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Versions: (draft-sakimura-oauth-rjwtprof) 00 01 02 03 04 05

OAuth Working Group                                          N. Sakimura
Internet-Draft                                 Nomura Research Institute
Intended status: Standards Track                                   K. Li
Expires: January 23, 2020                                  Alibaba Group
                                                              J. Bradley
                                                                  Yubico
                                                           July 22, 2019


       The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework: JWT Pop Token Usage
                      draft-sakimura-oauth-jpop-05

Abstract

   This specification describes how to use JWT POP (Jpop) tokens that
   were obtained through [POPKD] in HTTP requests to access OAuth 2.0
   protected resources.  Only the party in possession of the
   corresponding cryptographic key for the Jpop token can use it to get
   access to the associated resources unlike in the case of the bearer
   token described in [RFC6750] where any party in posession of the
   access token can access the resource.

Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 23, 2020.







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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Notational Conventions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Terms and definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  JWT POP Token . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  Sender Constrained Token  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     4.1.  Client ID Constrained Token . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     4.2.  Key Constrained Token . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   5.  Resource access method  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     5.1.  Signature method  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   6.  Authorization Error . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   7.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     7.1.  Jpop Authentication Scheme  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     7.2.  JWT Confirmation Methods  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   8.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     8.1.  Certificate validation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     8.2.  Key protection  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     8.3.  Audiance Restriction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     8.4.  Dynamic client registration elements  . . . . . . . . . .   9
   9.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   10. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     10.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     10.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   Appendix A.  Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11

1.  Introduction

   This document specifies the method for the client to use a proof-of-
   possestion token against a protected resource.  The format of such
   token is defined in section 3 of [RFC7800].




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   The same methods and JWT schema elements can be used with opaque
   tokens and OAuth 2.0 Token Introspection.  [RFC7662]

   [POPKD] can be used for a client to dynamically specify a key, or the
   Authorization Server can use information provided by the client at
   registration either through the dynamic registration or developer
   portal to provide the confirmation element.

1.1.  Notational Conventions

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC
   2119 [RFC2119].

   Unless otherwise noted, all the protocol parameter names and values
   are case sensitive.

2.  Terms and definitions

   For the purpose of this document, the terms defined in [RFC6749] and
   [RFC7800] are used.

3.  JWT POP Token

   JWT PoP token is a JWS signed JWT whose payload is a JWT Claims Set.
   The JWT claims set MUST include the following:

   iss  The issuer identifier of the auhtorization server.

   aud  The identifier of the resource server.

   iat  The issuance time of this token.

   exp  The expiry time of this token.

   cnf  The confirmation method.

   Their semantics are defined in [RFC7519] and [RFC7800].












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   Following is an example of such.

        {
         "iss": "https://server.example.com",
         "aud": "https://resource.example.org",
         "iat": "1360189224",
         "exp": "1361398868",
         "cnf":{...}
        }

                    Figure 1: Example of JWT PoP Token.

4.  Sender Constrained Token

   There are several varieties of sender constrained token.  Namely:

   1.  Client ID Constrained Token

   2.  Key Constrained Token

4.1.  Client ID Constrained Token

   The constraint in the Client ID constrained token is expressed by
   including the following member at the top level of cnf claim.

   cid  The client_id of the client that the client used in the
      authorization request.  The combination of the "iss" of the access
      token and this value forms a globally unique identifier for the
      client.

   The authorization server finds the client ID from the client ID used
   in the client authentication at the token endpoint.

4.2.  Key Constrained Token

   Methods to express key constraints are extensively described in the
   section 3 of [RFC7800].  Such cnf claim is used in the access token
   described in section 3 to form a key constrained token.  [RFC7800]
   defines 4 confirmation methods.

   jwk  JSON Web Key Representing a Public Key

   jwe  Encrypted JSON Web Key

   jwkt#s256  [RFC7638] Thumbprint of a JWK using the SHA-256 hash
      function.

   x5t#s256  [RFC7515] X.509 Certificate SHA-256 Thumbprint



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   jku  JWK Set URL

   The client provides the corresponding keys or the pointers to the
   authorization server as a part of the client configuration.  It can
   be done through out-of-band methods (e.g., developper portal) or
   through some form of dynamic registration, etc.

   Following is an example of a JWT payload containing a JWK with a raw
   key.

        {
         "iss": "https://server.example.com",
         "sub": "joe@example.com",
         "aud": "https://resource.example.org",
         "exp": "1361398824",
         "nbf": "1360189224",
         "cnf":{
           "jwk":{
             "kty": "EC",
             "use": "sig",
             "crv": "P-256",
             "x": "18wHLeIgW9wVN6VD1Txgpqy2LszYkMf6J8njVAibvhM",
             "y": "-V4dS4UaLMgP_4fY4j8ir7cl1TXlFdAgcx55o7TkcSA"
            }
          }
        }

              Figure 2: Example of a JWK Key Constrained JWT.

   Following is an example of a JWT payload containing a jku URI.

        {
         "iss": "https://server.example.com",
         "sub": "joe@example.com",
         "aud": "https://resource.example.org",
         "exp": "1361398824",
         "nbf": "1360189224",
         "cnf":{
           "jku": "https://client.example.com/keys/client123-jwks"
               }
          }

                Figure 3: Example of a jku Constrained JWT.

   Following is an example of a JWT payload containing a x5t#s256
   Certificate Thumbprint of a x509 certificate. .





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        {
         "iss": "https://server.example.com",
         "sub": "joe@example.com",
         "aud": "https://resource.example.org",
         "exp": "1361398824",
         "nbf": "1360189224",
         "cnf":{
           "x5t#s256": "w5cK0ebwmCZUYDB2Y5SlESsXE8o9yZg05O89jdNidgI"
               }
          }

    Figure 4: Example of a x5t#s256 Certificate Thumbprint Constrained
                                   JWT.

5.  Resource access method

   The resource server that supports this specification MUST
   authenticate the Client by having it demonstrate that it is the
   holder of the key associated with the access token being used.  The
   confirmation method can be broadly categorized in the method that
   leverages mutual TLS client authentication and the method that
   leverages client generated signature.  Since the former is now dealt
   with MTLS document, this document will only discuss the signature
   method.

5.1.  Signature method

   For this, the following steps are taken:

   STEP1:  The client accesses the protected resource and gets an
           authorization error as in Section 6.  With it, the client
           obtains a nonce.

   STEP2:  The client prepares a client nonce, "cnonce", and nounce
           count, "nc" as defined in section 3.2.2 of [RFC2617].

   STEP3:  The client creates JWS compact serialization over the nonce.

   To obtain it, first create a JSON with a name "nonce" and the value
   being what was received in the previous step.  The JWS MUST contain a
   kid header element if the client has more than one signing key
   published via JWKS URI e.g.,

   {
           "nonce":"dcd98b7102dd2f0e8b11d0f600bfb0c093",
           "nc":"00000001",
           "cnonce":"0a4f113b"
   }



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   Then, "jws-on-nonce" is obtained by creating a compact serialization
   of JWS on this JSON.

   STEP4:  The client sends the request to the resource server, this
           time with Authorization Request Header as defined in section
           4.2 of [RFC7235] with the credential as follows:

        credentials      =  "Jpop" jpop-response
        jpop-response    =  at-response "," s-response
        at-response      =  "at" "=" access-token (* As specified by [POPKD] *)
        s-response       =  "s" "=" jws-on-nonce (* Created in the STEP3. *)
        access-token     =  quoted-string
        jws-on-nonce     =  quoted-string

   In the following example, the access token and the jws-on-nonce are
   represented as access.token.jwt and jws.of.nonce for the sake of
   brevity.

           GET /resource/1234 HTTP/1.0
           Host: server.example.com
           Authorization: Jpop at="access.token.jwt", s="jws.of.nonce"

                     Figure 5: Example resouce request

   STEP5:  The resource server finds the client's public key form the
           access token through the methods described in [RFC7800].

   STEP6:  The resource server MUST verify the value of "s" of the
           Authorization header.  If it fails, the process stops here
           and the resource access MUST be denied.

   STEP7:  The resource server MUST verify the access token.  If it is
           valid, the resource SHOULD be returned as HTTP response.

6.  Authorization Error

   If the client requests the resource without the proper authoization
   header, the resource server returns a HTTP 401 response with "WWW-
   Authenticate" header as defined in section 4.1 of [RFC7235] with the
   challenge as follows:

             challenge        =  "Jpop" jpop-challenge
             jpop-challenge   =  "nonce" "=" nonce-value
             nonce-value      =  quoted-string

   Following example depicts what the response would look like.





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   HTTP/1.0 401 Unauthorized
   Server: HTTPd/0.9
   Date: Wed, 14 March 2017 09:26:53 GMT
   WWW-Authenticate: Jpop nonce="dcd98b7102dd2f0e8b11d0f600bfb0c093"

                     Figure 6: Example error response.

7.  IANA Considerations

7.1.  Jpop Authentication Scheme

   A new scheme has been registered in the HTTP Authentication Scheme
   Registry as follows:

   Authentication Scheme Name: Jpop

   Reference: Section 3 of this specification

   Notes (optional): The Named Authentication scheme is intended to be
   used only with OAuth Resource Access, and thus does not support proxy
   authentication.

7.2.  JWT Confirmation Methods

   o  Confirmation Method Value: "dn"

   o  Confirmation Method Description: DN match with the TLS client
      auth.

   o  Change Controller: IESG

   o  Specification Document(s): This document.

   o  Confirmation Method Value: "cid"

   o  Confirmation Method Description: Client ID Confirmation

   o  Change Controller: IESG

   o  Specification Document(s): This document.

8.  Security Considerations

8.1.  Certificate validation

   The "dn" JWT confirmation method relies its security property on the
   X.509 client certificate authentication.  In particular, the validity
   of the certificate needs to be verified properly.  It involves the



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   traversal of all the certificate chain and the certificate validation
   (e.g., with OCSP).

8.2.  Key protection

   The client's secret key must be kept securely.  Otherwise, the notion
   of PoP breaks down.

   It should be noted that JWE confirmation method is significantly
   weaker form of the PoP, as the resource server and the authorization
   server can masquerade as the client.

8.3.  Audiance Restriction

   When using the signature method the client must specify to the AS the
   aud it intends to send the token to, so that it can be included in
   the AT.

   A malicious RS could receive a AT with no aud or a logical audience
   and then replay the AT and jws-on-nonce to the actual server.

   NOTE another approach would be to include the resource in the jws-on-
   nonce

8.4.  Dynamic client registration elements

   When a AS uses dynamic client registration it may accept software
   statements supplied by a federation operator.  Those software
   statements can contain a JWKS-URI that is hosted by the federation
   operator or protected by a certificate provisioned from a trusted
   root.  These methods would allow the federation operator to
   administratively revoke the keys at the JWKS-URI without requiring
   the JWKS to contain x5c elements with CA issued certificates and
   having to have the RS perform full certificate validation for each
   request.

9.  Acknowledgements

   The authors thank the following people for providing valuable
   feedback to this document.  Nov Matake (YAuth).

10.  References

10.1.  Normative References







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   [POPKD]    Bradley, J., Hunt, P., Jones, M., and H. Tschofenig,
              "OAuth 2.0 Proof-of-Possession: Authorization Server to
              Client Key Distribution", March 2017,
              <https://tools.ietf.org/html/
              draft-ietf-oauth-pop-key-distribution-03>.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC2617]  Franks, J., Hallam-Baker, P., Hostetler, J., Lawrence, S.,
              Leach, P., Luotonen, A., and L. Stewart, "HTTP
              Authentication: Basic and Digest Access Authentication",
              RFC 2617, DOI 10.17487/RFC2617, June 1999,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2617>.

   [RFC6749]  Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework",
              RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6749>.

   [RFC6750]  Jones, M. and D. Hardt, "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization
              Framework: Bearer Token Usage", RFC 6750,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6750, October 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6750>.

   [RFC7235]  Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
              Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Authentication", RFC 7235,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7235, June 2014,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7235>.

   [RFC7515]  Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
              Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May
              2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7515>.

   [RFC7517]  Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", RFC 7517,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7517, May 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7517>.

   [RFC7519]  Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
              (JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.

   [RFC7638]  Jones, M. and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Key (JWK)
              Thumbprint", RFC 7638, DOI 10.17487/RFC7638, September
              2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7638>.





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   [RFC7662]  Richer, J., Ed., "OAuth 2.0 Token Introspection",
              RFC 7662, DOI 10.17487/RFC7662, October 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7662>.

   [RFC7800]  Jones, M., Bradley, J., and H. Tschofenig, "Proof-of-
              Possession Key Semantics for JSON Web Tokens (JWTs)",
              RFC 7800, DOI 10.17487/RFC7800, April 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7800>.

10.2.  Informative References

   [POPA]     Hunt, P., Ed., "OAuth 2.0 Proof-of-Possession (PoP)
              Security Architecture", March 2015,
              <https://tools.ietf.org/html/
              draft-ietf-oauth-pop-architecture-08>.

   [RFC7636]  Sakimura, N., Ed., Bradley, J., and N. Agarwal, "Proof Key
              for Code Exchange by OAuth Public Clients", RFC 7636,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7636, September 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7636>.

   [TINTRO]   Richer, J., "OAuth 2.0 Token Introspection", July 2015.

Appendix A.  Document History

   -05  Removed the MTLS related contents as they are now dealt with
      mTLS spec.

Authors' Addresses

   Nat Sakimura
   Nomura Research Institute
   Otemachi Financial City Grand Cube, 1-9-2 Otemachi
   Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo  100-0004
   Japan

   Phone: +81-3-5533-2111
   Email: n-sakimura@nri.co.jp
   URI:   https://nat.sakimura.org/


   Kepeng Li
   Alibaba Group

   Email: kepeng.lkp@alibaba-inc.com






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   John Bradley
   Yubico

   Email: ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com
   URI:   http://www.thread-safe.com/














































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