +----------------------------------------------------------------+
   |                            Repair 7                            |
   +----------------------------------------------------------------+

   Figure 2: Source block creation with the simple encoding scheme, for
    code rate 1/2 (equal number of source and repair symbols, 4 in this
                             example), S = 0.



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   Note that neither the initial 3 bytes nor the optional padding are
   sent over the network.  However, they are considered during FEC
   encoding.  It means that a receiver who lost a certain FEC source
   packet (e.g., the UDP datagram containing this FEC source packet)
   will be able to recover the ADUI if FEC decoding succeeds.  Thanks to
   the initial 3 bytes, this receiver will get rid of the padding (if
   any) and identify the corresponding ADU flow.


5.  Simple Reed-Solomon FEC Encoding Scheme over GF(2^^m) for Arbitrary
    ADU Flows

   This Fully-Specified FEC Scheme specifies the use of Reed-Solomon
   codes over GF(2^^m), with 2 <= m <= 16, with a simple FEC encoding
   for arbitrary packet flows.

5.1.  Formats and Codes

5.1.1.  FEC Framework Configuration Information

   The FEC Framework Configuration Information (or FFCI) includes
   information that MUST be communicated between the sender and
   receiver(s).  More specifically, it enables the synchronization of
   the FECFRAME sender and receiver instances.  It includes both
   mandatory elements and scheme-specific elements, as detailed below.

5.1.1.1.  Mandatory Information

   o  FEC Encoding ID: the value assigned to this fully-specified FEC
      scheme MUST be XXX, as assigned by IANA (Section 8).
   When SDP is used to communicate the FFCI, this FEC Encoding ID is
   carried in the 'encoding-id' parameter.

5.1.1.2.  FEC Scheme-Specific Information

   The FEC Scheme Specific Information (FSSI) includes elements that are
   specific to the present FEC scheme.  More precisely:
   o  Encoding symbol length (E): a non-negative integer that indicates
      either the length of each encoding symbol in bytes (strict mode,
      i.e., if S = 1), or the maximum length of any encoding symbol
      (i.e., if S = 0).
   o  Strict (S) flag: when set to 1 this flag indicates that the E
      parameter is valid for the whole session, unless otherwise
      notified.  When set to 0 this flag indicates that the E parameter
      is only the maximum length of each encoding symbol, for the whole
      session, unless otherwise notified.





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   o  m parameter (m): an integer that defines the length of the
      elements in the finite field, in bits.  We have: 2 <= m <= 16.
   These elements are required both by the sender (RS encoder) and the
   receiver(s) (RS decoder).

   When SDP is used to communicate the FFCI, this FEC scheme-specific
   information is carried in the 'fssi' parameter in textual
   representation as specified in [SDP_ELEMENTS].  For instance:

   fssi = E:1400,S:0,m:8

   If another mechanism requires the FSSI to be carried as an opaque
   octet string (for instance after a Base64 encoding), the encoding
   format consists of the following 3 octets:
   o  Encoding symbol length (E): 16 bit field.
   o  Strict (S) flag: 1 bit field.
   o  m parameter (m): 7 bit field.

    0                   1                   2
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |   Encoding Symbol Length (E)  |S|     m       |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

                      Figure 3: FSSI encoding format.

5.1.2.  Explicit Source FEC Payload ID

   A FEC source packet MUST contain an Explicit Source FEC Payload ID
   that is appended to the end of the packet as illustrated in Figure 4.

   +--------------------------------+
   |           IP Header            |
   +--------------------------------+
   |        Transport Header        |
   +--------------------------------+
   |              ADU               |
   +--------------------------------+
   | Explicit Source FEC Payload ID |
   +--------------------------------+

    Figure 4: Structure of a FEC source packet with the Explicit Source
                              FEC Payload ID.

   More precisely, the Explicit Source FEC Payload ID is composed of the
   Source Block Number, the Encoding Symbol ID, and the Source Block
   Length.  The length of the first two fields depends on the m
   parameter (transmitted separately in the FFCI, Section 5.1.1.2):



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   Source Block Number (SBN) (32-m bit field):  this field identifies
      the source block to which this FEC source packet belongs.
   Encoding Symbol ID (ESI) (m bit field):  this field identifies the
      first source symbol associated to this FEC source packet in the
      source block (remember there can be several source symbols per
      ADUI, Section 4.3).  This value is such that 0 <= ESI <= k - 1 for
      source symbols.
   Source Block Length (k) (16 bit field):  this field provides the
      number of source symbols for this source block, i.e., the k
      parameter.  If 16 bits are too much when m <= 8, it is needed when
      8 < m <= 16.  Therefore we provide a single common format
      regardless of m.

    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |           Source Block Number (24 bits)       | Enc. Symb. ID |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |    Source Block Length (k)    |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   Figure 5: Source FEC Payload ID encoding format for m = 8 (default).


    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |   Source Block Nb (16 bits)   |   Enc. Symbol ID (16 bits)    |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |    Source Block Length (k)    |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

        Figure 6: Source FEC Payload ID encoding format for m = 16.

   The format of the Source FEC Payload ID for m = 8 and m = 16 are
   illustrated in Figure 5 and Figure 6 respectively.

5.1.3.  Repair FEC Payload ID

   A FEC repair packet MUST contain a Repair FEC Payload ID that is
   prepended to the repair symbol(s) as illustrated in Figure 7.  There
   MUST be a single repair symbol per FEC repair packet.









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   +--------------------------------+
   |           IP Header            |
   +--------------------------------+
   |        Transport Header        |
   +--------------------------------+
   |      Repair FEC Payload ID     |
   +--------------------------------+
   |         Repair Symbol          |
   +--------------------------------+

    Figure 7: Structure of a repair packet with the Repair FEC Payload
                                    ID.

   More precisely, the Repair FEC Payload ID is composed of the Source
   Block Number, the Encoding Symbol ID, and the Source Block Length.
   The length of the first two fields depends on the m parameter
   (transmitted separately in the FFCI, Section 5.1.1.2):
   Source Block Number (SBN) (32-m bit field):  this field identifies
      the source block to which the FEC repair packet belongs.
   Encoding Symbol ID (ESI) (m bit field)  this field identifies the
      repair symbol contained in this FEC repair packet.  This value is
      such that k <= ESI <= n - 1 for repair symbols.
   Source Block Length (k) (16 bit field):  this field provides the
      number of source symbols for this source block, i.e., the k
      parameter.  If 16 bits are too much when m <= 8, it is needed when
      8 < m <= 16.  Therefore we provide a single common format
      regardless of m.

    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |           Source Block Number (24 bits)       | Enc. Symb. ID |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |    Source Block Length (k)    |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   Figure 8: Repair FEC Payload ID encoding format for m = 8 (default).


    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |   Source Block Nb (16 bits)   |   Enc. Symbol ID (16 bits)    |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |    Source Block Length (k)    |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

        Figure 9: Repair FEC Payload ID encoding format for m = 16.



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   The format of the Repair FEC Payload ID for m = 8 and m = 16 are
   illustrated in Figure 8 and Figure 9 respectively.

5.2.  Procedures

   The following procedures apply:
   o  The source block creation procedures are specified in Section 4.3.
   o  The SBN value is incremented for each new source block, starting
      at 0 for the first block of the ADU flow.  Wrapping to zero will
      happen for long sessions, after value 2^^(32-m) - 1.
   o  The ESI of source symbols is managed sequentially, starting at 0
      for the first symbol.  There are a maximum of 2^^m encoding
      symbols per block.  The first k values (0 <= ESI <= k - 1)
      identify source symbols, whereas the last n-k values (k <= ESI <=
      n - 1) identify repair symbols.
   o  The FEC repair packet creation procedures are specified in
      Section 5.1.3.

5.3.  FEC Code Specification

   The present document inherits from [RFC5510] the specification of the
   core Reed-Solomon codes based on Vandermonde matrices for a packet
   transmission channel.


6.  Reed-Solomon FEC Encoding Scheme over GF(2^^m) for a Single
    Sequenced ADU Flow

   TBD


7.  Security Considerations

7.1.  Problem Statement

   A content delivery system is potentially subject to many attacks.
   Some of them target the network (e.g., to compromise the routing
   infrastructure, by compromising the congestion control component),
   others target the Content Delivery Protocol (CDP) (e.g., to
   compromise its normal behavior), and finally some attacks target the
   content itself.  Since this document focuses on various FEC schemes,
   this section only discusses the additional threats that their use
   within the FECFRAME framework can create to an arbitrary CDP.

   More specifically, these attacks may have several goals:
   o  those that are meant to give access to a confidential content
      (e.g., in case of a non-free content),




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   o  those that try to corrupt the ADU Flows being transmitted (e.g.,
      to prevent a receiver from using it),
   o  and those that try to compromise the receiver's behavior (e.g., by
      making the decoding of an object computationally expensive).
   These attacks can be launched either against the data flow itself
   (e.g., by sending forged FEC Source/Repair Packets) or against the
   FEC parameters that are sent either in-band (e.g., in the Repair FEC
   Payload ID) or out-of-band (e.g., in a session description).

7.2.  Attacks Against the Data Flow

   First of all, let us consider the attacks against the data flow.

7.2.1.  Access to Confidential Contents

   Access control to the ADU Flow being transmitted is typically
   provided by means of encryption.  This encryption can be done within
   the content provider itself, by the application (for instance by
   using the Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP) [RFC3711]), or
   at the Network Layer, on a packet per packet basis when IPSec/ESP is
   used [RFC4303].  If confidentiality is a concern, it is RECOMMENDED
   that one of these solutions be used.  Even if we mention these
   attacks here, they are not related nor facilitated by the use of FEC.

7.2.2.  Content Corruption

   Protection against corruptions (e.g., after sending forged FEC
   Source/Repair Packets) is achieved by means of a content integrity
   verification/sender authentication scheme.  This service is usually
   provided at the packet level.  In this case, after removing all
   forged packets, the ADU Flow may be sometimes recovered.  Several
   techniques can provide this source authentication/content integrity
   service:
   o  at the application level, the Secure Real-time Transport Protocol
      (SRTP) [RFC3711] provides several solutions to authenticate the
      source and check the integrity of RTP and RTCP messages, among
      other services.  For instance, associated to the Timed Efficient
      Stream Loss-Tolerant Authentication (TESLA) [RFC4383], SRTP is an
      attractive solution that is robust to losses, provides a true
      authentication/integrity service, and does not create any
      prohibitive processing load or transmission overhead.  Yet,
      checking a packet requires a small delay (a second or more) after
      its reception with TESLA.  Other building blocks can be used
      within SRTP to provide authentication/content integrity services.
   o  at the Network Layer, IPSec/ESP offers (among other services) an
      integrity verification mechanism that can be used to provide
      authentication/content integrity services.




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   It is up to the developer and deployer, who know the security
   requirements and features of the target application area, to define
   which solution is the most appropriate.  Nonetheless it is
   RECOMMENDED that at least one of these techniques be used.

7.3.  Attacks Against the FEC Parameters

   Let us now consider attacks against the FEC parameters included in
   the FFCI that are usually sent out-of-band (e.g., in a session
   description).  Attacks on these FEC parameters can prevent the
   decoding of the associated object.  For instance modifying the m
   field (when applicable) will lead a receiver to consider a different
   code.  Modifying the E parameter will lead a receiver to consider bad
   Repair Symbols for a received FEC Repair Packet.

   It is therefore RECOMMENDED that security measures be taken to
   guarantee the FFCI integrity.  When the FFCI is sent out-of-band in a
   session description, this latter SHOULD be protected, for instance by
   digitally signing it.

   Attacks are also possible against some FEC parameters included in the
   Explicit Source FEC Payload ID and Repair FEC Payload ID.  For
   instance modifying the Source Block Number of a FEC Source of Repair
   Packet will lead a receiver to assign this packet to a wrong block.

   It is therefore RECOMMENDED that security measures be taken to
   guarantee the Explicit Source FEC Payload ID and Repair FEC Payload
   ID integrity.  To that purpose, one of the packet-level source
   authentication/content integrity techniques of Section 7.2.2 can be
   used.


8.  IANA Considerations

   Values of FEC Encoding IDs are subject to IANA registration.

   TBD


9.  Acknowledgments

   The authors want to thank Hitoshi Asaeda for his valuable comments.


10.  References






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10.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", RFC 2119.

   [RFC5052]  Watson, M., Luby, M., and L. Vicisano, "Forward Error
              Correction (FEC) Building Block", RFC 5052, August 2007.

   [RFC5510]  Lacan, J., Roca, V., Peltotalo, J., and S. Peltotalo,
              "Reed-Solomon Forward Error Correction (FEC) Schemes",
              RFC 5510, April 2009.

   [FECFRAME-FRAMEWORK]
              Watson, M., "Forward Error Correction (FEC) Framework",
              Work in Progress, July 2010.

   [SDP_ELEMENTS]
              Begen, A., "SDP Elements for FEC Framework", Work
              in Progress, April 2010.

10.2.  Informative References

   [RS-codec]
              Rizzo, L., "Reed-Solomon FEC codec (revised version of
              July 2nd, 1998), available at
              http://info.iet.unipi.it/~luigi/vdm98/vdm980702.tgz and
              mirrored at http://planete-bcast.inrialpes.fr/",
              July 1998.

   [Rizzo97]  Rizzo, L., "Effective Erasure Codes for Reliable Computer
              Communication Protocols", ACM SIGCOMM Computer
              Communication Review Vol.27, No.2, pp.24-36, April 1997.

   [RFC5170]  Roca, V., Neumann, C., and D. Furodet, "Low Density Parity
              Check (LDPC) Forward Error Correction", RFC 5170,
              June 2008.

   [RFC5053]  Luby, M., Shokrollahi, A., Watson, M., and T. Stockhammer,
              "Raptor Forward Error Correction Scheme", RFC 5053,
              June 2007.

   [RFC5775]  Luby, M., Watson, M., and L. Vicisano, "Asynchronous
              Layered Coding (ALC) Protocol Instantiation", RFC 5775,
              April 2010.

   [RFC5740]  Adamson, B., Bormann, C., Handley, M., and J. Macker,
              "Negative-acknowledgment (NACK)-Oriented Reliable
              Multicast (NORM) Protocol", RFC 5740, November 2009.



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   [RFC4303]  Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)",
              RFC 4303, December 2005.

   [RFC3711]  Baugher, M., McGrew, D., Naslund, M., Carrara, E., and K.
              Norrman, "The Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP)",
              RFC 3711, March 2004.

   [RFC4383]  Baugher, M. and E. Carrara, "The Use of Timed Efficient
              Stream Loss-Tolerant Authentication (TESLA) in the Secure
              Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP)", RFC 4383,
              February 2006.


Authors' Addresses

   Vincent Roca
   INRIA
   655, av. de l'Europe
   Inovallee; Montbonnot
   ST ISMIER cedex  38334
   France

   Email: vincent.roca@inria.fr
   URI:   http://planete.inrialpes.fr/people/roca/


   Mathieu Cunche
   INRIA
   655, av. de l'Europe
   Inovallee; Montbonnot
   ST ISMIER cedex  38334
   France

   Email: mathieu.cunche@inria.fr
   URI:   http://planete.inrialpes.fr/people/cunche/


   Jerome Lacan
   ISAE/LAAS-CNRS
   1, place Emile Blouin
   Toulouse  31056
   France

   Email: jerome.lacan@isae.fr
   URI:   http://dmi.ensica.fr/auteur.php3?id_auteur=5






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   Amine Bouabdallah
   ISAE/LAAS-CNRS
   1, place Emile Blouin
   Toulouse  31056
   France

   Email: Amine.Bouabdallah@isae.fr
   URI:   http://dmi.ensica.fr/


   Kazuhisa Matsuzono
   Keio University
   Graduate School of Media and Governance
   5322 Endo
   Fujisawa, Kanagawa  252-8520
   Japan

   Email: kazuhisa@sfc.wide.ad.jp

































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